O avanço de lutas em torno dos direitos sexuais e reprodutivos vem sendo tratado por diversos segmentos políticos e religiosos como uma ameaça às hierarquias tradicionais. Diante deste campo que envolve diferentes perspectivas conflitantes, o artigo apresentado propõe uma análise sobre o uso da noção de “ideologia de gênero” como elemento fundamental na ofensiva contra esses direitos. Para isso, o texto proposto será dividido em duas partes: na primeira, serão apresentados os seus antecedentes e sua posterior difusão; na segunda, será (...) realizada uma análise genealógica acerca da literatura produzida por distintos autores que se reconhecem como conservadores, adotando uma postura reativa em relação aos estudos de gênero e sexualidade; e por fim, na terceira parte, mostraremos como essa premissa acerca da existência de uma natureza humana e sexual universalmente diferenciada entre homens e mulheres não se sustenta, tomando como referência distintas pesquisas sobre gênero e sexualidade publicadas nas últimas décadas. (shrink)

n the first part of the paper I will present Pritchard’s approach to Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge commitments, which is essential to his solution to the closure-based sceptical arguments. And, in the second par of the paper, I will raise some concerns that I have regarding Pritchard’s non-belief reading of the hinge commitments. In the third and final part, I make some concluding remarks regarding Pritchard’s overall strategy to solve the closure-based sceptical paradox.

In Posterior Analytics II 16-17, Aristotle seems to claim that there cannot be more than one explanans of the same scientific explanandum. However, this seems to be true only for “primary-universal” demonstrations, in which the major term belongs to the minor “in itself” and the middle term is coextensive with the extremes. If so, several explananda we would like to admit as truly scientific would be out of the scope of an Aristotelian science. The secondary literature has identified a second (...) problem in II 16-17: the middle term of a demonstration is sometimes taken as the definition of the minor term (the subject), other times as the definition (or the causal part of the definition) of the major (the demonstrable attribute). I shall argue that Aristotle’s solution to the first problem involves showing that certain problematic attributes, which appear to admit more than one explanation, actually fall into the privileged scenario of primary-universal demonstrations. In addition, his solution suggests a conciliatory way-out to our second problem (or so I shall argue): the existence of an attribute as a definable unity depends on its subject having the essence it has, which suggests that both the essence of subjects and the essence of demonstrable attributes can play explanatory roles in demonstrations. (shrink)

Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim,Pascal Ludwig | : La plupart des théoriciens de l’identité des types souscrivent à un physicalisme a posteriori à l’égard des propriétés phénoménales. Selon cette conception, les énoncés d’identité esprit/cerveau peuvent être justifiés par une inférence à la meilleure explication (IME) partant du fait empirique des corrélations esprit/cerveau. Nous soutenons que la théorie de l’identité ne peut pas s’appuyer sur cette méthodologie abductive. Nous montrons tout d’abord que l’on ne peut pas justifier les énoncés d’identité esprit/cerveau (...) au moyen d’une IME partant des corrélations esprit/cerveau car cette stratégie conduit à un dilemme : ou bien les corrélations ne sont pas des explananda, ou bien les identités esprit/cerveau doivent être admises comme des faits bruts au même titre que les lois dualistes. Nous montrons ensuite que ces énoncés d’identité peuvent être néanmoins justifiés par une IME partant du pouvoir causal des états phénoménaux. Cette seconde stratégie n’est toutefois d’aucune aide pour la forme a posteriori de théorie de l’identité ici discutée dans la mesure où elle débouche sur un physicalisme de type a priori. | : Most type identity theorists endorse a posteriori physicalism about phenomenal properties. On such a view, mind/brain identity statements can be justified by an inference to the best explanation (IBE) starting from the empirical premise of mind/brain correlations. We contend that Identity Theory cannot be based on such an abductive methodology. First, we argue that mind/brain identity statements cannot be justified by an IBE from correlations as it leads to the following dilemma : either correlations are trivial facts that cannot pretend to the status of explananda, or mind/brain identities must be admitted as brute facts, just like dualist laws. Second, we show that these identity statements can still be justified by an IBE starting from the premise of mental causation. However, this strategy is of no help for the a posteriori brand of Identity Theory here challenged since the same premise forces one to embrace a priori physicalism. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to engage with C. Thi Nguyen’s characterization of the echo chamber and to propose two things. First, I argue that a proper reading of his concept of echo chamber should make use of the notion of ignorance in the form of a structural epistemic insensitivity. My main contention is that ignorance as a substantive structural practice accounts for the epistemically deleterious effects of echo chambers. Second, I propose that from the talk of ignorance we (...) should be able to see echo chambers in terms of their more harmful impacts in our daily lives. To do that, I argue that we should think of echo chambers as tools to promote hermeneutical domination. If my representation of Nguyen’s concept is accurate, I believe we can see some important theoretical consequences stemming from the way Nguyen understands it. (shrink)

O processo de desenvolvimento da história (e demais ciências) das religiões, com objeto e metodologia próprios, pode ser analisado por meio das discussões que aprofundaram as relações entre a defesa do caráter racionalista do homem ocidental e a persistência de formas religiosas de expressão no transcorrer dos séculos XIX e XX (bem como neste início de século XXI). Por meio do estudo da história da teologia e das religiões, são estabelecidos critérios para o julgamento das convergências entre movimentos religiosos, também (...) de suas especificidades, aqui discutidos à luz de pressupostos subjacentes em obras de Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) e Mircea Eliade (1907-1986). A escolha dos autores se justifica pelo fato de representarem, cada qual a seu modo, estágios teórico-analíticos no desenvolvimento das ciências das religiões que abarcam o conflito entre racionalismo ocidental e formas religiosas. Pelo que guardam de semelhança ou contradição, especialmente pela presença do sagrado em sua argumentação, os três autores vêm a confirmar uma suspeita (do religioso) ou hipótese (do cientista): a religião persiste. Palavras-chave: Ciências da Religião. Teologia. Émile Durkheim. Rudolf Otto. Mircea Eliade.The process of the development of History (and other sciences) of Religions, with its object and methodology, can be analyzed by the discussions that deepened the relations between the defense of the rationalist character of the western man and the persistence of religious forms of expression in the 19th and 20th centuries (as well as in the beginning of the 21th century). Studying the History of Theology and of Religions, the criteria for the judgment of the convergences within religious movements can be established, as well their specificities, discussed here under the subjacent ideas found in Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) and Mircea Eliade (1907-1986). The selection of these authors can be justified by the fact that they represent each one on his own way, the theoretical analytical stages in the development of the Sciences of Religions that enclose the conflict between western rationalism and religious forms. Considering what they have in common and in contradiction, especially for the presence of the holy in their argumentation, the three authors confirm a suspicion (of the religious man) or a hypothesis (of the scientist): the religion persists. Keywords: Sciences of Religion. Theology. Émile Durkheim. Rudolf Otto. Mircea Eliade. (shrink)

Este artigo reconhece que nunca se falou tanto em fundamentalismo em nosso país como agora; e que o uso ampliado do conceito poucas vezes vem associado ao espectro do protestantismo definido pela hermenêutica literal das Escrituras, como nos primórdios do movimento fundamentalista. No Brasil contemporâneo, grosso modo, fundamentalista qualifica o evangélico conservador ou reacionário, quase sempre pentecostal, e com inserção na mídia e na política. Assim, é urgente que a ação de evangélicos fundamentalistas no espaço público-político brasileiro seja compreendida pelas (...) Ciências da Religião, uma vez que coloca em questão a democracia ao transformar interesses religiosos particulares em questões de Estado e ações de governo. O objetivo deste artigo, portanto, é avaliar como o qualificativo fundamentalista associado ao nome evangélico contribui para a compreensão da eleição de Jair Bolsonaro à presidência da República em 2018, adotando como recorte o caso da promessa de mudança da embaixada brasileira em Israel de Tel Aviv para Jerusalém. As conclusões alcançadas acerca das imbricações do assim chamado sionismo cristão com a eleição de Bolsonaro resultam de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, cujos dados empíricos foram retirados do jornal Folha de S. Paulo. (shrink)

Hax-Breno_On-identifying-and-identification.

according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge (...) of all scientific propositions were... (shrink)

In Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues against those who seem to accept contradictions. He distinguishes between the Sophists, who deny the principle of non-contradiction through arguments, and the Natural Philosophers, whose physical investigations lead to the acceptance of objective contradictions. Heraclitus’ name appears throughout the discussion. Usually, he is associated with the discussion against the Sophists. In this paper, I explore how the discussion with the Natural Philosophers may illuminate both the interpretation of Heraclitus by Aristotle and Heraclitus’ own worldview. To (...) refute the Natural Philosophers, Aristotle proposes a general reconstruction of their reasoning. Roughly, relying on sensory evidence (A1), they see that the same thing changes from one opposite to another (A2). Such a change appears to characterize a generation out of non-being, which a Natural Philosopher does not accept (A3). To solve the problem, despite their different worldviews, Natural Philosophers hint at a state in which opposites co-occur, characterizing an objective contradiction (C). Looking at the discussion in Metaphysics Γ and Heraclitus fragments, sections 1–3 show how assumptions A1, A2, and A3 easily apply to Heraclitus. The case of the conclusion is more challenging. In the case of the Pluralists, the co-existence of opposites characterizes a state in which there is no generation. Such a view does not fit Heraclitus’ mobilism. To argue that Aristotle’s argument is general enough to encompass dynamic views, I examine his problematization of accepting the change of change in Metaphysics K and Physics V. There, after re-stating several points that appear in Metaphysics Γ, Aristotle argues that accepting the becoming of another becoming leads to a state of contradiction in which the becoming is perishing. Heraclitus’ B8, cited in Nicomachean Ethics, gives evidence that, for Aristotle, Heraclitus puts a process at the origin of an opposite process. Moreover, after examining the expression ‘living the death/dying the life’ in B62, I argue that Heraclitus was aware that his worldview implied a dynamic objective contradiction. Finally, an analysis of elemental changes in B36 proves that accepting objective contradictions does not make Heraclitus’ worldview less attractive. (shrink)

The skin can be described as a niche structured by semiotic artefacts (tattoos) that work as symbolic–indexical devices (dicisigns). New biocompatible technologies responsive to organic and environmental variations change the role of the skin as a semiotic niche. New devices are transforming the skin into a niche of interactive interfaces. In this article we introduce a variety of techno-scientific artefacts, which are readily available, and their main characteristics. We are interested in the recent proliferation of devices based on biotechnologies that (...) can be coupled to the body, especially epithelial (superficial or invasive), and how they change what we know as ‘embodied communication’. (shrink)

In this paper, I present two ways of conceiving a genealogical explanation of the concept of knowledge. The first one is through the epistemic state of nature hypothesis developed by Edward Craig, according to which knowledge is understood as a concept evolved from the concept of a good informant. After considering Craig’s project, I draw a parallel between this approach and Miranda Fricker’s value-laden account of the same concept. Then, I present and discuss Fricker’s social take on Craig’s genealogy, in (...) which she suggests that the notions of a good informant and of knowledge are necessarily dependent on the establishment of a credibility norm, and that this norm should be viewed as inherently political. Lastly, I defend an illustration, through Kristie Dotson’s work, of how both genealogical approaches could explain and offer solutions to failings in the normativity of our epistemic systems. (shrink)

This is an Editorial Note for the special volume of the journal Manuscrito (42: 4) devoted to Aristotle's theory of demonstration and its logical and metaphysical entanglements, which has been organized by me and Breno Zuppolini (as Guest Editors), with papers authored by Benjamin Morison, Owen Goldin, David Bronstein, Michail Peramatzis, Andrea Falcon, Laura Castelli, Paolo Fait, Joseph Karbowski, Adam Crager, Klaus Corcilius, Robert J. Hankinson, Raphael Zillig and Pieter Sjoerd Hasper.

In this paper, I explore two possible readings of Republic IV, 439c2-d8, and of Plato’s claim that the just soul is governed by its rational element. My aim is to argue against a “desiderative” interpretation of the passage, according to which the motivational strength of rational desires depends on a set of desires given in advance and produced independently of reason. As an alternative, I advance a “cognitivist” reading according to which the rational desires of the just soul have as (...) its ultimate source a knowledge about the nature of goodness and happiness, with its own motivational force. Finally, I argue for a reinterpretation of 439a4-b1, a passage that, at first sight, seems to contradict my analysis of 439c2-d8. (shrink)

Trata-se de uma contextualização filosófica que perpassa os limites e as fronteiras do pensamento reducionista: que fragmenta e exclui a subjetividade humana em nome da objetividade racionalista. Volta-se ao pressuposto de que tanto a subjetividade quanto a objetividade são legítimas fontes do pensar e do agir humanos e, por isto mesmo, fontes primárias da religação ética entre o eu e o outro. Debruçar-se sobre o conceito de amorosidade, em Paulo Freire, remete à discussão acerca da ética como campo ontológico das (...) relações entre humanos e humanos, e entre humanos e não humanos. A proposta que tangencia o estudo tem por objetivo principal compreender o conceito de amorosidade e seus desdobramentos dentro e fora da pedagogia freireana, sobretudo incorporada ao ethos e à racionalidade prática, nesta contemporaneidade. Almeja-se, com isto, oferecer algumas reflexões sobre o sentido e o sentir da amorosidade como modo de acolhimento do outro no eu, uma possibilidade de reconhecimento de um eu no outro. Palavras-chave: Paulo Freire. Amorosidade. Ética. Formação humana. (shrink)

This article discusses immediate premises in Aristotle’s epistemology. The traditional interpretation identifies immediacy with indemonstrability: immediate truths are the indemonstrable principles of science from which the theorems are derived by demonstration. Against this common reading, I argue that Aristotle’s recognition of two kinds of epistemic priority (priority by nature and priority to us) commits him to the existence of two types of immediacy, only one of which is equivalent to indemonstrability. As a result, my interpretation offers a better understanding of (...) a puzzling passage (APo. 1.13, 78a22–b4) that seems to contradict the standard view. (shrink)

This article offers a reconstruction of an argument against infinite regress formulated by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I 22. I argue against the traditional interpretation of the chapter, according to which singular terms and summa genera, in virtue of having restrict logical roles, provide limits for predicative chains, preventing them from proceeding ad infinitum. As I intend to show, this traditional reading is at odds with some important aspects of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. More importantly, it fails to explain how (...) his proof is connected to a defence of the existence of ultimate explanations, a connection that must be the case if I 19-22 is advancing a foundationalist way-out to a sceptical challenge raised in I 3. (shrink)

For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles (...) of science could be known as such independently of their explanatory connections to demonstrable propositions. I shall argue that knowing first principles as such involves knowing them as explanatory of other scientific propositions. I shall then explain in which way noetic and demonstrative knowledge are in a sense interdependent cognitive states – even though νοῦς remains distinct from (and, in Aristotle’s words, more ‘accurate’ than) demonstrative knowledge. (shrink)

This book offers a powerful, comprehensive and compelling rereading of Hobbes's theory of representation, by reinstating it in a wider pattern of Hobbes’s theorizing about human thought and action in relation to images, roles and fictions of various types.

The article intends to analyze Nietzsches concept of conscience (Gewissen), in order to show its connection to the will to power. This relation inscribes in its interior, as derived from it, the bad conscience (schlechtes Gewissen), and thus opens a phenomenological horizon of interpretation of the will to power.

Thomas Hobbes combines true representation and representation by fiction in the making of the modern representative state. This chapter examines how this is done and to what effect. Hobbes's adoption, in the English Leviathan, of a broad and elastic concept of person as an agent capable of speech and action marks a departure from his earlier works. Words and actions are the “outward appearances” that make up the Hobbesian person. As the distinction between true representation and representation by fiction shows, (...) at the core of Hobbes's theory of representation lie the notions of authorization and attributed action. According to Hobbes, representation by fiction is the only form of representation available to people, things or abstractions who “cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors”. Representation was equally necessary, understood as the representation of the commonwealth itself as a formidable image of unity that transcended the mere sum of its authorizing parts. (shrink)

ResumoNo início do século xviii, Isaac Newton publicou seu principal trabalho sobre óptica, o Opticks. Impregnado por uma perspectiva indutiva, o livro logo se tornou a principal referência para os estudos sobre a luz e as cores, sendo amplamente popularizado pelos seguidores de Newton. Neste artigo, analisamos como dois importantes livros contribuíram para essa popularização e também qual era a imagem de ciência que tencionavam propagar, o Élements de la philosophie de Newton de Voltaire e o Newtonianismo per le dame (...) de Algarotti. Será possível perceber que ambos os autores distorceram o conteúdo do livro de Newton, no intuito de propagar uma imagem idealizada das ideias newtonianas e da própria filosofia natural.In the beginning of 18th century, Newton published his main work about light and colors, the Opticks. Impregnated by an inductive perspective, the book became the major reference for the studies about light and colors, being widely popularized by Newton's followers. In this article, we analyze how two important works contributed to this process of popularization and also what image of science they intended to propagate: Voltaire's Elements of Newton's philosophie and Algarotti's Sir Isaac Newton's philosophy explain'd for the use of the ladies. We will be notice that both authors distorted the content of the Opticks, in order to propagate an idealized image of Newtonian ideas and natural philosophy itself. (shrink)

Most interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics believe that the term ‘ameson’ is used to describe the principles or foundations of a given system of justification or explanation as epistemically prior to or more fundamental than the other propositions in the system. Epistemic readings (as I shall call them) arguably constitute a majority in the secondary literature. This predominant view has been challenged by Robin Smith (1986) and Michael Ferejohn (1994; 2013), who propose interpretations that should be classified as non-epistemic according (...) to the definition above. My aim in this article is purely negative. I intend to show that these non-epistemic interpretations are liable to serious objections and are in conflict with some important features of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o fenômeno do Totalitarismo no pensamento da filósofa alemã Hannah Arendt tendo como fio condutor a obra Origem do Totalitarismo. Verificaremos como a filósofa compreende o movimento totalitário e atuação do mesmo para capturar os seres humanos e destituí-los de todos os direitos usando para este fim os mais baixos artifícios, tais como os campos de concentração e o sistema propagandista ficcional. Focalizaremos especificamente no terceiro capítulo da obra supracitada, no qual a pensadora (...) apresenta os horrores das ditaduras e do Totalitarismo, revelando a face tenebrosa e cruel do homem. (shrink)

The aim is to examine the performative acts and gender constitution in the context of the Second British Invasion. Despite the pervasive character of patriarchy and the prevalence of sexual difference as an operative cultural distinction, gender was not passively scripted on the bodies of many British singers. The subversive performances did not exclude suffering and marginalization but simultaneously undermined compulsory coherence.

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle imposes some requirements on the formulation of scientific propositions: their terms must be able to perform the role of subject as well as of predicate; their terms should be universal; every demonstration must involve “primary” subjects denoted by terms that “cannot be said of another underlying subject”. Several interpreters, inspired by theses from the Categories, believed that this third requirement refers to names and descriptions of particular substances as basic subjects of predicative statements, since they (...) cannot perform the logical role of predicate. However, such reading puts the third requirement in conflict with the other two. I shall argue that this interpretation is wrong and that the third requirement does not assign to singular terms the function of basic subjects of scientific discourse, but rather acknowledges that substantial predicates have a certain prerogative to occur in denoting phrases. Consequently, Aristotle’s three demands turn out to be compatible with one another. (shrink)

[From SEP]: Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary VE research program. These (...) include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and which methods to use. It will be helpful to note some terminology before proceeding. First, we use ‘cognitive’, ‘epistemic’ and ‘intellectual’ synonymously. Second, we often use ‘normative’ broadly to include not only norms and rules, but also duties and values. Finally, ‘practitioners’ names contemporary virtue epistemologists. (shrink)

Entende-se que os experimentos mentais são dispositivos da imaginação que podem nos fornecer crenças que constituem conhecimento. John D. Norton apresentou uma abordagem que se tornou influente para explicar como os experimentos mentais científicos podem produzir novos conhecimentos so- bre o mundo. Ele afirma que não há nada distintivo nos experimentos men- tais, uma vez que sustenta que eles funcionam exatamente como argumen- tos. Neste artigo, contestamos sua abordagem. Examinamos aspectos essen- ciais de sua abordagem, que envolvem as noções de (...) “argumento” e “inferên- cia” para mostrar que um sujeito que chega a saber algo através da execução ou condução de um experimento mental dificilmente será considerado como tendo efetivamente executado um argumento ou um processo de raciocínio inferencial. (shrink)

BARROZO, Victor Breno Farias. Memória, Transmissão e emoção: estudo sobre a modernidade religiosa no pensamento de Danièle Hervieu-Léger. 2014. Dissertação (Mestrado), Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências da Religião, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte. Palavras-Chave: Danièle Hervieu-Léger. Modernidade religiosa. Senso religioso contemporâneo. Memória. Transmissão. Emoção. Keywords : Danièle Hervieu-Léger. Religious modernity. Contemporary religious sense. Memory. Transmission. Emotion.

O objetivo deste estudo é identificar como a adoção aparece nas histórias de vida de indivíduos adotados e como eles normalizam suas experiências relacionadas à adoção. Focaliza-se a re-historiação do “eu” na narrativa e considera-se que o seu final é determinado por quem constrói a narrativa, não por eventos relatados cronologicamente. Os dados provêm das narrativas de dois indivíduos adotados, transcritas segundo convenções utilizadas na Análise da Conversa Etnometodológica, nas quais se destaca a presença dos eventos relacionados à adoção na (...) re-historiação dos pesquisados e na constituição de seus “eus” parciais, considerando também as características rítmicas e outras propriedades da fala em interação. Foi possível constatar que o final da história influencia na maneira como a narrativa é construída e como as experiências de adoção aparecem nas narrativas, com maior ou menor grau de normalização a elas atribuído. (shrink)

In this paper, Charles Mills discusses what he calls “white ignorance”, developing one of the main themes of his 1997 book, The Racial Contract. His discussion is concerned with the idea of a cognitive disadvantage based on membership in a social group, which is not strange to the radical philosophical tradition, and that has been explored with more vigor in the recent Social Epistemology, in debates about epistemic injustices, silencing, willful ignorance, cognitive biases, epistemological standpoints, etc. Mills argues for an (...) “Epistemology of the white ignorance”, a racially and socially situated epistemology, which contraposes itself, in a great extent, to the individualistic tendencies of the traditional epistemological work, while conserving the interests in objectivity and truth of this work. (shrink)

At the beginning of the first book of Posterior Analytics, Aristotle‟s feature of demonstrative knowledge involves a certain concept of “necessity”. The traditional interpretation tends to associate this concept with modal necessity, which is found in the Prior Analytics and De interpretatione. The present article aims to show in which way the sixth chapter of book A of Posterior Analytics presupposes a set of essentialist theses that claims to base the necessity of scientific knowledge on predicative relations of essential character. (...) To acknowledge this essentialist background and simultaneously support a modal interpretation of scientific necessity urges us to attribute serious drawbacks to Aristotle‟s theory of demonstration, forcing us to reassess this interpretative tendency. (shrink)

Brain–machine interfaces combining visual, auditory, and tactile feedback have been previously used to generate embodiment experiences during spinal cord injury rehabilitation. It is not known if adding temperature to these modalities can result in discomfort with embodiment experiences. Here, comfort levels with the embodiment experiences were investigated in an intervention that required a chronic pain SCI patient to generate lower limb motor imagery commands in an immersive environment combining visual, auditory, tactile, and thermal feedback. Assessments were made pre-/ post-, throughout (...) the intervention, and at 7 weeks follow up. Overall, high levels of embodiment in the adapted three-domain scale of embodiment were found throughout the sessions. No significant adverse effects of VR were reported. Although sessions induced only a modest reduction in pain levels, an overall reduction occurred in all pain scales at follow up. A high degree of comfort in the comfort scale for the thermal-tactile sleeve, in both the thermal and tactile feedback components of the sleeve was reported. This study supports the feasibility of combining multimodal stimulation involving visual, auditory, tactile, and thermal feedback to generate embodiment experiences in neurorehabilitation programs. (shrink)