This book contains a series of essays that explore the concept of unconsciousness as it is situated between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. A leading goal of the collection is to carve out phenomenological dimensions within psychoanalysis and, equally, to carve out psychoanalytical dimensions within phenomenology. The book examines the nature of unconsciousness and the role it plays in structuring our sense of self. It also looks at the extent to which the unconscious marks the body as it (...) functions outside of experience as well as manifests itself in experience. In addition, the book explores the relationship between unconsciousness and language, particularly if unconsciousness exists prior to language or if the concept can only be understood through speech. The collection includes contributions from leading scholars, each of whom grounds their investigations in a nuanced mastery of the traditional voices of their fields. These contributors provide diverse viewpoints that challenge both the phenomenological and psychoanalytical traditions in their relation to unconsciousness. (shrink)

This article distinguishes thought on phenomenology and psychoanalysis versus doing phenomenology and psychoanalysis and argues that while Fanon was primarily concerned with the latter, his thought also offers contributions to the former. They include methodological critique and an interrogation into the human sciences that includes a psychoanalytical decolonial critical reflection on science linked to open possibilities of human conditions.

The notion of emotion in phenomenology involves the centrality of the concept of “value.” This general assumption is here articulated in three theses. The first thesis concerns the public, expressive and behavioral nature of emotion. The second thesis relates to its corporeal and material nature. The third maintains that the structure of emotion is essentially temporal. Each of these arguments converges in emphasizing the irruption of an impersonal dimension into human consciousness, and in particular into emotional consciousness. The objective (...) of this essay is to probe this sub-categorical, or inter-corporeal, dimension from the dual viewpoint of phenomenology and psychoanalysis.La notion d’émotion en phénoménologie implique la centralité du concept de « valeur ». Cette supposition est ici articulée en trois thèses. La première concerne la nature publique, expressive et comportementale de l’émotion. La seconde se rapporte à la nature corporelle et matérielle de l’émotion. La troisième soutient que la tructure de l’émotion est essentiellement temporelle. Ces trois arguments permettent de souligner l’irruption d’une dimension impersonnelle au sein de la conscience humaine, et en particulier dans la conscience émotionnelle. L’objectif de cet essai est de sonder cette dimension sous-catégorique, ou inter-corporelle, à partir du double point de vue de la phénoménologie et de la psychanalyse. La nozione di emozione in fenomenologia implica la centralità del concetto di “valore”. Nel presente articolo, questo assunto generale è articolato secondo tre tesi. La prima concerne l’aspetto pubblico, espressivo e comportamentale dell’emozione. La seconda ha a che fare con la sua natura corporea e materiale. La terza afferma il carattere essenzialmente temporale dell’emozione. Queste argomentazioni convergono nel tentativo di mettere in luce l’irruzione di una dimensione impersonale nella coscienza umana, e in particolare nella coscienza emozionale. L’obiettivo di questo studio è esaminare questa dimensione sub-categoriale, o inter-corporea, dal duplice punto di vista della fenomenologia e della psicoanalisi. (shrink)

This paper examines the origin of phenomenology, and delineates several of its significant developments and refractions, in order to arrive at a renewed conception of phenomenological theory and practice: a future phenomenology that can, it is argued, articulate productively with certain grounds opened up by psychoanalysis. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 8, Edition 1 May 2008.

"This unique text develops an original theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between trauma and time by combining phenomenological and psychoanalytical traditions. Moving beyond Western psychoanalytical and phenomenological traditions, this volume presents new perspectives on the assessment and treatment of trauma patients. Powerfully illustrating how the temporal dimension of a patient's symptoms has until now been overlooked, the text presents a wealth of research literature to deepen our understanding of how trauma disrupts individual temporal experience. Ultimately, the resulting phenomena that (...) occur, positions time as a transdiagnostic psychological dimension, closely connected to the subject's sense of self. This text will benefit researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and trauma and dissociation studies more broadly. Those specifically interested in the philosophy of the mind, Freud, and psychotherapy will also benefit from this book. Selene Mezzalira has completed PhDs in Philosophy and Clinical Psychology at the University of Padova, Italy, and Ryokan College, USA respectively. She has been a visiting scholar at Columbia University in the city of New York and at the University of California, Irvine, USA"--. (shrink)

Neither the lived body, taken up by Merleau-Ponty after Husserl, nor the libidinal body theorised by psychanalysts after Freud, can be reduced to the counted, measured, physical body, apprehended only from outside. Both phenomenology and psychoanalysis set forth the priority of a global subjective lived body, approached "from within". However, their perspectives seem to differ when it comes to the conception of the interiority of this lived body, which psychoanalysis deems as imaginary. This paper examines the similarities (...) and discrepancies between the Merleau-Pontyan phenomenological body and the Freudian erogenous body. It attempts to show how the very categories of perception and imagination are reversed when moving from one discipline to the other. It concludes by proposing some lines along which the comparison could be prolonged. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Combining two distinct philosophical fields to the study of cinema, Patrick Fuery proposes the first study showing how phenomenology and psychoanalysis are explored through their commonalities rather than differences.

This article discusses our experience of other people from both phenomenological and psychoanalytic perspectives. Drawing on Husserl and Freud, I will distinguish between different temporal modes of the other: while Husserl carefully examines the ways in which others are constituted as synchronous or as asynchronous, Freud underlines that others may also appear in a temporally displaced, anachronous manner, whereby one’s experience of some past other dominates in the experience of the present other. Freud discusses this third kind of relationship to (...) the other under the rubric “transference”. The main objective of this article is to argue that the Freudian concept of transference is a structural element in our experience of others, and that, in this respect, the psychoanalytic concept of transference should be seen as complementing the phenomenological account of empathy and interpersonal understanding. (shrink)

Both Hegel's philosophy and psychoanalytic theory have profoundly influenced contemporary thought, but they are traditionally seen to work in separate rather than intersecting universes. This book offers a new interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and brings it into conversation the work of two of the best-known contemporary psychoanalysts, Christopher Bollas and André Green. Hegel and Psychoanalysis centers a consideration of the Phenomenology on the figure of the Unhappy Consciousness and the concept of Force, two areas that (...) are often overlooked by studies which focus on the master/slave dialectic. This book offers reasons for why now, more than ever, we need to recognize how concepts of intersubjectivity, Force, the Third, and binding are essential to an understanding of our modern world. Such concepts can allow for an interrogation of what can be seen as the profoundly false and constructed senses of community and friendship created by social networking sites, and further an idea of a "global community," which thrives at the expense of authentic intersubjective relations. (shrink)

What are the conditions that make understanding of a disturbed person possible? It is by no means easy to restrict oneself to this question after analyzing the first three studies in psychopathology before us. But it is important for philosophers to take note of the new question that phenomenological and existential psychopathologists are asking. Should we assume, as philosophers usually do, that the understanding of disturbed persons ought to proceed by the rules that presumably apply to the experience and knowledge (...) of bodies, minds, and values enjoyed by "normal" persons? Or should understanding of "the world" of disturbed persons lead us to reconsider some of the epistemic analyses that have been all too dominant, and prematurely so? (shrink)

This essay argues that his encounter with the Lacanian claims about the imaginary and symbolic functions incited Merleau-Ponty to transform his early phenomenology. “The Mirror Stage Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” forced Merleau-Ponty to reconsider the primacy of the notion of Leib (corps propre) in his early phenomenology. The modification of his phenomenological starting point culminates in the revision of his position on the relation of the imaginary and the symbolic functions (...) to the real from The Phenomenology of Perception to The Visible and the Invisible. I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s focus on reversibility in The Visible and the Invisible should be read as an ontological elaboration of what is at the core of ‘The Mirror Stage,’ namely, the role of the imaginary and the symbolic functions in the formation of our corporeal visibility.Cet essai démontre que la convergence de Merleau-Ponty avec les revendications lacaniennes concernant l’imaginaire et les fonctions symboliques l’a incité à modifier sa première phénoménologie. « Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je telle qu’elle nous est révélée dans l’expérience psychanalytique » a forcé Merleau-Ponty à reconsidérer la primauté de la notion de Leib (corps propre) issue de sa première phénoménologie. La modification de son point de départ phénoménologique aboutit, depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception jusqu’à Le visible et l’invisible, à la révision de sa position sur la relation de l’imaginaire et des fonctions symboliques au réel. Je suppose que l’attention portée par Merleau-Ponty sur la réversibilité dans Le visible et l’invisible devrait être lue comme l’élaboration ontologique de ce qui est au coeur du « stade du miroir », à savoir le rôle de l’imaginaire et des fonctions symboliques dans la formation de notre visibilité corporelle.Il presente articolo avanza la tesi che l’incontro di Merleau-Ponty con la dimensione simbolica e la dimensione immaginaria descritte da Lacan, ha indotto il filosofo a trasformare la sua prima riflessione fenomenologica. “Lo stadio dello specchio come formatore della funzione dell’io” costrinse Merleau-Ponty a riesaminare il primato della nozione di Leib (corps propre), proprio della prima fase del suo pensiero e della sua adesione alla fenomenologia. La trasformazione del suo punto di partenza fenomenologico culmina in una revisione delle sue posizioni riguardo alla relazione delle funzioni immaginaria e simbolica rispetto al reale, che investe il passaggio da Fenomenologia della percezione al Visibile e l’invisibile. Attraverso questa lettura propongo di comprendere la nozione di reversibilità presente nel Visibile e l’invisibile, come una rielaborazione ontologica del nucleo centrale dello stadio dello specchio, ovvero il ruolo delle funzioni immaginaria e simbolica nella formazione della nostra visibilità corporea. (shrink)

In this article, we highlight the importance of psychoanalysis and the Heideggerian concept of ‘place’ for each respective domain of inquiry. In particular, the writings of Jung and Lacan can unconceal and reveal new dimensions of Jeff Malpas’s work on place. Alternatively, Malpas can extend the work of these psychoanalysts by showing new dimensions of their ideas through an analysis of ‘place’. Ultimately, this article sets up a number of possibilities for future research through this novel interaction and engagement (...) between the philosophy of place and psychoanalysis. One of these possibilities is in genomics and genetic determinism, which we briefly acknowledge throughout. (shrink)

In this article, we highlight the importance of psychoanalysis and the Heideggerian concept of 'place' for each respective domain of inquiry. In particular, the writings of Jung and Lacan can unconceal and reveal new dimensions of Jeff Malpas's work on place. Alternatively, Malpas can extend the work of these psychoanalysts by showing new dimensions of their ideas through an analysis of 'place'. Ultimately, this article sets up a number of possibilities for future research through this novel interaction and engagement (...) between the philosophy of place and psychoanalysis. One of these possibilities is in genomics and genetic determinism, which we briefly acknowledge throughout. (shrink)

Este ensaio examina o relacionamento possível entre o pensamento de Martin Heidegger enquanto emerge no Zollikon Seminaire na sua troca de idéias com Medard Boss e a perspectiva da psicanálise como aparece através do prisma da releitura de Freud oferecido por Jacques Lacan. Heidegger entende Freud como vítima de uma compreensão positivista da ciência que procura explicar o comportamento humano patológico por um complexo de causas discerníveis conscientemente. Quando determinados fenômenos não podem ser explicados desta maneira, Freud postula um jogo (...) de causas psíquicas que não são conscientes, cuja soma ele chama o "inconsciente". Desde que todos os fenômenos humanos são, para Heidegger, discerníveis via uma profunda fenomenologia do ser humano como o ser-no-mundo, a construção hipotética de Freud é desnecessária e, a longo prazo, perniciosa. Mas Lacan propõe uma nova maneira de compreender o inconsciente descoberto por Freud, a saber, que não deve ser entendido como um sistema físico de forças hidráulicas, mas como um processo que seja estruturado como um idioma. A pergunta levantada neste ensaio é se Heidegger seria ou não igualmente hostil à hipótese de Freud, apresentada a ele dentro da forma de Lacan, como algo "estruturado como um idioma". O ensaio sugere que a resposta poderia ser "provavelmente não". Baseado num exemplo clínico altamente simplificado, este ensaio esforça-se para mostrar a compatibilidade entre determinados conceitos básicos de Heidegger e diversos, de Lacan, em especial as noções da verdade e da liberdade.This paper examines the possible relationship between the thought of Martin Heidegger as it emerges in the Zollikon Seminaire through his exchange with Medard Boss and the perspective of psychoanalysis as it appears through the prism of Jacques Lacan's rereading of Freud. Heidegger takes Freud to be victim of a positivist conception of science that seeks to explain pathological human behaviour by a complex of consciously discernible causes. When certain phenomena cannot be explained in this way, Freud postulates a set of psychic causes that are not conscious, the sum total of which he calls the "unconscious." Since all human phenomena are, for Heidegger, discernible through a thorough-going phenomenology of human being as being-in-the-world, Freud's hypothetical construct is unnecessary and, in the long run, pernicious. But Lacan proposes a new way to understand the unconscious that Freud discovered, namely, that it is not to be thought of as analogous to a physical system of hydraulic forces but rather to a process that is structured like a language. The question raised in the paper is whether or not Heidegger would have been equally hostile to Freud's hypothesis, if it had been presented to him in Lacanian fashion as something "structured like a language". The paper suggests that the answer could be "probably not". On the basis of a highly simplified clinical example, it endeavors to show the compatibility between certain basic Heideggerean concepts and several of those essential to Lacan, especially the notions of truth and freedom. (shrink)

Psychoanalysis is often equated with Sigmund Freud, but this comparison ignores the wide range of clinical practices, observational methods, general theories, and cross-pollinations with other disciplines that characterise contemporary psychoanalytic work. Central psychoanalytic concepts to do with unconscious motivation, primitive forms of thought, defence mechanisms, and transference form a mainstay of today's richly textured contemporary clinical psychological practice. -/- In this landmark collection on philosophy and psychoanalysis, leading researchers provide an evaluative overview of current thinking. Written at the (...) interface between these two disciplines, the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis contains original contributions that will shape the future of debate. With 34 chapters divided into eight sections covering history, clinical theory, phenomenology, science, aesthetics, religion, ethics, and political and social theory, this Oxford Handbook displays the enduring depth, breadth, and promise of integrating philosophical and psychoanalytic thought. -/- Anyone interested in the philosophical implications of psychoanalysis, as well as philosophical challenges to and re-statements of psychoanalysis, will want to consult this book. It will be a vital resource for academic researchers, psychoanalysts and other mental health professionals, graduates, and trainees. (shrink)

The Philadelphia Association is always linked with the name of R. D. Laing, one of its founders, but very little is known about its unorthodox contribution to the development of psychoanalysis. Founded in 1965, it took as its aim the relief of mental illnesss of all desciptions, in particular schizophrenia. At its inception it was a focus for people, with a diversity of backgrounds and interests, concerned with 'mental illness' and how society defines it. Its members - who included (...) psychoanalysis, psychiatrists and artists - developed a philosophical critique of psychoanalysis grounded in phenomenology, and an 'anti-psychiatry' critique of the institutional treatment of the mentally ill. They favoured the setting up of therapeutic community households of which the best known was Kingsley Hall. The PA was then very much part of the counter culture - it staged, for example, the famous Dialectics of Liberation Congress at London's Roundhouse in 1967. The psychotherapists who currently belong to the Philadelphia Association continue to work with community households and to offer a psychotherapy training. Here the authors share their innovative and distinctive approach on a number of interrelated themes: the herapeutic community and differend ways it can be understood; work with deeply regresed patients; the concept of identity in a social context; the debate between Lacan and Derrida on Poe's 'The Purloined Letter'; the phenomenology of knowledge and transference and authority. Together, they offer a cogent critique of many psychiatric and psychonalaytic assumptions. The contributors are Robin Cooper, Joseph friedman, Steven Gans, John Heaton, Chris Oakley, Haya Oakley and Paul Zeal. They are all psychotherapists and members of the Philadelphia Association. (shrink)

For more than four decades, George Atwood and I have been absorbed in rethinking psychoanalysis as a form of phenomenological inquiry. In the course of this work, I repeatedly made the claim that phenomenology led us inexorably to relationality, but until now I did not offer an explanation of this inexorability. In this article, I show that emotional phenomenology and relationality always already form an indissoluble unity, because relationality is constitutive of emotional experience.

This special issue reconsiders the contributions that phenomenology can make to the development and practice of a clinicat science of psychology. In it, we suggest that earlier attempts to apply phenomenological principles were influenced heavily by psychoanalysis, with few, if any, alternative versions of a "depth" psychology available on which to draw in reframing the nature of psychopathology and its treatment. We suggest that this lingering presence of psychoanalysis runs counter to the founding principles of phenomenological method (...) and offer a few examples of a constructive alternative grounded in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Borrowing from Mohanty, we offer this approach as a respectful-as opposed to suspicious-phenomenology, and begin to outline ways in which a transcendental ly-grounded psychology reconceptualizes both clinical research and practice, from the initial intake interview and interpretation of interview data to the aims and strategies of psychological interventions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 87-90 [Access article in PDF] Phenomenological and Biological Psychiatry:Complementary or Mutual? James Morley Keywords: phenomenology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, ontology. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered the problems of life have still not been touched at all. (Witgenstein, Tractatus, 6.52) IF ONE WAS TO PERFORM a thought experiment by imagining a scientifically explained universe, how would this explained (...) universe resolve my issues of value and meaning? Would it help me to live a better life? In one sentence, Witgenstein expressed exactly the issues dividing, and defining, the phenomenological and biophysical approaches to psychiatry. (Natural) scientific questions are concerned with relations of physical causality while phenomenology is aimed at the problems of life, i.e., the elucidation of lived personal meanings.Clarifying the relation between phenomenology and the general psychiatric literature is clearly a significant undertaking. At this juncture in the history of psychiatry where the biophysical model is so dominant, the authors' efforts are especially welcome, as I wholeheartedly appreciate, and thank the authors for this endeavor. I only wish to explicate a few issues latent within the article and perhaps add a few supportive points. Explicitly or implicitly, the need for phenomenology in psychiatry is long enduring and will always persist (Ellenberger 1981, 1993). The integration of phenomenology with general psychiatric practice would certainly serve the needs of patients and society generally. But, in the present state of affairs where the biological model is so preeminent, a full accounting of the dramatic divergences between the two approaches is necessary if there is to be authentic dialogue between them.Essentially, I want to stress that phenomenology and natural science medicine are genuinely distinct paradigms for construing reality and organizing knowledge. As distinct scientific paradigms, each one is holistically self-contained. Like soap bubbles, if pushed together too forcefully one or the other may burst. In this case, it is more likely that the smaller, less prevalent paradigm would burst by becoming absorbed into the more dominant paradigm. I believe that this is precisely the risk when phenomenology is introduced to conventional psychiatry as "complementary." Whereas one could hardly object to any application of empathy and understanding toward the experiences of patients, it would be tragic if the [End Page 87] full philosophical power of phenomenology were to be overlooked in favor of its mere utility as a preliminary stage of diagnosis and assessment, a framework for bedside manners, or worst of all, an appendage to neuroscience or pharmacology. This would not be phenomenology but the very symptomatology that the authors have has so clearly distinguished from true phenomenology.This equation of phenomenology with symptomatology is exactly the misunderstanding that the authors so effectively address. However, I would hesitate to join the authors' optimism in regard to phenomenology's potential complementary role to conventional psychiatric practice. Furthermore, in the process of paradigm mix, certain constituents of each paradigm may be taken out of context and the strength of each paradigm thus diluted. For example, the very power of the experimental method is its reduction of phenomena to measurable variables that can be altered in order to discern causality. Unmeasurable variables detract form the rigor of this entire approach. Then on the other hand, phenomenological empathy is only possible within a standpoint that is severed from the causal thinking of experimental science. This is the holistic perceptual shift that cannot be accomplished when one only appends phenomenological insights to an otherwise materialist approach to psychiatry. Thus, it is not at all clear how one can be both phenomenological and nonphenomenologically natural scientific. Instead of positioning phenomenology as a potential complimentary component of natural-science psychiatry, both world views need to be examined, on their own terms, in a framework of mutuality.Empathy or the understanding of other peoples subjective experience is indeed an essential component of the application of phenomenology to clinical assessment and especially therapeutic treatment. But, to limit phenomenology to this theme alone may not honor the profoundly radical character of this paradigm. As the authors point out, phenomenology asks the practitioner to... (shrink)

There has been a wealth of literature on the relationship between phenomenology and psychoanalysis as well as a persistent interest in the exchange between these two forces of twentieth century philosophy.1 Even so, the relationship between the notable figures of the phenomenological tradition and psychoanalysis has been fraught: in spite of Freud being a contemporary of Husserl, having also studied with Brentano at the University of Vienna, references to Freud in Husserl's work are notably absent.2 For his (...) part, Heidegger seems to have been actively hostile to psychoanalysis, calling the conscious and the unconscious a "fatal distinction" and referring to Lacan's Écrits as an "obviously baroque text." He also... (shrink)

이 논문을 통해 우리는 리쾨르 철학에서 프로이트의 현존(présence)을 확인하고 이것이 리쾨르 철학의 중요한 국면들에서 어떤 영향을 끼쳐 왔는지를 찾아보고 확인하는 작업을 하려고 한다. 리쾨르 철학의 관점에서 보면 프로이트 담론은 ‘현상학의 해석학적 변형’이고자 하는 리쾨르 자신의 마지막 철학적 단계에서 결정적 역할을 하는 방향타라고 볼 수 있다. 리쾨르를 현대 해석학을 대표하는 인물로 자리매김하는 데 핵심적인 내용을 제공해준 담론 역시 프로이트의 담론일 것이다. 물론 여전히 기술현상학의 틀과 한계 내에서 움직이고 있는 『의지의 철학 I』과 『해석에 대하여: 프로이트에 관한 시론』 사이의 결정적 차이는 “반성”이 일종의 (...) 해석학이어야 한다고 주장함으로써 “반성에 철저히 연계된 해석학적 방법”을 가져오는 데 있어 그가 프로이트 담론에 의존하고 기대었다는 것이다. 욕망의 선재성, 사유에 대한 ‘sum’의 선재성을 프로이트 담론이 설득력 있게 드러내는 이상, 반성은 그런 (욕망하는) 삶의 기호들을 해석하는 프로이트 담론을 만나지 않고 피해 가는 방법은 없었다. 리쾨르에게 프로이트는 필연적인 우회(détour)의 길이었다. 현상학적 철학의 한계와 근대적 반성철학의 전통에 새로운 전기를 마련하는 데 프로이트 담론의 독창적인 기여를 인정하는 차원이라고 보는 게 정확할 것이다. 리쾨르 철학의 긴 여정 속에서 1950년 전후에 프로이트 담론은 (기술현상학이라는) 제한된 관점과 전망 속에서 처음으로 도입되고, 1965년을 전후하여 확장되며 변형된 (해석학적) 대면과 도전의 차원에서 논의되며, 1990년 전후해 2008년까지는 이전의 도입과 대면의 지점을 넘어 충분히 성숙하여 침윤되어 그의 철학 안에 내면화되는 지점에 도달하게 되었다. (shrink)

An overview of trends in present Continental philosophy and science. Husserl's writings are shown to prefigure the notion of a stratified structure as a model for scientific inquiry. Recent work in economics, sociology, and civil law is seen to presuppose something like Jasper's theory of the creative existential encounter. Heidegger's speculations on the nature of temporality and being-in-the-world are paralleled by several current versions of psychoanalysis. Though the influence of philosophy upon contemporary scientific movements is not claimed to be (...) direct in each instance, a convincing case is made out that those two fields are equally indicative of and contributive to a new humanistic Weltanschauung.--E. S. C. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se abordará, desde una perspectiva fenomenológica, el problema que llevó a Sigmund Freud a transitar desde la fisiología a la psicopatología, terreno en el cual va a dar origen al psicoanálisis. Este problema consiste en la constitución “patológica” de la experiencia del cuerpo. En esta línea se argumentará a favor del papel principal que este asunto juega en el origen del psicoanálisis y se expondrá la manera en que el mismo tema puede ser abordado desde una (...) perspectiva fenomenológica, que trasciende la alternancia entre las aproximaciones fisiológicas y psicológicas. From a phenomenological perspective, this article will try to deal with the problematic issue that forced Sigmund Freud to move from the field of physiology to the field of the psycho-pathology, which gave birth to the discipline known as psychoanalysis. These range of problems, deal with the constitution of a “pathologic” experience of the body. On this issue, it will be argued on the essential role it has in the origin of psychoanalysis and it will be shown how this same issue can be understood from a phenomenological perspective, which will transcend the dichotomy between a physiological and psychological approach. (shrink)

Structures of Subjectivity: Explorations in Psychoanalytic Phenomenology and Contextualism, is a revised and expanded second edition of a work first published in 1984, which was the first systematic presentation of the intersubjective viewpoint – what George Atwood and Robert Stolorow called psychoanalytic phenomenology – in psychoanalysis. This edition contains new chapters tracing the further development of their thinking over the ensuing decades and explores the personal origins of their most essential ideas. In this new edition, Atwood and (...) Stolorow cover the philosophical and theoretical assumptions of psychoanalysis and present a broad approach that they have designated phenomenological contextualism. This approach addresses personal subjective worlds in all their richness and idiosyncrasy and focuses on their relational contexts of origin and therapeutic transformation. Structures of Subjectivity covers the principles guiding the practice of psychoanalytic therapy from the authors' viewpoints and includes numerous detailed clinical case studies. The book will be essential reading for psychoanalysts, practitioners of psychotherapy, psychiatrists, psychologists, counselors, and social workers. It will also be of interest to scholars and students with an interest in psychoanalytic theory and practice, and its philosophical premises. (shrink)

This volume covers the period between the 1890s and 1930s, a period that witnessed revolutions in the arts and society which set the agenda for the rest of the century. In philosophy, the period saw the birth of analytic philosophy, the development of new programmes and new modes of inquiry, the emergence of phenomenology as a new rigorous science, the birth of Freudian psychoanalysis, and the maturing of the discipline of sociology. This period saw the most influential work (...) of a remarkable series of thinkers who reviewed, evaluated and transformed 19th-century thought. A generation of thinkers - among them, Henri Bergson, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, Max Scheler, and Ludwig Wittgenstein - completed the disenchantment of the world and sought a new re-enchantment. (shrink)

Throughout history philosophers have relentlessly pursued what may be called "inaccessible domains." This book explores how the traditions of existential phenomenology relate to Freudian psychoanalysis. A clear, succinct, and systematic account of the philosophical presuppositions of psychoanalytic theory and practice, this work offers a deeper and richer understanding and appreciation of Freudian thought, as well as its antecedents and influences. With its unique perspective on Freud's work, Apprehending the Inaccessible puts readers in a better position to appreciate his (...) contributions and evaluate the relationship between his and other philosophical world views. The authors, both of whom have extensive backgrounds in philosophy and psychology, present balanced critical analyses of crucial developments in, for example, the evolution of the Freudian notion of the unconscious, and the engagement of existential phenomenology with Freudian psychoanalysis. Askay and Farquhar then consider-often for the first time-individual thinkers' reflections on and interpretations of Freud, ranging from the primary figures in existential phenomenology to the most prominent figures in the existential psychoanalytic movement. Even as their work offers a new approach to Freudian thought, it reasserts the importance of alternative views found in existential phenomenology as those views pertain to psychoanalysis and the question of apprehending the inaccessible. (shrink)