Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the (...) last 2300 years this basic idea has been expressed in many ways, resulting in a rather extended family of views, theories, and theory sketches. The members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences. (shrink)

To study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range ofunpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources ofdanger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation (...) is an index ofhow the animal about that situation. Withholding conditions or commodities for which an animal shows (i.e., for which it continues to work despite increasing costs) is very likely to cause suffering. In designing environments for animals in zoos, farms, and laboratories, priority should be given to features for which animals show inelastic demand. The care ofanimals can thereby be based on an objective, animal-centered assessment of their needs. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple response Russellians (...) might want to make to Plantinga’s anti-existentialist argument. I then explore one aspect of this response—one that leads to some rather curious consequences for the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. (shrink)

A constant of Frege’s writing is his rejection of indeterminate predicates as found in natural language. This paper follows Frege’s remarks on vagueness from the early "Begriffsschrift” to his mature works, drawing brief parallels with the main contemporary theories of vagueness. I critically examine Frege’s arguments for the inconsistency of natural language and argue that the inability to accommodate vagueness in his mature ontology is mainly due to heuristic rules of thumb which Frege took as essential, not to a deep (...) problem in his fundamental apparatus. (shrink)

Margaret Urban Walker’s essay ‘Getting out of line’ questions gendered assumptions about moral agency in old age and its assumed links to the concept of a ‘career self.’ In this article I develop and apply her critique to consider what forms ageing activism might take. This focuses on recognising and remembering the value of connections with people and with struggles that may both pre-date and outlive the individual. I suggest that we need to think of remembering as future as well (...) as past oriented and as political as well as personal. In developing my argument I draw from experience of working with old people in initiatives focussed on achieving change in health and social care services, on accounts of feminist activists of different generations and on personal reflections of contacts that embody both awareness of different vulnerabilities and of shared struggles for change. (shrink)

Critical comments on Guido Melchior’s book, Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (2019). In the second part of his book, Melchior aims to employ his sensitivity account of the epistemic concept of checking to explain well-known puzzle cases about knowing. My comments focus on Melchior’s explanation of knowledge-closure puzzles, as exemplified by Dretske’s zebra case. I raise three critical points about the explanation Melchior proposes for puzzles of this type.

The contemporary scientific and technological progress builds on the accomplishments of classical mechanics from the 19th century when the so-called ‘European scientific method and values’ were accepted practically by the whole educated world. Most scientific results and conclusions were reached based on the causal ontological approach proposed in principle already by Plato’s Socrates and developed further by Aristotle. Despite the late-modern paradigm shift in science, the topicality of the ontological approach proposed by Aristotle remains. On the other hand, 19th and (...) 20th century philosophers, mainly positivists such as Mach and Avenarius but also Schlick and Carnap, attempted to change this approach to unify scientific knowledge in accordance with an ideological, i.e. positivist outlook on reality. The authors place a special emphasis on the contribution of Rudolf Carnap and his interaction with Martin Heidegger. Three very different theories are applied to physical reality in the present: classical mechanics in the standard macroscopic realm, Copenhagen quantum mechanics in the microscopic realm, and special theory of reality in both realms in the case of systems consisting of objects having higher velocity values. Any explanation or description of transitions between different realms and theories had not been provided until now. Our paper describes the corresponding evolution in the modern period and identifies the underlying false philosophical assumptions and statements existing in today’s scientific systems. We will then demonstrate that one common theory for all realms of reality may exist; one that will be based fully on Hamilton equations. Only time change of particle impulse is to be determined by a corresponding force. All necessary characteristics of physical reality may be derived in such a case. Direct correlations of such physical approach to philosophy will be drawn. (shrink)

The causes of asymmetries for handedness and cerebral speech are of scientific interest, but is it sensible to try to determine which of these came first? I argue that (1) first causes belong to mythology, not science; (2) much of the cited evidence is weak; and (3) the treatment of individual differences is inadequate in comparison with the right shift theory.

In this article I wish to show how care ethics puts forward a fundamental critique on the ideal of independency in human life without thereby discounting autonomy as a moral value altogether. In care ethics, a relational account of autonomy is developed instead. Because care ethics is sometimes criticized in the literature as hopelessly vague and ambiguous, I shall begin by elaborating on how care ethics and its place in ethical theory can be understood. I shall stipulate a definition of (...) care ethics as a moral perspective or orientation from which ethical theorizing can take place. This will mean that care ethics is more a stance from which we can theorize ethically, than ready-made theory in itself. In conceiving care ethics in this way, it becomes possible to make clear that, for instance, a moral concept of autonomy is not abandoned, but instead is given a particular place and interpretation. In the final part of this article I will show how ‘relational autonomy’ can be applied fruitfully in the practice of psychiatric care. (shrink)

The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, (...) I then point out that a “sexy” conclusion that is sometimes drawn from Putnam-Burge-style externalist arguments, namely that our mental states are not in our heads, presupposes content essentialism — which suggests that the view is not entirely trivial. Moreover, it seems intuitively that physicalists should reject the view: If beliefs are physical states, how could they have their propositional contents essentially? I distinguish three readings of the title question. Content essentialism does seem fairly obvious on the first two, but not so on the third. I argue that the common-sense argument mentioned earlier presupposes one of the first two readings but fails to apply to the third, on which ‘belief’ refers to belief-state tokens. That’s because ordinary belief individuation is silent about belief-state tokens. Token physicalists, I suggest, should indeed reject content essentialism about belief-state tokens. What about token dualists? One might think they ought to embrace content essentialism about belief-state tokens. I end with puzzling why this should be so. (shrink)

The topic of science was one of the most significant topics in the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was not primarily a science methodologist; he could be considered a significant philosopher of science. Heidegger’s philosophy of science is often labeled supertemporal. Although Heidegger was interested in reflecting several stages of science, the present article only deals with his philosophical view of modern science. The article does not analyze how Heidegger reflects on particular sciences; it analyses how he reflects on science (...) as a whole, specifically the individual stages of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The basic question of the research is whether his philosophy of science before the “Turn” is in any way different from his philosophy of science after the “Turn,” i.e., whether we can speak of two completely different approaches to science, or whether it is possible to find some continuity between them. Besides Heidegger’s published works, the paper also reflects on the discovery of an original, unpublished version of his text and looks critically at some interpreters of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The study concludes that despite numerous differences in his reflection on science before and after the Turn, it can be stated that there is substantial continuity between the stages of Heidegger´s philosophy of science. (shrink)

I examine issues tied to the allegeddifficulties of mutual understanding betweenRussia and the West. I show that some of thebackground to these issues lies in thedifference of culturally grounded differencesin perceptual and conceptual schemata. In theWest, a broadly understood Aristotelianism andin Russia Neoplatonism designate dominantattitudes to the world. The Russian `lunar''consciousness, in comparison with the `solar''consciousness of the West, tends by and largeprecipitously to totalize the world, and theexperienced multiplicity of the real isreferred to its imagined center. The differencebetween Russia (...) and the West, limited to somedegree by mutual similarities, can become thebasis of an axiological and intellectualdialogue important for one side and theother. (shrink)

The T-biconditionals, also known as T-sentences or T-equivalences, play a very prominent role in contemporary work on truth. It is widely held that they are so central to our understanding of truth that conformance with them is indispensable to any account of truth that aspires to be adequate. Even “deflationists” and “inflationists” tend to agree on this point; their debate turns largely on just how central a role these biconditionals can play in a theory of truth. In the present paper, (...) I want to bracket this debate about their “theoretical role” and focus on the T- biconditionals themselves. They are typically presented as entirely unproblematic, as models of simplicity, clarity, and obviousness. I confess that I find them rather more puzzling than that. The main purpose of the paper is to reflect on some of these biconditionals and to survey and explore some doubts one might have about their virtues. (shrink)

Minimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate (...) explanation —a move that deprives it from giving support to Minimalism. At the heart of Minimalism lies a theory of truth for propositions. It is called the minimal theory, or MT for short. It consists of a collection of axioms. Each axiom is a proposition of the form.. (shrink)

In this article, I bring together the archive of institutional activism of Niara Sudarkasa in the U.S. and the posthumous impact of activist and public administrator Marielle Franco. The 1970s historical sources show Sudarkasa’s institutional solidarity with students and faculty in the creation of one of the first Africana Studies departments in the U.S. Reading them, I articulate an ethos for the curation ‘715 Haven Street: Art Looks Back,’ a public digital art gallery comprised of art and history found in (...) the DAAS Papers (Department of Afroamerican and African Studies) housed in the Bentley Library’s digital and physical archives. The analysis of the primary sources is guided by an engagement with the ‘Marielle Effect,’ generating a historical parameter for Abolitionist solidarity between American, Brazilian, Latin American, African American, Diasporic, and ally scholarly communities. The discussion of these parameters is embedded in my discussion of the concept of pacification, a phenomenon of colonial and post-colonial policing that survives through the perpetuation of an extra-judicial policing impetus articulated along race, identity, legality, and sexual legitimacy of subjects. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to describe the evolution of the fundamental guidelines according to René Girard’s interpretation of the Oedipus myth. After close examination, it appears Girard’s methodology is based on four complementary levels: (1) the common-sense tracking of sacrificial substitutions; (2) the careful analysis of symmetries and dissymmetries in mythical texts; (3) the identification of cross-cultural and historical persecution stereotypes; (4) the application of the common standard of evidence (i.e. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) for criminal conviction. (...) Throughout the paper, we will show that Girard’s approach bears strong resemblance with William Whewell’s method of consilience as well as Charles Sanders Peirce’s views of the historical sciences. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two general grounds. First, some (...) functionalists will object to being classified as reductionists. Second, Kim argues for a version (or a reading) of functionalism, conceptualized functionalism, that makes it rather similar to the “old” mind-body identity theory it was designed to replace. Moreover, Kim’s conceptualized functionalism turns out to be a somewhat surprising brand of reductionism—a reductionism with some eliminativist cut-outs and, possibly, some dualist leftovers. At the end of the paper I propose a construal of the more standard version of functionalism that obviates Kim’s argument for switching-over to his conceptualized version. (shrink)

According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial assumptions.

In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in (...) which a sentence, viz. the sentence 'I am a brain in a vat', is mentioned rather than used. In this respect my version of the argument is importantly different from what appears to be Putnam's own version. (shrink)

Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, (...) in particular, it will also do away with truth. I shall argue that there is, indeed, no way for Quine to protect truth against the type of argument he himself advanced in “Two Dogmas” against Carnap’s notion of analyticity. If he wants to keep his argument, Quine has to discard truth along with analyticity. At the end of the paper I suggest an interpretation of Quine on which he can be seen as having done just that. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa defender a tese de que há dois tipos diferentes de métodos nas éticas de Aristóteles. Costumeiramente, as prescrições metodológicas de EN VII 1 e EE I 6 são vistas como complementares, fazendo parte de um mesmo método que fora descrito por Barnes como o “método dos endoxa”. Esse método, claramente presente na prescrição da EN, consiste em estabelecer os phainomena, percorrer as aporias e provar o que for possível das opiniões reputadas. Contudo, o método que é (...) prescrito em EE I 6 parte da noção de “passar do mais vago ao mais preciso” utilizando os phainomena como indícios e modelos. Defenderemos aqui que a noção de phainomena, embora apareça nas duas prescrições, tem papéis e escopos diferentes em cada um dos métodos, de onde surge sua diferença. Para isso, analisaremos a prescrição de EN VII 1 juntamente ao assim chamado “método dos endoxa”, em seguida partiremos para a análise da prescrição de EE I 6 e, por fim, analisaremos detalhadamente a diferença entre essas duas prescrições. (shrink)

I want to discuss, in some detail, a short section from Quine’s Philosophy of Logic. It runs from pages 10 to 13 of the second, revised edition of the book and carries the subheading ‘Truth and semantic ascent’.1 In these two and a half pages, Quine presents his well-known account of truth as a device of disquotation, employing what I call Quine’s Ladder. The section merits scrutiny, for it has become the central document for contemporary deflationary views about truth.

According to a classical correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true iff it corresponds to a fact. The approach has its competitors. One of them, the identity theory of truth, pushes for a surprising simplification. It says that true propositions do not correspond to facts, they are facts. Some find this view too bizarre to be taken seriously. Some are attracted to it because they worry that the correspondence theory opens a gap between our thoughts and reality--a gap that, (...) once opened, will turn out to be unbridgeable, thus making it impossible for our thoughts to come into contact with reality and for us to attain knowledge. They think the identity theory will avoid these nasty consequences because it does not open the gap to begin with. The no-gap theme will play a role in the background of the present paper. It will surface at times. But the paper is more concerned with a different theme, the collapse-charge. Opponents of the correspondence theory sometimes charge that the theory is unstable, that it must collapse into the identity theory, because there is not enough play between true propositions and facts to leave room for a genuine relation to hold between them. Those who regard the identity theory as absurd might see this a reductio of the correspondence theory. Others might see it as an argument for the identity theory. After some exploration of the identity theory, I will present one form of the collapse-charge, then I will discuss what a correspondence theorist has to offer by way of a response. (shrink)

In 1976, I met John Bell several times in CERN and we talked about a possible violation of optical theorem, purity tests, EPR paradox, Bell’s inequalities and their violation. In this review, I resume our discussions, and explain how they were related to my earlier research. I also reproduce handwritten notes, which I gave to Bell during our first meeting and a handwritten letter he sent to me in 1982. We have never met again, but I have continued to discuss (...) BI-CHSH inequalities and their violation in several papers. The research stimulated by Bell’s papers and experiments performed to check his inequalities led to several important applications of quantum entanglement in quantum information and quantum technologies. Unfortunately, it led also to extraordinary metaphysical claims and speculations which in our opinion John Bell would not endorse today. BI-CHSH inequalities are violated in physics and in cognitive science, but it neither proved the completeness of quantum mechanics nor its nonlocality. Quantum computing advantage is not due to some magical instantaneous influences between distant physical systems. Therefore one has to be _cautious in drawing-far-reaching philosophical conclusions from Bell’s inequalities_. The true resource for quantum computing is contextuality and not nonlocality. (shrink)

No livro I da Ethica Eudemia, Aristóteles dedica um capítulo a considerações acerca de seu método. No entanto, analisando passagens de outros tratados do autor, é possível concluir que há algo comum que perpassa as diversas considerações acerca de seu método, a saber: que o ponto de partida de toda investigação é dado pelo que é mais cognoscível a nós, e todo o procedimento de investigação visa chegar ao que é mais cognoscível em si mesmo – o conhecimento estrito do (...) objeto, que inclui compreender suas causas. O objetivo deste trabalho é tentar compreender como esse procedimento acontece na investigação moral, que opera no âmbito do discurso e, portanto, das definições. Para isso, pretendemos analisar como acontece a passagem da análise do que é dado na experiência em direção ao conhecimento de suas causas, que é próprio de outros tratados aristotélicos, para a análise das opiniões vagas e imprecisas em direção às definições estritas com as quais a Ethica Eudemia pretende operar. (shrink)