In standard quantum mechanics, a state vector \ may belong to infinitely many different orthogonal bases, as soon as the dimension N of the Hilbert space is at least three. On the other hand, a complete physical observable A is associated with a N-dimensional orthogonal basis of eigenvectors. In an idealized case, measuring A again and again will give repeatedly the same result, with the same eigenvalue. Let us call this repeatable result a modality \, and the corresponding eigenstate \. (...) A question is then: does \ give a complete description of \? The answer is obviously no, since \ does not specify the full observable A that allowed us to obtain \; hence the physical description given by \ is incomplete, as claimed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in their famous article in 1935. Here we want to spell out this provocative statement, and in particular to answer the questions: if \ is an incomplete description of \, what does it describe? is it possible to obtain a complete description, maybe algebraic? Our conclusion is that the incompleteness of standard QM is due to its attempt to describe systems without contexts, whereas both are always required, even if they can be separated outside the measurement periods. (shrink)

Excerpt from Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie Seit Leibniz Die präftabilirte @armonie 124. Demeiß be? Dafeinß (öotteß 125. (öotteäbegriff 128. Die befie 28elt unb ihre 92othroenbigteit 128. Determinifmuß 132; Dollfommenheit ber qbelt 133; Dheobicee 134; baß Döfe 140. Dranfcenbeng (R)otteä 143. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original (...) format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.

Probleme der Psychologie.--Proaktive Psychologie kontra reaktive Psychologie.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

HEINRICH SCHIPPERGES vollendete am 17. Marz 1983 sein 65. Lebensjahr. Urn ihm eine Freude zu machen, ja urn ihm die gebiihrende Referenz zu erweisen, hatte sich am 19. Marz im Auditorium der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften ein Kreis von Gratulanten eingefun­ den. Die Sprecher brachten ihre Gabe, je einen Beitrag aus dem eigenen Arbeitsgebiet, zum Vortrag, und der lubilar selbst griff in die Speichen. Er zeigte, was er unter "An­ thropologie" versteht. Nicht aIle Beitdige zu diesem Buche konnten miindlich ausgebreitet (...) werden, aus auBeren Grunden. Nicht alles, was gesagt wurde, konnte gedruckt werden, aus ganz verschiedenen sachlichen Grunden. Es ist nur natiirlich, daB in unserem Buche die historischen Aspekte iiberwiegen. Andererseits geht es gewiI3 nicht nur urn "Geschichte" und "Problemgeschichte", sondern urn klarende und kritische Untersuchungen zum Stand der "Hildegard-Forschung", zum Krankheits-, zum ModeIlbe­ griff, urn Gestalttheorie und Krankheitsforschung, - urn nur einiges zu nennen. Die Darstellung unserer "Aspekte" bringt, wie ich denke, zwei Kostbarkeiten: den Bericht der ehrwiirdigen Frau Sr. ADELGUNDIS FUHRKOTIER OSB iiber die Frage, was ist gesichert im literarischen Nachlaj3 der hI. Hildegard von Bingen, und die bezaubernde Geschichte der Vorwor­ ter der Dedikationsliteratur des 12. bis 17. sc. durch einen der besten Kenner des Prooemium, den lubilar selbst. Unser Buch enthalt elf wissenschaftliche Beitrage und eine bibliographische Materialsammlung zur Medizinischen Anthropologie. Dieser Beitrag will dem, der sich orientie­ ren muB, was diese Anthropologie darstellt und wie sie ge­ worden ist, einen "Handapparat" geben. (shrink)

In this article we present a possible way to make usual quantum mechanics fully compatible with physical realism, defined as the statement that the goal of physics is to study entities of the natural world, existing independently from any particular observer’s perception, and obeying universal and intelligible rules. Rather than elaborating on the quantum formalism itself, we propose a new quantum ontology, where physical properties are attributed jointly to the system, and to the context in which it is embedded. In (...) combination with a quantization principle, this non-classical definition of physical reality sheds new light on counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics such as the origin of probabilities, non-locality, and the quantum-classical boundary. (shrink)

The theory of so-called‘mental images’, which is put forward again in contemporary cognitive psychology, is criticized by way of elaborating the distinctly different intentional structures of the mental activities of‘remembering something’and‘representing something pictorially’(by means of a painting, photo, sculpture, etc.) It is suggested that psychology in its concept and theory formation could use profitably phenomenological-descriptive analyses of the different forms of intentionality as exemplified in the paper.

SummaryThe theory of so‐called‘mental images’, which is put forward again in contemporary cognitive psychology, is criticized by way of elaborating the distinctly different intentional structures of the mental activities of‘remembering something’and‘representing something pictorially’ It is suggested that psychology in its concept and theory formation could use profitably phenomenological‐descriptive analyses of the different forms of intentionality as exemplified in the paper.

In previous articles we presented a simple set of axioms named “Contexts, Systems and Modalities”, where the structure of quantum mechanics appears as a result of the interplay between the quantized number of modalities accessible to a quantum system, and the continuum of contexts that are required to define these modalities. In the present article we discuss further how to obtain Born’s rule within this framework. Our approach is compared with other former and recent derivations, and its strong links with (...) Gleason’s theorem are particularly emphasized. (shrink)

On the whole our study has made a plea for the combined research into the history, methodology and philosophy of science. There is an intricate communication between these aspects of science, philosophy being both a fruit of scientific developments and a higher-level frame of reference for discussion on the inevicable metaphysical issues in science.As such philosophy can be very useful to science, but should never impose its ideas on the conduct of scientists . ... Zie: Summary.

Following an article by John von Neumann on infinite tensor products, we develop the idea that the usual formalism of quantum mechanics, associated with unitary equivalence of representations, stops working when countable infinities of particles (or degrees of freedom) are encountered. This is because the dimension of the corresponding Hilbert space becomes uncountably infinite, leading to the loss of unitary equivalence, and to sectorisation. By interpreting physically this mathematical fact, we show that it provides a natural way to describe the (...) “Heisenberg cut”, as well as a unified mathematical model including both quantum and classical physics, appearing as required incommensurable facets in the description of nature. (shrink)

After reminding the main issues at stake in the famous Einstein–Bohr debate initiated in 1935, we tentatively propose a way to get them closer, thus shedding a new light on this historical discussion.

This paper reflects on the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and scientific psychology. It tries to show how phenomenological results have relevance and validity for present-day cognitive developmental psychology by arguing that consciousness matters in the study of the representational mind. The paper presents some methodological remarks concerning empirical or applied phenomenology; it describes the conception of an exploratory developmental study with 3 to 9-year-old children viewing a complex pictorial display; it then illustrates how a phenomenological interpretation of the data works; (...) in conclusion, it sketches a view of realism about conscious experiences which is taken to be inherent in the phenomenological perspective of understanding the representational mind. (shrink)

"Allerdings, das ist eine grosse Frage, der ich zu sehr ausgewichen bin, die Evidenz des Ich als ein Identisches, das also doch nicht in dem Bündel bestehen kann." (Husserl, 1907) Bekanntlich verwirft Husserl in den Logischen Untersuchungen die Auffassung, "dass die Beziehung auf das Ich etwas zum we sentlichen Bestande des intentionalen Erlebnisses selbst Gehöriges sei'',! und bildet um 1907, nach Einführung der phänomenolo gischen Reduktion, "die Beziehung auf das Ich zu unterlassen, oder von ihr zu abstrahieren" geradezu die Bedingung, (...) ein "reines Phänomen im Sinne der Phänomenologie" 2 zu gewinnen. Und bekanntlich heisst es demgegenüber in den Ideen von 1913: "Unter den allgemeinen Wesenseigentümlichkeiten des tran szendental gereinigten Erlebnisgebietes gebührt eigentlich die erste Stelle der Beziehung auf das,reine' Ich",3 und revidiert Husserl in der zweiten Auflage der Logischen Untersuchungen von 4 1913 seine Stellungnahme zur Frage des reinen Ich. Weniger bekannt ist bisher, wie Husserl auf seinem Denkweg von der einen zur anderen Stellungnahme zum Problem des Ich gekommen ist. Was bewegte ihn, das "Ich" in die phänomeno logische Problematik einzubeziehen? Zu vermuten war, dem Wandel in der Stellung zum Problem des Ich liege ein Wandel im Verständnis der Phänomenologie selbst zugrunde. Welche Phänomene motivierten, auf dem phänomenologischen Boden selbst, die Einbeziehung des Ich? Vor allem dieser Frage gehen wir, unter Berücksichtigung des Nachlassmaterials des Husserl Archivs (Leuven), in unserer Studie nach. (shrink)

The paper first addresses Husserl's conception of philosophical phenomenology, metaphysics, and the relation between them, in order to explain why, on Husserl's view, there is no metaphysics of consciousness without a phenomenology of consciousness. In doing so, it recalls some of the methodological tenets of Husserl's phenomenology, pointing out that phenomenology is an eidetic or a priori science which has first of all to do with mere ideal possibilities of consciousness and its correlates; metaphysics of consciousness, on the other hand, (...) has to do with its reality or actuality, requiring an eidetic foundation in order to become scientifically valuable. Presuming that, if consciousness is to be the subject-matter of a metaphysics which is not simply speculative or based on prejudice, it is crucial to get the phenomenology of consciousness right, the paper then engages in a detailed descriptive-eidetic analysis of mental acts of re-presenting something and tries to argue that their structures, involving components of non-actual experiencing, pose a serious problem for a materialistic or physicalistic metaphysics of consciousness. The paper ends with a brief comment on Husserl's broader view of metaphysics, having to do with the irrationality of the transcendental fact, i.e. the constitution of the factual world and the factual life of the mind. (shrink)

The most common tendencies in religious life of the second half of the twentieth century, which I propose to call "convergent processes". The term "convergence" was first used by German scholar Henry Frick in his work Comparative Religion. In seeking to approximate the terminology of the natural sciences and social sciences, begun by DF Schlemmacher, G. Frick used the term in the sense in which it was already used primarily in biology, where this concept characterizes the process of appearance of (...) similarities in the structure and functions in distant the origin of the organisms as a result of their adaptation to the same conditions of existence. The term was used by the researcher to refer to similar processes in different religions. (shrink)

In this paper I explore possibilities of bringing post-positivist philosophies of empirical science to bear on the dynamics of mathematical development. This is done by way of a convergent accommodation of a mathematical version of Lakatos's methodology of research programmes, and a version of Kuhn's account of scientific change that is made applicable to mathematics by cleansing it of all references to the psychology of perception. The resulting view is argued in the light of two case histories of radical conceptual (...) innovations. (shrink)

This paper consists in a study of the development of Husserl’s thought on the notions of phantasy and image consciousness. It shows how, following a first phase in which he still identified phantasy with image consciousness, Husserl gradually began to distinguish the two and define what is proper to each in an increasingly precise manner. The paper then shows how Husserl came to view pure phantasy as a modification of perception. Concerning image consciousness, it shows how the status of the (...) image-object and the nature of its reference to the image subject evolved throughout Husserl’s thought. The problems raised by this model are also discussed, in particular when it comes to cases where there is no image subject, e.g. in theatre. Finally, the paper shows how the development of these concepts in Husserl’s work involves a new conception of the notion of “phantasm” – one that goes hand in hand with rejection of the ‘content of apprehension-apprehension’ scheme. (shrink)