Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 299-314, October 2021.

Princeton University Press, 984. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (3.9 MB).

A identidade corporal e a expressão da sexualidade na cultura ocidental são marcadas por tabus, devendo ser restritas à intimidade das “quatro paredes”. Entretanto, a experiência da intimidade é construída socialmente e carrega consigo todas as marcas de um tempo histórico, no qual os corpos estão inscritos. As mulheres prostitutas que desafiam os prescritivos morais da sexualidade atrelados à reprodução e ao matrimônio e que monetizam a experiência sexual, sofrem penalidades sociais, como a exclusão. O objetivo deste trabalho é refletir, (...) a partir do filme Uma linda mulher, o modo como a identidade corporal das mulheres profissionais do sexo é significado socialmente, com base na literatura brasileira. A metodologia eleita é a análise de filme, por meio das categorias temáticas: objetificação do corpo feminino, invisibilização social do corpo feminino e adestramento corporal. As vestimentas, a composição estética de uma profissional do sexo pertencente a um contexto de classe baixa, como retratado no filme pela personagem Vivian, são alvo de um estereótipo de vulgaridade e a reduz a um objeto sexual. Essas mulheres tornam-se mais vulneráveis aos diversos tipos de violência, abuso e exploração, que, além da desumanização dos corpos, promove a invisibilização e o descarte para aqueles que não alimentam o estereótipo da prostituição. Para pertencer à classe das mulheres “respeitáveis”, rendem-se ao adestramento corporal e cultural, tornando-se este o passaporte para a visibilidade social. Tal percurso ocorre no filme com a personagem Vivian, que passa por um adestramento do seu corpo, por meio da contenção de seus hábitos gestuais anteriores, a fim de performar socialmente o lugar de uma mulher moralmente respeitável, o que também pode ser entendido como violência, podendo ser considerada uma ilustração do cenário brasileiro. (shrink)

Princeton University Press, 1982. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (5 MB).

John Pollock aims to construct a theory of rational decision making for real agents--not ideal agents. Pollock argues that theories of ideal rationality are largely irrelevant to the decision making of real agents. Thinking about Acting aims to provide a theory of "real rationality.".

This book addresses the question of how and why history begins with the work of Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War is distinctive in that it is a prose narrative, meant to be read rather than performed. It focuses on the unfolding of contemporary great power politics to the exclusion of almost all other elements of human life, including the divine. Western history has been largely an extension of Thucydides' narrative in that it repeats the unique methodological assumptions and (...) concerns that first appear in his text. The power of Thucydides' text has never been attributed either to the charm of its language or to the entertainment value of its narrative, or to some personal attribute of the author. In this study, Darien Shanske analyzes the difficult language and structure of Thucydides' History and argues that the text has drawn in so many readers into its distinctive world view precisely because of its kinship to the contemporary language and structure of Classical Tragedy. This kinship is not merely a maTter of shared vocabulary or even aesthetic sensibility. Rather, it is grounded in a shared philosophical position, in particular on the polemical metaphysics of Heraclitus. (shrink)

This book is addressed to readers who have laid the foundation of a liberal education & are beginning the special study of law.

Thucydides is the author of the most harrowing account of societal breakdown in antiquity. Brian Leiter has recently made the provocative claim that Thucydides’ analysis of such breakdowns indicates that morality is of little import in guiding behavior, including legal behavior. Yet Thucydides also narrates events, particularly in Athens, that indicate that something resembling morality can continue to guide action, including legal action, even at the worst of times. Thucydides provides tantalizing clues as to why he narrates events that only (...) sometimes follow the path predicted by Leiter. In particular, Thucydides (accurately) portrays the law that suffuses Athenian life and saves Athens itself as, for the most part, informal and infused with moral concerns. Leiter's reading of Thucydides therefore not only is limited but misses implicit arguments that challenge Leiter's broader argument for a particular form of legal realism. (shrink)

David Hume: Moral Philosophy Although David Hume is commonly known for his philosophical skepticism, and empiricist theory of knowledge, he also made many important contributions to moral philosophy. Hume’s ethical thought grapples with questions about the relationship between morality and reason, the role of human emotion in thought and action, the nature of moral … Continue reading David Hume: Moral Philosophy →.

This paper is informed by my own participant observation and uses my own ethnography which included conducting in-depth interviews with anonymous paid egg donors and observing a listserv for women considering, pursuing, or having completed egg donation, to illustrate the way that power operates at this particular site of the reproductive center in postmodernity. After outlining who the consumers and providers of eggs are, I will use Foucault's concepts of biopower, disciplinary power, and normativity to describe how anonymous paid egg (...) donation plays a socially useful role in reproducing privilege and in preserving the myth of the nuclear family. Drawing on feminist theorizing to problematize altruism, I will show how the construction of the altruist narrative feeds the preservation of that myth by giving egg donors appropriately feminine motivations. Finally, I will focus on one particular site of resistance on the part of egg donors—controlling their self-presentation, tweaking the pool of eggs—to underscore the simultaneity of control of and control by egg donors. (shrink)

A fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and of the Royal Society, William Clifford made his reputation in applied mathematics, but his interests ranged far more widely, encompassing ethics, evolution, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. This posthumously collected two-volume work, first published in 1879, bears witness to the dexterity and eclecticism of this Victorian thinker, whose commitment to the most abstract principles of mathematics and the most concrete details of human experience resulted in vivid and often unexpected arguments. Volume 1 includes (...) a detailed biographical introduction by Clifford's colleague, Frederick Pollock, who situates his close friend's interests in Darwin and Spinoza within a larger, life-long devotion to the principles of scientific enquiry and experiment. This volume also features two important essays, 'On Some of the Conditions of Mental Development', his first public lecture delivered at the Royal Institute in London, and 'The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences'. (shrink)

The “grand problem” of AI has always been to build artificial agents with human-like intelligence. That is the stuff of science fiction, but it is also the ultimate aspiration of AI. In retrospect, we can understand what a difficult problem this is, so since its inception AI has focused more on small manageable problems, with the hope that progress there will have useful implications for the grand problem. Now there is a resurgence of interest in tackling the grand problem head-on. (...) Perhaps AI has made enough progress on the little problems that we can fruitfully address the big problem. The objective is to build agents of human-level intelligence capable of operating in environments of real-world complexity. I will refer to these as GIAs — “generally intelligent agents”. OSCAR is a cognitive architecture for GIAs, implemented in LISP.1 OSCAR draws heavily on my work in philosophy concerning both epistemology (Pollock 1974, 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2008b, 2008; Pollock and Cruz 1999; Pollock and Oved, 2005) and rational decision making (2005, 2006, 2006a). (shrink)

The contributions in this volume make an important effort to resurrect a rather old fashioned form of foundationalism. They defend the position that there are some beliefs that are justified, and are not themselves justified by any further beliefs. This epistemic foundationalism has been the subject of rigorous attack by a wide range of theorists in recent years, leading to the impression that foundationalism is a thing of the past. DePaul argues that it is precisely the volume and virulence of (...) the assaults which points directly to the strength and coherence of the position. (shrink)

Internalism in epistemology is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are importantly internal to the believer, while externalism is the view that at least some of those factors are external. This extremely modest first approximation cries out for refinement (which we undertake below), but is enough to orient us in the right direction, namely that the debate between internalism and externalism is bound up with the controversy over the correct account of the distinction (...) between justified beliefs and unjustified beliefs.1 Understanding that distinction has occasionally been obscured by attention to the analysis of knowledge and to the Gettier problem, but our view is that these problems, while interesting, should not completely seduce philosophers away from central questions about epistemic justification. A plausible starting point in the discussion of justification is that the distinction between justified beliefs and unjustified beliefs is not the same as the distinction between true beliefs and false beliefs. This follows from the mundane observation that it is possible to rationally believe.. (shrink)

Philosophy and AI presents invited contributions that focus on the different perspectives and techniques that philosophy and AI bring to the theory of ...

This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.

This special issue explores intersections of feminism, postcolonialism, and technoscience. The papers emerged out of a 2014 research seminar on Feminist Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies at the Institute for Research on Women and Gender, University of Michigan. Through innovative engagement with rich empirical cases and theoretical trends in postcolonial theory, feminist theory, and STS, the papers trace local and global circulations of technoscience. They illuminate ways in which science and technology are imbricated in circuits of state power and global (...) inequality and in social movements resisting the state and neocolonial orders. The collection foregrounds the importance of feminist postcolonial STS to our understandings of technoscience, especially how power matters for epistemology and justice. (shrink)

"A sequel to Pollock's How to Build a Person, this volume builds upon that theoretical groundwork for the implementation of rationality through artificial ...

Pandemics first and foremost hit those who are most vulnerable, and the COVID-19 pandemic is not different. Although the infection rate in the nation’s poorest neighborhoods is twice as it is in th...

Princeton University Press, 1974. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (5 MB).

As the market and civil society sectors reflect different core logics, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that partner with companies need strategies to cope with these differences. This paper seeks to provide insight into the coping strategies of environmental NGOs that partner with corporations. We present an assessment framework to analyse the strategies of the Environmental Defense Fund and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature Netherlands as case studies. The analysis demonstrates that the strategic options for a partnering NGO are guided and (...) constrained by the choices the NGO makes with regard to its action strategy towards companies. Although individual NGOs manage to cope adequately with the challenges that the partnership trend poses to their organisations, we argue that the partnering trend also creates challenges for the NGO field as a whole. (shrink)

There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.

In this book Pollock deals with the subject of probabilistic reasoning, making general philosophical sense of objective probabilities and exploring their ...

In terms of the Science of Theological Statement [Kalam] Abd Allah Baydawi concisely outlines perceived Islamic reality - in its modes of the naturally Possible, the apodictically Divine, and the humanly heroic Prophetic - as the process of perfecting man's spiritual structure.

Pollock describes an exciting theory of rationality and its partial implementation in OSCAR, a computer system whose descendants will literally be persons.

This paper recognizes the complexity of the debate on informed consent and discusses the importance of the ongoing process of consent for people affected by Huntington's disease (HD). Although written information may not be the most appropriate form of obtaining informed consent in qualitative research, it remains an important part of the ethical approval process for health research in the UK. This paper draws on a study in which the information sheet and consent form were specifically designed to help obtain (...) consent from people who may be impaired by the cognitive and physical effects of HD. The forms were developed by drawing on expert opinion and relevant literature and fall in line with recommendations from the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to encourage people to make their own decisions. The paper describes the feasibility of a method for obtaining consent as an ongoing process with patients affected by HD using information sheets and consent forms specifically designed for people with potential cognitive and/or physical impairments. In conclusion, this paper adds a pragmatic approach to the debate on informed consent by describing the development of a written information sheet and consent form being used in a current social research study. Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of written information being adapted according to the needs of potential participants. (shrink)

Reidel, 1976. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (3.3 MB).

Pollock argues that theories of ideal rationality are largely irrelevant to the decision making of real agents. Thinking about Acting aims to provide a theory of "real rationality.".

Human beings think of themselves in terms of a privileged non-descriptive designator — a mental “I”. Such thoughts are called “de se” thoughts. The mind/body problem is the problem of deciding what kind of thing I am, and it can be regarded as arising from the fact that we think of ourselves non-descriptively. Why do we think of ourselves in this way? We investigate the functional role of “I” (and also “here” and “now”) in cognition, arguing that the use of (...) such non-descriptive “reflexive” designators is essential for making sophisticated cognition work in a general-purpose cognitive agent. If we were to build a robot capable of similar cognitive tasks as humans, it would have to be equipped with such designators. Once we understand the functional role of reflexive designators in cognition, we will see that to make cognition work properly, an agent must use a de se designator in specific ways in its reasoning. Rather simple arguments based upon how “I” works in reasoning lead to the conclusion that it cannot designate the body or part of the body. If it designates anything, it must be something non-physical. However, for the purpose of making the reasoning work correctly, it makes no difference whether “I” actually designates anything. If we were to build a robot that more or less duplicated human cognition, we would not have to equip it with anything for “I” to designate, and general physicalist inclinations suggest that there would be nothing for “I” to designate in the robot. In particular, it cannot designate the physical contraption. So the robot would believe “I exist”, but it would be wrong. Why should we think we are any different? (shrink)

Representation and computation are the best tools we have for explaining intelligent behavior. In our program, we explore the space of representations present in the mind by constraining them to explain data at multiple levels of analysis, from behavioral patterns to neural activity. We argue that this integrated program assuages Brette's worries about the study of the neural code.

Leading scholars offer new readings of Degas1 representations of the family, prostitution, city life and leisure in which looking at women is shown to be a complex and ambiguous process. One major topic of the book is the encounter between feminism and art history. Having put images of women1 on the agenda of cultural analysis, feminist interventions in the theory and analysis of representation have created a diverse and intricate field of interpretation which now supersedes that formulation. These essays challenge (...) art history to confront issues of spectatorship, the interface of class and gender, identification and the politics of vision. This illustrated collection is thus a major contribution to debates on representation and sexuality. (shrink)

The objective of this book is to produce a theory of rational decision making for realistically resource-bounded agents. My interest is not in “What should I do if I were an ideal agent?”, but rather, “What should I do given that I am who I am, with all my actual cognitive limitations?” The book has three parts. Part One addresses the question of where the values come from that agents use in rational decision making. The most comon view among philosophers (...) is that they are based on preferences, but I argue that this is computationally impossible. I propose an alternative theory somewhat reminiscent of Bentham, and explore how human beings actually arrive at values and how they use them in decision making. Part Two investigates the knowledge of probability that is required for decision-theoretic reasoning. I argue that subjective probability makes no sense as applied to realistic agents. I sketch a theory of objective probability to put in its place. Then I use that to define a variety of causal probability and argue that this is the kind of probability presupposed by rational decision making. So what is to be defended is a variety of causal decision theory. Part Three explores how these values and probabilities are to be used in decision making. In chapter eight, it is argued first that actions cannot be evaluated in terms of their expected values as ordinarily defined, because that does not take account of the fact that a cognizer may be unable to perform an action, and may even be unable to try to perform it. An alternative notion of “expected utility” is defined to be used in place of expected values. In chapter nine it is argued that individual actions cannot be the proper objects of decision-theoretic evaluation. We must instead choose plans, and select actions indirectly on the grounds that they are prescribed by the plans we adopt. However, our objective cannot be to find plans with maximal expected utilities. Plans cannot be meaningfully compared in that way. (shrink)