While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unitifed cognitive map, this this volume offers novel, even paradoxical views of the relationship. Touching on various disciplines, it considers what constitutes human rationality, behavior, and intelligence.

As the eleventh volume in the New Directions in Cognitive Science series (formerly the Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science series), this work promises superb scholarship and interdisciplinary appeal. It addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rationality. While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unified cognitive map, this volume offers novel, even paradoxical, views of the relationship. Comprised of outstanding essays from distinguished philosophers, it considers what constitutes (...) human rationality, behavior, and intelligence covering diverse areas of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and computer science. Indeed, it is at the forefront of cognitive research and promises to be of unprecedented influence across numerous disciplines. (shrink)

This research presents a computer model called EUREKA that begins with novice‐like strategies and knowledge organizations for solving physics word problems and acquires features of knowledge organizations and basic approaches that characterize experts in this domain. EUREKA learns a highly interrelated network of problem‐type schemas with associated solution methodologies. Initially, superficial features of the problem statement form the basis for both the problem‐type schemas and the discriminating features that organize them in the P‐MOP (Problem Memory Organization Packet) network. As EUREKA (...) solves more problems, the content of the schemas and the discriminating features change to reflect more fundamental physics principles. This changing network allows EUREKA to shift from a novicelike means‐ends strategy to a more expertlike “knowledge development” strategy in which the presence of abstract concepts are triggered by problem features. In this model, the strategy shift emerges as a natural consequence of the evolving expertlike organization of problem‐type schemos. EUREKA captures many of the descriptive models of novice expert differences, and also suggests a number of empirically testable assumptions regarding problem‐solving strategies and the representation of problem‐solving knowledge. (shrink)

This article uses simulation as an empirical method for identifying process models of strategy effects in a category-learning task. A general set of learning assumptions defined a symbolic learning framework in which alternative simulation models were defined and tested. The goal was to identify process models that could account for previously reported data on the interaction between how a learner encounters category variance across a series of training samples and whether the task instructions suggested an active, hypothesis-testing approach, or a (...) more passive learning mode. Descriptive characterizations of active and passive learning were mapped into complementary settings of parameters operating with the general learning framework. Alternative models, defined by different configurations of these parameters, were evaluated on their goodness of fit to the observed data. The signature differences between models that best fit the passive learning data and models that best fit the active learning data concerned a delayed versus immediate learning parameter and a degree-of-match parameter that determined which patterns were retrieved to make category decisions. A functional account of these parameters is given by considering the learning task as a search process and the role of these parameters in localizing the impact of learning mechanisms in certain areas of the search space. Issues related to simulation as an empirical method for identifying candidate process models are discussed. (shrink)

Default reasoning occurs whenever the truth of the evidence available to the reasoner does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion being drawn. Despite this, one is entitled to draw the conclusion “by default” on the grounds that we have no information which would make us doubt that the inference should be drawn. It is the type of conclusion we draw in the ordinary world and ordinary situations in which we find ourselves. Formally speaking, ‘nonmonotonic reasoning’ refers to argumentation in (...) which one uses certain information to reach a conclusion, but where it is possible that adding some further information to those very same premises could make one want to retract the original conclusion. It is easily seen that the informal notion of default reasoning manifests a type of nonmonotonic reasoning. Generally speaking, default statements are said to be true about the class of objects they describe, despite the acknowledged existence of “exceptional instances” of the class. In the absence of explicit information that an object is one of the exceptions we are enjoined to apply the default statement to the object. But further information may later tell us that the object is in fact one of the exceptions. So this is one of the points where nonmonotonicity resides in default reasoning. (shrink)

Psychologism in logic is the doctrine that the semantic content of logical terms is in some way a feature of human psychology. We consider the historically influential version of the doctrine, Psychological Individualism, and the many counter-arguments to it. We then propose and assess various modifications to the doctrine that might allow it to avoid the classical objections. We call these Psychological Descriptivism, Teleological Cognitive Architecture, and Ideal Cognizers. These characterizations give some order to the wide range of modern views (...) that are seen as psychologistic because of one or another feature. Although these can avoid some of the classic objections to psychologism, some still hold. (shrink)

This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that these (...) stable elements, while constraining representational and linguistic schemes, do not define a single framework for truthmaking relations. We strengthen this position by considering themes on situated rational agency from cognitive science and artificial intelligence, arguing that whatever enables or supports rational action within a particular environment must figure into some account of truth and truthmaking, and vice versa. (shrink)

There has long been a history of studies investigating how people (“ordinary people”) perform on tasks that involve deductive reasoning. The upshot of these studies is that people characteristically perform some deductive tasks well but others badly. For instance, studies show that people will typically perform MP (“modus ponens”: from ‘If A then B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) and bi-conditional MP (from: ‘A if and only if B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) correctly when invited to make the inference and additionally (...) can discover of their own accord when such inferences are appropriate. On the other hand, the same studies show that people typically perform MT (“modus tollens”: from ‘If A then B’ and ‘not-B’, infer ‘not-A’) and biconditional MT badly. They not only do not recognize when it is appropriate to draw such inferences, but also they will balk at doing them even when they are told that they can make it. Related to these shortcomings seems to be the inability of people to understand that contrapositives are equivalent (that ‘If A then B’ is equivalent to ‘If not-B then not-A’). [Studies of people’s deductive inference-drawing abilities have a long history, involving many studies in the early 20th century concerning Aristotelian syllogisms. But the current spate of studies draws much of its impetus from Wason (Wason, 1968; see also Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). ] The general conclusion seems to be that there are specific areas where “ordinary people” do not perform very logically. This conclusion will not come as a surprise to teachers of elementary logic, who have long thought that the majority of “ordinary people” are inherently illogical and need deep and forceful schooling in order to overcome this flaw. (shrink)

We report empirical results on factors that influence how people reason with default rules of the form "Most x's have property P", in scenarios that specify information about exceptions to these rules and in scenarios that specify default-rule inheritance. These factors include (a) whether the individual, to which the default rule might apply, is similar to a known exception, when that similarity may explain why the exception did not follow the default, and (b) whether the problem involves classes of naturally (...) occurring kinds or classes of artifacts. We consider how these findings might be integrated into formal approaches to default reasoning and also consider the relation of this sort of qualitative default reasoning to statistical reasoning. (shrink)

A comparative study of Charles S. Peirce’s and Ernst Cassirer’s triadic phenomenological theories of categories. Both Peirce and Cassirer developed, in a mature stage of their philosophical reflection, phenomenological theories on three fundamental categories: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are the names of Peirce’s categories,while Cassirer’s ‚basis phenomena‘ are denominated with the personal pronouns Ich, Du and Es. Prompted by John Michael Krois’s suggestion of an indirect similarity between the two phenomenological theories of categories, this essay aims to find a possible (...) justification for this convergence, thereby reconstructing its metaphysical and epistemological grounding. The study is divided into four sections. In the first part, Peirce’s and Cassirer’s theories of knowledge are compared as expressions of a similar symbolic conception of thought. Secondly, I offer a parallel account of the reasons which led the two philosophers toward a more metaphysical grounding of their symbolic theories, focusing in particular on the relevance of the problem of life in both views. In the third section, I concentrate on the content of the two phenomenological theories and argue that they both represent an attempt to conciliate the tension between the transcendental premises of their symbolic theories of knowledge and the living character of experience. Finally, the reflections of Goethe and Schiller are presented as a possible source of Peirce’s and Cassirer’s triadic phenomenological theories. (shrink)

Le thème de la « relation personnelle à Dieu » peut à la fois être approché comme un lieu théologique parmi d’autres et comme une condition de l’exercice théologique en tant que tel. Cet article propose d’explorer au niveau doctrinal la relation entre ces deux aspects de la « relation personnelle à Dieu ». Il effectue d’abord un rappel des conditions contemporaines du travail de la théologie systématique comme herméneutique du discours religieux. Dans un second temps, il situe la place (...) de la « relation personnelle à Dieu » dans la dogmatique. Finalement, il présente le statut et la place de la « relation personnelle à Dieu » pour l’exercice contemporain de la théologie à partir de trois figures théologiques – la prière, l’amour et le témoignage – sans nier la brisure qui traverse l’existence humaine. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl and Ernst Cassirer rank among the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Despite the differences between their philosophical outlooks, their investigations show a common enduring interest in the exploration of human culture. This volume provides the first extensive analysis of Husserl’s and Cassirer’s approaches to the philosophy of culture, assembling contributions by leading international scholars and young researchers. The chapters offer insights into issues such as the various modalities of sense-giving in culture, the relationship between perception and (...) meaning, the place of science in culture, the dismissal of scientism, and the possibility of humanism. (shrink)

Manifeste de la philosophie cartésienne, le Discours de la méthode (1637) est tout à la fois le récit d'un cheminement intellectuel et l'illustration magistrale d'un projet : fonder l'unité des sciences et constituer une science universelle. Foyer d'une oeuvre foisonnante, le Discours revendique les droits de la raison contre toute tradition et toute autorité. C'est pourquoi il assigne à la philosophie une tâche : s'élever à 1a certitude. La présente édition, augmentée d'un dossier, entend mettre en évidence le jeu de (...) résonances qui relie le Discours aux autres textes de Descartes. (shrink)

This document describes the technique and technology currently used to apply cryosurgery, a technic based on low temperatures for medical purposes that allows the controlled destruction of pathological cells and tissues. Cryosurgery is an effective and innocuous process that is painless, safe and economical, applied to multiple specialities in which it provides alternatives to its traditional methods. A search was carried out for articles and bibliographic reviews referring to Cryosurgery and from whose information this technical note was obtained. Research on (...) the application of Cryosurgery presents solid evidence of its benefits. Therefore, it has been used in several countries and health campaigns, showing excellent results, so it is advisable to implement it in health systems. (shrink)

I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than ...

Mimmo Paladino’s artistic research is characterized by an interest in the language and the relationship between “individual” and “community”. The idea of “individual” Paladino focuses in his work on is placed in the Mediterranean culture, and carries with itself the request of social emancipation — that can be ascribable to some Marxist topics — and the faith in the magical power. Along this route Paladino meets Ernesto De Martino’s South and Magic, Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s works. With the same (...) naturalness he makes coincide his sign with those of Matisse and Beuys, overlaps conceptually Spinoza to Jarry, Giordano Bruno to Beuys by getting the common trait in the transgressive dimension. It would be misleading trying to get a unitary route at all costs because only in the idea of the “encounter” apparently causal, that recalls the impracticable and audacious routes of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, we can get the meaning of the Paladino’s contaminations with philosophy. (shrink)

Riassunto: Al centro di questo articolo è l’analisi dei fondamenti neurocognitivi dei deficit macrolinguistici, discorsivo-narrativi nello specifico, osservabili nei pazienti affetti da schizofrenia. Tale analisi è condotta in riferimento alle ricerche svolte negli ultimi decenni nell’ambito della psicolinguistica e delle neuroscienze. I risultati di queste ricerche hanno mostrato che alcuni aspetti dei disturbi macroelaborativi che caratterizzano il profilo linguistico dei pazienti schizofrenici possono essere spiegati chiamando in causa i deficit di tre sistemi cognitivi: teoria della mente, funzioni esecutive, memoria semantica. (...) In questo articolo si sostiene che un tale quadro esplicativo vada integrato attraverso il riferimento a un ulteriore processo cognitivo cruciale per l’elaborazione macrolinguistica: la costruzione di scenari. Tale processo è fondamentale per la comprensione e produzione discorsiva in quanto responsabile della costruzione della rappresentazione globale degli eventi del discorso narrativo. Alla luce di queste considerazioni, in questo lavoro si propone che un ruolo cruciale nella spiegazione di alcuni aspetti dei disturbi macrolinguistici nella schizofrenia sia svolto da una compromissione nel processo di costruzione di scenari mentali e si avanza l’ipotesi che tale compromissione sia determinata, a sua volta, da problematiche che agiscono sul piano del funzionamento delle aree cerebrali preposte alla percezione e all’assemblaggio multimodale delle rappresentazioni sensomotorie. Parole chiave: Abilità macrolinguistiche; Costruzione di scenari; Elaborazione discorsiva: Embodied Cognition; Narrazione; Schizofrenia; Percezione; Modelli mentali The role scenario building in the explanation of macrolinguistic disorders in schizophrenia: This article analyzes the neurocognitive foundations of macrolinguistic deficits, specifically narrative, observable in patients with schizophrenia. This analysis is conducted with reference to the investigations carried out in recent decades in the field of psycholinguistics and neuroscience. The results of these investigations showed that some aspects of macrolinguistic deficits of schizophrenics can be explained in terms of impairments of three cognitive systems: theory of mind, executive functions, and semantic memory. In this article, it is suggested that this explanatory framework has to be integrated with the reference to a further cognitive process: scenarios construction. Such process turns out to be critical for discourse comprehension and production as it is responsible for the building of the global representation of events of a narrative. In the light of these considerations, it is claimed that a crucial role in the explanation of some aspects of macrolinguistic disorders in schizophrenia is played by an impairment in the process of constructing mental scenarios. The hypothesis is that this impairment is, in turn, determined by problems affecting the brain areas responsible for the perception and multimodal assembly of sensorimotor representations. Keywords: Discourse Processing; Embodied Cognition; Macrolinguistic Skills; Scenario Building; Narrative; Schizophrenia; Perception; Mental Models. (shrink)

I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...) that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification. (shrink)

I argue that the offense generation pattern of slurring terms parallels that of impoliteness behaviors, and is best explained by appeal to similar purely pragmatic mechanisms. In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the speaker signals that she endorses the term. Such an endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense whenever a speaker's use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the slurring term. Since this explanation comes at low theoretical cost and imposes few constraints on (...) an account of the semantics of slurs, this suggests that we should not require semantic accounts to provide an independent explanation of the offense profile. (shrink)

L'idea che la natura venga sistematicamente violata dal progresso e che la sua distruzione metta a repentaglio la sopravvivenza stessa dell'umanità costituisce uno degli assunti base del movimento ecologista radicale. Si tratta di un'idea che recupera una visione mitica ed erronea della storia: prima dell'età moderna l'uomo avrebbe vissuto in armonia con la natura e oggi saremmo chiamati a ricostruire questo equilibrio attraverso politiche capaci di mettere un limite allo sviluppo economico. Tali posizioni non hanno però alcun fondamento nella cultura (...) scientifica attuale, in cui si fa strada la crescente consapevolezza che la natura è data da sistemi aperti, non-lineari, difficilmente spiegabili senza fare ricorso a una nuova teoria della complessità. 13 scienziati, ognuno secondo un punto di vista personale e della propria disciplina, riflettono sul concetto di "natura" partendo dalla scienza per ridefinirlo e gettare le basi di una nuova ecologia. (shrink)

Substructural approaches to paradoxes have attracted much attention from the philosophical community in the last decade. In this paper we focus on two substructural logics, named ST and TS, along with two structural cousins, LP and K3. It is well known that LP and K3 are duals in the sense that an inference is valid in one logic just in case the contrapositive is valid in the other logic. As a consequence of this duality, theories based on either logic are (...) tightly connected since many of the arguments for and objections against one theory reappear in the other theory in dual form. The target of the paper is making explicit in exactly what way, if any, ST and TS are dual to one another. The connection will allow us to gain a more fine-grained understanding of these logics and of the theories based on them. In particular, we will obtain new insights on two questions concerning ST which are being intensively discussed in the current literature: whether ST preserves classical logic and whether it is LP in sheep’s clothing. Explaining in what way ST and TS are duals requires comparing these logics at a metainferential level. We provide to this end a uniform proof theory to decide on valid metainferences for each of the four logics. This proof procedure allows us to show in a very simple way how different properties of inferences (unsatisfiability, supersatisfiability and antivalidity) that behave in very different ways for each logic can be captured in terms of the validity of a metainference. (shrink)

Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.

Volume I. Aborto-azione popolare -- Volume II. Banche dati-Buoni costumi -- Volume III. Cadavere-Cyborg -- Volume IV. Danno alla salute-Duplice effetto -- Volume V. Ebraismo-Evoluzionismo -- Volume VI. Fallacia naturalistica-Guerra -- Volume VII. Handicap-Living will -- Volume VIII. Madre - mutilazioni genitali -- Volume IX. Nanoscienza e nanotecnologia - ortodossia -- Volume X. Pace-robotica -- Volume XI. Sacralità della vita : sviluppo sostenibile -- Volume XII. Tecniche di fecondazione artificiale : zigote.

1. Fondamenti ed etica biomedica -- 2. Aspetti medico-sociali.

Presents a metaphysical foundation for ethics grounded in non-relative, personalist values that can be communicated cross-culturally. Examines the philosophical bases of ethical criteria and applies them to issues in medical practice ranging from genetic engineering to euthanasia.