Updated and revised, the Second Edition of _Danto and His Critics_ presents a series of essays by leading Danto scholars who offer their critical assessment of the influential works and ideas of Arthur C. Danto, the Johnsonian Professor Emeritus in the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University and long-time art critic for _The Nation_. Reflects Danto's revisions in his theory of art, reworking his views in ways that have not been systematically addressed elsewhere Features essays that critically assess the changes (...) in Danto's thoughts and locate Danto's revised theory in the larger context of his work and of aesthetics generally Speaks in original ways to the relation of Danto's philosophy of art to his theory of mind Connects and integrates Danto's ideas on the nature of knowledge, action, aesthetics, history, and mind, as well as his provocative thoughts on the philosophy of art for the reader. (shrink)

Pictorial representation is a subject of interest to both cognitive science and aesthetics. Standard theories of depiction often draw on vision science, and vision science must give an account of picture perception. I offer a critical overview of standard theories of depiction and argue that none of them is adequate. I then describe ways in which new theories of perception blend elements of representationalism with an emphasis on attention and motor control. Such theories, in effect, limit the reliance on mental (...) representation in perceptual tasks. This work provides the basis for a theory of depiction in which pictorial representation is explained in terms of both mental representations and perceptual strategies. I argue that, in the case, the mental representations are most plausibly individuated by the functional and conceptual roles, rather than by causal links to the external world. (shrink)

If it is true, as one of its founders, George Miller, tells us, that cognitive science was born in 1956, then by human aging standards it is coming upon a mid-life crisis. Crises, as Kuhn has taught us, often precipitate radical change, in science as well as in individuals. It should therefore not be surprising to find that cognitive scientists have begun to look to the future and predict, or hope, that it will include both the beautiful and the good. (...) Thus it is that the neuroscientist, Semir Zeki, has recently declared: “We are at the threshold of a great enterprise” which he calls neuroesthetics. His optimism about that enterprise has been echoed by a number of other researchers; and for the most part, their hopefulness is based on discoveries about how pictures are perceived. So, for example, V. S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein have said that by understanding the neuropsychological principles of picture perception, we may come to understand the very “essence of art”. Indeed, by identifying perceptual principles in the right way, according to David Gilden, we may discover common ground for normative disciplines of all stripes; a theory of “what is sexy, what is virtue, or what is a good buy”. (shrink)

If it is true, as one of its founders, George Miller, tells us, that cognitive science was born in 1956, then by human aging standards it is coming upon a mid-life crisis. Crises, as Kuhn has taught us, often precipitate radical change, in science as well as in individuals. It should therefore not be surprising to find that cognitive scientists have begun to look to the future and predict, or hope, that it will include both the beautiful and the good. (...) Thus it is that the neuroscientist, Semir Zeki, has recently declared: “We are at the threshold of a great enterprise” which he calls neuroesthetics. His optimism about that enterprise has been echoed by a number of other researchers; and for the most part, their hopefulness is based on discoveries about how pictures are perceived. So, for example, V. S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein have said that by understanding the neuropsychological principles of picture perception, we may come to understand the very “essence of art”. Indeed, by identifying perceptual principles in the right way, according to David Gilden, we may discover common ground for normative disciplines of all stripes; a theory of “what is sexy, what is virtue, or what is a good buy”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Resemblance Modularity Conclusion.

In this chapter, the author considers a line of thought in Arthur Danto in that regard about the bearing of cognitive science on our construal of changes in art. For Danto, a key to the issue of how to understand change in art forms and artistic identities is found in his fundamental notion that both the meaning and the style of a work of art are historically indexed; that is, they depend on historical conditions. Danto's skepticism about facile changes in (...) world views is born out of his theory that the history of such changes has certain logic, defined over basic or fundamental forms of action and thought; a view that applies as much to science as it does to art. The author's claim has been that recent research shows that, logical deductions aside, advances in cognitive science suggest that the language of art criticism will have to change. (shrink)

The basic problem of perceptual change is how to account for both variation and constancy in perceiving the world. Is order learned? How deep does plasticity go in that respect? I argue that different kinds of perceptual plasticity have been confused in recent debates, notably between J. Fodor and P. M. Churchland. By focusing on changes in the use of concepts, the issues in the Fodor-Churchland debate can be resolved. Beyond that debate, I propose a generalized encoding approach to perception (...) as a way of accounting for a significant form of perceptual change. (shrink)

The psycho-historical account implies two ways of construing the relation of basic exposure to the artistic design stance and artistic understanding. One is empirically dubious and the other does not fit well with the account. The assumption that combining psychology with history requires identifying actual intentions is undermined by the artistic design stance.

In this analysis, I address the recent debate over the functional characteristics of mental imagery, in which the question is whether the format for imagistic representation is pictorial or sentential. I offer an account of imagery and cognition as an important aspect of the theory of mental representation, one which serves as a test for prevalent views of the nature of explanation in cognitive science. ;The first chapter articulates a functionalist theory of internal states. I argue for the need to (...) individuate mental states by virtue of their formal features, but in a way which is consistent with the fact that natural representational systems are self-interpreting. To that end, I describe a basic capacity for imaging which underlies any mental representation. ;In the second chapter, I discuss recent experiments and argue that a correct interpretation of the data cannot be determined on methodological grounds. The substantive argument against mental pictures is set forth and shown to rest upon two distinct assumptions. ;The third chapter aims to show that the argument that mental pictures are inherently ambiguous fails as an argument for an exclusively sentential format. I argue further that sentential states alone are insufficient to account for all rational behavior. The conclusion is that conceptual considerations do not preclude nondiscursive images, and a view of cognition as broader than computation favors them. I propose a logical foundation for an account of access to mental images-under-descriptions. ;The fourth chapter sets forth principles governing operations in which images might occur naturally. I argue that such an account depends upon the possibility of pictorial attitudes, mental features which are theoretically important for the notion of representational competence. ;In the fifth chapter, I show the relevance of the general account described in the previous chapter by applying it to diverse contexts: animal representation, hypothesis in perception, and self-representation. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Part I: System and Method Part II: Intention and Interpretation Part III: Philosophy of Art Part IV: Historical Knowledge Part V: What Philosophy Is.

Marr's theory of vision is often said to exemplify wide psychology. The claim rests primarily on Marr's appeal to a high level theory of computational functions. I agree that Marr's theory embodies an exemplary form of wide psychology; what is exemplary about it is the appeal to perceptual tasks. But I argue that the result of invoking task considerations is that we should not adhere to Marr's own conception of proper explanatory width. There is no one conception of width that (...) has a priviledged place in explanation. (shrink)

The questions addressed in research on mental imagery have become more refined as experimental techniques have become more exact. One issue that has emerged in current work is whether, or in what ways, imaging is like perceiving. Daniel Reisberg and Deborah Chambers have devised a series of experiments that put that question to the test by asking whether images can be reinterpreted in the same ways that perceptual objects can be reinterpreted. They argue that the evidence points to a negative (...) conclusion. Other psychologists have responded, and a debate has ensued. The debate, intersects with philosophy in two ways: (i) philosophers have appropriated the empirical results in defence of their views on imagery; and (ii) psychologists on both sides have argued about the role of 'philosophical considerations' in evaluating the results. My aim is to clarify the issues at stake, to dispel certain confusions apparent in the literature, and to show that recent research does not support the claim that imaging is unlike perceiving in specific respects. (shrink)

The Socrates of Plato's Apology is typically depicted as a brilliant ironist whose behavior at his trial contributed to his conviction and sentence. Beginning with Xenophon, commentators have often characterized Socrates' speeches as adopting a prideful tone that was bound to offend even reasonable people. Some suggest that Socrates' arrogant conduct is exemplified by his own proposed sentence of meals in the Prytaneum. C. D. C. Reeve disputes this rather traditional reading of Plato's Socrates in his sensible and cogent book. (...) On his view, Socrates is fundamentally non-ironic when he claims not to have knowledge or to teach. Furthermore, Socrates mounts a plausible defense against his accusers, which can be understood only in terms of his substantive philosophical positions. Thus, Reeve has much to say about such topics as the nature of the elenchos, Socratic irony, the profession of ignorance and whether Socrates is a teacher, moral virtue and happiness, Socratic religion, and Socratic politics. Here I shall focus on the following parts of Reeve's discussion: the charges against Socrates and the religious basis of his mission, the nature of "human wisdom" and expert knowledge, and questions about Socratic eudaimonism. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Chronology of the Manuscripts 1885–89. Appendix to KGW IX. After the completion of the topological manuscript edition in section IX of the Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke (KGW IX), the additional chronological indexing of the late Nachlass remained a desideratum. The current manuscript closes this editorial gap. As an appendix to KGW IX, the chronology of the manuscripts 1885–89 provides the date for each distinguishable layer of inscription for every manuscript and note edited in KGW IX. In the first part of (...) the following chronology, the dated inscription layers for all late manuscripts from notebook N VII 1 to the scattered notes are recorded topologically. In the second part, the inscription layers are indexed chronologically from spring 1885 to the beginning of January 1889. (shrink)

Hume's Reception in Early America: Expanded Edition brings together the original American responses to one of Britain's greatest men of letters, David Hume. Now available as a single volume paperback, this new edition includes updated further readings suggestions and dozens of additional primary sources gathered together in a completely new concluding section. From complete pamphlets and booklets, to poems, reviews, and letters, to extracts from newspapers, religious magazines and literary and political journals, this book's contents come from a wide variety (...) of sources published in colonial America and the early United States between 1758 and 1850. As well as classics by Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, it contains scores of unknown and hard-to-locate items, many of which have not been reprinted since their original publication. These responses are divided into four parts covering Hume's Essays; his Philosophical Writings; his History of England; and his Character and Death. Each of those parts has a separate introductory essay, and every selection is introduced by a short headnote that sets the piece in its historical context and provides bibliographical references. Packed with new insights into Hume and American thought and culture, Hume's Reception in Early America reveals the relevance and impact of Hume on American political, philosophical, historical, religious, and aesthetic debates. (shrink)

Prologue, invitation to thinking about God In the Hebrew Bible? -- Part I, questions about God? -- Why does God in the Bible have a body? -- What do God's body parts in the Bible mean? -- Why is God angry in the Bible? -- Does God in the Bible have gender or sexuality? -- Part II, questions about God in the world? -- What can creation tell us about God? -- Who-or what-is the Satan? -- Why do people suffer (...) according to the Hebrew Bible? -- Epilogue, God in the Bible and beyond. (shrink)

Seventeen years before Kant published The Critique of Pure Reason, there appeared another work designed to undercut Hume’s skepticism and the principles upon which that skepticism was based—Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. In this ambitious work, Reid hoped to show, against Hume, that there need be no quarrel between common sense and philosophical inquiry. “Philosophy,” proclaimed Reid, “has no other roots but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and (...) draws its nourishment from them.” Reid’s self-imposed task was thus two-fold—to expose the errors in philosophical method which had inexorably culminated in Hume’s phenomenalistic atomism, and correlatively to provide a more adequate metaphysical scheme which could avoid the pitfalls of skepticism while doing justice to our ordinary beliefs about the world. (shrink)

Prologue: The caretaker's trial -- Introduction: What would Judas do? -- The Word of God -- The betrayer, the betrayed, or the beloved? -- Abraham as the Father of Faith(ful betrayal) -- The biblical whole -- The being of God -- The name of God -- Eclipsing God -- Beyond God -- The event of God -- The intervention of God -- The miracle of Christian faith -- Forging faith communities without God -- Conclusion: Crossing out God for the sake (...) of God. (shrink)

Requiring covariance of Maxwell's equations without a priori imposing charge invariance allows for both spin-1 and spin-1/2 transformations of the complete Maxwell field and current. The spin-1/2 case yields new transformation rules, with new invariants, for all traditional Maxwell field and source quantities. The accompanying spin-1/2 representations of the Lorentz group employ the Minkowski metric, and consequently the primary spin-1/2 Maxwell invariants are also spin-1 invariants; for example, Φ2−A2, E2−B2+2iE⋅B−2. The associated Maxwell Lagrangian density is also the same for both (...) spin-1 and spin-1/2 fields. However, in the spin-1/2 case, standard field and source quantities are complex and both charge and gauge invariance are lost. Requiring the potentials to satisfy the Klein–Gordon equation equates the Maxwell and field-potential equations with two Dirac equations of the Klein–Gordon mass, and thus one complex Klein–Gordon Maxwell field describes either two real vector fields or two Dirac fields, all of the same mass. (shrink)

The Philosopher at the End of the Universe demonstrates how anyone can grasp the basic concepts of philosophy while still holding a bucket of popcorn. Mark Rowlands makes philosophy utterly relevant to our everyday lives and reveals its most potent messages using nothing more than a little humor and the plotlines of some of the most spectacular, expensive, high-octane films on the planet. Learn about: The Nature of Reality from The Matrix, Good and Evil from Star Wars, Morality from (...) Aliens, Personal Identity from Total Recall, The Mind-Body dilemma from Terminator, Free Will from Minority Report, Death and the Meaning of Life from Blade Runner, and much more. A search for knowledge about ourselves and the world around us with a star-studded cast that includes: Tom Cruise, Plato, Harrison Ford, Immanuel Kant, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigourney Weaver, René Descartes, and Keanu Reeves. Rowlands anchors his discussions in easily understood everyday terms and relates them in a manner easy to identify with. Interspersed with a ready joke or two, he wonderfully explains why those SciFi movies we love so much are much deeper than they appear to be on the surface. Mark Rowlands's entertaining and stimulating guide is perfect for anyone searching for knowledge of the world around us. If Keanu can understand Descartes surely everyone can. (shrink)

This paper offers a new way to make sense of disagreement expansion from a polylogical perspective by incorporating various places in addition to players and positions into the analysis. The concepts build on prior implicit ideas about disagreement space by suggesting how to more fully account for argumentative context, and its construction, in large-scale complex controversies. As a basis for our polylogical analysis, we use a New York Times news story reporting on an oil train explosion—a significant point in the (...) broader controversy over producing oil and gas via hydraulic fracturing. (shrink)