In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minds, Memes, and MultiplesStephen R. L. Clark (bio)AbstractMultiple Personality Disorder is sometimes interpreted as evidence for a radically pluralistic theory of the human mind, judged to be at odds with an older, monistic theory. Older philosophy, on the contrary, suggests that the mind is both plural (in its sub-systems or personalities) and unitary (in that there is only one light over all those lesser parts). Talk of gods and (...) demons has been a way of arranging elements of human mind and motivation. The one light, or center, is something which requires mental discipline to discover rather than being immediately obvious. This indeed is what even Descartes (sometimes blamed for introducing the notion of a simple, transparent self) really intended. Discovering or uncovering the Self is a psychotherapeutic as well as a philosophical imperative.Keywordsconsciousness, gods, Multiple Personality Disorder, passivity, thought alienationMultiple Personality 1The phenomena popularly identified as evidence of “multiple personality disorder” are strangely attractive. The stories suggest that those who provide, who are, the evidence for this disorder are usually in acute distress, but those who wish to believe in it find the idea almost exhilarating. Most of us would rather wish to think that we had undeveloped possibilities, that it would be exciting to be a married academic today, a celibate bus-driver tomorrow and a teenage hooligan on Sundays. The impulse to put aside our duties, or our habits, can be a powerful one, and only the sober thought that we would not, after all, succeed in keeping our lives separate keeps us single. The notion that there are people who take the risk, that our bodies could house a multitude, is one we would wish to believe. At the same time, we wish to remember that such divisions bring their own problems, and as easily suspect that those who apparently succeed in dividing themselves up must have suffered serious trauma in the past, and be plagued by missed appointments and self-hatred in the present. Some of us believe that “multiple personality” reveals a truth about us all, that none of us is actually the simple, heroic self that we pretend: “the self” is only an occasionally concordant swarm of impulses, easily divided. Others of us suspect that it is a wish to avoid responsibility, and guilt, that causes some of us to pretend not to be the selves that actually we are (see Rycroft 1987).On earlier occasions (notably Clark 1991b), I have myself expressed some doubt about reports of Multiple Personality Disorder, and suggested that they should be seen as fictions or dramatic representations (whether by the patient or the reporter) which should not be judged as “true” or “false,” but rather as “interesting” or “pernicious.” Stephen Braude, in a recent excellent book, seems at first to side with the true believers: it is absurd, he suggests, not to believe the many reports of fugue, discordance and fully developed multiples (Braude 1991; see also Wilkes 1984, [End Page 21] Brennan 1990). Maybe a few such reports are over-credulous: it would not be surprising that the occasional clever criminal successfully pretended not to know what an alien other did with his body. But there are, he says, too many independent records to disbelieve, and not only the distant stories of Miss Beauchamp (Prince 1908) or Eve (Thigpen & Cleckley 1954, 1957). Since the 1970s the number of reported cases has been rising again. It may be that some, many, or all the cases are artifacts, in the sense that the doctor’s expectations helped to produce or develop the varied personalities: “when a client walks into the therapist’s office and sits down, the expectation framework of the therapist immediately comes into play” (Crabtree 1985, 211; see also Hawthorn 1983). But the evidence is also compatible with the thought that psychotherapeutic fashion now allows the therapist to notice, rather than invent, the phenomena. Multiples often wish to conceal their condition, it is said, and only observers alerted to the possibility will notice them. Conscious or half-conscious role-playing, which would perhaps be less philosophically interesting, cannot explain more than a few of the cruder cases.In short... (shrink)

Illness has a way of disorientating us, as if we are cast adrift in a foreign land. Like strangers in a dessert we seek oasis to recollect ourselves, find refuge and learn to build our own shelters. Using the philosophy of Levinas and Derrida, we can interpret health care providers (HCP), and the sites from which they act (e.g. hospitals), as _dwelling hosts_ that offer hospitality to strangers in this foreign land. While often the dwellings are physical (e.g. hospitals), this (...) is not always the case. Language represents a mobile home of refuge to the sick. Using language the HCP has built a shelter so as to dwell in the land of illness. However, while hospitality is an inviting concept, it also implies hostility. The door that opens may also be slammed shut. This article explores the paradox of the linguistic mobile home offered to patients. It highlights the power of language to construct a safe place in a strange land, but also explores the inherent violence. It ends with an exploration of the ways language can be used by HCP to assist patients to construct their own mobile shelters. (shrink)

This chapter looks at several ways philosophy deals with natural law, especially through the work of Ayn Rand, whose thought was a major influence on one of the creators of Doctor Stephen Strange, Steve Ditko. Rand's philosophy, known as objectivism, covers a lot of ground, but the chapter focuses on what she perceives to be its foundation, the three basic axioms of life: existence, consciousness, and identity. For an Objectivist like Mordo, knowledge must serve natural law. For (...) Strange knowledge serves the mission: he sees violating natural law as another option, and one that sometimes allows him to uphold it in a broader sense. Strange was not only willing to defend Earth by using his knowledge and choosing to violate natural law, but in doing so he became the only one able to stand up to Dormammu and defeat him. (shrink)

Doctor Stephen Strange and Leo Tolstoy both experienced significant changes in mid‐life, though, that affected their worldviews and led them to reconsider the meaning of life. For his part, Tolstoy developed a strong opposition to violence, even when used in resistance to evil. A central focus of Tolstoy's newfound philosophy is the evil of the violence practiced by humans throughout history. The metaphysical nature of evil is reflected in the amount of time Doctor Strange spends (...) in such realms as the Dream Dimension, fighting the darkness that tries to take over human minds and souls. If Tolstoy were in the world of Doctor Strange, he might open the sacred Book of Vishanti, don the Eye of Agamotto, and become a sorcerer‐defender of our planet from demonic evil. (shrink)

Doctor Stephen Strange, the Master of the Mystic Arts, not only chose to live the life of a hero, but did so in such a way that links him to one of the most important philosopher‐heroes of all time. In making the choice to pursue the Mystic Arts and dedicating himself to living a life devoted to seeking wisdom, acting rightly, and improving society, Doctor Strange set out on a trail blazed more than 2000 years (...) ago by the original philosopher and hero, Socrates. In order to learn the truth of wisdom, virtue, and beauty, Socratic Heroes must step outside themselves and engage in deep self‐examination. While intellectual humility and the examined life shine the spotlight directly on the “wannabe” philosopher, Socratic Heroism also includes a social component that looks outward. Strange transformed into a sorcerer supreme, and a true Socratic Hero, by accepting his own limitations and looking for wisdom in the right place. (shrink)

Doctor Stephen Strange was a renowned neurosurgeon in his “previous life”, but after his time in Kamar‐Taj he is mostly associated with his mastery of the mystic arts. In Doctor Strange people learn that mastery of physical skills is critical for mastery as a mystic. In addition to the physical skills of martial arts, the portrayal of Doctor Strange is reminiscent of many aspects of Eastern philosophical traditions. Ironically, the reason that Strange (...) originally gave for seeking the elixir is that he swore the Hippocratic Oath, which requires him to prescribe medical treatments for the good of his patients. One problem with applying the Hippocratic Oath to Strange's choice is that it's meant to apply to the doctor‐patient relationship. Perhaps Stan Lee and Steve Ditko, the creators of Doctor Strange, meant to show that, by losing his skill as a surgeon, Strange finally learned what it means to be a good physician. (shrink)

As Sorcerer Supreme, Doctor Stephen Strange has had several occasions in which he had to deal with the concept of a personal God. Despite his lack of traditional faith, there are important instances in which Doctor Strange acknowledges the Creator God using expressions drawn from the Western monotheistic traditions. In his Metaphysics, the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle presents the idea of God, or more specifically a god among the gods, who is responsible for the origin (...) and operation of the whole universe. A more helpful image of God can be found in the writing of Saint Thomas Aquinas, who formed a theological synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian revelation. According to Aquinas, the all‐good Creator of the universe is the author of the moral law. In the Chronicles of Narnia, author and English professor C. S. Lewis refers to the eternal law of God as the “deep magic” that comes from the “Emperor Beyond the Sea”. (shrink)

This chapter presents a movie Doctor Strange, which is about a gifted physician. Throughout the course of the movie, Doctor Stephen Strange experience a magnificent existential conversion. Early in the film, Strange holds a philosophical perspective that has three primary features: it is empirical, practical, and scientific. Strange starts to realize that there might be meaning and value to existence, but that these things can only be found outside of scientific nihilism. After facing (...) off with Kaecilius, Strange finds himself in a dilemma once he achieves prowess as a powerful sorcerer and uses his abilities to help defend the New York Sanctum. Although Strange started with a perspective that was mostly nihilistic about the meaning of life, by the end of the film, he has discovered his freedom to make authentic choices and decisions which are ultimately more powerful and effective than his old ones. (shrink)

In the 2016 film Doctor Strange, the title character undergoes a radical transition from successful neurosurgeon to highly skilled sorcerer. This chapter examines what Doctor Stephen Strange's transition can teach us about the nature of scientific inquiry. Philosopher Thomas Kuhn thought that “scientific revolutions” often looked quite a bit like Strange's experience, where scientists refused to change their fundamental ideas about how the world works, or their paradigms, until a series of crises forced them (...) to. At certain points in history, however, scientists have changed their paradigms, such as when they adopted the Copernican, sun‐centered model of the solar system over the older Ptolemaic, Earth‐centered model. In Strange's particular case, this same sort of shift occurs when he abandons his career as a surgeon for one as an aspiring sorcerer. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for two theses. First, if Christianity is true, then morality should depend on the metaphysics of the afterlife. Second, if Christianity is true, then contemporary moral theory is mistaken. The argument for the first thesis rests on two premises. If rightness depends on an act’s effects on an individual, then—at least in part—it depends on the long-term effects on him. If rightness depends—at least in part—on the long-term effects on an individual, then it depends on (...) the metaphysics of the afterlife. The argument for the second thesis rests on how heaven or hell swamp other considerations. By changing assumptions about the nature of heaven or hell, who goes there, and standard mathematics, we end up with different ethical theories. Some of these assumptions conflict with contemporary moral theory regarding killing, letting die, and saving. (shrink)

….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a difference between minds and bodies (...) per se, it is not initially clear what he is maintaining. Maybe this is because one no longer recognizes ‘minds’ as entities in their own right, or ‘substances.’ However, selves - the things we refer to by use of ‘I’ - are surely substances, and it does little violence to the intention behind mind/body dualism to interpret it as a dualism of bodies and selves. If the substance dualist’s meaning remains obscure, that is because it can mean several different things to say that selves are not bodies. (shrink)

Substantial efforts have recently been made to reform the physician-patient relationship, particularly toward replacing the `silent world of doctor and patient' with informed patient participation in medical decision-making. This 'new ethos of patient autonomy' has especially insisted on the routine provision of informed consent for all medical interventions. Stronly supported by most bioethicists and the law, as well as more popular writings and expectations, it still seems clear that informed consent has, at best, been received in a lukewarm fashion (...) by most clinicians, many simply rejecting what they commonly refer to as the `myth of informed consent'. The purpose of this book is to defuse this seemingly intractable controversy by offering an efficient and effective operational model of informed consent. This goal is pursued first by reviewing and evaluating, in detail, the agendas, arguments, and supporting materials of its proponents and detractors. A comprehensive review of empirical studies of informed consent is provided, as well as a detailed reflection on the common clinician experience with attempts at informed consent and the exercise of autonomy by patients. In the end, informed consent is recast as a management tool for pursuing clinically and ethically important goods and values that any clinician should see as meriting pursuit. Concurrently, the model incorporates a flexible, anticipatory approach that recognizes that no static, generic ritual can legitimately pursue the quite variable goods and values that may be at stake with different patients in different situations. Finally, efficiency of provision is addressed by not pursuing the unattainable and ancillary. Throughout, the traditional principle of beneficence is appealed to toward articulating an operational model of informed consent as an intervention that is likely to change outcomes at the bedside for the better. (shrink)

This paper expands the literature on accounting ethics education by considering the teaching of ethics in accounting doctoral education. Some of the ethical issues that might be addressed in accounting doctoral education are reviewed. A number of matters relating to teaching ethics to accounting doctoral students are considered. The paper concludes with a summary and some final remarks.

….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a difference between minds and bodies (...) per se, it is not initially clear what he is maintaining. Maybe this is because one no longer recognizes ‘minds’ as entities in their own right, or ‘substances.’ However, selves - the things we refer to by use of ‘I’ - are surely substances, and it does little violence to the intention behind mind/body dualism to interpret it as a dualism of bodies and selves. If the substance dualist’s meaning remains obscure, that is because it can mean several different things to say that selves are not bodies. (shrink)

In “Friendship Amongst the Self-Sufficient: Epicurus” (this Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 2001), Andrew Mitchell explores the Epicurean view of the relationship between self-sufficiency and friendship by contrasting it with the views of Aristotle and the Stoics. Epicurus, Aristotle, and the Stoics do indeed have interestingly different views on friendship that are well worth comparing. Yet Mitchell’s characterization of Aristotelian friendship is misleading, his account of Stoic friendship is inaccurate, and his interpretation of Epicurean friendship is curiously imaginative but (...) ultimately rather strange. (shrink)

‘What does the brain have to do with learning?’Prima facie, this may seem like a strange thing for anyone to say, especially educational scholars, researchers, practitioners, and policy makers. There are, however, valid objections to injecting various and sundry neuroscientific considerations piecemeal into the vast field of education. These objections exist in a variety of dimensions. After providing a working definition for educational neuroscience, identifying the ‘mindbrain’ as the proper object of study thereof, I discuss, dispel or dismiss some (...) of these objections prior to presenting my motivations, aims, and prospects for this new area of educational research. I then briefly outline a positive case for educational neuroscience in terms of theories, methods, and collaborations, and conclude with a brief discussion of some challenges, results, and implications thereof. Naturally, the following considerations are but my own, some of which may be shared to some extent by others working in this area, as the case may be. (shrink)

In October 2015 I supervised a series of séances in Hanau, Germany with Felix Circle physical medium Kai Mügge. The purpose was to try to obtain better documentation of Kai’s table levitations than my team was able to achieve in Austria in 2013 (Braude, 2014). Although that goal was not met over the course of four séances, we nevertheless witnessed some interesting phenomena that are difficult to explain away normally given the control conditions imposed at the time. These include object (...) movements beyond the reach of the sitters, a very strange “exploding” sound from the séance table, and some extended levitations in which the table seemed to sway or swim in mid-air. But what may be most interesting about this series of séances is the way the phenomena reflect the complex, and tortured, underlying psychodynamics of the occasion. Indeed, what readers need to know about the FEG phenomena has as much to do with personalities involved as with the phenomena themselves. As a result, this report focuses as much on the background to the investigation as on the investigation itself. (shrink)

In what follows I consider whether the idea of a person's interest or good might be better understood through that of care or concern for that person for her sake, rather than conversely, as is ordinarily assumed. Contrary to desire-satisfaction theories of interest, such an account can explain why not everything a person rationally desires is part of her good, since what a person sensibly wants is not necessarily what we would sensibly want, insofar as we care about her. First, (...) however, a tale: There was no other explanation which seemed reasonable. … [W]as it not reasonable to assume that he meant never to claim his birth-right? If this were so, what right had he, William Cecil Clayton, to thwart the wishes, to balk the self-sacrifice of this strange man? If Tarzan of the Apes could do this thing to save Jane Porter from unhappiness, why should he, to whose care she was intrusting her whole future, do aught to jeopardize her interests? (shrink)

According to the Balinese expert, Dr. Anak Agung Mad ´e Djelantik, “no writings about aesthetics specifically as a discipline exist in Bali.”1 The arts are discussed in ancient palm leaf texts, but mainly in connection with religion, spirituality, ceremony, and the like. However, there are famous accounts by expatriate Westerners and anthropologists.2 There have also been collaborations between Balinese and Western scholars.3 In addition, there is a significant literature written in Indonesian by Balinese experts, beginning in the 1970s.4 Considerable experience (...) of the culture is necessary to appreciate the full detail of these analyses and to be able to understand the arts from a Balinese perspective. I attempt neither task in this paper. What I have written is addressed more to the cultural tourist than the anthropologist. Tourists are often captivated by the colorful opulence of Balinese culture and the centrality of art to the daily lives of ordinary Balinese. At the same time, all but the most indifferent or obtuse cannot fail to notice that the Balinese attitude to the arts is sometimes strangely different from our own Western culture. In following sections, I outline what is likely to strike non-Balinese as puzzling or unique in the Balinese attitude to and treatment of the arts. I focus on four areas: the relation between art and religion and between art and community, the competitive aspect of the arts, and the high value placed on novelty, innovation, and adaptation. I begin, though, by discussing notions that are foundational in Balinese aesthetics. (shrink)

The experience of having to suffer debilitating pain is far too common in the United States, and many patients continue to be inadequately treated by their doctors. Although many physicians freely admit that their pain management practices may have been somewhat lacking, many more express concern that the prescribing of heightened levels of opioid analgesics may result in closer regulatory scrutiny, criminal investigation, or even criminal prosecution.Although several researchers have examined the regulatory environment and the threat of sanction or harm (...) it poses to physicians and patients, few have examined the likelihood of investigation or prosecution stemming from the aggressive use of opioids in physician-directed pain management. Accordingly, in an effort to assess whether the fear of prosecution is realistic and, if so, what factors contribute to its likelihood, we surveyed chief prosecutors in four states about their knowledge, opinions, and attitudes concerning opioids and the prosecution of physicians stemming from the treatment of patients who were either terminally ill or suffering from chronic noncancer pain. (shrink)

The experience of having to suffer debilitating pain is far too common in the United States, and many patients continue to be inadequately treated by their doctors. Although many physicians freely admit that their pain management practices may have been somewhat lacking, many more express concern that the prescribing of heightened levels of opioid analgesics may result in closer regulatory scrutiny, criminal investigation, or even criminal prosecution.Although several researchers have examined the regulatory environment and the threat of sanction or harm (...) it poses to physicians and patients, few have examined the likelihood of investigation or prosecution stemming from the aggressive use of opioids in physician-directed pain management. Accordingly, in an effort to assess whether the fear of prosecution is realistic and, if so, what factors contribute to its likelihood, we surveyed chief prosecutors in four states about their knowledge, opinions, and attitudes concerning opioids and the prosecution of physicians stemming from the treatment of patients who were either terminally ill or suffering from chronic noncancer pain. (shrink)

Conscience and conscientious objections are important issues in medical law and ethics. However, discussions tend to focus on a particular type of conscience-based claim. These types of claims are based upon predictable, generalizable rules in which an individual practitioner objects to what is otherwise standard medical treatment. However, not all conscience based claims are of this type. There are other claims which are based not on an objection to a treatment in general but in individual cases. In other words, these (...) cases may involve practices which the doctor does not usually object to but does so in this instance on these facts. This paper will explore these types of conscience-based claims in two ways. First, it will explore whether these types of individualised conscience-based claims are really conscience claims at all. Second, it will explore how these claims interact with the other sorts of judgements we expect doctors to make in these cases. (shrink)

Recognizing that students are fundamentally engaged in a process of learning and self-development, ethical review of sub-doctoral student research should be proportionate to that objective. A student's tutor has the pedagogical role and an ethics committee should not interfere with that relationship other than to seek to avoid harms unforeseen by either the student or tutor. Underpowered or other statistically or methodologically flawed sub-doctoral research should not however, in general, be regarded as ethically concerning. With the proviso that no subject (...) is harmed the student can be allowed to learn such lessons as their mistakes may afford them. (shrink)

The Doctor Strange offers a unique opportunity to explore the question: how can people say that something exists if it can't be detected in the physical world. As a physician and a man of science, Doctor Stephen Strange has a strictly materialist worldview. Before Kamar‐Taj, Strange sought his cure through the only means he could understand: medicine and science. Medicine and science always push the boundaries of what people can know about the human body (...) and the universe, constantly discovering new methods and drugs through research and experimentation. The Doctor Strange provides an opportunity to consider the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard writes that “it is also the ultimate passion of the understanding to will the collision” with the unknown. Kierkegaard describes two different kinds of teachers in the Philosophical Fragments: Socratic teacher and the god as teacher. The Ancient One seems to be a combination of the Socratic teacher and the god as teacher. (shrink)

n one of the numerous movie versions of A Christmas Carol , Ebenezer Scrooge, mounting the steps to visit his dying partner, Jacob Marley, encounters a dignified gentleman sitting on a landing. "Are you the doctor?" Scrooge inquires. "No," replies the man, "I'm the undertaker; ours is a very competitive business." The cutthrought world of intellectuals must rank a close second, and few events attract more notice than a proclamation that popular ideas have died. Darwin's theory of natural selection (...) has been a perennial candidate for burial. (shrink)

Most clinicians take for granted a simple, reductionist understanding of medical knowledge that is at odds with how they actually practice medicine; routine medical decisions incorporate more complicated kinds of information than most standard accounts of medical reasoning suggest. A better understanding of the structure and function of knowledge in medicine can lead to practical improvements in clinical medicine. This understanding requires some familiarity with epistemology, the study of knowledge and its structure, in medicine. Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowing (...) is advanced as the basis for developing a more accurate understanding of medical knowledge. Tacit knowing, which explores the taken-for-granted background knowledge that underlies all human knowing, is explained in detail with a focus on its relevance for clinical medicine. The implications of recognizing tacit knowing in medicine and medical decisions are discussed. These include the ability to explain the importance of the clinical encounter in medical practice, mechanisms for analysing patient and doctor as persons, and the need for humility given the uncertainty that the tacit dimension injects into all medical decisions. This more robust medical epistemology allows clinicians to better articulate the nature and importance of patient-centred care, to avoid pitfalls inherent in reductionist approaches to medical knowledge, and to think more clearly about the relationships between medicine and health care at the individual and population levels. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Elizabeth Gould, “The Nomadic Turn: Epistemology, Experience, and Women College Band Directors”Stephen Franklin ZdzinskiI want to thank Elizabeth Gould for providing us with a thought-provoking paper examining the journeys of women university band directors through a post-modernist and feminist perspective. As a music education professor who deals with students from undergraduate through doctoral levels, I have the opportunity to provide professional guidance to many students, (...) both female and male. A number of my female instrumental music education students ask me about becoming high school and university band directors. I want to be honest with them about the realities of the profession, but I want also to encourage them to pursue their [End Page 195] professional dreams and goals despite any potential structural limitations. I found this paper to provide me with very good insights that I can use to advise my students.According to Gould, there are a number of factors that contribute to the under-representation of women in the field of college band directing. For example, we can see that historically the first band directors and instrumental music educators came either from military or professional performance backgrounds and as a result, most instrumental music teachers were initially male. In addition, early college band organizations, particularly marching musical organizations, were entirely male in composition. While these conditions have not continued to the present day, they set the stage for what was to follow.Socialization and Women University Band DirectorsThe different socialization of girls and boys may also be found to play a role in the under-representation of women as university band directors. A number of researchers have found gender differences in instrument selection,1 and other research points to additional familial socialization differences by gender.2According to Paul Woodford,3 the primary socialization of music education majors and the formation of a music teacher's identity occur during their own pre-collegiate schooling. Several researchers have suggested that precollegiate teaching experiences may be influential in decisions to choose music teaching as a career.4 Through countless hours of observation in their own programs, female and male students may be socialized to professional expectations of band directing before they ever enter a university-based instrumental music education program. Sylvia Tibbets, Winifred Shepard and David Hess, Stan Albrecht, Philip Griswold, and Denise Chroback all found that instrumental music teaching was viewed by both children and adults as a masculine profession.5 Woodford found that many of our current teacher education programs merely recreate existing practices, thus replicating inequitable situations in regards to opportunities for women in the profession of high school and college band directing.6After graduation, the outcome of a gender-influenced instrument choice may be inhibiting the career aspirations of future women band directors. Research by Barry Kopetz examined the influences of gender, school type, and instrument on instrumental music teacher selection by school principals.7 While significant gender differences in favor of males were found, they accounted for only 3% of the variance in teacher selection. Also important was the type of school being attended (performance versus music education institution), also accounting for 3% of the variance. Instrument, on the other hand, accounted for 10% of the variance in teacher selection, with teachers being selected in the following order: [End Page 196] trumpet, clarinet, oboe, and violin. If one examines the instruments commonly played by female instrumentalists, the research by Kopetz may suggest that gender discrimination in band hiring may in fact be exaggerated by playing the "wrong" instrument. If the student in addition comes from a performance-oriented school, that is considered by hiring officials as another negative factor that reduces their job possibilities.Structural Difficulties and Woman University Band DirectorsGould makes an interesting point when she states that while it is useful to know about the reasons for a lack of women in the band directing profession, this information by itself is not going to change things until we actually understand the structural underpinnings of the problem. The use of the metaphor of the nomad is helpful in attempting to explain the structural difficulties inherent in women becoming university band directors. In fact, I... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Elizabeth Gould, “The Nomadic Turn: Epistemology, Experience, and Women College Band Directors”Stephen Franklin ZdzinskiI want to thank Elizabeth Gould for providing us with a thought-provoking paper examining the journeys of women university band directors through a post-modernist and feminist perspective. As a music education professor who deals with students from undergraduate through doctoral levels, I have the opportunity to provide professional guidance to many students, (...) both female and male. A number of my female instrumental music education students ask me about becoming high school and university band directors. I want to be honest with them about the realities of the profession, but I want also to encourage them to pursue their [End Page 195] professional dreams and goals despite any potential structural limitations. I found this paper to provide me with very good insights that I can use to advise my students.According to Gould, there are a number of factors that contribute to the under-representation of women in the field of college band directing. For example, we can see that historically the first band directors and instrumental music educators came either from military or professional performance backgrounds and as a result, most instrumental music teachers were initially male. In addition, early college band organizations, particularly marching musical organizations, were entirely male in composition. While these conditions have not continued to the present day, they set the stage for what was to follow.Socialization and Women University Band DirectorsThe different socialization of girls and boys may also be found to play a role in the under-representation of women as university band directors. A number of researchers have found gender differences in instrument selection,1 and other research points to additional familial socialization differences by gender.2According to Paul Woodford,3 the primary socialization of music education majors and the formation of a music teacher's identity occur during their own pre-collegiate schooling. Several researchers have suggested that precollegiate teaching experiences may be influential in decisions to choose music teaching as a career.4 Through countless hours of observation in their own programs, female and male students may be socialized to professional expectations of band directing before they ever enter a university-based instrumental music education program. Sylvia Tibbets, Winifred Shepard and David Hess, Stan Albrecht, Philip Griswold, and Denise Chroback all found that instrumental music teaching was viewed by both children and adults as a masculine profession.5 Woodford found that many of our current teacher education programs merely recreate existing practices, thus replicating inequitable situations in regards to opportunities for women in the profession of high school and college band directing.6After graduation, the outcome of a gender-influenced instrument choice may be inhibiting the career aspirations of future women band directors. Research by Barry Kopetz examined the influences of gender, school type, and instrument on instrumental music teacher selection by school principals.7 While significant gender differences in favor of males were found, they accounted for only 3% of the variance in teacher selection. Also important was the type of school being attended (performance versus music education institution), also accounting for 3% of the variance. Instrument, on the other hand, accounted for 10% of the variance in teacher selection, with teachers being selected in the following order: [End Page 196] trumpet, clarinet, oboe, and violin. If one examines the instruments commonly played by female instrumentalists, the research by Kopetz may suggest that gender discrimination in band hiring may in fact be exaggerated by playing the "wrong" instrument. If the student in addition comes from a performance-oriented school, that is considered by hiring officials as another negative factor that reduces their job possibilities.Structural Difficulties and Woman University Band DirectorsGould makes an interesting point when she states that while it is useful to know about the reasons for a lack of women in the band directing profession, this information by itself is not going to change things until we actually understand the structural underpinnings of the problem. The use of the metaphor of the nomad is helpful in attempting to explain the structural difficulties inherent in women becoming university band directors. In fact, I... (shrink)

The case of the Brazilian medium, Carlos Mirabelli, is one of the most tantalizing and frustrating in psychical research. If his phenomena—especially his psychokinetic manifestations—occurred as reported, he was probably the greatest physical medium of all time. Mirabelli reportedly moved objects (including very large objects) at a distance, levitated himself while bound to a chair, and dematerialized and transported to another location objects of all kinds (including himself). Mirabelli also reportedly produced full-figure materializations in bright daylight. Sitters would watch them (...) form; attending physicians would carefully examine them for up to 30 minutes and report ordinary bodily functions; photographs of the figures would be taken; and then they would slowly dissolve or fade before everyone’s eyes. However, Mirabelli was also clearly guilty of fraud on occasion, including his notorious doctoring of a photo ostensibly showing him to be levitating. His case therefore presents an all too familiar challenge to psi research—namely, how to assess cases of so-called “mixed” mediumship. (shrink)

This book looks at a family of views involving the pro-life view of abortion and Christianity. These issues are important because major religious branches (for example, Catholicism and some large branches of Evangelicalism) and leading politicians assert, or are committed to, the following: (a) it is permissible to prevent some people from going to hell, (b) abortion prevents some people from going to hell, and (c) abortion is wrong. They also assert, or are committed to, the following: (d) it is (...) permissible to use defensive violence to prevent people from killing innocents, (e) doctors who perform abortions kill innocents, and (f) it is wrong to use defensive violence against doctors who perform abortions. In this book, I argue that these and other principles are inconsistent. (shrink)

Philosopher Martin Heidegger and German poets who evoke nature offer excellent introductions to elemental earth. Those poets privilege earth among the elements using their earthy language. Heidegger views earth as the hidden ground of things. The article approaches elemental earth through Heidegger’s analysis of what he views as Georg Trakl’s crucial line of poetry about earth: “something strange is the soul on earth.” Heidegger stresses the soul as the stranger. In contrast, this article argues that on the basis of (...) a contextual analysis of Trakl’s poetry and some other German poetry, it is the earth that is strange. Forgotten earth is the background out of which and the foundation upon which things manifest themselves. Elemental earth makes possible human experience of space and place. (shrink)

Professor Gostin is a leading authority on health law, whose writing and teaching are among the most authoritative in the United States, as exemplified by his recent work, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint. Gostin's article in this issue of the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics pays homage to Jonathan Mann by expressing the debt he feels toward this extraordinary doctor and public health official with whom he had collaborated on several projects.As many will remember, Mann held high-level (...) positions at the Centers for Disease Control and worked on AIDS research in Central Africa before setting up the World Health Organization's Global Programme on AIDS, which he ran from 1986 to 1990. Thanks to his profound commitment and consummate communication skills, he achieved the unprecedented feat of raising the budget within two years to almost $100 million from the initial set-up of “himself, a secretary, and one typewriter,” as described by Daniel Tarantola. (shrink)

An “objectified God” does not satisfy. On this point, surely all will agree with Doctor Marti. To seek an “objectivie essence” behind God’s presence is implicitly to deny the reality of that presence. In subjecting the idea of God to ratiocination, the absoluteness and infinity of God are compromised, for a God-object must assume a particular existence over against the divine essence, and thereby abandon God’s freedom to be, the divine essence as pure relation. On this, reason and faith (...) are in perfect harmony: when God is reduced to an object, it is no longer God that is in view. (shrink)

After briefly recounting a strange, quasi-mystical experience I had while first reading Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, I devote most of this article to exploring various similarities between theories Kant developed and ideas more commonly associated with Paul Tillich. Hints are drawn from Chris Firestone’s book, Kant and Theology at the Boundaries of Reason, which argues that my interpretation of Kant echoes themes in Tillich’s ontology. Among the themes whose Kantian roots I explore are Tillich’s theories of: God (...) as the Ground of Being; faith as ultimate concern; courage as the proper life-choice in the face of the anxiety that naturally arises out of an honest response to the human situation, given our fundamental alienation from the divine; the crucial role of cultural symbols in bringing faith into historically realistic expressions; political forms as ideally self-negating; and love as a gift that we must express with power and justice in order to be efficacious. After considering whether Kant influenced Tillich more than Tillich ever admitted, I conclude by wondering if my own effort to develop an “affirmative” interpretation of Kant’s theory of religion may have itself had a hidden influence from my prior reading of Tillich. * Professor of Philosophy, Dept. of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR, China ׀ [email protected]. (shrink)

Probably, most JSE readers already have at least a rough idea of what the term “synchronicity” means. The concept of synchronicity—it hardly deserves its familiar classification as a theory—is usually credited to Carl Jung (Jung 1973), although Jung really didn’t do much actually to clarify the notion. I’ll say something shortly about the problems with Jung’s approach, but what he had in mind—again, very roughly speaking—is this. We’ve all experienced coincidences in our lives: surprising combinations of events that appear to (...) be causally unrelated. Of course, what surprises us about the events isn’t simply that they’re apparently unrelated causally. That’s true of many (if not most) pairs of events at any given time, and in fact the vast majority of events are completely unremarkable when considered in combination. The event-clusters in a coincidence attract our attention first, because something about their combination seems personally noteworthy or strange, and second because we consider that combination to be more or less improbable. In fact, the more improbable we believe the event-clusters to be, the more significant and remarkable the coincidences are likely to seem. (shrink)

Consistent materialists are almost bound to suggest that , if it exists at all, is no more than epiphenomenal. A correct understanding of the real requires that everything we do and say is no more than a product of whatever processes are best described by physics, without any privileged place, person, time or scale of action. Consciousness is a myth, or at least a figment. Plotinus was no materialist: for him, it is Soul and Intellect that are more real than (...) the phenomena we misdescribe as material. Nor does he suppose that consciousness depends on language (as Stoics and modern materialists have sometimes said): wordless experience is actually superior. And much of what counts towards our present consciousness is to be discarded. It is better not to remember most of what now seems more significant to us; better to discard images; better that the intellect be than , losing any sense of separation between subject and object. The goal of the Plotinian intellectual is to join , but it is a mark of the good dancer that she is not conscious of what she does. There is therefore a strange confluence between Plotinus and modern materialists: our experience at least is transitory, deceitful, epiphenomenal, and is to be encountered when we have shed our illusions. (shrink)

Philosophers of earlier ages have usually spent time in considering thenature of marital, and in general familial, duty. Paley devotes an entire book to those ‘relative duties which result from the constitution of the sexes’,1 a book notable on the one hand for its humanity and on the other for Paley‘s strange refusal to acknowledge that the evils for which he condemns any breach of pure monogamy are in large part the result of the fact that such breaches are (...) generally condemned. In a society where an unmarried mother is ruined no decent male should put a woman in such danger: but why precisely should social feeling be so severe? Marriage, the monogamist would say, must be defended at all costs, for it is a centrally important institution of our society. Political community was, in the past, understood as emerging from or imposed upon families, or similar associations. The struggle to establish the state was a struggle against families, clans and clubs; the state, once established, rested upon the social institutions to which it gave legal backing. (shrink)

While humanists have pondered the subject of love to the point of obsessiveness, philosophers have steadfastly ignored it. One might wonder whether the discipline of philosophy even recognizes love. The word _philosophy _means “love of wisdom,” but the absence of love from philosophical discourse is curiously glaring. So where did the love go? In _The Erotic Phenomenon,_ Jean-Luc Marion asks this fundamental question of philosophy, while reviving inquiry into the concept of love itself. Marion begins his profound and personal book (...) with a critique of Descartes’ equation of the ego’s ability to doubt with the certainty that one exists—“I think, therefore I am”—arguing that this is worse than vain. We encounter being, he says, when we first experience love: I am loved, therefore I am; and this love is the reason I care whether I exist or not. This philosophical base allows Marion to probe several manifestations of love and its variations, including carnal excitement, self-hate, lying and perversion, fidelity, the generation of children, and the love of God. Throughout, Marion stresses that all erotic phenomena, including sentimentality, pornography, and even boasts about one’s sexual conquests, stem not from the ego as popularly understood but instead from love. A thoroughly enlightening and captivating philosophical investigation of a strangely neglected subject, _The Erotic Phenomenon _is certain to initiate feverish new dialogue about the philosophical meanings of that most desirable and mysterious of all concepts—love. (shrink)

Practitioners of disciplines whose problems are debated by moral philosophers regularly complain that the philosophers are engaged in abstract speculation, divorced from ‘real-life’ consequences and responsibilities, that it is the practitioners (doctor, research scientist, politician) who must take the decisions, and that they cannot (and should not) act in accordance with strict abstract logic.

This paper begins the last instalment of a six-part project correlating the key aspects of Kant’s architectonic conception of philosophy with a special version of the Chinese Book of Changes that I call the “Compound Yijing”, which arranges the 64 hexagrams (gua) into both fourfold and threefold sets. I begin by briefly summarizing the foregoing articles: although Kant and the Yijing employ different types of architectonic reasoning, the two systems can both be described in terms of three “levels” of elements. (...) Starting at an unnumbered level devoid of any element (the tao or thing in itself), the system proceeds by elaborating a key fourfold distinction (or “quaternity”) on the first level, a twelvefold distinction on the second level, and twelve quaternities (grouped in four quadrants, each with a set of three quaternities) on the third level. Each set of three quaternities (i.e., each quadrant) on the third level corresponds to one of the four “faculties” of the university, as elaborated in Kant’s book, The Conflict of the Faculties. Previous papers have examined the correlations between three key quaternities that Kant defends in relation to each of three faculties (philosophy, theology, and law) and the 12 gua that correspond to that faculty in the Compound Yijing. The final step is to explore the fourth quaternity on the third level, the 12 gua corresponding to the medical faculty. The “idea of reason” in Kant’s metaphysics that guides this wing of the comparative analysis is freedom, and the ultimate purpose of this faculty of the university is to train doctors to care for people’s physical well-being, as free agents imbedded in nature. But this paper will focus only on the four gua that correspond to four basic concepts in Kant’s theory of medicine. The two quaternities in the “yin-yang” (medical) quadrant of the Compound Yijing that will be skipped here are as follows. First, Kant’s account of the idea of freedom itself, which gives rise to the area of traditional metaphysics known as rational cosmology, comes in the first Critique’s Dialectic, in the section on the Antinomy of Reason (CPR A405-567/B432- 595). There he examines four irresolvable issues: whether the world has a beginning in time; whether composite substances consist of simple parts; whether a causality of freedom operates in the natural world; and whether an absolutely necessary being exists. Later I will argue that these correspond to the quaternity consisting of gua 15, 22, 36, and 52. (shrink)

Consistent materialists are almost bound to suggest that ‘conscious experience’, if it exists at all, is no more than epiphenomenal. A correct understanding of the real requires that everything we do and say is no more than a product of whatever processes are best described by physics, without any privileged place, person, time or scale of action. Consciousness is a myth, or at least a figment. Plotinus was no materialist: for him, it is Soul and Intellect that are more real (...) than the phenomena we misdescribe as material. Nor does he suppose that consciousness depends on language (as Stoics and modern materialists have sometimes said): wordless experience is actually superior. And much of what counts towards our present consciousness is to be discarded. It is betternotto remember most of what now seems more significant to us; better to discard images; better that the intellect be ‘drunk’ than ‘sober’, losing any sense of separation between subject and object. The goal of the Plotinian intellectual is to join ‘the dance of immortal love’, but it is a mark of the good dancer that she is not conscious of what she does. There is therefore a strange confluence between Plotinus and modern materialists:ourexperience at least is transitory, deceitful, epiphenomenal, and ‘reality’ is to be encountered when we have shed our illusions. (shrink)

Practitioners of disciplines whose problems are debated by moral philosophers regularly complain that the philosophers are engaged in abstract speculation, divorced from ‘real-life’ consequences and responsibilities, that it is the practitioners (doctor, research scientist, politician) who must take the decisions, and that they cannot (and should not) act in accordance with strict abstract logic.

Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible. (Foucault, OT, 318)Man is a mode of being which accommodates that dimension-always open, never finally delimited, yet constantly traversed-which extends from a part of himself not reflected in a cogito to the act of thought by which he apprehends that part; and which, in the inverse direction, extends from that (...) pure apprehension to ... the whole silent horizon of what is posited in the sandy stretches of non-thought .... The question is no longer: How can experience of nature give rise to necessary judgements? But rather: How can man think what he does not think, inhabit as though by a mute occupation something that eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement that figure of himself that takes the form of a stubborn exteriority? (pp. 322-3). (shrink)