Many humanists and social scientists argue—if not assume—that race's centrality in social-scientific research provides an empirical justification for its reality as a constructed kind. In this paper, we first regiment these arguments, and then show that they face significant challenges. Specifically, race-concepts' social-scientific success is compatible with race being neither constructed nor real.

Looking at responsibility within a Lévinasian sense, human beings are firstly seen not in the philosophically traditional sense, of being egocentric, but rather seen as ethical subjects based on “the other” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). The purpose of this paper is to examine the notion of responsibility as Lévinas conceptualized in the idea that human beings are responsible for not only themselves but for others. Lévinas within “Ethics as First Philosophy” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989) states that before all other forms (...) of being in the world there must be responsibility to the Other (Lévinas & Hand, 1989). Lévinas defines this to mean that before freedom of the subject, and their subjectivity, before self-consciousness, before the consciousness of consciousness, before being, and before relativity there is “responsibility for the Other pre-exists any self-consciousness” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75). Perhaps, Lévinas is saying that a human beings obligation comes before all of what follows from our being in this world, our obligation to the Other beginning with the “face to face” (Lévinas & Hand, 1989, p.75), interaction, which is our first and foremost responsibility, the responsibility to the Other. And to be ethical beings who begin with responsibility we rely on the fundamental relationship of others. This notion of responsibility appears when we encounter, in the face-to-face interaction, the unknowable other. However, does this responsibility extend to more than two individuals and to those outside our immediate proximity? For example, Lévinas states that it is the “face to face” notion of seeing one in distress, yet what if it is a group of people, and what if they are not in close proximity but on the other side of the world? What if they are on the other side of a screen that can also be artificial intelligence in our modern era. Are we still responsible? And if we are responsible, how does Lévinas’s concept of responsibility fit into that situation or is it limited? I want to examine responsibility in terms of proximity through a Lévinasian ethical lens and plurality, defined as more than two individuals, by questioning responsibility in terms of relationality, and vulnerability. I will be looking mainly at five authors Emmanuel Lévinas, Ernst Van Alphen, Judith Butler, Kevin Quashi, and Lisa Guenther, to answer the question of whether Lévinas’s definition of responsibility includes proximity, and plurality. (shrink)

Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism”, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and background (...) assumptions. Using examples of several different scientific practices, we argue that inquisitive truth monism outperforms true-belief monism. (shrink)

The ‘Practicum-3’ preservice teachers are those who are in their 3rd year of their degree studies and have prior teaching experience. The intent of this qualitative paper is to assess the challenges experienced by the preservice teachers and the tactics used by them to manage these challenges, during their first week of teaching practice. The challenges reported herein were thematically analysed after extrapolating from the participants’ narratives and presented within the context of the Gibbs’ Reflective Cycle. Findings from this study (...) reveal that there are several factors within and outside the control of the student teacher that affect the practicum experience. Further, the preservice teacher’s preparedness and emotional disposition significantly influence discharge of the duty. In the same vein, the mentor-mentee relations contribute a lot in making or breaking the practicum experience for student teachers in the UAE. The findings recommend further explorative assessments of the situation and necessary policy corrections in the preservice teacher education. (shrink)

This article attempts to study cost minimizing multi-objective fractional solid transportation problem with fuzzy cost coefficients c ˜ i j k r {\tilde{c}}_{ijk}^{r}, fuzzy supply quantities a ˜ i {\tilde{a}}_{i}, fuzzy demands b ˜ j {\tilde{b}}_{j}, and/or fuzzy conveyances e ˜ k {\tilde{e}}_{k}. The fuzzy efficient concept is introduced in which the crisp efficient solution is extended. A necessary and sufficient condition for the solution is established. Fuzzy geometric programming approach is applied to solve the crisp problem by defining membership (...) function so as to obtain the optimal compromise solution of a multi-objective two-stage problem. A linear membership function for the objective function is defined. The stability set of the first kind is defined and determined. A numerical example is given for illustration and to check the validity of the proposed approach. (shrink)

This chapter gives an overview of the various themes and issues discussed in the volume. It includes summaries of all chapters and places the contributions, some of which are part of a critical conversation format, in the context of the larger literature and debates.

Because idealizations frequently advance scientific understanding, many claim that falsehoods play an epistemic role. In this paper, we argue that these positions greatly overstate idealiza...

(2013). GENERAL ISSUE 2013. Angelaki: Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 1-2.

The purpose of this study is to explore and illuminate the phenomenon of busyness as experienced by nurses. The daily work of nursing practice is often characterized by a hectic pace in the execution of tasks. Previous research shows that busyness can potentially lead to a reduction in the quality of nursing. Little has been explored about nurses' own experiences of busyness. This study has a qualitative design. The method chosen is a phenomenological hermeneutical exploration of personal experiences. Results reveal (...) that busyness is experienced as a disparity between perceived necessary tasks and time available to accomplish them. Busyness has an outer dimension of events and a dimension of internal processes. Busyness is experienced as acceptable to some extent, but feels strongly uncomfortable if important tasks remain undone. The intolerable busyness raises negative emotions, steals energy and weakens health. Coping with busyness seems to be a personal and individual struggle, even though health service enterprises are a collective matter. (shrink)

From antiquity to the end of the twentieth century, philosophical discussions of understanding remained undeveloped, guided by a 'received view' that takes understanding to be nothing more than knowledge of an explanation. More recently, however, this received view has been criticized, and bold new philosophical proposals about understanding have emerged in its place. In this book, Kareem Khalifa argues that the received view should be revised but not abandoned. In doing so, he clarifies and answers the most central questions (...) in this burgeoning field of philosophical research: what kinds of cognitive abilities are involved in understanding? What is the relationship between the understanding that explanations provide and the understanding that experts have of broader subject matters? Can there be understanding without explanation? How can one understand something on the basis of falsehoods? Is understanding a species of knowledge? What is the value of understanding? (shrink)

The experience of fear in the Contemporaneity is mostly determined by a type of enmity that, unlike that which prevailed in Modernity, shows itself untraceable, virtual, rarely visible, given the delocalization structures of globalization. All this refers to a specific epistemology, linked to the loss of the classic coordinates of finitude and to the opening of a paradigm where the lack of representation and the apparent depoliticization will turn adversaries and combatants into mere ghosts, thus increasing their terrifying effect. The (...) article tries to review these notions taking the dread that contemporary terrorism causes as a starting point to build a more global reflection that includes the specific type of gear generated in times of pandemic. La experiencia del miedo en la Contemporaneidad viene mayormente determinada por un tipo de enemistad que, a diferencia de la que imperaba en la Modernidad, se muestra ilocalizable, virtual, pocas veces visible, dadas las estructuras de deslocalización propias de la globalización. Todo ello remite a una epistemología concreta, ligada a la pérdida de las coordenadas clásicas de la finitud y a la apertura de un paradigma donde la falta de representacionalidad y su aparente despolitización convertirán a los adversarios y combatientes en meros fantasmas, aumentando así su efecto terrorífico. El artículo pretende revisar estas nociones tomando el pavor que ocasiona el terrorismo contemporáneo como punto de partida para construir una reflexión más global que incluye el específico tipo de miedo generado en tiempos de pandemia. (shrink)

Los análisis sobre la filosofía política hobbesiana suelen girar alrededor del estudio del miedo y de cómo este es el factor fundamental para explicar el surgimiento de la soberanía. Este artículo tiene como objetivo ir más allá del concepto de temor como base articuladora de la política y centrar el análisis en un terreno fundamental sin el cual no se explica el Leviatán: la alteridad entendida como enemistad. Un análisis de la específica otredad que pone en juego Hobbes a través (...) de su perspectiva mecanicista permitirá entender los diferentes matices que esta visión incorpora, así como las consecuencias que derivan de una filosofía política basada en una concepción negativa de la compañía. El texto explorará las líneas de articulación del concepto de enemistad hobbesiana tanto desde el punto de vista del interior del Estado como desde una perspectiva interestatal. (shrink)

This paper informs the results of a research which aimed to analysed the meanings of work for women in a small poultry slaughterhouse, in Santa Catarina State, Brazil. The understanding of the meanings was supported by the Social Psychology related to social constructionism theory. The information w..

Sensory deficits are a feature of autism and schizophrenia, as well as the upper end of their non-clinical spectra. The mismatch negativity, an index of pre-attentive auditory processing, is particularly sensitive in detecting such deficits; however, little is known about the relationship between the visual MMN to facial emotions and autism and schizophrenia spectrum symptom domains. We probed the vMMN to happy, sad, and neutral faces in 61 healthy adults, and evaluated their degree of autism and schizophrenia spectrum traits using (...) the Autism Spectrum Quotient and Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire. The vMMN to happy faces was significantly larger than the vMMNs to sad and neutral faces. The vMMN to happy faces was associated with interpersonal difficulties as indexed by AQ Communication and Attention to Detail subscales, and SPQ associated with more interpersonal difficulties. These data suggest that pre-attentive processing of positive affect might be more specific to the interpersonal features associated with autism and schizophrenia. These findings add valuable insights into the growing body of literature investigating symptom-specific neurobiological markers of autism and schizophrenia spectrum conditions. (shrink)

Among epistemologists, it is common to assume that insofar as coherence bears on the justification of belief, the only relevant coherence relations are those _within_ an individual subject’s web of beliefs. After clarifying this view and exploring some plausible motivations for it, we argue that this individualistic account of the epistemic relevance of coherence fails to account for central facets of scientific practice. In its place we propose a social account of coherence. According to the view we propose, a scientist (...) _S_’s belief that _p_ is _prima facie_ unjustified if this belief negatively coheres with justified scientific claims in her scientific community. This account of coherence yields an epistemology for scientific belief which, we argue, has all of the benefits and none of the liabilities of its more individualistic predecessor. (shrink)

Recently, several authors have argued that scientific understanding should be a new topic of philosophical research. In this article, I argue that the three most developed accounts of understanding--Grimm's, de Regt's, and de Regt and Dieks's--can be replaced by earlier accounts of scientific explanation without loss. Indeed, in some cases, such replacements have clear benefits.

In what ways is students’ participation in school related to their participation and becoming subjects across the school context and other contexts in which they participate? This is the question analyzed in this paper, based on observations of, and narratives and perspectives provided by, three 15-year-old ethnic minority boys and their teachers at a school in Denmark. Drawing upon Davies’ concept of teaching-as-usual, I explore exclusions and marginalization inside school before exploring how these can be seen as connected to, and (...) seemingly having an impact on, the lives the students lead outside school, with an understanding of this connection rooted in Holzkamp’s concept of conduct of everyday life. In this regard, I make use of concepts of recognition ) and viable life in order to point to how a lack of such within the school tends to drive the students away from the school context, while simultaneously driving them towards other contexts outside school, with gang related street communities being a particularly potential one. (shrink)

Peter Lipton has argued that understanding can exist in the absence of explanation. We argue that this does not denigrate explanation's importance to understanding. Specifically, we show that all of Lipton's examples are consistent with the idea that explanation is the ideal of understanding, i.e. other modes of understanding ought to be assessed by how well they replicate the understanding provided by a good and correct explanation. We defend this idea by showing that for all of Lipton's examples of non-explanatory (...) understanding of why p , there exists a correct and reasonably good explanation that would provide greater understanding of p. (shrink)

In this essay, we extend earlier inferentialist-expressivist treatments of traditional logical, semantic, modal, and representational vocabulary (Brandom 1994, 2008, 2015; Peregrin 2014) to explanatory vocabulary. From this perspective, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) appears to be an obvious starting point. In its simplest formulation, IBE has the form: A best explains why B, B; so A. It thereby captures one of the central inferential features of explanation. An inferentialist-expressivist treatment of “best explains” would treat it as a logical operator. (...) Analogous to the inferentialist-expressivist treatment of other logical operators, this essay aims to provide introduction and elimination rules for “best explains.” Indeed, by exhibiting a form of detachment, IBE superficially looks like an elimination rule. The sequent calculus LEA+, described in Section 5 below, makes good on this intuition. By showing how “A best explains why B” is related to the underlying, scientific inference “A, so B,” we can purchase the inference ticket of IBE for no more than the cost of science’s material inferences. (shrink)

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.

Several argue that truth cannot be science’s sole epistemic goal, for it would fail to do justice to several scientific practices that advance understanding. I challenge these arguments, but only after making a small concession: science’s sole epistemic goal is not truth as such; rather, its goal is finding true answers to relevant questions. Using examples from the natural and social sciences, I then show that scientific understanding’s epistemically valuable features are either true answers to relevant questions or a means (...) thereof. (shrink)

Recently, it has been debated as to whether understanding is a species of explanatory knowledge. Those who deny this claim frequently argue that understanding, unlike knowledge, can be lucky. In this paper I argue that current arguments do not support this alleged compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck. First, I argue that understanding requires reliable explanatory evaluation, yet the putative examples of lucky understanding underspecify the extent to which subjects possess this ability. In the course of defending this claim, I (...) also provide a new account of the kind of ‘grasping’ taken to be central to understanding. Second, I show that putative examples of lucky understanding unwittingly deploy a kind of luck that is compatible with knowledge. Finally, appealing to a number of works on explanation and its attendant epistemology, I argue that alleged instances of lucky understanding that overcome these two obstacles will invariably violate certain norms of explanatory inquiry – our paradigmatic understanding-oriented practice. By contrast, knowledge of the same information is immune to these criticisms. Consequently, if understanding is environmentally lucky, it is always inferior to the understanding that a corresponding case of knowledge would provide. (shrink)

Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1Introduction2Change-Relating Monism's Three Problems3Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together4Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism4.1High-grade necessity4.2Unity in diversity5Conclusion.

We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.

Economists use the term ‘stylized fact’ in many contexts, though the meaning of this phrase and the motivation for using such a concept is unclear. In this paper, we provide a philosophical analysis of stylized facts, which aims to be methodologically interesting and useful. While our framework applies to all principled uses of stylized facts, we illustrate its core features by applying it to Nicholas Kaldor's initial and exemplary use of stylized facts in growth economics.

This article examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demonstrate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states among agents of the same type. This is quite different from Schelling-like behavior and suggests that segregation (...) is an instance of macrobehavior that can arise from a wide variety of micromotives. (shrink)

Although interest in the subject of human-resource marketing is growing among researchers and practitioners, there have been remarkably few studies on the effects on employees of how benevolent their organization is. This article looks at the link between the presumption of organizational benevolence and the well-being of employees at work. The results of an empirical study of 595 employees show that the presumption of organizational benevolence is positively linked to employee well-being. The effect is indirect, as it is mediated by (...) the perceived level of organizational support. The existence of a link between employee well-being and intention to quit the company is also confirmed. (shrink)

Criticism is a staple of the scientific enterprise and of the social epistemology of science. Philosophical discussions of criticism have traditionally focused on its roles in relation to objectivity, confirmation, and theory choice. However, attention to criticism and to criticizability should also inform our thinking about scientific pursuits: the allocation of resources with the aim of developing scientific tools and ideas. In this paper, we offer an account of scientific pursuitworthiness which takes criticizability as its starting point. We call this (...) the apokritic model of pursuit. Its core ideas are that pursuits are practices governed by norms for asking and answering questions, and that criticism arises from the breach of these norms. We illustrate and advertise our approach using examples from institutional grant review, neuroscience, and sociology. We show that the apokritic model can unify several indices of criticizability, that it can account for the importance of criticizing pursuits in scientific practice, and that it can offer ameliorative advice to erstwhile pursuers. (shrink)

This essay presents a fully inferentialist-expressivist account of scientific representation. In general, inferentialist approaches to scientific representation argue that the capacity of a model to represent a target system depends on inferences from models to target systems. Inferentialism is attractive because it makes the epistemic function of models central to their representational capacity. Prior inferentialist approaches to scientific representation, however, have depended on some representational element, such as denotation or representational force. Brandom’s Making It Explicit provides a model of how (...) to fully discharge such representational vocabulary, but it cannot be applied directly to scientific representations. Pursuing a strategy parallel to Brandom’s, this essay begins with an account of how surrogative inference is justified. Scientific representation and the denotation of model elements are then explained in terms of surrogative inference by treating scientific representation and denotation as expressive, analogous to Brandom’s account of truth. The result is a thoroughgoing inferentialism: M is a scientific representation of T if and only if M has scientifically justified surrogative consequences that are answers to questions about T. (shrink)

Primary research on HIV/AIDS in India has predominantly focused on known risk groups such as sex workers, STI clinic attendees and long-distance truck drivers, and has largely been undertaken in urban areas. There is evidence of HIV spreading to rural areas but very little is known about the context of the infection or about issues relating to health and social impact on people living with HIV/AIDS. In-depth interviews with nineteen men and women infected with HIV who live in rural areas (...) were used to collect experiences of testing and treatment, the social impacts of living with HIV and differential impacts on women and men. Eight focus group discussions with groups drawn from the general population in the four villages were used to provide an analysis of community level views about HIV/AIDS. While men reported contracting HIV from sex workers in the cities, women considered their husbands to be the source of their infection. Correct knowledge about HIV transmission co-existed with misconceptions. Men and women tested for HIV reported inadequate counselling and sought treatment from traditional healers as well as professionals. Owing to the general pattern of husbands being the first to contract HIV women faced a substantial burden, with few resources remaining for their own or their children’s care after meeting the needs of sick husbands. Stigma and social isolation following widowhood were common, with an enforced return to the natal home. Implications for potential educational and service interventions are discussed within the context of gender and social relations. (shrink)

Many have argued that the human sciences feature a unique form of understanding that is absent from the natural sciences. However, in the last decade or so, epistemologists and philosop...