The happy fish episode from the outer chapters of the Zhuangzi poses enormous difficulty for interpreters. While it may appear to surprisingly resemble the dialectic in Western philosophy, any attempt to analyse it in terms of the patterns of inference familiar to the West is often frustrated by the ostensible queerness that defies such treatment. The following examination of the dialogue in the episode is intended to address the difficulty and to provide a reasoned explanation for both the surface resemblance (...) and apparent queerness. I suggest that the dialogue becomes perfectly intelligible, if it is read against the backdrop of the disputations practiced in ancient China. My contention is that the real purpose of the dialogue is to expose the fundamental unreliability of the logic of the disputers by means of the logic itself. (shrink)

Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream story can be read as a skeptical response to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum solution, for it presents I exist as fundamentally unprovable, on the grounds that the notion about “I” that it is guaranteed to refer to something existing, which Descartes seems to assume, is unwarranted. The modern anti-skepticism of Hilary Putnam employs a different strategy, which seeks to derive the existence of the world not from some “indubitable” truth such as the existence of myself , (...) but from the meaning of some particular assertion I make. In this paper, I argue, however, that Putnam’s argument fails to deliver on the promise of showing the self-refuting nature of the skeptical hypothesis, as it relies on a double use of “I”, a fallacy of equivocation, reflecting an unsolved tension between the argument’s general premise, which is rather Zhuangzian in spirit, and his unwitting adoption of that unwarranted notion about “I”. I try to show further that the skepticism in Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream not only can be used to refute the proofs of the existence of the empirical I , but also is effective against accounts concerning the existence of the transcendental I. (shrink)

This paper follows the tradition of treating Zhuangzi's Butterfly Dream episode as presenting a version of skepticism. However, unlike the prevalent interpretations within that tradition, it attempts to show that the skepticism conveyed in the episode is more radical than it has been conceived, such that the episode can be read as a skeptical response to Descartes' refutation of skepticism based on the _Cogito, ergo sum_ proof. The paper explains how the lack of commitment in Zhuangzi to the dubious assumption (...) about 'I' that it necessarily refers to something existing to which Descartes seems to uncritically adhere allows Zhuangzi to doubt what for Descartes is absolutely indubitable: _I exist_. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for the conclusion that the Chinese sentences that are regularly translated into subject-predicate sentences in English may be understood as all non-subject-predicate sentences. My argument is based on the premise that some grammatical features are crucial to yield the sense of contrast between the completeness of subject and the incompleteness of predicate. The absence of such grammatical features in Chinese makes it impossible to establish any criterion for the distinction between subject and predicate in Chinese.

I argue that the idea of reference failure which is frequently mentioned and occasionally argued for in the recent philosophy of language literature is a misnomer at best and incoherent when taken seriously. In the first place, there is no such thing as an empty name or name that fails to name anything, where names are understood as not replaceable by descriptions. In the case of demonstrative reference, because the speaker‘s perception fixes the referent and the speaker‘s referential intention is (...) not formed prior to the fixation of the referent, reference is guaranteed. My argument is based on an analysis of the alleged cases of reference failure. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that in addition to the three generally recognized kinds of de re thought, i.e., perception-based, memory-based and communication-based thought, there is a kind of de re thought, which is based on image and cannot be assimilated to any of these recognized kinds of de re thought. I call it simply image-based de re thought. Although image-based thought shares some similarities with the other kinds of de re thought, it should and can be distinguished from each (...) of them. The focus of this paper is on the distinction between image-based thought and perception-based thought, as it is this distinction that is either overlooked or denied by philosophers who have no difficulty seeing the distinct role of images in our thinking about things in the world. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to show that Searle’s theory of social reality is largely based on his observation of some essential features of democratic societies, and is not universally applicable as it claims to be. I argue that his notion of collective acceptance or agreement, which is fundamental to his general theory, does not explain why a dictatorial or totalitarian regime as a social reality is able to survive through a significant period of time and continuously create and maintain (...) institutional facts which are supposed to have no basis of collective acceptance or agreement. (shrink)

Feature-placing sentences are often confused with the general sentences in the canonical predicate calculus. The confusion is largely caused by their perceived commonality that both lack the subject-predicate form. In this paper, I offer some clarification of the fundamental differences between the two: the general sentences of the canonical predicate calculus contain predicates and variables which take individual objects as their values, and it is the sense of predication implied by the existence of predicates in these general sentences that is (...) completely absent in feature-placing sentences. (shrink)

Feature-placing sentences are often confused with the general sentences in the canonical predicate calculus. The confusion is largely caused by their perceived commonality that both lack the subject-predicate form. In this paper, I offer some clarification of the fundamental differences between the two: the general sentences of the canonical predicate calculus contain predicates and variables which take individual objects as their values, and it is the sense of predication implied by the existence of predicates in these general sentences that is (...) completely absent in feature-placing sentences. (shrink)

Marion contends that whereas the traditional metaphysics (“onto-theology”) poses the first ‘idolatry’ in the sense that it reduces God, who is both transcendent and infinite, to a being, albeit the highest being, Heidegger’s ontology represents a second, yet subtler ‘idolatry’ in that Being is thought as a condition of God, and as such it constitutes a ‘screen’ over Him. I argue, however, that Marion’s criticism of Heidegger with regard to his position on the relationship between Being and God is not (...) well founded, as it is based on a misinterpretation of Heidegger’s conception of Being. I attempt to show that Heidegger’s ontology accommodates the notion of God free from any ontological constraints. (shrink)

Dans le présent article, j’essaie de montrer que la théorie de la réalité sociale de Searle est fondée principalement sur sa perception de certaines caractéristiques essentielles des sociétés démocratiques et qu’elle n’est pas applicable de façon aussi universelle qu’il l’affirme. Je soutiens que son concept de consentement ou d’accord collectif, élément fondamental de sa théorie, n’explique pas pourquoi le régime dictatorial ou totalitaire en tant qu’une réalité sociale parvient à survivre pendant une période aussi considérable ni comment il parvient à (...) produire et à maintenir de façon prolongée et continue des faits institutionnels qui ne devraient avoir aucun fondement dans un consentement ou un accord collectif. (shrink)

This paper seeks to formulate the idea of subjectless change in the established conceptual scheme, which is so often thought to necessarily exclude it. The idea, first espoused by some pre-Socratic thinkers in the form of the universal flux doctrine, was subsequently abandoned due to its alleged logical incoherence. Its reintroduction in contemporary metaphysics is essentially part of a massive revolt against the established conceptual scheme; it serves as a conceptual tool to reinterpret the world and to represent it in (...) an entirely new picture. In this paper I argue, however, that the idea of subjectless change need not be associated with the dissolution of particulars or the dispensing with the concept of object, a trademark of the revolt; rather its usefulness lies in its explanatory power which renders presenting a more complete picture of the world in the established conceptual scheme possible. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explain how the Heraclitean doctrine of universal flux must be rejected, while the notion of flux should and can be preserved. Against the reductionist account of subjectless change, a modern version of the Heraclitean doctrine advocated by revisionist metaphysics, I argue that (1) the idea of subjectless change is one that can and should be formulated in the established conceptual framework, and (2) subjectlessness is a feature that most aptly characterizes material changes. In (...) essence, I seek to provide a proper accommodation for the notion of flux in a conceptual framework that is traditionally understood (or rather misunderstood) as decidedly excluding it. (shrink)

In diesem Artikel versuche ich zu beleuchten, Searles Theorie der sozialen Wirklichkeit gründe hauptsächlich auf dessen Wahrnehmung etlicher wesentlicher Eigenschaften demokratischer Gesellschaften, und sei nicht – wie er behauptet – universell verwendungsfähig. Ich halte daran fest, sein Begriff der kollektiven Akzeptanz bzw. Übereinkunft – als Grundterminus seiner Theorie – erläutere nicht, weswegen das diktatorische oder totalitäre Regime als soziale Wirklichkeit maßgeblich lange zu bestehen und institutionelle Fakten kontinuierlich zu schaffen bzw. zu erhalten vermöge, die in einer gemeinsamen Akzeptanz bzw. Übereinkunft (...) keinerlei Fundament finden sollten. (shrink)

U ovom članku pokušavam pokazati da je Searlova teorija socijalne stvarnosti uglavnom temeljena na njegovom opažanju nekih bitnih značajki demokratskih društava te da nije univerzalno primjenjiva kao što tvrdi. Tvrdim da njegov pojam kolektivnog pristanka ili dogovora, kao temeljni pojam njegove teorije, ne objašnjava zašto diktatorski ili totalitarni režim kao socijalna stvarnost uspijeva preživjeti značajno dugo i kontinuirano stvarati i održavati institucionalne činjenice koje ne bi trebale imati nikakvog temelja u kolektivnom pristanku ili dogovoru.

In this paper, I offer an examination of the two existing criteria of change, one indicated, implicitly, by Aristotle and the other proposed, quite formally, by Russell. Both criteria engender problems. While the Aristotelian criterion is both too narrow and too broad, as it includes bogus changes and excludes subjectless changes, the Russellian criterion avoids the distinction between genuine changes and bogus changes completely. The aim of the paper is to address these problems and to show how these two existing (...) criteria of change can be made to deal with the problems through revision and integration. (shrink)

It has been suggested that there may exist languages that contain only feature-placing sentences, and hence the conceptual scheme implied by such languages is radically different from the one with which we are more familiar. Contrary to what some philosophers believe, I argue that with such languages, we may not be able to say things having approximately the force of the things we actually say, that is, to express the so-called ordinary matters merely at the expense of simplicity. For one (...) thing, in such languages not only we cannot speak of change in something, e.g., that Theaetetus grows older, but also the sense of change in the expression of change in something cannot be preserved in the feature-placing translation. (shrink)

It has been suggested that there may exist languages that contain only feature-placing sentences, and hence the conceptual scheme implied by such languages is radically different from the one with which we are more familiar. Contrary to what some philosophers believe, I argue that with such languages, we may not be able to say things having approximately the force of the things we actually say, that is, to express the so-called ordinary matters merely at the expense of simplicity. For one (...) thing, in such languages not only can we not speak of change in something, but also the sense of change in the expression of change in something cannot be preserved in the feature-placing translation. (shrink)

"Social ontology, conventionally defined, is not primarily about us. Rather, it is about the social world (or worlds), about social reality (or realities), or about the domain(s) of social facts. Social ontology aims at providing an inventory of the basic kinds of entities that make up the social world(s) - items such as norms, institutions, social practices, status positions, power structures, and artifacts. It is the study of the basic kinds of properties of these entities, and of how the social (...) world exists, how it is constituted, or constructed"--. (shrink)

Ludwik Fleck, Edmund Husserl : on the historicity of scientific knowledge -- Gaston Bachelard : the concept of "phenomenotechnique" -- Georges Canguilhem : epistemological history -- Pisum : Carl Correns's experiments on Xenia, 1896-99 -- Eudorina : Max Hartmann's experiments on biological regulation in protozoa, 1914-21 -- Ephestia : Alfred Kähn's experimental design for a developmental physiological -- Genetics, 1924-45 -- Tobacco mosaic virus : virus research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Biochemistry and Biology, 1937-45 -- The concept of (...) the gene : molecular biological perspectives -- The liquid scintillation counter : traces of radioactivity -- The concept of information : the writings of François Jacob -- Intersections -- Preparations -- The economy of the scribble. (shrink)

Rethinking politics in a new vocabulary, Hans Sluga challenges the firmly held assumption that there exists a single common good which politics is meant to realize. He argues that politics is not a natural but a historical phenomenon, and not a single thing but a multiplicity of political forms and values only loosely related. He contrasts two traditions in political philosophy: a 'normative theorizing' that extends from Plato to John Rawls and a newer 'diagnostic practice' that emerged with Marx and (...) Nietzsche and has found its three most prominent twentieth-century practitioners in Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, and Michel Foucault. He then examines the sources of diagnostic political thinking, analyzes its achievements, and offers a critical assessment of its limitations. His important book will be of interest to a wide range of upper-level students and scholars in political philosophy, political theory, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

_Wittgenstein_ presents a concise, comprehensive, and systematic treatment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's thought from his early work, _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,_ to the posthumous publication of _On Certainty_, notes written just prior to his death. A substantial scholarly addition to our understanding of one of the most original and influential thinkers of the twentieth century, by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, Hans Sluga Proposes an original new interpretation of Wittgenstein's work Written to also be accessible to readers unfamiliar with Wittgenstein's thought Includes discussion of the (...) social and political background and contemporary relevance of Wittgenstein's thoughts. (shrink)

This volume outlines a model of language that can be characterized as functionalist, usage-based, dynamic, and complex-adaptive. The core idea is that linguistic structure is not stable and uniform, but continually refreshed by the interaction between three components: usage, the communicative activities of speakers; conventionalization, the social processes triggered by these activities and feeding back into them; and entrenchment, the individual cognitive processes that are also linked to these activities in a feedback loop. Hans-Joerg Schmid explains how this multiple feedback (...) system works by extending his Entrenchment-and-Conventionalization Model, showing how the linguistic system is created, sustained, and continually adapted by the ongoing interaction between usage, conventionalization, and entrenchment. Fulfilling the promise of usage-based accounts, the model explains how exactly usage is transformed into collective and individual grammar and how these two grammars in turn feed back into usage.0The book is exceptionally broad in scope, with insights from a wide range of linguistic subdisciplines. It provides a coherent account of the role of multiple factors that influence language structure, variation, and change, including frequency, economy, identity, multilingualism, and language contact. (shrink)

Technik bestimmt auf die mannigfaltigste Weise unser Leben und Zusammenleben. Obgleich sie von Platon und Aristoteles bis in das zwanzigste Jahrhundert in Einzelaspekten betrachtet worden ist, wurde sie erst in den letzten Jahrzehnten zu einem eigenständigen Gegenstand der Philosophie. Dennoch werden ihre philosophischen Probleme immer noch eher beiläufig behandelt. So geht es um die Klärung ganz zentraler und herausfordernder Aufgaben – von der menschlichen Schöpferkraft über eine Klärung, was ein technisches Artefakt ist, zum technischen Wissen, in all diesen Elementen verknüpft (...) mit dem Verantwortungsproblem. Das Ziel ist eine Darstellung dieser faszinierenden philosophischen Fragen vor dem Hintergrund der Tradition. (shrink)

This paper combines various structures representing degrees of belief, degrees of disbelief, and degrees of non-belief (degrees of expectations) into a unified whole. The representation uses relations of comparative necessity and possibility, as well as non-probabilistic functions assigning numerical values of necessity and possibility. We define all-encompassing necessity structures which have weak expectations (mere hypotheses, guesses, conjectures, etc.) occupying the lowest ranks and very strong, ineradicable ('a priori') beliefs occupying the highest ranks. Structurally, there are no differences from the top (...) to the bottom. I argue that belief is a vague notion, and that thresholds for belief, if there are any, are context-dependent. (shrink)

This is a unique volume by a unique scientist, which combines conceptual, formal, and engineering approaches in a way that is rarely seen. Its core is the relation between ways of learning and knowing on the one hand and different modes of time on the other. Partial Boolean logic and the associated notion of complementarity are used to express this relation, and mathematical tools of fundamental physics are used to formalize it. Along the way many central philosophical problems are touched (...) and addressed, above all the mind-body problem. Completed only shortly before the death of the author, the text has been edited and annotated by the author's close collaborator Harald Atmanspacher. (shrink)

Heidegger's Crisis shows not only how the Nazis exploited philosophical ideas and used philosophers to gain public acceptance, but also how German philosophers played into the hands of the Nazis. Hans Sluga describes the growth, from World War I onward, of a powerful right-wing movement in German philosophy, in which nationalistic, antisemitic, and antidemocratic ideas flourished.

Eric Voegelin (1901-1985) zahlt zu den prominentesten Vertretern einer neoklassischen politischen Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert. Wesentliche Grundlagen seiner politischen Theorie entwickelt Voegelin in der Auseinandersetzung mit der staatstheoretischen Debatte der 1920er- und 1930er-Jahre und im Versuch der Grundlegung einer "Staatslehre als Geisteswissenschaft". Im weiteren Verlauf seiner theoretischen Arbeit erscheint ihm der Begriff des Staates als politiktheoretische Fundamentalkategorie aber zunehmend fragwurdig. Im Sinne der Leitfrage der Reihe Staatsverstandnisse, was sich den Ideen von Staatsdenkern fur ein zeitgemasses Verstandnis des Staates entnehmen lasst, (...) erweist sich Voegelins Beitrag als das zunachst staatstheoretisch inspirierte Projekt einer Dekonstruktion des Staatsbegriffs und der Entfaltung ihrer theoretischen Konsequenzen - von der Herausarbeitung der im Staatsbegriff enthaltenen, aber verschleierten Verhaltnisbestimmung zwischen Politik und Religion bis hin zum Entwurf einer politischen Theorie als "Ordnungswissenschaft". Mit Beitragen von: Barry Cooper, Daiane Eccel, Jurgen Gebhardt, Bruno Godefroy, Michael Henkel, Manfred Henningsen, Oliver Lembcke, Matthias Riedl, Tilo Schabert, Christian Schwaabe, Hans-Jorg Sigwart, Klaus Vondung. (shrink)

This book interprets Hannah Arendt’s work as a “wandering” type of political theory. Focusing on the sub-text of Arendt’s writings which questions “how to think” adequately in political theory whilst categorically refraining from explicitly investigating meta-theoretical questions of epistemology and methodology, the book characterizes her theorizing as an oscillating movement between the experiential positions of philosophy and politics, and by its distinctly multi-contextual perspective. In contrast to the “not of this world” attitude of philosophy, the book argues that Arendt’s political (...) theory is “of this world”. In contrast to politics, it refrains from being “at home” in any particular part of this world and instead wanders between the multiple horizons of the many different political worlds in time and space. The book explores how these two decisive motives of Arendt’s theoretical self-perception majorly influence her epistemological, methodological and normative frame of reference and inspire her understanding of major concepts, including politics, judgment, understanding, nature, and space. (shrink)

Hans Peter Riegel zählt zu den wenigen Künstlern, die gleichzeitig als Autor tätig sind. Aus dieser Position schreibt er kenntnisreich und kritisch über den Kunstmarkt sowie Künstlerinnen und Künstler. Während der Recherchen zu seinen erfolgreichen Biographien über Joseph Beuys und Jörg Immendorff hat er viele Gespräche geführt, die bislang nur in Auszügen veröffentlicht wurden. Immer wieder hat er auch für namhafte Medien geschrieben, Künstler und Kreative interviewt. Jetzt hat Hans Peter Riegel eine Auswahl dieser Texte in diesem Buch zusammengefasst. Unter (...) anderem mit Beiträgen zu Marina Abramovic, Helge Achenbach, Joseph Beuys, Tina Brown, Jörg Immendorff und Eva Presenhuber sowie Interviews mit Jörg Immendorff, Diane Keaton, Marc Spiegler und Klaus Staeck. (shrink)

Kritik der Repräsentation ist eine Einführung in die Theorie der Überzeugungen und der Wissenskulturen, der Erkenntnis und des Wissens. Sie warnt davor, angesichts des neurowissenschaftlichen Naturalismus zu resignieren, und plädiert für eine "kopernikanische Wende der Objektivität". Aufklärung über Repräsentation beruht auf der Klärung dessen, was Einstellungen, Meinungen und Überzeugungen sind und ob sie als wahr gerechtfertigt werden können. Daher steht die Rolle der freien richterlichen Überzeugung im Recht ebenso zur Debatte wie die Bedeutung von Überzeugungen in naturwissenschaftlichen Experimentalkulturen. Weil Ansprüche (...) auf die eine Wahrheit Kennzeichen totalitärer Herrschaft und Politik sind, schließt das Buch mit der Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Wissen, Urteilsfähigkeit, Recht und Demokratie. (shrink)