This paper shows that the Freudian “timelessness” of psychical process is not to be understood as a bare consequence of his distinction between conscious and unconscious psychical process. It shows that Freud have a positive and phenomenological characterization of that timelessness, obtained and affirmed beyond and against that distinction, and that the challenge that Freud, with this timelessness, throws to a “Kantian” philosophy is not completely senseless, but can be well worked-out in a somewhat Bergsonian lines.

In »Materie und Gedächtnis« , seinem Hauptwerk, erörtert der französische Philosoph und Nobelpreisträger Henri Bergson das Zusammenwirken von Körper und Geist in der freien Handlung. Auf höchstem gedanklichen Niveau, aber in bestechend einfacher Sprache geschrieben, zählt das Werk zu den wenigen herausragenden Grundtexten der Gegenwartsphilosophie, vergleichbar »in ihrer Zeit mit Berkeleys Principles oder Kants Kritik« .Nachdem Bergson im Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience das Verhältnis von Freiheit und Determinismus auf eine neue Basis zu stellen versucht (...) hat, wendet er sich hier, in Auseinandersetzung mit der Psychologie und Hirnphysiologie seiner Zeit, dem alten philosophischen Problem des Verhältnisses von Geist und Materie zu. Dabei reduziert er ›Materie‹ weder – idealistisch – auf reine Vorstellungen noch nimmt sie – materialistisch – als deren dinglichen Grund an, sondern sieht sie als eine Gesamtheit von ›Bildern‹, wobei er den Bildbegriff auf halbem Wege zwischen Ding und Vorstellung ansetzt und damit vor die Trennung von Existenz und Erscheinung zurückgeht. Eine herausragende Bedeutung kommt dabei dem Gedächtnis zu: hier verstanden nicht als ›mechanisches‹ Registrieren aufgenommener Inhalte, sondern als ›reines‹, lebendiges Gedächtnis, das sich einer geistigen, in der Vergangenheit entstandenen Bilderwelt bedient und der Dauer korrespondiert. Das auf Dauer ausgerichtete Gedächtnis verweist auf eine Selbstständigkeit des Geistes, die allerdings qua Handlung wieder auf den Körper zurückwirkt. »Der Geist entnimmt der Materie die Wahrnehmungen, aus denen er seine Nahrung zieht, und gibt sie ihr zurück in Form von Bewegung, der er seine Freiheit aufgeprägt hat«. (shrink)

Kant criticizes Plato for his interest in positing ideas that are entirely purified from any sensible elements, but which, nonetheless, exist in some supra-sensible reality. I argue that Kant’s criticism can be repositioned and even countered if, in our assessment of Plato, we assign a wider scope of significance and greater value to the senses. In order to lend focus to my article, I analyze Socrates’ presentation of what I translate as the “look of the Good” (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, 508e) (...) in the Republic so as to show the proximity between Plato and Kant on the question of sensibility. I also draw on the Phaedo and extant literature that goes against the traditional view regarding the status of Ideas or Forms, including the Idea of the Good. I further discuss an affinity between the Good that is “beyond being” (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509c) in the Republic and Kant’s view of God as an Ideal of Reason. Given my articulation of the importance of the sensible dimension in Plato, there is a continuity between Kant and Plato on the question of the illegitimacy of certain ideas. In other words, in my reading (and contrary to Kant’s view of Plato), Kant does not so much overturn Plato’s metaphysics, but develops further the view that is already inscribed in Plato. (shrink)

Felsefe, kümülatif yapısı ile ele alınmalıdır. Bu yüzden, bir filozofun düşünceleri anlaşılmak istendiğinde, o kendi çağındaki mevcut ve geçmiş teorilerden soyutlanmamalı ve bu kümülatif ve devamlılık arz eden yapı dikkate alınarak incelenmelidir. Bu bağlamda, Kant, Bergson ve İkbal’in zaman anlayışları, bazı uyumsuz noktalara sahip gibi anlaşılabilseler de, dikkatle incelendiğinde birbirleri arasında bir devamlılığın bulunduğu göze çarpar. Kant’ın zaman anlayışı, Kritik öncesi ve Kritik dönemi olmak üzere iki dönemde incelenebilir. Kritik öncesi döneminde Kant, zamanın insan zihninin dışında kendinde bir gerçekliğe (...) ve varlığa sahip olduğunu kabul eder. Fakat Kant, zamanı bütün duyuları önceleyen bir görü olarak anlamasının tohumlarını da hala Kritik öncesi dönemde iken eker. Bu doğrultuda, onun odağı özneyi merkeze alan bir tutuma doğru ilerler görünür. Kritik döneminde özne merkezci konumu daha da belirginleşir ve Kant, zamanın bütün dışsallıkları öncelediğini iddia eder. Ona göre zaman, duyulur bir görü olarak, eşyayı zihnin algılayabilmesi için eşzamanlılık ve ardışıklık içinde konumlandırır. Diğer taraftan Bergson, Kant’ı pek çok açıdan eleştirmekle beraber onun düşüncelerinden açık bir şekilde faydalanır. Bergson’un zaman anlayışı iki bileşenden oluşur: Salt süre ve homojen zaman. Salt süre, özne-merkezci olması bakımından üzerinde Kant’ın düşünce pratiğinin etkisinin görünür olduğu bir kavramsallaştırmadır. Bu, her bir bilincin, kişinin geçmiş ve şimdisini bir bütünde birleştirerek bireysel olarak sahip olduğu ve özünde heterojen, sırasız bir şekilde ardışık ve bölünemez zamandır. Homojen zaman ise sıralı ve eşzamanlı olması bakımından köklerini yine Kant’ta bulur. Homojen zaman, salt sürelerin uyum içinde çalışmasını sağlayan, bireyler için ortak zemini teşkil eden zamandır. Bu iki filozofun düşünceleri doğrultusunda İkbal’in zaman teorisi incelendiğinde, onun hem duyulabilir görünün bir formu olan Kant’ın zamanından hem de Bergson’un salt süresinden faydalandığı ortaya çıkar. İkbal, bu iki zaman anlayışını kullanarak İslam düşüncesinde İlahi Zaman’ı ve dolayısıyla da özgür iradeyi yeniden inşa eder. Salt süre ve yaratıcılık açısından, evrene yönelik mekanik bir anlayış Bergson ve İkbal tarafından reddedilir. Böylece İkbal, özgür iradenin Tanrı’nın salt süresi, yani İlahi Zaman, aracılığı ile yayılmasına ve tüm benliklere ait salt sürelere nüfuz etmesine izin verir. Biz, bu makale aracılığı ile, İkbal’in salt süre mefhumunu ve Tanrı’ya ait salt süre olarak İlahi Zaman’ı kullanarak özgür irade anlayışını yeniden inşa etmesinin köklerine gitmek niyetindeyiz. (shrink)

A travers les différents thèmes abordés le réel, la poésie, la pulsion de mort, l'interprétation, la télépathie, le rêve, l'inconscient ou le rire est ici interrogée la relation entre ces deux penseurs strictement contemporains du XXe siècle. L'exégèse textuelle recrée un dialogue qui n'a pas réellement existé entre eux. Elle l'inscrit dans un contexte épistémique très riche où se livre une bataille spéculative à l'origine d'une rupture majeure dans les sciences humaines, dont les retombées sont encore palpables aujourd'hui, se nouant (...) autour de nombreux points théoriques liés à la naissance de la psychologie. La finalité revendiquée par celle-ci est ambivalente : à la fois se distinguer de la philosophie et de la médecine, et s'y rattacher. Dans cette optique, autant Bergson que Freud vont se trouver au centre d'un débat sur la "scientificité" de la science du psychique, revendiquant, à l'instar de T Ribot ou P Janet par exemple, le recours à l'expérimentation et aux thèses psychophysiologistes et psychophysiques. La métaphysique de Bergson, comme la métapsychologie de Freud, ainsi désignée en 1896, seront redevables de ces théories, tout en s'en détachant pour aller vers l'idée d'inconscient, concept fondateur de la psychoanalysefreudienne. (shrink)

There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre-discursive representation of moral motivation, and the (...) unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account (an account in terms of the causal development of empirical human beings) of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant's analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper. (shrink)

L’avenir du judéo-christianisme (suite et fin), p. 55. La première partie de cet article ( Revue philosophique, 2001-4, p. 435-480) envisageait, pour le siècle nouveau, un judéo-christianisme compatible avec l’athéisme contemporain, car il consisterait en une sorte de pratique « théâtrale » qui, de la tradition, ne retiendrait pas la foi métaphysique et historique mais le couple péché/Rédemption vécu comme une sorte d’illusion positive. On essaie maintenant de déterminer le rôle qu’ont pu jouer, dans ce devenir : Kant, Bergson, (...) Freud, le pape Jean-Paul II et certains philosophes français d’aujourd’hui (Michel Henry, Alain Juranville, Jean-Luc Marion). (shrink)

This interdisciplinary article takes a philosophical approach to The Interpretation of Dreams, connecting Freud to one of the few philosophers with whom he sometimes identified - Immanuel Kant. It aims to show that Freud's theory of dreams has more in common with Bion's later thoughts on dreaming than is usually recognized. Distinguishing, via a discussion of Kant, between the conflicting 'epistemological' and 'anthropological' aspects of The Interpretation of Dreams, it shows that one specific contradiction in the book - concerning the (...) relation between dream-work and waking thought - can be understood in terms of the tension between these conflicting aspects. Freud reaches the explicit conclusion that the dream-work and waking thought differ from each other absolutely; but the implicit conclusion of The Interpretation of Dreams is quite the opposite. This article argues that the explicit conclusion is the result of the epistemological aspects of the book; the implicit conclusion, which brings Freud much closer to Bion, the result of the anthropological approach. Bringing philosophy and psychoanalysis together this paper thus argues for an interpretation of The Interpretation of Dreams that is in some ways at odds with the standard view of the book, while also suggesting that aspects of Kant's 'anthropological' works might legitimately be seen as a precursor of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

O presente comentário analisa um breve texto tardio de Kant sobre afisiologia especulativa. Além de ilustrar muito bem os princípios metodológicos doprograma de pesquisa kantiano para as ciências da natureza – segundo o qual as ficçõesespeculativas, de valor apenas heurístico, podem ser utilizadas para observar eorganizar fenômenos na procura de suas leis empíricas –, esse escrito antecipa,metodológica e epistemologicamente, os trabalhos de Freud sobre a metapsicogiafisiológica.t:This commentary analyzes a short text by late Kant on speculativephysiology. It ilustrates main metodological principles (...) of Kant’s research programmefor natural sciences – according to which speculative fictions with exclusively heuristicvalue are allowed to be used in observing and organizing phenomena in search forempirical laws – and in addition it anticipates, both methodologically andespistemologically, Freud’s writings on physilogical metapsychology. (shrink)

This paper engages Freud’s relation to Kant, with specific reference to each theorist’s articulation of the interconnections between ethics and religion. I argue that there is in fact a constructive approach to ethics and religion in Freud’s thought, and that this approach can be better understood by examining it in relation to Kant’s formulations on these topics. Freud’s thinking about religion and ethics participates in the Enlightenment heritage, with its emphasis on autonomy and rationality, of which Kant’s model of practical (...) reason is in many ways exemplary. At the same time, Freud advances Kantian thinking in certain important respects; his work offers a more somatically, socially, and historically grounded approach to the formation of rational and ethical capacities, and hence makes it more compatible with contemporary concerns and orientations that eschew the pitfalls of ahistorical idealist orientations. (shrink)

Dans un passage de L’évolution créatrice, Bergson ne réfute pas purement et simplement Kant, mais le présente comme le précurseur d’une philosophie nouvelle, voire comme un précurseur probable mais manqué de sa propre philosophie. Si la philosophie transcendantale, pourtant prometteuse, s’avère finalement décevante, c’est parce qu’elle ne propose qu’une déduction des catégories et non une genèse de l’intelligence. Mais comment Bergson ose-t-il comparer deux démarches que tout semble opposer? Y a-t-il, chez Kant lui-même, quelque chose qui justifie ce (...) rapprochement apparemment incongru entre une déduction transcendantale et une genèse de l’intelligence?In a passage of Creative Evolution, Bergson does not refute Kant, but presents him as a precursor of a new philosophy, and even as a liable but failed precursor of his own philosophy. If the transcendental philosophy, really promising, seems finally disappointing, it is because it only gives us a deduction of the categories and not a genesis of intelligence. How can Bergson say that? How can he compare two perspectives which seem diverging completely? Is there anything in Kant’s texts which evidences this connexion between a transcendental deduction and a genesis of intelligence? (shrink)

Resumo: Este texto tem por objeto a análise da intuição, das especificidades das definições bergsonianas e suas distinções em relação à visão moderna, sobretudo da doutrina kantiana, buscando mostrar os pontos de rompimento e avanço de Bergson em relação a essa concepção. O que se nota, em um primeiro momento, é como a obra de Bergson está de certo modo intimamente ligada a alguns temas clássicos da teoria do conhecimento já amplamente trabalhados na obra de Kant, razão pela (...) qual esse autor está presente desde o início de seu pensamento, desde o Ensaio sobre os dados da consciência, estendendo-se mesmo por quase todo o conjunto de sua obra. De fato, se se abordar os textos de Bergson pela sua referência à história da filosofia, será Kant, sem dúvida, que aparecerá como seu grande interlocutor; na maior parte das vezes como contrapondo a uma crítica que pode ser estendida a toda tradição filosófica, sobretudo àquela que teria subjugado a metafísica aos métodos e orientações da ciência. É natural, com efeito, que o autor da Crítica da Razão Pura surja como personagem importante na obra de Bergson. O pensamento de Kant está assentado em um momento importante quanto aos "rumos" da filosofia, especialmente no que diz respeito ao alcance da metafísica. E, se Bergson expressara, em sua doutrina, todo um esforço para reaver o lugar de direito da metafísica, ampliando mesmo, para além dos limites da análise científica, seu alcance, é certamente Kant que ele haveria de encontrar em suas investigações.: This text aims to analyze intuition, the specificities of the Bergsonian definitions relevant to it, and their distinctions relative to the modern view. Above all, we discuss the doctrine of Kant and seek to show Bergson's points of rupture and advancement in relation to this conception. What is noticeable at first glance is how Bergson's work is in a certain way intimately linked to some classical themes of the theory of knowledge already extensively treated in Kant's work. Kant is present from the beginning of Bergson's thought, ever since his An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, and his influence extends through almost all of Bergson's work. In fact, if one approaches the texts of Bergson in terms of his references to the history of philosophy, it is no doubt Kant who appears as the great interlocutor, in most cases advancing a critique that can be extended to the whole philosophical tradition, especially to that part which would subjugate metaphysics to the methods and orientations of science. It is natural, indeed, that the author of the Critique of Pure Reason emerges as an important character in Bergson's work. Kant's thinking appeared at an important moment in terms of the "directions" of philosophy, especially with regard to the attainment of metaphysics. Bergson expressed in his doctrine an effort to reclaim the rightful place of metaphysics, even extending its reach beyond the limits of scientific analysis, and thus it is certain that he would encounter Kant in his investigations. (shrink)

Koichiro Kokubun focuses on Deleuze's method of 'free indirect discourse' to locate and explicate Deleuze's philosophy of transcendental empiricism and its constitutive limits. He works through Deleuze's confrontations with Hume, Kant, Bergson, Freud, Lacan, Foucault and Guattari, and the influence of structuralism and psychoanalysis.

Research into Bergson’s philosophy downplays a key development in his first work, Time and free will. It is there that Bergson explicitly opposes himself to Kant by arguing that succession is not a temporal concept, but a spatial one. This is the crucial point of departure for Bergson’s entire philosophy, one that allows him to radically dismiss Kant’s notion of freedom in favor of one based on duration and multiplicity. This text has two aims. Firstly to add (...) to Bergson scholarship by explicating the structure and force of Bergson’s initial argument against Kant, demonstrating that his engagement with Kant is much less incremental than has been suggested in secondary literature. Secondly, to reconstruct the consequences regarding freedom that Bergson immediately draws in departing from Kant, which illustrates the profundity and originality of his thought at the very inception of his oeuvre. (shrink)

Dans un passage de L'évolution créatrice, Bergson ne réfute pas purement et simplement Kant, mais le présente comme le précurseur d'une philosophie nouvelle, voire comme un précurseur probable maie manqué de sa propre philosophie. Si la philosophie transcendantale, pourtant prometteuse, s'avère finalement décevante, c'est parce qu'elle ne propose qu'une déduction des catégories et non une genèse de l'intelligence. Mais comment Bergson ose-t-il comparer deux démarches que tout semble opposer ? Y a-t-il, chez Kant lui-même, quelque chose qui justifie (...) ce rapprochement apparemment incongru entre une déduction transcendantale et une genèse de l'intelligence ? In a passage of Creative Evolution, Bergson does not refute Kant, but presents him as a precursor of a new philosophy, and even as a liable but failed precursor of his own philosophy. If the transcendental philosophy, really promising, seems finally disappointing, it is because it only gives us a deduction of the categories and not a genesis of ntelligence. How can Bergson say that ? How can he compare two perspectives which seem diverging completely ? Is there anything in Kant's texts which evidences this connexion between a transcendental deduction and a genesis of intelligence ? (shrink)

This article analyzes the role played by Immanuel Kant's defense of the death penalty, in the first and the second years of Jacques Derrida's Death Penalty Seminars, delivered from 1999 to 2001. Regarding the first year, the initial part of this article charts how Derrida introduces Kant's writings that purport to elaborate the categorical imperative of the death penalty, not by Kant's primary arguments but rather precisely through Kant's concession of an exception to this categorical imperative, concerning the impunity of (...) a mother's infanticide. Derrida's lectures juxtapose Kant's philosophy of the death penalty with Victor Hugo's claim for the inviolability of life, and in doing so, the sessions introduce other examples of the applicability of the death penalty to mothers who have killed their children. What is at stake is the status of philosophy relative to the death penalty. Concerning the second year, the latter part of this article isolates the logic of Kant's categorical imperative, as deconstructed by Derrida, through recourse to the additions that Kant was obliged to append to his initial argument—those involving precisely sex crimes. The article follows how Derrida thoroughly takes apart both the simplicity of Kant's categorical imperative of the death penalty by means of the complications that are its abyssal foundation and the phallogocentrism of Freud's sexual oppositions through the extraction of insights into another thinking of sexual difference that Freud's categories foreclosed. (shrink)

O presente comentário analisa um breve texto tardio de Kant sobre afisiologia especulativa. Além de ilustrar muito bem os princípios metodológicos doprograma de pesquisa kantiano para as ciências da natureza – segundo o qual as ficçõesespeculativas, de valor apenas heurístico, podem ser utilizadas para observar eorganizar fenômenos na procura de suas leis empíricas –, esse escrito antecipa,metodológica e epistemologicamente, os trabalhos de Freud sobre a metapsicogiafisiológica.t:This commentary analyzes a short text by late Kant on speculativephysiology. It ilustrates main metodological principles (...) of Kant’s research programmefor natural sciences – according to which speculative fictions with exclusively heuristicvalue are allowed to be used in observing and organizing phenomena in search forempirical laws – and in addition it anticipates, both methodologically andespistemologically, Freud’s writings on physilogical metapsychology. (shrink)

This paper is inspired by one of Freud’s last notes, which is famous for its astonishing conclusion: “Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it,” which describes the perception of space as a product of the extension of the psychic apparatus, and compares it with Kant’s a priori categorie s. The Author reconstructs the historical background of this idea as part of a long discussion between Freud and his pupil Marie Bonaparte in the second half of 1938, and shows how the (...) relationship between body and psychic functions in Freud’s thought was influenced by his intellectual debt to Kant. Through an outline of the influence of Kantian philosophy on the emerging Naturphilosophie in fin de siècle Vienna, the Author aims to show the profound influence of Kantian philosophy on the development of Freu d’s thought. By committing to a modern and non -dualistic conception of the relationship between body and mind, Freud conceives an indissoluble bond between the mind and, not only the brain, but the whole body and its spatial extension. The Author concludes by identifying a close link between the aphorism of 1938 and Kantian pre-Critique thought, and, more generally, highlighting the influence of the Königsberg philosopher on the relationship between mind and body and on the perception of time and space in Freudian thought. (shrink)

During his 2000–2001 seminar on the death penalty, Jacques Derrida argues that Kant is the most ‘rigorous’ philosophical proponent of the death penalty and, thus, the thinker who poses the most serious objections to the kind of philosophical abolitionism that Derrida is trying to develop in his seminar. For Kant, the death penalty is the logical result of the fundamental principle of criminal law, namely, talionic law or the right of retaliation as a principle of pure, disinterested reason. In this (...) paper, I demonstrate how Derrida attempts to undermine Kant’s defence of the death penalty by demonstrating both its internal contradictions and its strange affinities with the law of primitive peoples. I argue that Derrida’s repeated returns throughout the seminar to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals suggest that Kant’s seemingly rational defence of the death penalty is ultimately motivated by interests that belie the supposed disinterestedness of modern law and by a notion of natural justice that at once subtends and subverts all criminal law. (shrink)

La première partie de cet article envisageait, pour le siècle nouveau, un judéo- christianisme compatible avec l'athéisme contemporain, car il consisterait en une sorte de pratique « théâtrale » qui, de la tradition, ne retiendrait pas la foi métaphysique et historique mais le couple péché/Rédemption vécu comme une sorte d'illusion positive. On essaie maintenant de déterminer le rôle qu'ont pu jouer, dans ce devenir : Kant, Bergson, Freud, le pape Jean-Paul II et certains philosophes français d'aujourd'hui. The first part (...) of this paper was studying, for this coming century, a new judeo- christianism compatible with contemporary atheism since it would consist in some kind of a theatrical practice. This new form of judeo- christianism would keep from tradition no longer the metaphysical and historical faith but the couple sin/redemption, lived as some kind of a positive illusion. One now attempts at determining what may be the part played in such a process by Kant, Bergson, Freud, Pope John Paul II and a few French philosophers of today. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende analisar a natureza e a função da teoria metapsicológica napsicanálise freudiana. Mostra-se que a teoria psicanalítica de Freud é composta por umaparte empírica – a sua psicologia dos fatos clínicos – e outra, especulativa – ametapsicologia. Esta última é considerada por ele uma superestrutura especulativa de valorapenas heurístico, passível de ser substituída por outras superestruturas do mesmo tipo.Sustenta-se, ainda, que sua metapsicologia é fruto do método especulativo, cujosfundamentos foram elaborados por filósofos e epistemólogos anteriores a Freud, entre (...) elesImmanuel Kant e Ernst Mach. O artigo finaliza com algumas considerações sobre o futuroda teorização do tipo metapsicológica, explicitando críticas feitas à metapsicologiafreudiana, tanto por filósofos quanto por psicanalistas, e apontando para a perspectiva,aberta por Donald W. Winnicott, de uma psicanálise sem metapsicologia. This article seeks to analyze the nature and function of metapsychologicaltheory in Freudian psychoanalysis. It will show that Freudian psychoanalytic theory iscomposed of an empirical part — the psychology of clinical facts — and a speculative part— metapsychology. Freud considers this latter part as being a speculative superstructure ofvalue that is only heuristic, capable of being substituted by other superstructures of thesame type. This article sustains the idea that this metapsychology is the fruit of speculativemethod, whose foundations were elaborated by philosophers and epistemologists beforeFreud, including Immanuel Kant and Ernst Mach. The article concludes withconsiderations regarding the future of metapsychological theorization, presenting criticismsof Freudian metapsychology offered by both philosophers and psychoanalysts, andpointing to the open perspective of Donald W. Winnicott of a psychoanalysis without metapsychology. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 1010-1025, December 2021.

There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre‐discursive representation of moral motivation, and the (...) unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant's analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper. (shrink)

Bergson reconoce a Kant el mérito de haber caracterizado al espacio y al tiempo homogéneos como actos del espíritu distintos de todo contenido sensible. Le reprocha no haber advertido que su función no es especulativa sino práctica. De ahí la posibilidad de la metafísica como conocimiento de la duración, una vez superado el mecanismo espacializante de la inteligencia.

Derrida's essay, ‘Devant la loi’, opens with the citation of an1897 letter from Freud to his friend, Wilhelm Fliess, in which he confides that he has a presentiment he shall soon discover the origin of morality. What interests Derrida is not only the discovery that will indeed soon follow but the temporal structure of presentiment itself. Seeking to give such a vague intimation a more rigorous sense, he theorizes presentiment as a way of ‘precognizing’ something that will never otherwise have (...) been known as such. Through close readings of Kafka, Freud and Kant, Derrida asks how the moral law itself might be thinkable only in the mode of a certain pre-, a mode whose very ‘beforeness’ has to be radically rethought. (shrink)

This book argues that tradition is not dissociable from processes of self-consciousness involving our capacity to situate ourselves in a world that includes a rich legacy of predecessors and precedents. It explores how language, the body, experience, imagination, desire, and affect are not dissociable from tradition as transference in the Freudian sense. This argument draws support from several major thinkers and offers new interpretations of them.

RESUMENAunque Bergson no ignoró las tesis de Freud ni el psicoanálisis, sin embargo las divergencias entre los dos pensadores respecto al inconsciente resultan, en gran medida, irreconciliables. El presente trabajo pretende mostrar que sus intereses en este ámbito fueron dispares: mientras Freud se interesó por el funcionamiento de los procesos inconscientes atendiendo a un punto de vista experimental más que especulativo, a Bergson le preocupa su existencia y naturaleza.PALABRAS CLAVEINCONSCIENTE – PSICOLOGÍA – BERGSON – FREUD ABSTRACTAlthough (...) class='Hi'>Bergson did not ignore Freud’s theses nor phychoanalysis, their divergencies concerning the unconcious are, to a great extent, irrenconciliable. The present article intentds to demostrate that ther interests were completely different : whereas Freud was interested in the unconcious processes from an experimental rather than a spectualtive point of view, Bergson was concerned with their existence and nature.KEYWORDSUNCONSCIOUS – PSYCHOLOGY – BEGSON – FREUD. (shrink)

Bergson définit le temps par la succession, qui est création de nouveauté. Mais il prend des exemples qui relèvent non de la succession mais de la simultanéité, garante d’une autre différence, entre deux choses qui coexistent en même temps, c’est-à-dire l’individualité. Dans Le Rire, on trouve en outre un type de comique qui joue sur la duplication simultanée du même. Ces cas de comique engagent la différence entre la simultanéité naturelle d’individus différents et la simultanéité artificielle d’êtres identiques. Si (...) la simultanéité mécanique du même fait rire, c’est bien que la simultanéité naturelle fonde les différences. Cet oubli de Bergson est d’autant plus surprenant que sa conception du temps repose sur une critique de celle de Kant, lequel avait précisément inclus la simultanéité dans le temps comme un de ses modes ; garant du « divers simultané ». Finalement, Bergson est contraint par sa controverse avec Einstein à réintégrer la simultanéité dans le temps. (shrink)