Karl Popper (1902-1994) est mort avant d’avoir terminé cette collection d’articles. Quelques uns (comme « Back to the Presocratics » (1958), publié dans Conjectures et Réfutations, ou la note de The Open Society (1945) – huit pages – consacrée aux corps premiers du Timée) sont relativement connus. Certains, tel celui consacré à « la lumière que la Lune peut jeter sur les deux voies de Parménide » (1992) le sont moins. D’autres enfin sont inédits, comme la « réhabilitation » de (...) Xénophane (ch.... (shrink)

Advancing our understanding of one of the most influential 20th-century philosophers, Robert Vinten brings together an international line up of scholars to consider the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas to the cognitive science of religion. Wittgenstein's claims ranged from the rejection of the idea that psychology is a 'young science' in comparison to physics to challenges to scientistic and intellectualist accounts of religion in the work of past anthropologists. Chapters explore whether these remarks about psychology and religion undermine the frameworks (...) and practices of cognitive scientists of religion. Employing philosophical tools as well as drawing on case studies, contributions not only illuminate psychological experiments, anthropological observations and neurophysical research relevant to understanding religious phenomena, they allow cognitive scientists to either heed or clarify their position in relation to Wittgenstein's objections. By developing and responding to his criticisms, Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion offers novel perspectives on his philosophy in relation to religion, human nature, and the mind. Contents: Introduction (Robert Vinten); Ch.1: 'Wittgenstein, Concepts, and Human Nature' (Roger Trigg); Ch.2: 'On Truth, Language, and Objectivity' (Florian Franken Figueiredo); Ch.3 'Pascal Boyer's Miscellany of Homunculi: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Religion Explained' (Robert Vinten); Ch.4 'The Brain Perceives/Infers' (Hans van Eyghen); Ch.5 'The Imaginary Inner Inside Cognitive Science of Religion' (Christopher Hoyt); Ch.6 'Cognitive Theories and Wittgenstein: Looking for Convergence not for Divergence' (Olympia Panagiotidou); Ch. 7 'Wittgenstein, Naturalism, and Interpreting Religious Phenomena' (Thomas Carroll); Ch.8 'Natural Thoughts and Unnatural Oughts: Lessing, Wittgenstein, and Contemporary CSR' (Guy Axtell); Ch.9 'Normative Cognition in Cognitive Science of Religion' (Mark Addis); Ch.10 'Brains as the Source of Being: Mind/Brain Focus and the Western Model of Mind in Dominant Cognitive Science Discourse' (Rita McNamara); Ch.11 'On Religious Practices as Multiscale Active Inference: Certainties Emerging From Recurrent Interactions Within and Across Individuals and Groups' (Inês Hipólito and Casper Hesp). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:VIOLENT MEMES AND SUSPICIOUS MINDS: GIRARD'S SCAPEGOAT MECHANISM IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTION AND MEMETICS Guömundur Ingi Markússon Reykjavik, Iceland The present article is an attempt to bring mimetic theory into dialogue with certain evolutionary approaches to human culture, i.e., evolutionarypsychology and memetics. That which immediately suggests a consonance between these approaches is a shared concern for the fundamental aspects ofhuman culture, or "fundamental anthropology." My discussion aims at (...) reconsidering Girard's startling insight concerning the significance of scapegoating in the formation of human culture, ritual and myth—or, in short, his concept of the scapegoat mechanism. Two alternative approaches will be explored: (1) On the basis of evolutionary psychology, scapegoating is considered as a cognitive side-effect; (2) with reference to memetics, it is suggested that the scapegoat mechanism is a memetic parasite. The former account is an interpretation ofPascal Boyer's ideas about group mentality and fundamentalist violence in his recent book ReligionExplained(2001). The latter consideration is inspired byTerrence W. Deacon's concept of language evolution and symbolic reference in his book The Symbolic Species (1997). It should be emphasized at the outset that neither Boyer nor Deacon are concerned with scapegoating and, needless to say, the application and interpretation oftheir ideas is entirely my own. 1. The Scapegoat Mechanism as a Cognitive Side Effect The following is an attempt to formulate a cognitive account of scapegoating based on Pascal Boyer's ideas about fundamentalism (2001, 292ff). Guömundur Ingi Markússon89 1.1. The Coalitional Reasoning ofthe Social Mind Boyer's theory of religion is firmly rooted in evolutionary psychology (2001, 118, passim)} A key concept in evolutionary psychology is the environment ofevolutionary adapteäness (EEA) which is centered around the claim that our cognitive apparatus evolved in response to ecological problems faced by our ancestors in the Pleistocene period (which lasted from ca. 2 million-10,000 years ago). In other words, the cognition of modern humans is geared to the ancestral environments of our huntergatherer past. The key issue in evolutionary psychology is to gain insight into the adaptive problems faced by our ancestors, and figure out the necessary cognitive capabilities needed to solve them. The resulting models of how the mind works can then be tested experimentally. Evolutionary psychologists also emphasize the áomain specificity of our psychological mechanisms, i.e., in simple terms, that our mind is a collection of specialized mechanisms wrought by natural selection to deal with specific features of our environment, such as detecting predators, keeping track of social relations, etc. In Boyer's account, the mixed stock of our evolutionary heritage includes a complex array of psychological mechanisms for keeping track ofa wide spectrum ofsocial relations, the social mina (2001, 122). An essential aspect of our social intelligence is "intuitive psychology" or a "theory of mind," i.e., seeing others as intentional agents, realizing what they are up to, what their beliefs and desires are, being able to predict their behavior, etc. According to evolutionary psychologists we are adapted for social exchange. We easily calculate the costs and benefits of our interactions with others. Experiments have shown that logical problems are much more transparent to people when presented as social exchange problems. In such cases, the logical rule in question is restated as a "check for cheaters" rule, i.e., the problem is to figure out whether people respect social conventions or not. Evolutionary psychologists interpretthese results to the effect that our cognition is geared to evaluate social exchange, and we have evolved a disposition to check for cheaters in social exchange situations (2001, 124f; Cosmides 1989; Cosmides & Tooby 1992).2 1 On evolutionary psychology, see Barkow et al. and Laland and Brown (ch. 5). 2 Cosmides, one of the pioneers of evolutionary psychology, characterizes "check for cheaters" thus: "cheating can be defined as the violation of a rule established, explicitly or implicitly, by acceptance ofa social contract. A social contract relatesperceived benefits to 90Violent Mêmes and Suspicious Minds Evaluation oftrust is essential to human interaction: "That humans depend on cooperation creates strategic problems, where the value (the expected benefit) of a particular move depends on whether someone else makes a particular move...." (2001, 125... (shrink)

Entre los historiadores de la filosofía, desde hace tiempo se viene discutiendo acerca de la postura de san Agustín frente a los argumentos de la existencia de Dios, tomados del mundo material. Mientras unos, como M. Schmaus, E. Gilson, se pronuncian por una respuesta negativa, otros, como Ch. Boyer, J. Geyser, F. Cayré, responden afirmativamente. A nuestro modo de ver, la opinion de los últimos está más cerca de la verdad, ya que la lectura de las obras del obispo de (...) Hipona nos permite descubrir dos argumentos formulados en sus grandes líneas: el argumento de la causalidad eficiente o argumento cosmológico, y el argumento de la finadidad o argumento teleológico. Vamos a examinar ahora la doctrina agustiniana sobre estos dos argumentos. (shrink)

This collection contains studies on justice, juridical reasoning and argumenta tion which contributed to my ideas on the new rhetoric. My reflections on justice, from 1944 to the present day, have given rise to various studies. The ftrst of these was published in English as The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument. The others, of which several are out of print or have never previously been published, are reunited in the present volume. As justice is, for me, the (...) prime example of a "confused notion", of a notion which, like many philosophical concepts, cannot be reduced to clarity without being distorted, one cannot treat it without recourse to the methods of reasoning analyzed by the new rhetoric. In actuality, these methods have long been put into practice by jurists. Legal reasoning is fertile ground for the study of argumentation: it is to the new rhetoric what mathematics is to formal logic and to the theory of demonstrative proof. It is important, then, that philosophers should not limit their methodologi cal studies to mathematics and the natural sciences. They must not neglect law in the search for practical reason. I hope that these essays lead to be a better understanding of how law can enrich philosophical thought. CH. P. (shrink)

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirelyad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of (...) two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers,” “that is not mine.” This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free ofad hocstipulations. (shrink)

Many ethical concerns surrounding human genetics studies remain unresolved. We report here the situation in Cameroon.Objectives: To describe the profile of human genetic studies that used Cameroonian DNA samples, with specific focus on i) the research centres that were involved, ii) authorship, iii) population studied, iv) research topics and v) ethics disclosure, with the aim of raising ethical issues that emerged from these studies.Method: Bibliometric Studies; we conducted a PubMed-based systematic review of all the studies on human genetics that used (...) Cameroonian DNA samples from 1989 to 2009.Results and Discussion: Fifty articles were identified, involving predominantly research centres from Europe (64%) and America (32%). Only 7 (14%) Cameroonian institutions and 14 (28%) Cameroonian authors were associated with these publications.At least 52% of publications were devoted to population genetics (variation/migration patterns) amongst 30 Cameroonian ethnic groups. Very few studies concerned public health related genetic issues and only 5 (10%) references were found for hemoglobinopathies like sickle cell anaemia. Almost all DNA samples are ‘banked’ outside of the African continent.Capacity building, rights to the genetic information and benefits to the individuals, communities and populations who contribute to these studies are addressed.Conclusions: 1) Our data suggests the need for a wider debate towards building capacity and addressing ethical issues related to human genomic research in sub-Saharan Africa and specifically in Cameroon; 2) National ethical guidelines and regulations concerning the collection, use and storage of human DNA are urgently needed in Cameroon. (shrink)

Since at least as far back as the seventeenth century, the “Quarrel Between the Ancients and the Moderns” has figured on the philosopher’s agenda, in aesthetics and in natural philosophy as well as in ethics and in politics. In this last field, one of the most important stakes of the quarrel turns on the distinction which Benjamin Constant drew in 1819, between two different conceptions of liberty: that of the Ancients and that of the Moderns. The problem of freedom lies (...) at the very heart of all philosophical reflection: in metaphysics and in theology, as well as in ethics and in social and political philosophy. Being founded on a very strong affirmation of the preeminent value of individual freedom, liberalism has, for at least two centuries, been at the centre of the discussion both in modern political philosophy and in economics. Not only were its first rivals, namely anarchism, socialism and a reactionary mode of thought together with its nostalgia for a hierarchical society, defined against the background of liberalism; but the internal discussions within liberalism itself have not been any the less intense, as is realized when comparing its “solidarist” with its “proprietarist” or “libertarian” versions. Some liberals claim descent from Burke, others from Condorcet, some from Humboldt and others from the early Fichte. Liberalism can indeed be spelt out in different ways. One can anyway perceive in present-day objections to liberalism the reappearance of a good many classical philosophical theses. Thus the communitarian criticism of abstract universalism and of state neutrality reminds one of the Hegelian and romantic criticism of the Enlightenment; while some arguments advanced by “leftist” communitarians recall the Marxist criticisms aimed at the formal idealism inherent in the Declaration of the Rights of Man. (shrink)

Through an analysis of policy texts, population statistics and a targeted sample from the popular press, this paper both furthers knowledge about changing meanings of working motherhood in the contemporary US, and proposes a refinement to existing conceptual work relating to how wage-work and care-work are combined. I focus analysis on recent US social policy which grants new rights and protections for women seeking to combine lactation and wage-work (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2011). I critique this (...) policy through Bernise Hausman’s work on the politics of motherhood, arguing that it represents a form of work-life integration that is particularly burdensome for working mothers. I further argue that maternal practice as well as well as expectations of working motherhood in the contemporary US are being reshaped around the demands of neoliberalism, producing what I term ‘neoliberal motherhood’. I assert that this policy represents a way of combining wage-work and care-work that is not captured within existing feminist theory, and suggest that a re-working of theory in this area is needed in order to address cases in which embodied care-work is enfolded within the time and space of wage-work. (shrink)

We are all aware that many people can easily combine general moral understandings that make unprovoked violence inexcusable, with tolerance or even support for that same behavior when it is carried...

Commentators discussed the coherence and validity of a minimalist approach to ownership intuitions, in ways that make it possible to clarify the model, re-evaluate its cognitive underpinnings, and sketch some of its implications. This response summarizes the model; addresses issues concerning the need for a special technical lexicon when describing cognitive semantics; the psychology involved in contexts of competitive acquisition and their consequences for possession and use of rival resources; the role of cooperative expectations in creating mutually beneficial allocation of (...) resources; the consequences of ownership psychology for social interaction and the production of social norms of property; and the relations between psychological processes and legal institutions in the domain, before proposing some final thoughts. (shrink)

Bering argues that belief in posthumous intentional agency may confer added fitness via the inhibition of opportunistic behavior. This is true only if these agents are interested parties in our moral choices, a feature which does not result from Bering's imaginative constraint hypothesis and extends to supernatural agents other than dead people's souls. A by-product model might handle this better.

Should we reduce cell phone emissions to prevent possible cancer, even though the causal link has not been demonstrated? Should an allegedly unsafe vaccine be removed from the market? Can a modest...

Popper cite Bergson dès ses premiers écrits, dans les années 1930, en s'appuyant sur l'idée d' « intuition créatrice », contre l'inductivisme et le positivisme, mais sans accorder quelque infaillibilité que ce soit à l'intuition. Il lui emprunte ensuite les termes de « société ouverte / société close », en leur donnant un sens rationaliste, et en critiquant fortement le mysticisme et le vitalisme « historiciste » et même « hégélien » du philosophe français. À partir des années 1960, il (...) donne un tour evolutionniste à son épistémologie, et est amené à réhabiliter l'idée d'évolution créatrice, en référence constante à Bergson, dont il cherche à montrer qu'une vision « activiste » de l'évolution néodarwinienne permet de simuler Y élan vital sans le supposer. Il propose une cosmologie de l'avenir ouvert, affirmant la réalité du temps et de sa direction, pour permettre de penser l'émergence et la liberté créatrice de nouveauté, ce qui le rapproche encore de Bergson, mais sans spiritualisme ni arrière-plan religieux. Il a toujours admiré la clarté du style de Bergson. In the thirties, Popper used Bergson's idea of a « creative intuition », against inductivism and positivism. But he denied it any infallibility. In the forties, he borrowed from Bergson the expressions « société ouverte I société close », but gave them a rationalist interpretation, criticizing fiercely Bergson's mysticism, as well as his vitalism, regarded as an essentialist historicism à la Hegel. But eventually in the sixties Popper gave his epistemology an evolutionary turn, somewhat rehabilitating the Bergsonian idea of a « creative evolution » and even the idea of an « élan vital ». He argued that an « activist » understanding of Darwinian mechanisms was able to simulate the latter idea, without presupposing it. He proposed a cosmology of the « Open Universe », stressing the reality and irreversibility of time. He went on to use the concept of emergence and tried to give an account of man's freedom, regarded as a power to create genuine novelty in the world, as Bergson had proposed. But Popper eliminated all substantialist spiritualism, and he gave no religious background to his vision of the world. It may be added that he confessed his admiration for the lucidity of Bergson's writing. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de montrer que l’analyse humienne de la justice, et en particulier de l’obligation des promesses telle qu’elle est présentée à la section 5 de la seconde partie du livre III du Traité de la nature humaine, repose sur une conception fictionnaliste de la motivation morale, au sens où l’obligation naturelle de justice (notamment de fidélité) est une fiction. Si cette conception est cohérente avec d’autres aspects de la philosophie de Hume, d’une part, et si elle (...) est une preuve supplémentaire que Hume n’est pas un précurseur de l’utilitarisme, d’autre part, celle-ci risque néanmoins de réduire la justice à une forme de superstition utile. (shrink)

RESUMEN La trayectoria fijada en este artículo busca explorar una geografía mental o atmósfera ambiente donde el encuentro y relevo entre imaginarios singulares permita trazar una nueva cartografía en la que pensamiento crítico y decolonialidad converjan hacia un horizonte común. Por lo tanto, daré nuevo curso al tránsito que conduce de una razón insular a una razón archipiélica, explorando y rastreando la imagen de la isla emergente en diversos textos filosóficos y en ensayos sobre el Caribe. El itinerario trazado parte (...) de "la isla del entendimiento" en la Crítica de la razón pura, pasando por La Atlántida y La nueva Atlántida, retoma su rumbo hacia "La isla desierta" y La isla que se repite, para acostar finalmente sobre La isla encallada. ABSTRACT This article embarks upon a new journey that explores a mental geography or ambient atmosphere, where the encounter and relief amongst singular imaginaries allows one to trace a new cartography, one in which critical and decolonial thought may converge in a common horizon. Thus, undertaking anew the transit that leads from an insular reason to an archipelagic reason, by tracing the forms taken by the image of the island in different texts, is proposed. Accordingly, our point of departure will be the "island of understanding" in the Critique of Pure Reason, we will pass swiftly through Atlantis and The New Atlantis, then we will move on to "the desert island" and The island that repeats itself to finally land on The stranded island. (shrink)

In this paper, I engage with the original criticism of utilitarianism that Philippa Foot offers in her work on moral philosophy. I show that her discussion of this normative ethical theory was one of the reasons that the British philosopher again took up the notion of practical rationality in the last part of her work, especially in her discussion of utilitarianism and the obligation of promises in her 2001 book,Natural Goodness.

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

Having read the works of Wang Ch'ung [A.D. 27-c. 100], I realized that they need to be recapitulated. Here I shall evaluate Wang Ch'ung and his thought and present what I feel to be the real significance that Wang Ch'ung's thought still has today.

Research ethics review is a critical aspect of the research governance framework for human subjects research. This usually requires that research protocols be submitted to a research ethics committee for review and approval. This has led to very rapid developments in the domain of research ethics, as RECs proliferate all over the globe in rhyme with the explosion in human subjects research. The work of RECs has increasingly become elaborate, complex, and in many cases urgent, necessitating supporting rules and procedures (...) of operation. Guidelines for elaborating standard operating procedures for the functioning of RECs have also been proposed. The SOPs of well-placed and well-resourced RECs have tended to pay much attention to details, resulting, as a consequence, in generally long, elaborate, intricate and complex SOPs; a model that can hardly be replicated by other committees, equally under ethics review pressures, but working under much more constraining conditions in resource-destitute environments. In this paper, we looked at the content and length of SOPs from African RECs and compared them to the World Health Organization ’s guidelines as the gold standard. We also looked at the SOPs from the Ethics Review and Consultancy Committee of the Cameroon Bioethics Initiative that we elaborated in a simplified way in 2013, and compared them to the WHO’s guidelines and to the other SOPs. Sixteen SOPs from 14 African countries were collected from various sources. Their average length was of 30 pages. By comparison to the guidance of the WHO, only six of them were found acceptable with more than 70 % of the criteria from the gold standard that were fully described. Among those six, two of them were very long and detailed, while the four remaining SOPs ranged from 16 to 24 pages. The ERCC SOPs are seven pages long but maintain all that is of essence for the rigorous, efficient and timely review of protocols. We are convinced that, because of their brevity, simplicity, clarity and user-friendliness, the ERCC SOPs recommend themselves as a model template to, at least, committees similarly situated and/or circumstanced as the ERCC of the Cameroon Bioethics Initiative is. In fact, brevity, clarity, simplicity and user-friendliness are recognized values. Whatever is brief and clear is better than what is not and saves time. What is simple and user-friendly is better than what is not even though the two have the same aims because it saves both time and mental energy. And if this be true in general, it is even truer of the context and its peculiar constraints that we are addressing. (shrink)