The amount of realist positions put forward by philosophers of religion and theologians is impressive. one can certainly doubt whether there is a need for yet another alternative. However, most realist positions employed in studies on religion fall prey to Hilary Putnam’s criticism against metaphysical realism. This gives rise to a dilemma that I aim at solving by introducing yet another realist position, namely non-metaphysical realism.

Drawing on the work of Putnam, Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson, the author elaborates a non-metaphysical realist perspective that she recommends as a ...

Introduction: Public health ethics addresses moral dilemmas arising from balancing individual healthcare needs with societal interests. Ethical considerations in public health during pandemics and disasters aim to reduce mortality rates and minimize social injustice through fair principles. Objective: This paper analyzes public health ethics and ethical values in allocating resources during mass casualty incidents. The intersection of public health ethics, applied bioethics, and ethics of social consequences (through non-utilitarian consequentialism) guides addressing serious public health challenges in catastrophic scenarios. The application (...) of the given interaction is significant for professional medical ethics. Methodology: The paper employs inductive, deductive, and normative methods of bioethics and the methodology of ethics of social consequences. Conclusion: The paradigmatic disparity between the bioethics of pandemics and disaster bioethics lies in the fluid application of bioethical principles and the accentuation of utilitarian demands depending on the severity and scale of mass casualty incidents. Applied bioethics in crisis situations respects the approaches of public health ethics and attempts to increase positive social outcomes. The application of (scarce) resource allocation criteria and triage of patients is derived from ethical decisions beneficial to public health and lege artis approaches of medical bioethics. The paper presents professional and ethical criteria for medically inappropriate treatment within the framework of patient triage; we approach crisis ethics from the perspective of maximization of benefit. Age is not an exclusion criterion of acute healthcare provision in crisis situations. Ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism allowing for social consequences bridges public health ethics and applied bioethics. (shrink)

In _On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World_ from 1975, Quine formulated a thesis of underdetermination roughly to the effect that every scientific theory has an empirically equivalent but logically incompatible rival, one that cannot be discarded merely as a terminological variant of the former. For Quine, the truth of this thesis was an open question. If true, some would argue that it undermines any belief in scientific theories that is based purely on their empirical success. But despite its potential (...) significance, surprisingly little has been done by way of establishing or refuting it. My aim is to establish the thesis for as large a class of theories as possible. Under various precisifications of the concepts involved, I show that it holds for all consistent and recursively axiomatizable theories that postulate infinitely many theoretical entities. (shrink)

With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some ‘natural’ properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive inferences in the first place. Moreover, it seems at first sight that (ii) Goodman’s problem does not affect the method that scientists actually use for making such inferences—namely, classical statistics. Taken together, this would indicate (...) that (iii) ‘naturalness’ is not such a relevant concept for the problem of induction, after all. I have no objections against (i) and (iii). But, contrary to (ii), I argue that classical statistics does face a version of Goodman’s problem, which I call the statistical riddle of induction. Given that his problem merely is an instance of the more general problem of underdetermination, this is hardly surprising. Perhaps more importantly, I also show how my riddle can be used for exposing a common fallacy in probabilistic reasoning, without relying on Bayesian assumptions. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate various notions of empirical equivalence in relation to the two main arguments for realism in the philosophy of science, namely the no-miracles argument and the indispensability argument. According to realism, one should believe in the existence of the theoretical entities postulated by empirically adequate theories. According to the no-miracles argument, one should do so because truth is the the best explanation of empirical adequacy. According to the indispensability argument, one should do (...) so because the theoretical terms employed in the formulation of an empirically adequate theory are practically indispensable for the formulation of its empirical content. The no-miracles argument might be refuted if one can establish an underdetermination thesis to the effect that every theory has empirically equivalent rivals that are incompatible with each other. Insofar as truth cannot explain the empirical adequacy of two incompatible theories, there is an obvious conflict between the underdetermination thesis and the no-miracles argument. I show that, under certain assumptions, some but not all notions of empirical equivalence support the underdetermination thesis. The indispensability argument might be refuted if one can establish a dispensability thesis to the effect that, for any theory with a practical formulation, there is an empirically equivalent theory with a practical formulation in purely empirical terms. I show that some but not all notions of empirical equivalence support this thesis. (shrink)

Das Ziel: Konstitutionssystem der Begriffe Das Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchungen ist die Aufstellung eines erkenntnismäßig-logischen Systems der ...

When it comes to Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic, there’s a choice to be made concerning the interpretation of the quantifiers. The simple approach is to let quantifiers range over all possible objects, not just objects existing in the world of evaluation, and use a special predicate to make claims about existence. This is the constant domain approach. The more complicated approach is to assign a domain of objects to each world. This is the varying domain approach. Assuming that (...) all terms denote, the semantics of predication on the constant domain approach is obvious: either the denoted object has the denoted property in the world of evaluation, or it hasn’t. On the varying domain approach, there’s a third possibility: the object in question doesn’t exist. Terms may denote objects not included in the domain of the world of evaluation. The question is whether an atomic formula then should be evaluated as true or false, or if its truth value should be undefined. This question, however, cannot be answered in isolation. The consequences of one’s choice depends on the interpretation of molecular formulas. Should the negation of a formula whose truth value is undefined also be undefined? What about conjunction, universal quantification and necessitation? The main contribution of this paper is to identify two partial semantics for logical operators, a weak and a strong one, which uniquely satisfy a list of reasonable constraints. I also show that, provided that the point of using varying domains is to be able to make certain true claims about existence without using any existence predicate, this result yields two possible partial semantics for quantified modal logic with varying domains. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Arguably, the proposition that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens and the proposition that water is H2O are both a posteriori. Nevertheless, they both seem to be necessary. Ever since Davies and Humberstone :1–31, 1980), it has been known that two-dimensional semantics can account for this fact. But two-dimensionalism isn’t the only theory on the market that purports to do so. In this paper, I will look at two alternatives, one by Scott Soames and one by Kathrin Glüer-Pagin and Peter Pagin, (...) and argue that both of them fail. Regarding the former, I argue that the conceptually possible but metaphysically impossible worlds one is required to postulate are hard to conceive of on closer inspection. As for the latter, the proposal doesn’t work for certain modal sentences, and I show that it cannot be easily amended. (shrink)

'My endeavour in these pages is to explain the main features of the method of philosophizing which we, the Vienna Circle, use, and by using try to develop further. It is the method of the logical analysis of science, or more precisely, of the syntactical analysis of scientific language.... The purpose of the book -- as of the lectures -- is to give a first impression of our method and of the direction of our questions and investigations to those who (...) are not yet acquainted with them.' -- From the Preface. (shrink)

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

A woman with congenital absence of a uterus applied for participation in a clinical trial for uterus transplantation. She was married to a woman who had the potential to carry a child without the need for aggressive medical intervention. Thus, the question arose regarding whether the infertile partner should be considered for uterus transplantation. In this article we discuss the ethical issues with uterus transplantation for a member of a same-sex couple, whose partner could carry a pregnancy. We review the (...) medical criteria for uterus transplantation, discuss the additional options for parenthood in same-sex couples, examine how to determine if this meets the criteria of just distribution of uterus grafts, and ultimately argue that the value of gestation is at the level of the individual rather than the couple. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can agree. My conclusion is that, in certain situations, they cannot. The upshot is that, if we assume that the classicist is not allowed to have a higher degree of belief in a null hypothesis after he has rejected it than before, then he has to either have trivial or incoherent credences to begin with (...) or fail to update his credences by conditionalization. (shrink)

Available for the first time in 20 years, here is the Rudolf Carnap's famous principle of tolerance by which everyone is free to mix and match the rules of ...

Some realists claim that theoretical entities like numbers and electrons are indispensable for describing the empirical world. Motivated by the meta-ontology of Quine, I take this claim to imply that, for some first-order theory T and formula δ(x) such that T ⊢ ∃xδ ∧ ∃x¬δ, where δ(x) is intended to apply to all and only empirical entities, there is no first-order theory T′ such that (a) T and T′ describe the δ:s in the same way, (b) T′ ⊢ ∀xδ, and (...) (c) T′ is at least as attractive as T in terms of other theoretical virtues. In an attempt to refute the realist claim, I try to solve the general problem of nominalizing T (with respect to δ), namely to find a theory T′ satisfying conditions (a)–(c) under various precisifications thereof. In particular, I note that condition (a) can be understood either in terms of syntactic or semantic equivalence, where the latter is strictly stronger than the former. The results are somewhat mixed. On the positive side, even under the stronger precisification of (a), I establish that (1) if the vocabulary of T is finite, a nominalizing theory can always be found that is recursive if T is, and (2) if T postulates infinitely many δ:s, a nominalizing theory can always be found that is no more computationally complex than T. On the negative side, even under the weaker precisification of (a), I establish that (3) certain finite theories cannot be nominalized by a finite theory. (shrink)

Many expressions intuitively have different epistemic and modal profiles. For example, co-referring proper names are substitutable salva veritate in modal contexts but not in belief-contexts. Two-dimensional semantics, according to which terms have both a so-called primary and a secondary intension, is a framework that promises to accommodate and explain these diverging intuitions. The framework can be applied to indexicals, proper names or predicates. Graeme Forbes argues that the two-dimensional semantics of David Chalmers fails to account for so-called nested contexts. These (...) are linguistic contexts where a sentence is embedded under both epistemic and modal operators. Chalmers and Rabern suggest a two-dimensional solution to the problem. Their semantics solves the nesting-problem, but at the cost of invalidating certain plausible principles. We suggest a solution that is both simpler and avoids this cost. (shrink)

"Die Gedanken, die ich in diesem Buche mitteile, sollen die Grundstimmung festhalten, die ich in der Weltanschauung Goethes beobachtet habe. Im Lauf vieler Jahre habe ich immer wieder und wieder das Bild dieser Weltanschauung betrachtet. Besonderen Reiz hatte es fur mich, nach den Offenbarungen zu sehen, welche die Natur uber ihr Wesen und ihre Gesetze den feinen Sinnes- und Geistesorganen Goethes gemacht hat. Ich lernte begreifen, warum Goethe diese Offenbarungen als so hohes Gluck empfand, dass er sie zuweilen hoher schatzte (...) als seine Dichtungsgabe. Die Eindrucke, welche Goethe von den Erscheinungen der Natur empfangen hat, muss man kennen, wenn man den vollen Gehalt seiner Dichtungen verstehen will. Die Geheimnisse, die er dem Wesen und Werden der Schopfung abgelauscht hat, leben in seinen kunstlerischen Erzeugnissen und werden nur demjenigen offenbar, der hinhorcht auf die Mitteilungen, die der Dichter uber die Natur macht. Niemand kann in die Tiefen der Goetheschen Kunst hinuntertauchen, dem Goethes Naturbeobachtungen unbekannt sind." [...] Rudolf Steiner war ein osterreichischer Esoteriker und Philosoph. Auf Grundlage seiner Lehre entstand unter anderem die Waldorfpadagogik. Der Verlag der Wissenschaften verlegt historische Literatur bekannter und unbekannter wissenschaftlicher Autoren. Dem interessierten Leser werden so teilweise langst nicht mehr verlegte Werke wieder zugangig gemacht. Das vorliegende Buch ist ein unveranderter Nachdruck der historischen Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1897.". (shrink)

Graphical AbstractThe fungus Neurospora comprises a novel model for testing hypotheses involving the role of sex and reproduction in eukaryotic genome evolution. Its variation in reproductive mode, lack of sex-specific genotypes, availability of phylogenetic species, and young sex-regulating chromosomes make research in this genus complementary to animal and plant models.

Excerpt from Über die Echtheit der Platonischen Briefe Der erste Aufenthalt Platos in Syrakus fällt, wie sich mit Hilfe einer bisher übersehenen Angabe seines Biographen Olympiodor feststellen läfst, in den Frühsommer des Jahres 388. Damals war Plato, der nach dem Zeugnis seines Schülers Hermodor 427 geboren ist, in der Tat beinahe 40 Jahre alt Das anfänglich gute Verhältnis zum älteren Dionys konnte bei der Ver schiedenheit der Charaktere nicht lange bestehen; schon um die Mitte des Sommers 388, zur Zeit der (...) olympischen Spiele, finden wir Plato wieder in Hellas. Nach einer bekannten Erzählung hatte nämlich der Tyrann den smrtanischen Gesandten Pullis veranlafst, ihn auf seinem Schiffe mitzunehmen und in Ägina aus Land zu setzen, damit er dort als Kriegsgefangener fest genommen und auf dem Sklavenmarkt verkauft würde. Es wäre nämlich gerade Krieg zwischen Athen und Ägina gewesen (bis Sein Gastfreund Anniceris von Cyrene sei zufällig hinzu gekommen und habe ihn losgekauft Ausdrücklich bemerkt Olympiodor zu dieser Erzählung, Anniceris sei mit einem Viergespann nach Hellas gekommen, um an den olympischen Spielen Demnach fällt Platos erste sizilische Reise in das Olympiadenjahr 388. Die chronologische Zuverlässigkeit des Briefes tritt am deutlichsten darin hervor, dafs nun seine An gabe, Plato sei damals beinahe 40 Jahre alt gewesen, gerade mit der bestbezeugten Angabe über sein Geburtsjahr übereinstimmt. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In what sense, and to what extent, do rules of inference determine the meaning of logical constants? Motivated by the principle of charity, a natural constraint on the interpretation of logical constants is to make the rules of inference come out sound. But, as Carnap observed, although this constraint does rule out some non-standard interpretations, it does not rule them all out. This is known as Carnap’s problem. I suggest that a charitable interpretation of the logical constants should, as far (...) as possible, make the rules of inference both sound and complete, and I show how this idea can be brought to bear on a successful solution to Carnap’s problem in the case of classical propositional logic, as well as classical first-order logic. In fact, the solution generalizes to any logic whose rules of inference are sound and complete with respect to a bivalent semantics that is classical with respect to negation. (shrink)

In der Arbeit wird eine textimmanente Problemstellung der Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft aufgegriffen, indem ausgehend vom Grundsatz der Vernunft nach der Möglichkeit eines regulativen Apriori im Rahmen der methodischen Vorgaben der Kritik der reinen Vernunft gefragt wird. Kants regulativer Vernunftgebrauch wird in drei Teilen untersucht: Der erste Teil – Problemfeld – entwickelt ausgehend von der Antinomie der reinen Vernunft immanente Kriterien, durch die das Lehrstück des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik dargestellt und geprüft werden kann. Der zweite Teil (...) – Analysen – entwickelt textimmanent die Herleitung der Vernunftbegriffe, das dadurch geleistete Systematische der Erkenntnis und ihre transzendentale Rechtfertigung. Der dritte Teil – Dimension und Reichweite – untersucht auf der Basis der textimmanenten Analyse die konkreten Beispiele, die Kant im Anhang zur Transzendentalen Dialektik anführt, um damit die begrifflich-abstrakten Gedankengänge an Fallbeispielen zu konkretisieren. Der Grundsatz der Vernunft wird dabei in seiner konstitutiven Form zurückgewiesen und in einer regulativen Interpretation als transzendentaler Grundsatz der Vernunft neu begründet. (shrink)

Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social norms. We aim at exploring whether chimpanzees possess evolutionary (...) precursors of universal social norms seen in humans. Chimpanzees exhibit important preconditions for their presence and enforcement: tolerant societies, well-developed social-cognitive skills and empathetic competence. Here, we develop a theoretical framework for recognizing different functional levels of social norms and distinguish them from mere statistical behavioural regularities. Quasi social norms are found where animals behave functionally moral without having moral emotions. In proto social norms, moral emotions might be present but cannot be collectivized due to the absence of a uniquely human psychological trait, i.e. shared intentionality. Human social norms, whether they are universal or cultural, involve moral emotions and are collectivized. We will discuss behaviours in chimpanzees that represent potential evolutionary precursors of human universal social norms, with special focus on social interactions involving infants. We argue that chimpanzee infants occupy a special status within their communities and propose that tolerance towards them might represent a proto social norm. Finally, we discuss possible ways to test this theoretical framework. (shrink)

In a crucial paragraph (KrV, A 663-664 / B 691-692) of the first part of the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant discusses the specific status of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. In doing so, he refers to an already proven argument and thus to other passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In search of this argument the “Transcendental Analytic” but in particular the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic” turn out to be possible reference points. Although (...) this contextualisation demands further systematic and editorial reflections, it also allows the clarification of the status of the principles and their justification in relation to a subjective deduction. Kant offers with the subjective deduction, as introduced in the “Preface” (of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason) and again in the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic”, a first argumentative strategy, which differs from the objective one but provides “some objective validity” (KrV, A 664 / B 692; Kant, 1998, p. 602) and therefore has systematic importance for the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. My aim is to offer immanent strategies for a justification of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity in the framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)