One can assign three different aims to the desire for knowledge : utility, pleasure, truth-for-truth's-sake. Whereas the first two aims have a concretely determinable content and therefore look evident, the third one has been looked upon as strange and problematic : it is not immediately clear what kind of value is defended in this case. Popper is one of the recent defenders of the traditional ideal of truth-for-truth's-sake. He wants to defend the ideal against three positions : a primitive taboo-ridden (...) fear for knowledge and truth, relativism, instrumentalism. Analysing Popper's ethic of cognition we do not agree with the instrumentalist's critique of it. However, precisely in advocating a non-instrumentalist value, Popper's position is not unique, but paradoxically resembles the „primitive” position. Popper's belief that there is an objective or absolute truth is, in his opinion, implied by the belief that the search for knowledge makes sense. We try to show that this thesis of absolute truth is based on a conceptual mistake. In opposition to Popper's view, we sketch a form of relativism avoiding this confusion, without doing away with any concrete possibility of discussion or search for truth. At the same time, we try to understand Popper's aversion to relativism as well as the appeal of his position, in that it is a strange mixture of a heroic cognitive ethic and a desire for imaginary control over the uncontrolable. We argue that the form of relativism we advocate easily and perhaps better fulfilb the „heroic” readiness to forsake security in cognitive matters. (shrink)

Startingpoint of the investigation is the Humean idea that the notion and problem of personal identity (and a fortiori of personhood) is best understood not from an epistemological-ontological perspective‚ but in the context of an analysis of ‘the concern we take in ourselves’ as in pride. It turns out that an insight in pride requires an analysis of the paradoxical relation of identification. It is argued that this relation cannot be understood in terms of a conscious strategy from the part (...) of the individual. The analysis shows that identification involves a fundamental passivity of the subject‚ but at the same time requires a certain capacity of distantiation with respect to the object(s) of identification. Pride and the identification(s) going with it‚ involve value-judgments not only concerning the value of the self as identified with certain valuable objects‚ but also concerning the mode of identification. The question is asked by whom and how the criteria of these judgments are determined. An attempt is made to give a rationale for the absence of definitive criteria in this matter. In the last parts of the paper‚ the fundamental passivity of the self in its identification(s) is interpreted as a fundamental ‘vulnerability’ which must somehow be assumed to fully be a person. (It is suggested that the analysis of pride and self-esteem in terms of ‘vulnerability’ could profit from an analysis of gratitude). (shrink)

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Annelien de Dijn’s Freedom: An Unruly History is a rich and thought-provoking work in intellectual history, tracing thinking and debating about political freedom in the West from ancient Greece to our own times. The ancient notion of freedom as self-government is referred to as the ‘democratic conception’. The argument is that this conception survived through the renaissance, the early-modern period and the 18th-century Atlantic revolutions only to be deliberately scrapped in the 19th century in favour of liberal freedom – (...) absence of state interference – thus severing the ancient links between freedom and democracy and turning democracy into a threat to freedom. The book is an impressive achievement and the use of sources staggeringly wide. However, though the liberal turn is certainly a fact of history, I am not convinced that it was such a decisive break, nor that the relations between conceptions of freedom and attitudes to democracy are as clear-cut as de Dijn needs them to be. De Dijn claims, with regret, that the liberal view remains our view and is now an essential part of Western civilization, but I find that to be empirically under-substantiated. By using the liberal turn to define an age, de Dijn lets history play out through the lens of the elite. (shrink)

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 197-207, January 2022. Annelien de Dijn’s Freedom: An Unruly History is a rich and thought-provoking work in intellectual history, tracing thinking and debating about political freedom in the West from ancient Greece to our own times. The ancient notion of freedom as self-government is referred to as the ‘democratic conception’. The argument is that this conception survived through the renaissance, the early-modern period and the 18th-century Atlantic revolutions only to (...) be deliberately scrapped in the 19th century in favour of liberal freedom – absence of state interference – thus severing the ancient links between freedom and democracy and turning democracy into a threat to freedom. The book is an impressive achievement and the use of sources staggeringly wide. However, though the liberal turn is certainly a fact of history, I am not convinced that it was such a decisive break, nor that the relations between conceptions of freedom and attitudes to democracy are as clear-cut as de Dijn needs them to be. De Dijn claims, with regret, that the liberal view remains our view and is now an essential part of Western civilization, but I find that to be empirically under-substantiated. By using the liberal turn to define an age, de Dijn lets history play out through the lens of the elite. (shrink)

A cursory view of the history of ethical thinking shows the presence of a limited variety of 'styles of ethical reasoning', a term used in analogy of Crombie's 'styles of scientific reasoning' for systems of thought that set their own standards and techniques for providing evidence. Each style of reasoning tends to suggest a specific role for ethicists. Styles are appropriate relative to particular contexts of problems and require special institutions to flourish. Herman De Dijn's discussion in Taboes, monsters (...) en loterijen of the problems hybridsproduced in biomedicine and biotechnology pose for the symbolic order is shown to rest on two 'styles of ethical reasoning', viz, 'postulation of principles' and 'hermeneutics'. It is argued that both styles fall short, but for different reasons. 'Postulation of principles' is ill-equipped to answer problems posed by a world of change. Hermeneutics requires a pace of time and institutions not available in current society. Confronted with the problems De Dijn discusses, therefore two separate problems arise. Ethicistsnot only have to learn how to account for the hybrids that biomedicine and biotechnology produce, they also have to think about and contribute to institutional innovation. Rather than opening a space for discussing both tasks, De Dijn's styles of reasoning close off this matter. (shrink)

In the first part of this critical study on Herman De Dijn’s Vloeibare waarden, I offer a concise presentation of the central ideas in this book against the backdrop of Zygmunt Bauman’s view of late modernity. In the second part, I try to characterize De Dijn’s so-called conservatism with the assistance of a few quotations from the work of Leszek Kolakowski, a Polish philosopher with whom De Dijn feels congenial. In the third part, I make two critical (...) observations concerning De Dijn’s position in his book. Finally, I make a passing remark as to the philosophical importance of what Hannah Arendt calls ”dangerous thinking’. (shrink)

The rise of the natural sciences in the 16th century has strongly influenced the way in which philosophers reflect on activities that confer meaning to human life and, more specifically, on the religious and ethical phenomenon. Measured by the ideal of rationality as can be found in the sciences, each act of conferring meaning is seen either as a specific form of irrational behaviour which can nevertheless be considered as fulfilling a need for psychic convenience, or as something in line (...) with the cognitive demands of science – many forms of ‘holism’ are an example of this. Burms and De Dijn indicate that every act of conferring meaning is ‘sui generis’ and cannot be reduced neither to an utilitarian nor to a cognitive interest. Mainly this last point is clarified in the first part of this article. The thesis that there is a divide or a gap between intellectual knowledge and life, between knowing and meaning is shown by referring to a twofold insight. Intellectual knowledge in itself cannot be a source of meaning. In opposition to the thesis of Boëthius knowledge cannot – according to De Dijn – give any consolation. What’s more: the craving for meaning cannot, as Wittgenstein remarked, be reduced to a craving for information. Religion and morality must, as disciplines of meaning, be described as original activities completely distinct from scientific insight. – In the same line Paul Moyaert points, inspired by Lacan’s analysis of desire, to the therapeutic role of the symbolic order and consequently to the priority the outer has on the inner. Since the Reformation and mainly since Kant the religious phenomenon threatens to be reduced to a moral opinion and its varieties. Moyaert wants to ‘de-protestantize’ reflection on religion, which involves according to him taking religion away from the order of the inner and taking it back home to the order of the outer. (shrink)

The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Don Garrett (ed.). Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xiii, 465. ISBN 0-521-39235-7 (hb); ISBN 0-521-39865-7 (pb). 40.00 (hb) 12.95 (pb). Spinoza: The Enduring Questions. Graeme Hunter (ed.). University of Toronto Press, 1994, pp. xviii, 182. ISBN 0-8020-2876-4. 45.00. The Spinozistic Heresy: The Debate on the 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus'. 1670-77. Paolo Cristofolini (ed.). APA-Holland University Press: Amsterdam and Maarssen, 1995, pp. viii, 260. ISBN 90-302-1502-X. Disguised and Overt Spinozism around 1700. Wiep van Bunge and Wim Klever (eds.). (...) Brill, Leiden, 1996, pp. ix, 378. ISBN 90-04-10307-4. Part of Nature: Self-Knowledge in Spinoza's 'Ethics', by Genevieve Lloyd. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1994, pp. 182. ISBN 0-8014-2999-4. 24.95. Spinoza and the 'Ethics', by Genevieve Lloyd. Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks, London, 1996, pp. x, 163. ISBN 0-415-10782-2 (pb). 6.99. Spinoza: The Way to Wisdom, by Herman de Dijn. Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, Indiana, 1996, pp. xii, 291. ISBN 1-55753-081-5. (shrink)

This is the first in a seven-volume series, to be based on The Jerusalem Conferences. Each volume is devoted to a specific topic, the first five following the division of Spinoza's "Ethics, the sixth dealing with Spinoza's social and political thought and the concluding one with the philosopher's life and origins. All papers are in English, yet present a wide-ranging picture of contemporary study of Spinoza's philosophy worldwide. Among the contributions to the present volume are Alan Donagan's "Substance, Essence and (...) Attribute in Spinoza," Edwin Curley's "On Jonathan Bennett's Interpretation of Spinoza's Monism," followed by Bennett's "Reply," Alexandre Matheron's "Essence, Existence and Power in Spinoza" and Herman De Dijn's "Metaphysics as Ethics." Papers are also presented by Margaret D. Wilson, Emilia Giancotti, Yirmiyahu Yovel, Jean-Luc Marion, Pierre Macherey, Jacqueline Lagrie, Don Garrett, Yosef Ben-Shlomo and Sylvain Zac. All participants present major papers, the book thus being the outcome of a long-standing interest in Spinozistic thought by a group of first-rate scholars. The book includes an index of subjects and proper names. (shrink)

The theme of this issue of Ethical Perspectives is the French tradition in liberal thought, and the unique contribution that this tradition can make to debates in contemporary liberalism. It is inspired by a colloquium held at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in December of 2008 entitled “In Search of a Lost Liberalism: Constant, Tocqueville, and the singularity of French Liberalism.” This colloquium was held in conjunction with the retirement of Leuven professor and former Dean of the Institute of Philosophy, André (...) Van de Putte, who found much inspiration in this tradition. A revised version of his valedictory lecture from the conference serves as the final contribution to this issue. Much contemporary liberal political philosophy is currently done in conversation with a line of liberal thinkers starting with John Locke, running through Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, and culminating in the work of John Rawls and his followers. The reasons for the enormous appeal of this philosophical tradition are, among other things, the combination of the central role of the intuitively appealing value of individual liberty with a strong rationalistic, universalistic, and normative character. The thread running through most of these liberal theories is a commitment to what the French liberal Benjamin Constant referred to as “the liberty of the moderns,” that is, liberty in a negative sense, as a lack of interference in one’s activity from others and from government. This focus has expanded over time to include a richer body of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights, for instance, in the work of liberal thinkers who have tried to integrate the insights of communitarian thought and discourse ethics in their work. However, the emphasis on individual liberty in the negative sense continues to be the normative and theoretical touchstone and default position for many contemporary liberal theories. The limitation of the canon of liberal thought to the aforementioned authors and themes deprives the contemporary debate of a rich source of ideas: the French liberal tradition. Montesquieu, considered to be the father of this tradition, provides a good example of how it can enrich current debates in liberal theory. Montesquieu’s work evinces a keen eye for the dynamics of power relations and the limitations of the power of the better rational argument. His insight that power can sometimes only be checked by an equal and opposing power, so that a system of separation and balance of powers is necessary in order to preserve liberty, is reflected in the foundations of most modern democracies. Montesquieu also argues that contingent environmental, historical, social and economic conditions play a dramatic role in determining what kind of government is appropriate for a particular society. On his view, ignoring these facts when framing a government can inadvertently end in despotism. Montesquieu’s observations challenge us to reexamine some of contemporary liberalism’s universalist and rationalist claims. Benjamin Constant is most famous for his distinction between two kinds of liberty: the liberty of the ancients and the liberty of the moderns. The ancient form of liberty manifested itself in the active political participation of citizens in the ancient republic. While this form of government and decision-making was suitable for small, homogeneous city-states, Constant argues that it is impracticable for large modern nation-states. Hence, the concept of modern liberty shifts to an emphasis on the rule of law and the non-interference of the state in private matters. This form of liberty is familiar to us from contemporary liberalism – and Constant cherishes this form of freedom as much as any liberal does today. However, his position is complex: he also argues that the liberty of the ancients should not be neglected. Active political participation is needed to ensure that the government is executing its duty of preserving the modern form of liberty by publicly pointing out violations. The contemporary relevance of Constant’s work is clear when we consider the alleged “democratic deficit” that plagues the EU and international institutions such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. Not only does this democratic deficit threaten the modern form of liberty by placing decision-making processes out of sight of the people, it also threatens citizens’ sense of self-respect derived from self-governance. Constant’s argument for the necessity of combining the liberty of the ancients with that of the moderns provides a fruitful resource for confronting these contemporary issues. Tocqueville’s work on liberalism benefits from his opportunity to observe a society founded on liberal democratic principles – the United States of America – in action. In his Democracy in America, he examines the social consequences, both intended and unintended, of building a society on ‘the equality of conditions’, as he defines ‘democracy’. Tocqueville sees a tension between the democratic value of equality and the aristocratic value of the rule of the best. He observes that democratic societies do not necessarily choose the best leaders and instead promote mediocrity instead of virtue, talent, and excellence. Democracy also confronts citizens with the threat of ‘soft despotism’, where a government that preserves the outer signs of the liberty of the moderns nevertheless controls the behavior of its citizens in minute detail through a system of detailed rules ostensibly aimed at their welfare. This paternalism is an even more insidious threat to liberal values than the hard variety of despotism, since it is so difficult to detect and done in the name of liberal values themselves. Taking Tocqueville’s observations seriously would add complexity to attempts to theorize about the modern social-democratic welfare state. The contributions to this issue supplement and critique mainstream liberal thought and its relation to contemporary issues through a serious engagement with the French liberal tradition. Annelien De Dijn’s contribution discusses Bertrand de Jouvenel, a lesser-known 20th Century representative of the French political tradition she terms ‘aristocratic liberalism’. This tradition has its roots in the work of Montesquieu, and emphasizes the importance of intermediary bodies, most importantly the aristocracy, in providing a check to the top-down power of despotic state authorities and the bottom-up power of revolutionary leveling tendencies, both of which threaten liberty. De Dijn situates Jouvenel in this tradition, but then indicates an important difference between his thought and that of his predecessors: his most significant work, On Power, is not only on French history, but on European history. Pointing to the enthusiastic reception of this work in the Anglophone world, she suggests that the rise of totalitarianism in Europe gave the anti-totalitarian features of aristocratic liberalism a broader appeal. Valentino Lumowa’s paper concerns Constant’s classic text, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns. Lumowa argues that in order to understand Constant’s piece, we must be aware that its two parts were written under different historical circumstances and decipher the argumentative thrust inherent in the text. Following Stephen Holmes, he argues that to understand the shift Constant made in the second part of the text, we should read it within the context of the increasing influence of the ultra-Royalists in the legislature during the Bourbon Restoration. However, in contrast to Holmes, he contends that the spirit of both civic and individual freedom, which enlivens representative system, is the backbone of the text in its unity. Demin Duan’s essay investigates an apparent ambivalence between liberal and imperialist tendencies in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, which has already drawn some attention from Tocquevillian scholars. These interpretations of Tocqueville and his writings on empire generally agree that Tocqueville stands in a recognized tradition of liberalism, which is characterized by respect for human rights, individual freedom and a sense of universal humanism. On this standard view, Tocqueville’s support of imperialism represents nothing but an unfortunate breach of his own otherwise consistent liberal thinking. Duan’s article questions this standard position. By questioning the assumption of Tocqueville’s liberalism in the first place, he tries to gauge the influence of both the old republican tradition and the new liberal perspective on his thinking. In conclusion, he argues that Tocqueville’s overall thought, especially his notion of freedom, is very much informed by an old republican tradition. His support of French imperialism could be better understood from this perspective rather than be rendered simply as a deviation from liberal norms. Pawel Marczewski’s contribution is an attempt to show that Tocqueville’s conception of liberty transcends the divisions between negative and positive aspects of freedom. He begins by juxtaposing this conception with the opposition drawn by Constant between liberty of the ancients and liberty of the moderns. While Tocqueville and Constant shared a concern for the preservation of individual rights, Tocqueville was much more reluctant to accept the modern loss of the communal dimension of liberty. He did not accept the view that jouissances privées, private pleasures, are the main compensation that the modern world has to offer for the lost ancient treasure of political participation. The essay then looks into the relevance of Tocqueville’s standpoint for current debates between liberal defenders of negative freedom and republican advocates of freedom as non-domination. Participants on both sides of the debate seem to be so devoted to showing that their particular approach provides the best guarantees against actual and possible threats to liberty that they overlook the fact that their definitions of freedom remain significantly similar. By arguing that ‘to be free is to be guided by one’s own will’, contemporary republicans, as well as their liberal counterparts, move along the lines drawn by Constant towards private pleasures. By questioning the inevitability of this turn, Tocqueville provides us with a valuable contribution to these discussions in contemporary political philosophy. Finally, André Van de Putte’s contribution, an adaptation of his emeritus speech that closed the conference on French Liberalism, appeals to Tocqueville in order to draw attention to the importance of intermediary, dialogical bodies in mitigating the implicit despotic tendencies of the democratic drive to equality. In Tocqueville’s view, the transition from the feudal corporate inequality to democratic individual equality was not a clean break. Rather, this transition is a continual process of democratization that is driven by a desire for equality, or egalité des conditions. This dissolution of distinctions of estate, class and status has the unintended consequence of concentrating the diffuse power of these entities into a centralized state, which is responsible for ensuring the equality of all under the law. This process leaves increasingly isolated and atomized individuals to face the power of a monolithic state in defense of their freedom, and moves toward a soft, paternalistic despotism. Constant’s freedom of the moderns is not sufficient to protect individuals from this centralized power. Democracy also requires the political freedom of the ancients. Van de Putte argues for a system in which atomized individuals organize themselves into intermediary bodies that, in a Montesquieuian balance of powers, can enter into dialogue with each other and the state on more equitable terms. Van de Putte’s contribution closes with a plea for a conception of democracy as a regime of dialogue. (shrink)

An evening seminar was held in connection with the Multatuli lecture in Leuven. During that seminar, Michael Sandel was invited to respond to a few questions springing from his lecture and from his book Democracy’s Discontent. What follows is the transcript of that discussion in which questions were formulated by Antoon Vandevelde , Koen Raes , Amaryllis Verhoeven , Ab Bijma , Bart Pattyn , Joseph Selling and Herman De Dijn.

ENTREVISTA COM PROFESSORAS(ES) DE FILOSOFIA DO ENSINO MÉDIO DO CEARÁ – BLOCO IICom: Dayane Evellin de Sousa Costa, Emilson Silva LopesPor: Antônio Alex Pereira de Sousa, Paulo Willame Araújo de Lima.

This article reflects on childhood times based on the words chrónos, kairós and aión, which the Greeks use to conceptualize time, in dialogue with different authors, such as Kohan, Pohlmann, Skliar, Kohan and Fernandes. In the pedagogical field, we explore how Pedagogy of Childhood has focused on the importance of childhood temporality and children’s agency, with contributions from Hoyuelos, Parrini, Aguilera et al., Barbosa, Oliveira-Formosinho e Araújo, Oliveira-Formosinho, Pinazza and Gobbi. We reflect on what forms of organizing time are possible (...) when we think about children and their childhoods. Would it be a continuous and chronological time, a time of opportunity for the instant or the timeless intensity of the aiónic? Would it be possible to open spaces in school for other temporalities, given its immersion in chronological time, and its extreme emphasis on routine? We seek a relationship between forms of temporality, philosophy, and early education in order to explore alternative possibilities in the relationship between child and the school context, and conclude that, since the child’s is the aiónic time of intense experience, it is in the heightened dynamic immediacy and the multiple symbolic languages of play that it may be possible to create pedagogical structures that provide a dwelling for childhood temporality. (shrink)

O silêncio e a invisibilidade são as palavras que melhor representam a história da mulher no decorrer de muitos séculos. Desde a antiguidade, as mulheres foram impedidas de falar, e até nos dias atuais, infelizmente, pouco se valoriza o discurso feminino. Em diversas sociedades, o direito a expressar-se é severamente combatido, punido com rigor. A essas mulheres, vilipendiadas em seus direitos, resta um único espaço: o da subalternidade. Nesse contexto de subalternidade, habitando o espaço prisional marginal, fazer uso da palavra (...) e apropriar-se do direito à fala é um ato de coragem e de rebeldia. O presente artigo analisa o testemunho de uma mulher em situação de prisão que, até chegar ali, teve quase todos os seus direitos humanos profanados. A narrativa destaca suas experiências e traz à luz suas memórias e a maneira como dialoga com o passado. A partir da cela da prisão, a mulher produz o seu discurso, elabora o seu balbucio, que embora abafado, ultrapassa as grades e os altos muros. É através do poder de sua voz que ela reivindica o direito à fala, o direito de recontar-se, de falar de si. Neste artigo, analisamos, sob a perspectiva dos Estudos Culturais, a história narrada por VB1, uma mulher negra que cumpre pena em regime fechado. A partir desta análise, propomos uma reflexão sobre o espaço prisional, o direito à fala e o papel da memória nesse processo. Teremos como referências teóricas as identidades culturais em tempos de pós-modernidade com Stuart Hall, as reflexões sobre memória individual e coletiva de Maurice Halbwachs, estudos acerca da subalternidade com Hugo Achugar e Gayatri Spivak, espaço fronteiriço e memórias subalternas com Edgar Nolasco, reflexões sobre o papel da mulher propostas por Michele Perrot, entre outros. Palavras-chave: Subalternidade. Memorialística. Prisão. (shrink)

Durante a formação, estudantes são constantemente expostos a estressores que, se persistentes, podem ocasionar a Síndrome de Burnout (SB). Considerando a importância dessa demanda, este estudo teve como objetivo identificar diferenças nas dimensões da SB em relação ao ano e turno em estudantes de Ps..

In September 1931, a panel discussion was convened at Central Hall Westminsteron the subject of the ‘Evolution of the Universe’, at the centenary meeting of theBritish Association for the Advancement of Science. Center stage was what todo about the evolving universe being younger than the stars, evidently a paradoxin the relativistic study of the evolving universe, at the time. Here, we discusstwo diametrically opposed reactions to the paradox, which were each broadcastat the meeting by Lemaˆıtre and de Sitter, respectively. As (...) we argue, that bothcould be projected to the public as viable reflects an unsettled question at thefoundations of the then-nascent discipline: what is the role for considerationsof scale in relativistic cosmology? (shrink)

This article raises the issue of the foundation of ethics in the situation of the pluralism of modern and contemporary society. Then , two types of answers to these problems are analyzed: comunitarism as the identitary ethics of an 'ourselves', and contractualism as the ethics of the partners' interests, which present themselves as rival theories in opposition to the universalism of kantian morality. It is however shown , how Kant himself had already worked at different levels of human integration with (...) both models: that of social contract and that of ethical community, and had articulated them in his system. The universal principle of morality , on the other hand, places itself at the meta-level of the profound grammar of the ethos of communities and contracts . Finally, it is observed that Kant´s fundamental ethical texts have not explicitly dealt with the hermeneutical problem of moral judgment in contexts of action. However, some passages of the Grundlegung are analyzed, as well as the Second Part of the Critique of Practical Reason, in which we find precise indications on this issue. It is maintained, that the observed lack of treatment may be bridged by means of widening the scope of the doctrine of reflexive judgment of aesthetic taste of the Third Critique's first part, which appears relevant, not for the foundation of the principle of morality, but for its application, i.e., for moral life.Este artículo plantea el problema de la fundamentación de la ética en la situación del pluralismo de la sociedad moderna y contemporánea. Se analizan luego dos tipos de respuesta a este problema: el comunitarismo como la ética identitaria de un nosotros, y el contractualismo como la ética de los intereses de los socios, los cuales se presentan como teorías rivales frente al universalismo de la moralidad kantiana. Se muestra sin embargo cómo el propio Kant había trabajado ya en distintos planos de la integración humana con los dos modelos del contrato social y de la comunidad ética, y los había articulado en su sistema. El principio universal de la moralidad se ubica en cambio en el meta-nivel de la gramática profunda del ethos de las comunidades y de los contratos . Se observa finalmente que los textos éticos fundamentales de Kant no han tratado de manera explícita el problema hermenéutico del juicio moral en los contextos de acción. Se analizan no obstante algunos pasajes de la Grundlegung y la Segunda Parte de la Crítica de la Razón Práctica, en los que hay indicaciones precisas sobre este problema. Se sostiene que la observada laguna se puede sortear mediante la ampliación de los alcances de la doctrina del juicio reflexivo del gusto estético de la primera parte de la Tercera Crítica, la cual parece relevante, no para la fundación del principio de la moralidad, pero sí para su aplicación, es decir: para la vida moral. (shrink)

Este texto tem dois objetivos principais: apresentar o conceito de “lei natural” e aquilo que seria a sua expressão como “lei escrita” e, depois, reinterpretar este conceito a partir de uma perspectiva nietzschiana. Para alcançar este duplo objetivo urge, pois, em primeiro lugar, traçar, nas suas grandes linhas, as vicissitudes que atravessou a teoria da “lei natural” ao longo da tradição #losó#ca até a sua culminância naquelas correntes do direito natural, típicas dos tempos modernos. Convém também assinalar que este conceito (...) encerra no seu bojo, como derivações, as noções de necessidade, de #nalidade e providência. Eis por que, para interpretá-lo e criticá-lo, são utilizadas algumas intui- ções e análises de Nietzsche que, ao longo de sua obra, não cessa de se referir, direta ou indiretamente, a estas questões e, também, àquela de acaso. Não se trata, portanto, de simplesmente apresentar uma crítica de Nietzsche aos conceitos de “lei natural” e “lei escrita”, mas, principalmente, de examiná-los à luz de seu pensamento. (shrink)