Tarski's manner of defining truth is generally considered highly significant. About why, there is less consensus. I argue first, that in his truth-definitions Tarski was trying to solve a set of philosophical problems; second, that he solved them successfully; third, that all of these that are simply problems about defining truth are as well or better solved by a simpler account of truth. But one of his crucial problems remains: to give an account of validity, one requires an account not (...) just of truth but of truth under varying interpretations. Tarski's account has the merit of generalizing to this, to model theory and to abstract algebra. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.

The volume documents, and makes an original contribution to, an astonishing period in twentieth-century philosophy—the progress of Arne Naess's ecophilosophy from its inception to the present. It includes Naess's most crucial polemics with leading thinkers, drawn from sources as diverse as scholarly articles, correspondence, TV interviews and unpublished exchanges. The book testifies to the skeptical and self-correcting aspects of Naess's vision, which has deepened and broadened to include third world and feminist perspectives. Philosophical Dialogues is an essential addition to the (...) literature on environmental philosophy. (shrink)

What I call the minimal notion of truth is just that which the redundancy thesis claims suffices for all legitimate purposes. I argue that the minimal notion is legitimate and useful whatever one's preferred theory of truth. I rebut some arguments against the redundancy thesis which are in effect arguments against the legitimacy of the minimal notion. Finally I compare the minimal notion with a slightly stronger notion I call the semiminimal notion, and argue that this does issue a refutation (...) of the redundancy thesis as I have defined it. (shrink)

Marx, the Body, and Human Nature demonstrates that prior considerations of Marx's works did not place a sufficient emphasis on the difficulties and promise of bodily experience. Fox provides a fresh 'take' on Marx, revealing how he drew on philosophers ranging from Aristotle to Feuerbach to present a much more open, dynamic and unstable conception of the body and the self. The result is a theory of human nature that is of great contemporary relevance, particularly for those interested in the (...) body and embodiment, and those who wish to contest exaggerated notions of independence and individuality. (shrink)

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) suggest that human reasoning is reflective and has evolved to support social interaction. Cognitive agents benefit from being able to reflect on their beliefs whether they are acting alone or socially. A formal framework for argumentation that has emerged from research on artificial cognitive systems that parallels M&S's proposals may shed light on mental processes that underpin social interactions.

This essay attempts to clarify certain notions that the author finds useful for the discussion of relativism and then to show what kinds of relativism about values, rationality, and truth are and are not coherent.

Much philosophy of science is methodology of science. How should one go about doing and evaluating it? The question is one of the methodology of methodology, i.e. of metamethodology. There is a vague thesis common to Descartes and more recent philosophers such as Quine and Lakatos: that what is good methodology, good evidence, good reason for accepting, rejecting or revising beliefs in mathematics and in the sciences properly so called, does not differ in significant kind from what is good methodology, (...) evidence or reason elsewhere, even in epistemology and ethics; and further, that mathematics and the natural sciences provide good paradigms for methodology generally. Following von Hayek,1 I call this form of epistemological and methodological monism: Scientism. (shrink)

I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...) I show that all these claims are mistaken. The system of statements accepted by an adherent of an epistemic account who also accepts the equivalence scheme is the same as that accepted by an adherent of a traditional account who also accepts a remarkably strong thesis of epistemic optimism. The singling out of one rather than another claim within this system as defining 'true' cannot make as much difference as to imply idealism or refute scepticism. However, it can make all the difference when it is a matter of explaining the value of truth. For a crucial point in such explanation depends on what can be soundly substituted for what in intensional contexts; above all those governed by such verbs as 'know', 'hope', 'believe', 'value'. That is, it depends on what expressions are intensionally equivalent. And one point of singling out one formulation as definitional can be to settle just this. But though some epistemic theorists have deemed ability to explain the value of truth a merit of their account (and lack of this ability a fatal defect of traditional accounts, of minimal accounts in particular), it turns out that minimal accounts of 'true' fit a sound account of our valuing of truth in a way that epistemic accounts do not. In the course of this argument I rebut related positions: e.g. Dummett's, that minimal definitions fail because they cannot account for the point of having a notion of truth, and that an account of the practice of assertion is what would fill this lacuna. I argue to the contrary that if the point of the notion could not be explained on the basis of a traditional definition, it could not be explained at all. (shrink)

This book provides practical and research-based chapters that offer greater clarity about the particular kinds of teacher reflection that matter and avoids talking about teacher reflection generically, which implies that all kinds of reflection are of equal value.

This volume contains 17 articles on various aspects of Islamic thought in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. The first 9 articles concentrate especially on the Qur’ān and its exegesis, Kalām and Sufism; the second 8 articles deal with Javanese Islam, and with Islam and modernity in Southeast Asia.

Functional near-infrared spectroscopy is a neuroimaging technique that has undergone tremendous growth over the last decade due to methodological advantages over other measures of brain activation. The action-observation network, a system of brain structures proposed to have “mirroring” abilities, has been studied in humans through neural measures such as fMRI and electroencephalogram ; however, limitations of these methods are problematic for AON paradigms. For this reason, fNIRS is proposed as a solution to investigating the AON in humans. The present review (...) article briefly summarizes previous neural findings in the AON and examines the state of AON research using fNIRS in adults. A total of 14 fNIRS articles are discussed, paying particular attention to methodological choices and considerations while summarizing the general findings to aid in developing better protocols to study the AON through fNIRS. Additionally, future directions of this work are discussed, specifically in relation to researching AON development and potential multimodal imaging applications. (shrink)

The earlier Life of Locke, by Lord King, had consisted largely of an assemblage of Locke's own letters and manuscripts, of great value to the historian, but of rather less interest to the student of Locke's philosophy. Fox Bourne's biography, by contrast, concentrates on Locke the philosopher, and seeks to place his philosophical works in the context of his life. Fox Bourne thus describes Locke's studies at Oxford, his distaste for scholasticism, the discovery of Descartes' Meditations, and the role of (...) his medical and scientific interests and of his friendships with Boyle, Sydenham and Newton, in shaping his thought. Although the seeds of the Essay may have been sown as early as 1670, Fox Bourne admits, it was during Locke's exile in Holland between 1683 and 1689, and under the influence of such Dutch friends as Le Clerc, that the great work really took shape. At the heart of the work, we are told, is the critique of revelation that occupies pride of place in Book Four - Locke's overriding concern was to articulate a rationally defensible and universally acceptable version of Christianity. (shrink)

That India once had a sustained ‘dialogue’ with Scottish Philosophy is not gener- ally known, or that the exchange occurred in the medium of Sanskrit, not English. The essay explores an important cross-cultural encounter in the colonial context of mid 19th-century Benares where two Scots, John Muir and James Ballantyne, served as principals of a Sanskrit college established by the East India Company. Educated toward the end of the Scottish Enlightenment, they endeavoured to translate such distinctive concepts of ‘Scotch (...) Metaphysics’ as Externalism into Indian philosophical categories. The ensuing ‘dialogue’ with Brahmin interlocutors shows that the prob- lems they faced were less terminological than conceptual, having to do with contras- tive ways of understanding ‘mind’ and ‘man’. Between the two Scots, there were also signifi cant differences, although both had gone to India as Scottish Calvinists. While Muir remained largely impervious to Indian infl uence, Ballantyne was profoundly changed, becoming, in effect, a ‘Vedantic Calvinist’. (shrink)

Through a wide-ranging study of primary sources, Christopher Fox identifies and details a decisive moment in the history of the concept of the self. A key figure here is John Locke; the crucial document, his chapter on "Identity and Diversity" added to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694). Locke's new concept of "identity of consciousness" was hotly debated for the next half century in philosophical, theological, and literary circles, and Fox makes a significant contribution in (...) drawing attention to this controversy. By situating The Memoirs of Scriblerus in the debates, Fox also brings needed attention to a Scriblerian performance that deserves to be better known today. Fox's book is necessary reading for anyone interested in the eighteenth century, in Locke and the Scriblerians, and in the larger history of the concepts of "self" and "consciousness.". (shrink)

Human beings find themselves sharing the world with a great variety of other animals. Besides using them in various ways, we think about them and compare ourselves with them, and it is hard to envisage the difference it would make to our understanding of ourselves if they were not there. For one thing we should not have the concept of the human species, and that human beings should be thought of, however theoretically, as all belonging to one species is of (...) momentous importance for morality. The existence of other species might be significant in that way, however, even if we did not pay much attention to them and even if more particular thoughts about or observations of them did not form part of the fabric of our moral thinking. It is with some particular ways in which other species enter our moral thinking and our thinking about morals that I intend to concern myself. There are three of these that I shall discuss: first, the use of animal characters in moral tales, secondly the description of human characteristics in terms of real or supposed analogies with the characteristics of beasts; and thirdly much more briefly the application to human beings of behaviour patterns established in studies of other animals. (shrink)

Human beings find themselves sharing the world with a great variety of other animals. Besides using them in various ways, we think about them and compare ourselves with them, and it is hard to envisage the difference it would make to our understanding of ourselves if they were not there. For one thing we should not have the concept of the human species, and that human beings should be thought of, however theoretically, as all belonging to one species is of (...) momentous importance for morality. The existence of other species might be significant in that way, however, even if we did not pay much attention to them and even if more particular thoughts about or observations of them did not form part of the fabric of our moral thinking. It is with some particular ways in which other species enter our moral thinking and our thinking about morals that I intend to concern myself. There are three of these that I shall discuss: first, the use of animal characters in moral tales, secondly the description of human characteristics in terms of real or supposed analogies with the characteristics of beasts; and thirdly much more briefly the application to human beings of behaviour patterns established in studies of other animals. (shrink)

One of Alfred North Whitehead’s Lowell lectures of 1925 encapsulated a common belief about the relations between science and romanticism. In a chapter on “The romantic reaction” in the published version of the lectures, Whitehead presented science and the romantic spirit as fundamentally at odds (Whitehead 1926, chapter 5). The romantic world view, for Whitehead, had no place for perceptions of nature as an unfeeling law-bound machine. Against the conventional scientific virtues of objectivity, it stressed subjectivity, and against the model (...) of inexorable determinism, it favored one closer to that of an organism, with the potential for growth and change. It is not hard to see the core of truth in Whitehead’s interpretation. When Wordsworth wrote “We murder to dissect,” he was voicing a romantic sensibility that saw the abstraction of science as, at best, scratching the surface of a natural world at once richer and closer to us as human beings than the one handed down by the mechanical .. (shrink)