About this topic
Summary

Husserl’s first-personal view of perceptual experience furnishes a principled alternative to current mainstream views. On the Husserlian view, perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions, rather than accuracy conditions. We perceive objects in terms of possibilities of degrees and kinds of fulfillment, i.e., better and more complete givenness, as when I examine an object from different sides, to attain a more complete overview. The idea of fulfillment also yields a non-inferential conception of how perceptual experiences justify beliefs or judgments: if I believe that there is a blackbird in the tree and then see that there is one, the two acts enter into a synthesis of fulfillment, providing justification for the belief. Lastly, the focus on fulfillments brings center-stage perceivers' embodiment, with the body’s kinaesthetic systems taking on a constitutive role in visual and other perceptual experiences.

Key works Parts of the classic Tugendhat 1967 discuss perceptual experiences in relation to the topics of fulfillment and truth. Mensch 1981, taking Husserl’s rejection of psychologism as starting point, explores the relations perceptual experiences bear to the world and to the cognitive states (or “acts”) they justify, in the Logical Investigations and Ideas I. Melle 1983 argues that Husserl, unlike Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, has a “meaning-theoretic” and “intellectualist” conception of the perceptual noema. Miller 1984 discusses Husserl's views of perceptual experiences, including the perception of time, from the point of view of the so-called West Coast interpretation, incorporating Fregean motifs. Mulligan 1995 compares Husserl’s views of perceptual experiences with those of the Gestalt psychologists, and examines Husserl's uses of the notion of “apprehension,” regarding perceptual experiences. Hopp 2011 draws upon Husserl’s views of perception and fulfillment to contribute to current debates on perceptual justification, viewing fulfillment as a kind of non-inferential perceptual justification, and taking perceptual contents as non-conceptual. Another recent contribution is Borsato 2009, considering inner and outer perception vis-à-vis imagination, and examining the relations between Brentano’s and Husserl’s views. Bernet 1978
Introductions Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 4, Smith 2006, Ch. 6
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
124 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 124
  1. Alia Al-Saji (2010). Bodies and Sensings: On the Uses of Husserlian Phenomenology for Feminist Theory. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 43 (1):13-37.
    What does Husserlian phenomenology have to offer feminist theory? More specifically, can we find resources within Husserl’s account of the living body ( Leib ) for the critical feminist project of rethinking embodiment beyond the dichotomies not only of mind/body but also of subject/object and activity/passivity? This essay begins by explicating the reasons for feminist hesitation with respect to Husserlian phenomenology. I then explore the resources that Husserl’s phenomenology of touch and his account of sensings hold for feminist theory. My (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jan Almäng (2014). Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy. Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. R. Barbaras (2003). Life and Perceptual Intentionality. Research in Phenomenology 33 (1):157-166.
    Husserl is the first philosopher who has managed to account for the specificity of perception, characterized as givenness by sketches (Abschattungen); but neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty have given a satisfying definition of the subject of perception. This article tries to show that the subject of perception must be conceived as living being and that, therefore, the phenomenology of perception must lead to a phenomenology of life. Here, life is approached from an existential point of view, that is to say, as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Michael D. Barber (2008). Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-Conceptual Content. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 24 (2):79-97.
    John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing McDowell’s rejection of what he means by non-conceptual content, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Wolfgang Becker (1990). Indexikalität, Wahrnehmung und Bedeutung bei Husserl. Conceptus 24 (61):51-71.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Rudolf Bernet (2009). The Hermeneutics of Perception in Cassirer, Heidegger, and Husserl. In Rudolf A. Makkreel & Sebastian Luft (eds.), Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy. Indiana University Press.
  7. Rudolf Bernet (1978). Endlichkeit und Unendlichkeit in Husserls Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 40 (1):251-269.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Federico Boccaccini (2012). Les promesses de la perception. La synthèse passive chez Husserl à la lumière du projet de psychologie descriptive brentanienne. Bulletin D'analyse Phénoménologique 8 (1).
    Le but du présent essai est de montrer la différence entre la phénoménologie descriptive et la phénoménologie transcendantale en ce qui concerne la per­ception et la constitution du sens objectif de l’expérience. La conception générale qui anime notre travail peut être caractérisée comme « néo-brenta­nienne ». -/- Nous ne visons pas à une exposition complète de la théorie de la synthèse passive telle qu’elle est développée principalement dans le volume XI des Husserliana1. Notre but n’est pas de faire un résumé (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Rudolf Boehm (1978). Das „ding-an-sich” AlS erkenntnisziel: Fragen zu Rudolf bernets aufsatz „endlichkeit und unendlichkeit in husserls phänomenologie der wahrnehmung”. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 40 (4):659 - 661.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Luciano Boi (2007). Phénoménoligie et méréologie de la perception spatiale, de Husserl aux théoriciens de la Gestalt. In Luciano Boi, Pierre Kerszberg & Frédéric Patras (eds.), Rediscovering Phenomenology: Phenomenological Essays on Mathematical Beings, Physical Reality, Perception and Consciousness (Phaenomenologica) (English and French Edition). Springer. 33-66.
  11. Andrea Borsato (2013). About Non-Noticeability in Perception. A Phenomenological Analysis of the Point of View of Analytical Philosophy on the Subject" Attention". Husserl Studies 29 (2):113-141.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Andrea Borsato (2013). Über Das Unbemerkbare in der Wahrnehmung. Eine Phänomenologische Auseinandersetzung Mit Dem Standpunkt der Analytischen Philosophie Zum Thema ,Aufmerksamkeit'. Husserl Studies 29 (2):113-141.
    Was wir nicht bemerken können, das können wir auch nicht wahrnehmen: Diese im Rahmen der gegenwärtigen analytischen Philosophie des Geistes weitverbreitete Ansicht wurde neulich von M. Tye und A. Noë verteidigt. Wir werden uns hier mit einigen empirischen Beispielen auseinandersetzen, die u.E. mit dieser Idee kaum in Einklang zu bringen sind und stattdessen den Gedanken nahelegen, dass die Grenzen des Wahrnehmbaren über die Grenzen sowohl des primär Bemerkbaren als auch des sekundär Bemerkbaren hinausgehen. Auf diesem Weg gelangen wir dann zur (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Matt Bower (forthcoming). Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-Representational Phenomenology. Husserl Studies:1-21.
    While classical phenomenology, as represented by Edmund Husserl’s work, resists certain forms of representationalism about perception, I argue that in its theory of horizons, it posits representations in the sense of content-bearing vehicles. As part of a phenomenological theory, this means that on the Husserlian view such representations are part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I believe that, although the intuitions supporting this idea are correct, it is a mistake to maintain that there are such representations defining the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Matt Bower (forthcoming). Husserl’s Theory of Instincts as a Theory of Affection. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology.
    Husserl’s theory of passive experience first came to systematic and detailed expression in the lectures on passive synthesis from the early 1920s, where he discusses pure passivity under the rubric of affection and association. In this paper I suggest that this familiar theory of passive experience is a first approximation leaving important questions unanswered. Focusing primarily on affection, I will show that Husserl did not simply leave his theory untouched. In later manuscripts he significantly reworks the theory of affection in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Robert Brisart (2013). L'expérience perceptive et son passif. À propos des sensations dans le constructivisme de Husserl. Philosophie 119 (3):33.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Anselmo Caputo (1999). Il concetto di hyle nella fenomenologia della percezione di Husserl. Idee 40:77-105.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Carleton B. Christensen (2008). Self and World - From Analytic Philosophy to Phenomenology. Walter de Gruyter.
    This book draws upon the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger to provide an alternative elaboration of John McDowell’s thesis that in order to understand how self-conscious subjectivity relates to the world, perception must be understood as a genuine unity of spontaneity (‘concept’) and receptivity (‘intuition’). Thereby it clarifies McDowell’s critique of Donald Davidson and develops an alternative conception of perceptual experience which gives sense to McDowell’s claim that self-conscious subjectivity is so inherently in touch with its world that scepticism (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Suzanne Cunningham (1986). Representation: Rorty Vs. Husserl. Synthese 66 (2):273 - 289.
    Richard Rorty in his recent book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1 offers a wide ranging critique of that version of modern philosophy which understands itself fundamentally as a theory of knowledge. He attacks analytic philosophy as well as phenomenology for falling into a sort of trap laid for us in the period of classical modern philosophy by most everyone from Descartes and Locke to Kant. I want to focus on just one element in Rorty's critique - namely, that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Suzanne Cunningham (1985). Miller, Izchak. 'Husserl, Perception and Temporal Awareness'. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 38 (3):665-666.
  20. Suzanne Cunningham (1985). Perceptual Meaning and Husserl. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (4):553-566.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Vittorio De Palma (2012). Die Welt Und Die Evidenz. Zu Husserls Erledigung des Cartesianismus. Husserl Studies 28 (3):201-224.
    Der Aufsatz will nachweisen, dass Husserls Denken in der Tat eine Erledigung des Cartesianismus darstellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Husserls Denken eine ganz andere Auffassung der Wahrnehmung und der Evidenz als Descartes zugrunde liegt. Denn – im Vorgriff auf eine Einsicht, die gegenwärtig in der analytischen Philosophie vertreten wird – meint Husserl, eine Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz könne nur aufgrund anderer Wahrnehmungen oder Evidenzen bezweifelt werden. Deshalb setzt jede solche Bezweifelung das Vertrauen in die Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz voraus und kann nicht (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Gunnar Declerck (2012). Incarnation, motricité et rapport au possible. Studia Phaenomenologica 12:35-60.
    For Husserl, kinaesthetic capability is a key piece of the process of perception. By ensuring the junction between the actual and the potential, it allows the exhibition of an object that is always more than what appears. Kinaesthetic capability preserves the transcendence of the object by preventing the phenomenon from being confined to pure actuality. This idea, however, poses significant challenges when one questions the nature of the possibilities that are at stake here. Especially, the perceived seems to enjoy a (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Arnaud Dewalque (2012). Intentionnalité cum fundamento in re : La constitution des champs sensoriels chez Stumpf et Husserl. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (1):70-96.
    J?aborderai ici le problème de la passivité de l?esprit dans le cadre d?une analyse de la perception sensible 1 . La question qui m?occupera sera la sui­vante : quel est le rôle des matériaux sensoriels ou des phénomènes sensibles dans la perception ? Plus exactement : quel sens faut-il donner ? s?il faut en donner un ? à la notion de « champs sensoriels » ( Sinnesfelder ) dans l?ana­lyse intentionnelle de la perception ? Je commencerai par rappeler que l?ap­proche (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. James Dodd (1996). Phenomenon and Sensation: A Reflection on Husserl's Concept ofSinngebung. [REVIEW] Man and World 29 (4):419-439.
    Husserl's idea of a self-enclosed region of pure consciousness, a transcendental subjectivity that is at once absolute being and a sense-giving synthesis of experience, has enjoyed few, if any, enthusiastic defenders. In a recent book on Husserl, David Bell struggles in vain to find anything of worth in Husserl's "transcendental ontology. ''1 To be sure, Bell is reading Husserl with Fregean eyes; yet much dissatisfaction can be found among continental thinkers as well. Jacques Derrida, for example, argues that the self-presence (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Maxime Doyon (2011). Husserl and McDowell on the Role of Concepts in Perception. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 11:42-74.
    In his collection of essays Having the World in View (2009), John McDowell draws a distinction between empirical experience (conceived as the conceptual activity relevant to judgment) and empirical judgment (i.e., the full-fledged assertoric content itself ). McDowell’s latest proposal is that the form of empirical experience is transferable into judgment, but it is not itself a judgment. Taking back the view he advanced in Mind and World, McDowell now believes that perception does not have propositional content as such, but (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Mark P. Drost (1990). The Primacy of Perception in Husserl's Theory of Imagining. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):569-582.
  27. John J. Drummond (1983). Objects' Optimal Appearances and the Immediate Awareness of Space in Vision. Man and World 16 (3):177-206.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. John J. Drummond (1979). On Seeing a Material Thing in Space: The Role of Kinaesthesis in Visual Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):19-32.
  29. John J. Drummond (1978). On the Nature of Perceptual Appearances, or Is Husserl an Aristotelian? New Scholasticism 52 (1):1-22.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Paul Ducros (2007). « Mais l'éclair dans la nuit de tempête ? » Phénoménologie d'une limite de la perception. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (1).
    Cette étude prend sa source dans une note du § 30 de Chose et espace, dans laquelle Husserl, après avoir établi les fondements d'une phénoménologie de la perception, s'exclame: "Mais l'éclair dans la nuit de tempête?", comme pour signifier que la description habituelle des vécus de perception échoue à saisir l'essence d'un vécu tel que l'éclair dans la nuit de tempête. La postérité phénoménologique (Fink notamment) a souvent souligné de telles limites et en a pris prétexte pour légitimer son effort (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Paul Ducros (2006). La coloration selon Husserl. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 104 (4):812-840.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Robin Durie (2008). At the Same Time. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (1):73-88.
    The essay on Husserl’s phenomenology of touch in Derrida’s recent On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy represents his only substantial re-engagement with Husserlian phenomenology to be published following the series of texts dating from the period marked by his Mémoire of 1955 through to the essay ‘Form and Meaning’ included in Margins (1972). The essay, devoted to some key sections of Husserl’s Ideas II, appears to break new ground in Derrida’s readings of Husserl, but in fact demonstrates a profound continuity with his earlier (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Daniel Dwyer (2013). Preconceptual Intelligibility in Perception. Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):533-553.
    This paper argues that John McDowell’s conceptualism distorts a genuine phenomenological account of perception. Instead of the seemingly forced choice between conceptualism and non-conceptualism as to what accounts for perceptual and discursive meaning, I provide an argument that there is a preconceptual intelligibility already in the perceptual field. With the help of insights from certain nonconceptualists I sketch out an argument that there is a teleological directedness in the way in which latent order and structure can be discriminated at the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Daniel J. Dwyer (2008). The Partial Re-enchantment of Nature Through the Analysis of Perception. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (6):1-12.
    Le réductionnisme scientiste a privé le monde de ce qui avait été un univers enchanté, empli des formes et des esprits qui hantaient le monde médiéval. Merleau-Ponty et Husserl dans son œuvre tardive tentent de réenchanter la nature, mais du point de vue de la perception. Leur insistance sur la structure et la forme perceptuelles est un moyen de protection contre le réductionnisme et donc, en un sens, réenchante le monde qui, pour parler comme Merleau-Ponty, est « con­damné au sens (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Daniel J. Dwyer (2007). Husserl's Appropriation of the Psychological Concepts of Apperception and Attention. Husserl Studies 23 (2):83-118.
    In the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl thematizes the surplus (Überschuß) of the perceptual intention whereby the intending goes beyond the partial givenness of a perceptual object to the object as a whole. This surplus is an apperceptive surplus that transcends the purely perceptual substance (Gehalt) or sensed content (empfundene Inhalt) available to a perceiver at any one time. This surplus can be described on the one hand as a synthetic link to future, possible, active experience; to intend an object is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Christian Ferencz-Flatz (2014). Husserls Begriff der Kinästhese Und Seine Entwicklung. Husserl Studies 30 (1):21-45.
    EinleitungDer Begriff Kinästhese ist in der Husserl-Literatur durchaus geläufig. Trotzdem fehlt bis heute eine umfassende Erörterung seiner Bedeutung und seiner Spielformen sowie auch seiner konkreten Entwicklungsgeschichte bei Husserl.Zu erwähnen wären in dieser Hinsicht besonders: Claesges (1964), Claesges’ „Einleitung des Herausgebers“ zu Hua XVI, Drummond (1984), Melle (1983), S. 114–120, Piedade (2001), Przybylski (2006) und Mattens (2009). Vermutlich würde fast jeder Husserl-Kenner – wenn danach fragt – ohne weiteres antworten, Kinästhesen seien jene Bewegungsmöglichkeiten des leiblichen Subjekts, durch die sich seine Wahrnehmungsgegenstände (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Christian Ferencz-Flatz (2012). Objects with a Past: Husserl on “Ad-Memorizing Apperceptions”. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 45 (2):171-188.
    In a late notation from 1932, Husserl emphasizes the fact that a broad concept of “apperception” should also include, alongside his usual examples, the apprehension of objects as bearers of an individual or inter-subjective past, specifically “indicated” with them; thus, he distinguishes between apperceptions “appresenting” a simultaneous content (co-presentations), anticipatory apperceptions pointing to future incidents, and retrospective apperceptions referring to “ad-memorized” ( hinzuerinnert , ad - memoriert ) features and events. The latter sort of apperceptions are involved not only in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Christian Ferencz-Flatz (2009). Gibt es perzeptive phantasie? AlS-ob-bewusstsein, widerstreit und neutralität in husserls aufzeichnungen zur bildbetrachtung. Husserl Studies 25 (3):235-253.
    Unser Beitrag versucht eine systematische Auslegung des Begriffs der „perzeptiven Phantasie , den Husserl in einigen Aufzeichnungen zum Bildbewusstsein anwendet. Dabei werden drei der wesentlichen Aspekte, die in der Husserl-Literatur das Thema Bild durchgehend bestimmen, einer gründlichen Analyse unterzogen: der Begriff des „Widerstreitbewusstseins , die Idee der „Neutralität und die Scheidung zwischen Impression und Reproduktion. Jedes dieser Themen spielt eine wesentliche Rolle in der husserlschen Auslegung des Bildbewusstseins. Dabei sind aber alle diese Themen, wie wir zeigen wollen, letztlich von einem (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Christian Ferencz-Flatz (2009). Is There a Perceptive Imagination? As-on-Account of Consciousness, Conflict and Neutrality in Husserl's Recordings for the Picture Consideration. Husserl Studies 25 (3):235-253.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Denis Fisette (2011). Brentano et Husserl sur la perception sensible. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 7 (1):37-72.
    On nous a habitué, dans les études husserliennes, à traiter de la ques tion du rapport de la phénoménologie des Recherches logiques à Brentano dans la perspective de la critique que Husserl adresse à la théorie immanen tiste de l’intentionnalité dans cet ouvrage*. Mais cette perspective laisse dans l’ombre un enjeu fondamental de la question qui sous-tend les discussions de Husserl dans la § 15 de la cinquième Recherche et dans l’Appendice au deuxième volume de l’ouvrage, à savoir ce que (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Dagfinn Føllesdal (1978). Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception. Grazer Philosophische Studien 5:83-94.
    The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion of hyle, whose (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Shaun Gallagher (2011). Embodiment and Phenomenal Qualities: An Enactive Interpretation. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):1-14.
    I argue that an older debate in phenomenology concerning Husserl’s notion of hyletic data can throw some light on contemporary debates about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. Both debates tend to ignore important considerations about bodily experience and how specific kinds of bodily experience can shape one’s consciousness of the world. A revised and fully embodied conception of hyletic experience enriches the concept of enactive perception.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Shaun Gallagher (1986). Hyletic Experience and the Lived Body. Husserl Studies 3 (2):131-166.
    The theory of hyletic data has been criticized and dismissed a number of times since Edmund Husserl proposed it early in this century. This rejection of Husserl's theory has been part of a larger, wholesale critique of the traditional notion of sensation in which theories of sensation have been displaced by theories of perception.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Nolen Gertz (2010). On the Possibility of a Phenomenology of Light. PhaenEx 5 (1):41-58.
    The phenomenological tradition has always had a peculiar preoccupation with light. This paper will attempt to determine how and why light appears as it does, and what this can tell us about the phenomenological understanding of light and its relevance. This will be carried out through a systematic analysis covering Husserl's study of light as "circumstance of apperception," Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's use of light as "symbol for the unsayable," and Levinas' interest in light as "rival to the 'there is'." (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Aron Gurwitsch (1964). Field Of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
  46. Aron Gurwitsch (1964). The Field of Consciousness. Duquesne University Press.
  47. Patrick A. Heelan (2004). The Phenomenological Role of Consciousness in Measurement. Mind and Matter 2 (1):61-84.
    A structural analogy is pointed out between a check hermeneutically developed phenomenological description, based on Husserl, of the process of perceptual cognition on the one hand and quantum mechanical measurement on the other hand. In Husserl's analytic phase of the cognition process, the 'intentionality-structure' of the subject/object union prior to predication of a local object is an entangled symmetry-making state, and this entanglement is broken in the synthetic phase when the particular local object is constituted under the influence of an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Alievtina Hervy (2013). Perception et imagination : La problématique des actes mixtes. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (1):1-29.
    Comment s’articule la dimension imaginative de la conscience à celle de la perception ? Quel rôle peut être appelée à jouer cette dimension imaginative de la conscience au niveau épistémologique ? Au sein de la Sixième Recherche logique , lorsque Husserl élabore sa théorie des actes du remplissement — qui fondent à l’époque sa théorie de la connaissance —, il semble admettre la possibilité d’un « mixte » entre perception et imagination. Cette hypothèse est fondée à partir d’un rapprochement des (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. A. Hogenova (2000). On the Problem of Inner Perception (Phenomenological Analysis as Understood by Husserl and Patocka). Filozofia 55 (4):283-293.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Walter Hopp (2014). Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis. Methodos 14.
    This is a response to Charles Travis's article "Is Seeing Intentional?" In it, I argue that while seeing differs from other intentional states in a variety of ways, seeing is indeed intentional, at least in the philosophically central sense of "intentional" introduced to us by Brentano and Husserl. Seeing is, quite often at least, the consciousness of something. I spend the majority of the paper discussing Travis's arguments that it is not, and providing reasons for thinking they are inconclusive. That (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 124