Professor Grossman’s introduction to the revolutionary work of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre studies the ideas of their predecessors too, explaining in detail Descartes’s conception of the mind, Brentano’s theory of intentionality, and Kierkegaard’s emphasis on dread, while tracing the debate over existence and essence as far back as Aquinas and Aristotle. For a full understanding of the existentialists and phenomenologists, we must also understand the problems that they were trying to solve. This book, originally published in 1984, presents clearly (...) how the main concerns of phenomenology and existentialism grew out of tradition. (shrink)

Mindfulness, derived from Buddhist psychology and philosophy, has gained broad popularity in the last decades, due importantly to scientific interest and findings. Yet Buddhist mindfulness developed in Asian pre-scientific culture and religion, and is predicated upon long-term cultivation of introspective awareness of lived experience, not highly accessible to empirical study. Further complicating the ‘science' of mindfulness, mindfulness's very definition is multifaceted, resistant to dismantling and requires substantial amounts of personal practice to gain expertise. Most scientists investigating mindfulness have not achieved (...) a high level of this expertise. Here I address how mindfulness is currently being invented as a scientific fact or object of inquiry. The intrinsic porosity of subjective and objective factors influencing the investigation of mindfulness is highlighted: the evolving body of ‘scientific' experts, instruments used to measure mindfulness, the alliances of funders and other supporters of mindfulness research, and the public representation of the related findings. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Hilary Putnam has recently observed that the fact/value distinction has acquired a strength and pervasiveness in our culture that make it akin to an institution. 1 I take it he meant an institution in the sense that Taboo is an institution in some cultures, not in the sense that the Church is an institution in ours. Invoking the distinction is a widespread conversational gambit in social life, not only in academic discussions. ‘That's a value judgment’ and ‘That's emotive’ are to (...) be heard at dinner parties more often than ‘Pass the salt’. (shrink)

The final section of the book considers two features of the world which transcend the categories, existence and negation.

A study of Jim Jones and the Peoples Temple. It features a prologue that considers the meaning of the tragedy for a post-Waco, post-9/11 world.

1. „Schwache“ oder „freie Menschen“? „Weil es aber doch einem nachdenkenden und forschenden Wesen anständig ist, gewisse Zeiten lediglich der Prüfung seiner eigenen Vernunft zu widmen, hierbei aber alle Parteilichkeit gänzlich auszuziehen, und so seine Bemerkungen anderen zur Beurteilung öffentlich mitzuteilen; so kann es niemanden verargt, noch weniger verwehrt werden, die Sätze und Gegensätze, so wie sie sich, durch keine Drohung geschreckt, vor Geschworenen von seinem eigenen Stande verteidigen können, auftreten zu lassen.“ These: Wer diesen Text kritisch liest, stutzt – (...) was sollen die „schwachen Menschen“ hier? Ist nicht das bizarre „schwacher“ durch „freier“ zu ersetzen? Kant verbindet mit der Gerichtshofmetapher die gegen die Politik der Machtsprüche des Absolutismus, aber auch gegen die Gesetzlosigkeit des „status naturalis“ gerichtete Freiheit der Richter und Geschworenen, nicht aber deren Schwäche. Erst im Staat unter Freiheitsgesetzen könne ein Gerichtshof eingerichtet werden – „Zu dieser Freiheit gehört denn auch, seine Gedanken, seine Zweifel, die man sich nicht selbst auflösen kann, öffentlich zur Beurteilung auszustellen, ohne darüber für einen unruhigen oder gefährlichen Bürger verschrieen zu werden [„durch keine Drohung geschreckt“] Das liegt schon in dem ursprünglichen Rechte der menschlichen Vernunft, welche keinen anderen Richter erkennt, als selbst wiederum die allgemeine Menschenvernunft, worin ein jeder seine Stimme hat.“ Die Freiheit bezieht sich auf den Bürgerstand der Menschen und ihre Freiheitsgesetze. Wir befinden uns im Bereich einer Rechtsinstitution – was soll da der Appell an die Schwäche? Gibt es einen bürgerlichen Stand der Schwachen? Nein. Das Ergebnis der Gerichtsverhandlung wird sein, dass weder Satz noch Gegensatz gilt oder dass beide gelten könnten. Nun kommt hinzu, dass Kant zuvor den Menschen charakterisiert, der zwischen These und Antithese hin- und herschwankt – ein schwacher Mensch, dem der nachdenkende und forschende Mensch entgegengesetzt wird, der nun entschlossen vor dem Gerichtshof erfahren will, wie es um die Ansprüche der beiden Parteien steht. Auch im nachfolgenden Text wird emphatisch dafür argumentiert, dass der Mensch das Problem der Antinomie und seine Auflösung in seiner eigenen Vernunft findet und daher „die Verantwortung [Beantwortung?] nicht von sich abweisen und auf den unbekannten Gegenstand schieben kann“. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

Re-emergent scientific atheism bears the marks of its historical origins in the efforts of Bonč-Bruevič and Jaroslavskij. The disciples of the 'Lenin generation' use their 'fathers' somewhat as 'second-level classics'.

In Plato's Meno , there is a famous discussion of desire and evil. This paper is not a contribution to Platonic scholarship, but a direct taking up of the issue whether someone can desire evil. One stock interpretation of the putative impossibility of desiring what is evil or bad is the interpretation which emphasizes an internal or conceptual tie between desire and good. This interpretation compares pairs of terms such as ‘fear—danger’, ‘belief—truth’ and ‘desire—good’. To fear something is to regard (...) it as, or believe that it is, dangerous ; to believe something is to regard it as, or believe it to be, true ; to desire something is to regard it as, to believe it to be, good. Since it is obvious that people believe things which are false, it is maintained that it is equally obvious that people may desire what is bad and fear what is harmless or of no danger. Let us call this interpretation of the doctrine that it is impossible to desire evil the weak thesis. The weak thesis allows what seems a plain fact of human reality, that people believe falsehoods, fear things that cannot harm them and desire things which are not good. Equally obviously, it allows that people fail to believe truths, fail to desire goods, and fail to fear things that are dangerous. On this weak interpretation, the manner in which wickedness to others and self-destructiveness are due to ignorance is that people are ignorant about the nature of things and ways of acting, ignorant about what it would be like to possess something or ignorant about what it would be like to do something or other. (shrink)

All humans experience itch in the course of their life. Even a discussion on the topic of itch or seeing people scratch can evoke the desire to scratch. These events are coined ‘contagious itch’ and are very common. We and others have shown that videos showing people scratching and pictures of affected skin or insects can induce itch in healthy persons and chronic itch patients. In our studies, patients with atopic dermatitis were more susceptible to visual itch cues than healthy. (...) Also, personality traits like agreeableness and public self-consciousness were associated with induced scratching in skin patients, while neuroticism correlated with induced itch in healthy subjects. The underlying course of contagious itch is not yet fully understood. It is hypothesized that there are human mirror neurons that are active when we imitate actions and/or negative affect. Until now, there has been only limited data on the mechanisms of brain activation in contagious itch though. We have barely begun to understand the underlying physiological reactions and the triggering factors of this phenomenon. We summarize what we currently know about contagious itch and provide some suggestions what future research should focus on. (shrink)

D. M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as: the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the general, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. This collection of essays explores the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. There are four sections to the book: possibility and identity, universals, laws and causality, and philosophy of mind. The contributors comprise an international (...) group of philosophers from the United States, England and Australia. An interesting feature of the volume is that Armstrong himself has written responses to each of the essays. There is also a complete bibliography of Armstrong's writings. (shrink)

What would it look like for researchers to take non-human animal rights seriously? Recent discussions foster the impression that scientific practice needs to be reformed to make animal research ethical: just as there is ethically rigorous human research, so there can be ethically rigorous animal research. We argue that practically little existing animal research would be ethical and that ethical animal research is not scalable. Since animal research is integral to the existing scientific paradigm, taking animal rights seriously requires a (...) radical, wholesale reimagining of science.Trial registration: ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT05340426. (shrink)