In 1956 W. B. Gallie advanced the thesis that certain political concepts, such as that of social justice, are .1 Since then, a considerable literature on the subject has developed, some of it in support of the thesis, some of it in opposition to it.2 W. E. Connolly is a leading supporter of it, and John Gray is a leading opponent of it. However, Connolly's advocacy of it in the second edition of his book is significantly more moderate than (...) that in the first (1974) edition of it. (shrink)

A revision of a sermon on the evils of calling model theory “semantics”, preached at Notre Dame on Saint Patrick’s Day, 2005. Provisional version: references remain to be added. To appear in Mathematics, Modality, and Models: Selected Philosophical Papers, coming from Cambridge University Press.

The book also draws on an alternative set of American thinkers to explore the blind spots in the pragmatic temper."—William Connolly, New York Times Book Review "An extraordinarily ambitious work of both analysis and synthesis. . .

For much of our century, pragmatism has enjoyed a charmed life, holding the dominant point of view in American politics, law, education, and social thought in general. After suffering a brief eclipse in the post-World War II period, pragmatism has experienced a revival, especially in literary theory and such areas as poststructuralism and deconstruction. In this critique of pragmatism and neopragmatism, one of our leading intellectual historians traces the attempts of thinkers from William James to Richard Rorty to find a (...) response to the crisis of modernism. John Patrick Diggins analyzes the limitations of pragmatism from a historical perspective and dares to ask whether America's one original contribution to the world of philosophy has actually fulfilled its promise. "Diggins, an eminent historian of American intellectual life, has written a timely and impressive book charting the rich history of American pragmatism and placing William James, Charles Peirce, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Sidney Hook, and Richard Rorty in their times and in the light of contemporary concerns. The book also draws on an alternative set of American thinkers to explore the blind spots in the pragmatic temper."—William Connolly, _New York Times Book Review_ "An extraordinarily ambitious work of both analysis and synthesis.... Diggins's book is rewarding in its thoughtfulness and its nuanced presentation of ideas."—Daniel J. Silver, _Commentary_ "Diggins's superbly informed book comprises a comprehensive history of American pragmatic thought.... It contains expert descriptions of James, John Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce, the first generation of American pragmatists.... Diggins is just as good on the revival of pragmatism that's taken place over the last 20 years in America.... [A] richly intelligent book."—Mark Edmundson, _Washington Post Book World_. (shrink)

Barack Obama has called him “one of my favorite philosophers.” John McCain wrote that he is “a paragon of clarity about the costs of a good war.” Andrew Sullivan has said, “We need Niebuhr now more than ever.” For a theologian who died in 1971, Reinhold Niebuhr is maintaining a remarkably high profile in the twenty-first century. In _Why Niebuhr Now?_ acclaimed historian John Patrick Diggins tackles the complicated question of why, at a time of great uncertainty (...) about America’s proper role in the world, leading politicians and thinkers are turning to Niebuhr for answers. Diggins begins by clearly and carefully working through Niebuhr’s theology, which focuses less on God’s presence than his absence—and the ways that absence abets the all-too-human sin of pride. He then shows how that theology informed Niebuhr’s worldview, leading him to be at the same time a strong opponent of fascism and communism and a leading advocate for humility and caution in foreign policy. Turning to the present, Diggins highlights what he argues is a misuse of Niebuhr’s legacy on both the right and the left: while neoconservatives distort Niebuhr’s arguments to support their call for an endless war on terror in the name of stopping evil, many liberal interventionists conveniently ignore Niebuhr’s fundamental doubts about power. Ultimately, Niebuhr’s greatest lesson is that, while it is our duty to struggle for good, we must at the same time be wary of hubris, remembering the limits of our understanding. The final work from a distinguished writer who spent his entire career reflecting on America’s history and promise, _Why Niebuhr Now? _is a compact and perceptive book that will be the starting point for all future discussions of Niebuhr. (shrink)

Barack Obama has called him “one of my favorite philosophers.” John McCain wrote that he is “a paragon of clarity about the costs of a good war.” Andrew Sullivan has said, “We need Niebuhr now more than ever.” For a theologian who died in 1971, Reinhold Niebuhr is maintaining a remarkably high profile in the twenty-first century. In _Why Niebuhr Now?_ acclaimed historian John Patrick Diggins tackles the complicated question of why, at a time of great uncertainty (...) about America’s proper role in the world, leading politicians and thinkers are turning to Niebuhr for answers. Diggins begins by clearly and carefully working through Niebuhr’s theology, which focuses less on God’s presence than his absence—and the ways that absence abets the all-too-human sin of pride. He then shows how that theology informed Niebuhr’s worldview, leading him to be at the same time a strong opponent of fascism and communism and a leading advocate for humility and caution in foreign policy. Turning to the present, Diggins highlights what he argues is a misuse of Niebuhr’s legacy on both the right and the left: while neoconservatives distort Niebuhr’s arguments to support their call for an endless war on terror in the name of stopping evil, many liberal interventionists conveniently ignore Niebuhr’s fundamental doubts about power. Ultimately, Niebuhr’s greatest lesson is that, while it is our duty to struggle for good, we must at the same time be wary of hubris, remembering the limits of our understanding. The final work from a distinguished writer who spent his entire career reflecting on America’s history and promise, _Why Niebuhr Now? _is a compact and perceptive book that will be the starting point for all future discussions of Niebuhr. (shrink)

The fine editions of the Aristotelian Commentary Series make available long out-of-print commentaries of St. Thomas on Aristotle. Each volume has the full text of Aristotle with Bekker numbers, followed by the commentary of St. Thomas, cross-referenced using an easily accessible mode of referring to Aristotle in the Commentary. Each volume is beautifully printed and bound using the finest materials. All copies are printed on acid-free paper and Smyth sewn. They will last.

Critical theory has recently charted the rise of an unprecedented wave of social acceleration transforming Western capitalism. Within that body of work, a tendency has emerged to frame this new temporality as a stable structure lacking in the possibility for visions of alternatives, let alone for substantive revolt or challenge. This essay argues that recent struggles like Occupy and 15-M experimented with an alternative, utopian temporality that challenged and disrupted acceleration, revealing the latter to be prone to generating and expanding (...) the conditions of temporal struggle. Acceleration is therefore unstable, and cannot be adequately understood apart from its increasing cultivation of visions of and experiments in other temporalities. (shrink)

Critical theory has recently charted the rise of an unprecedented wave of social acceleration transforming Western capitalism. Within that body of work, a tendency has emerged to frame this new temporality as a stable structure lacking in the possibility for visions of alternatives, let alone for substantive revolt or challenge. This essay argues that recent struggles like Occupy and 15-M experimented with an alternative, utopian temporality that challenged and disrupted acceleration, revealing the latter to be prone to generating and expanding (...) the conditions of temporal struggle. Acceleration is therefore unstable, and cannot be adequately understood apart from its increasing cultivation of visions of and experiments in other temporalities. (shrink)

In much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. — Ecclesiastes.

In much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.—Ecclesiastes.

This brief essay takes a look at Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), the English philosopher and social reformer, and his ideas about eugenics and dysgenics. It is evident from his works that like many other leading thinkers and social reformers of his time, Russell recognized the importance of genetics for human welfare and was deeply concerned about the dysgenic trends that he observed in his time. He included eugenics as an integral part of his moral philosophy and never abandoned the belief in (...) its importance, although he grew increasingly skeptical of some forms of genetic explanation and concerned about the real- world contexts of eugenic policies in his later years. (shrink)

In his recent articulation and defense of what he calls autonomy-minded anti-perfectionism, Ben Colburn relies on a distinction he draws between first-order and second-order values. In this paper I argue that his approach fails to make good on its promise to offer a distinct third way, is either too restrictive or too permissive and relies crucially on a kind of formal analysis that undercuts the central claim upon which rests his unification of neutrality-minded and perfectionistic liberalism.

In his recent articulation and defense of what he calls autonomy-minded anti-perfectionism, Ben Colburn relies on a distinction he draws between first-order and second-order values. In this paper I argue that his approach (1) fails to make good on its promise to offer a distinct third way, (2) is either too restrictive or too permissive and (3) relies crucially on a kind of formal analysis that undercuts the central claim upon which rests his unification of neutrality-minded (“political”) and perfectionistic (“comprehensive”) (...) liberalism. (shrink)

In this paper I shall analyse in detail one part of Hume 's writing on politics in order to explain and criticise his method of inquiry there. This will involve me in assessing the value of Hume 's contribution in this section of his work to the theory of politics. I shall make my investigation into Hume 's method bearing in mind his admiration of Newton and other natural scientists and his intention of adopting their methods in his studies.

Martin B. Peterson argues that the social experiment analysis improperly shifts our focus onto the rhetorical dimension of debates over technology, which is ‘clearly irrelevant’ to the ‘traditional...

Diggins brings Reinhold Niebuhr into the post-structuralist dialogue, and demonstates that his writings are the more constructive about the human predicament. "[I]n Niebuhr power and morality meet in one, with a suspicious glance at the disavowal of power and the pretensions of morality.".

Diggins observes in this essay that, while Nozick and Hook shared a passion for freedom and for understanding liberty in all its complexities, the two philosophers, one a libertarian and the other a democratic socialist, occupied different worlds when it came to how they viewed property and power. Nozick believed that freedom and justice depended upon a minimal state that would be severely restricted in its exercise of power. Sidney Hook never renounced his conviction, born of his early attraction to (...) Marxism, that truly dangerous power is wielded not principally by government but by private individuals of great material wealth: by industrialists. Diggins examines the divergent views of these two seminal thinkers on such issues as human rights, private property, democracy, and judicial review. The differences are profound, yet they shared a common interest in the life of the mind and in exploring such hoary philosophical topics as free will versus determinism and the grounding of moral values. (shrink)