In recent years there has been a noticeable yet largely unacknowledged ‘pragmatic turn’ in the scientific realism debate, inspired in part by van Fraassen’s work on ‘epistemic stances’. Features of this new approach include: an ascent to the meta-level (the focus is not so much on whether scientific realism is true, but on the prior questions of the nature of the positions in this debate, how to decide whether to be a scientific realist, etc.); a reinterpretation of scientific realism and (...) anti-realism as (or as closely associated with) stances or frameworks, rather than theories or beliefs; a move away from the previously dominant empirical-explanatory (i.e. quasi-scientific or naturalistic) conception of scientific realism, anti-realism, and their justification; and a stress on the pragmatic and values-based elements in the debate. The traditional scientific realism debate is concerned with determining which position is true, or most epistemically justified. The new approach by contrast is concerned with determining which position best serves certain values, e.g. is most useful, fruitful, or otherwise prudentially preferable. In this paper we try to bring together the various strands in this new orientation, summarise its key features, contrast it with superficially similar but opposing views, and explore the similarities and differences among some of its adherents. Given we are advocates of the turn, we also offer a defence of the value and fruitfulness of this reconceptualization of the debate. (shrink)

I aim to sketch a view of a methodology for metaphysics, suggested by Hookway’s reading of C. S. Peirce, that allows one to hold realist metaphysical views (i.e. ones that avoid anti-realism, or idealism) about some questions, but avoids merely verbal disputes, and ‘unwieldy realism’. It is named for Peirce’s ‘Critical Commonsensism’, and uses pragmatic transcendental arguments to defend realism about non-optional basic commitments, e.g. to generality, agency, normativity, modality, change, concrete substances, and other minds. It is critical because we (...) are entitled to hope that the presuppositions of our most basic non-optional commitments obtain, and commonsensical because we begin with our current practices and proceed with anti-sceptical fallibilism. I consider a number of objections to the proposed methodology, including concerns associated with our identification of presuppositions, with the basic non-optional commitments they are presuppositions of, and the community who are so committed. These questions, I will claim, are open to empirical and anthropological investigation, but can begin with careful observation of human practices of action, inquiry, explanation, and justification. I will defend the view we end up with as realist, rather than anti-realist or quasi-realist, and argue that, given holism of confirmation, we are plausibly justified in believing (rather than merely hoping) a number of metaphysical theses that have stood the test of time. (shrink)

Many important social and political goals are at least partially funded by charitable donations (e.g. environmental, public health, and educational). Recently a number of laboratory experiments have shown that a potential donor’s incidental emotions—those felt at the time of the decision but unrelated to the decision itself—are important factors. We extend these findings by examining the effect of incidental emotions on charitable giving using a natural field experiment, where the potential donors are unaware of the intervention. In partnership with a (...) pledge drive at a small national liberal arts college, we demonstrate that participants who were asked to recall a person or event that has benefited them since graduating, pledged larger amounts (an increase of 92%) compared to the control group, although the probability of making a pledge was statistically no different. (shrink)

Ultraviolet (UV) radiation is a very common carcinogen in our environment, but epidemiological data on the relationship between skin cancers and ambient solar UV radiation are very restricted. In hairless mice the process of UV carcinogenesis can be studied in depth. Experiments with this animal model have yielded quantitative data on how tumor development depends on dose, time and wavelength of the UV radiation. In combination with epidemiological data, these experimental results can be transposed to humans. Comparative studies on molecular, (...) cellular and physiological changes in mouse and man can further our fundamental understanding of UV carcinogenesis in man. This is likely to improve risk assessments such as those related to a stratospheric ozone depletion, and to yield well‐targeted intervention schemes, e.g. prescribing a specific drug or diet, for high‐risk individuals. (shrink)

 (e.g., Quine ), the main symptom of the unintelligibility of de re modal language is said to be the failure of coreferential “singular terms” to interchange salva veritate within the scope of modal operators. From this it is supposed to follow..

Free-choice disjunction manifests itself in complements of comparatives, existential modals, and related contexts. For example, “Socrates is older than Plato or Aristotle” is usually understood to mean “older than each”, not “older than at least one”. Normally, to get an “at least one” reading, a wh-rider has to be appended, e.g., “whichever is younger” or “but I don’t remember which”. Similarly, “Socrates could have been a lawyer or a banker” usually means “Socrates could have been a lawyer and could have (...) been a banker”. And “Socrates needs an umbrella or a raincoat” is normally understood in a way that isn’t synonymous with “Socrates needs an umbrella or Socrates needs a raincoat”. Roughly, the reading is “getting a satisfactory umbrella would meet his needandgetting a satisfactory raincoat would meet his need”.These examples all have “conjunctive force” and the question I address is whether there’s a satisfactory pragmatic account of why the force is with them. I present a simple Gricean argument that the “co-operative speaker” assumption, added to a disjunctive literal meaning, produces conjunctive force for epistemic modals. This argument may work for some other cases, but I express some pessimism about covering the full range of modals. (shrink)

Scientific claims implicitly invite criticism. While we might expect that challenging an epistemic authority in religious circles would be seen as an illegitimate activity (e.g. heresy) and met with suppression, challenging an epistemic authority in scientific circles is supposed to be a legitimate form of engagement, and should (ideally) be met with reasoned argument based in empirical evidence. Given this implicit invitation to challenge scientific claims, and the sweeping knowledge claims often made by today’s scientists, it is hardly surprising that (...) people outside narrowly defined scientific communities (i.e. science’s “public”) often challenge the truth of scientific consensuses. The scrutiny of scientific claims by non-scientist members of the public is quite understandable and in many ways unobjectionable, given the role that science advice increasingly plays in our society’s governance structures and public policy making. As scientists increasingly play policy-maker, they become doubly subject to public criticism: first as a scientist making substantive claims about reality and second as public-interest decision-maker making important decisions about public policy. Thus, for the scientist’s social role as epistemic authority to remain justified, public criticism of science should ideally be entertained and answered by practicing scientists. (shrink)

Professor Knox’s translation is, as one would expect, excellent. Even so, understanding this text will present difficulties to anyone who is anything less than expert not only in the philosophy of Hegel, but in those of Kant, Fichte and, especially, Schelling, because Hegel’s philosophy in 1802–3 was still by no means fully-fledged. The result is that the usual difficulties of Hegelian terminology are compounded by the infusion of the terminology and philosophical programme of Schelling; one’s tendency to interpret the text (...) in the light of Hegel’s mature philosophy has to be tempered by the realization that what prima facie looks ‘Hegelian’ is not necessarily so. This makes the initial agonies of a Hegel text even more hellish than usual, and no translator’s notes, no Introduction, however good, can spare one these pains when one starts reading. Perhaps the translator might have been a bit more generous with bracketed or footnoted explanations, for example, of words like ‘divine’, ‘difference’, ‘indifference’, and even more usefully of words that do not look odd in the context, like ‘immediately’ or ‘science’. On the other hand, since in reading a Hegel text for the first time it is usually best to push on regardless, it may be a help not to have too much in the way of explanation of technicalities to hold one up. (shrink)

The purpose of Donald Winch’s "historiographic revision" is to show that most recent interpretations of Smith have distorted his meaning because they have misread the intention of Smith’s work, treating it either as the first great justification of the nascent liberal capitalist polity, or as such a justification infiltrated by intimations of the Marxian notion of alienation. In Winch’s view, either account of Smith’s project is misleading by virtue of imposing nineteenth-century perspectives and categories upon "what is quintessentially a work (...) of the eighteenth century." The problem, then, is to determine the historically appropriate context or problematic within which the complex and at times paradoxical thought of the Wealth of Nations, the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and the Lectures on Jurisprudence can reasonably be situated. As Winch notes, his study is an application of the contextualist methodological principles of Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, and is similar in design to recent works on Locke by John Dunn and on Hume by Duncan Forbes. (shrink)

In the midst of a recrudescence of interest in the philosophy of Hegel in the United States and England, this polished translation of Hegel’s introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History is a timely and welcome addition to the English translations of the massive Hegelian corpus. At long last, Johannes Hoffmeister’s superlative edition of this accessible work is available in English twenty years after its publication in Germany. H. B. Nisbet presents Hegel’s lectures in italics and intersperses (...) the reconstructions of students’ notes in Roman type. Including Hegel’s first and second drafts of the first part of the "Introduction," the well-integrated lecture notes, an appendix on "The natural context or the geographical basis of world history," additions from 1826-7, Lasson’s "Notes on the Composition of the Text," and a chronological bibliography of writings dealing with the Lectures, this volume supersedes the previous English translations which were derived from Karl Hegel’s shorter edition. Duncan Forbes’ spritely introduction is a rapid fire counter-attack on a number of Hegel’s critics which charges that Hegel is misunderstood because of an inadequate grasp of the principle of identity in difference and the assumption that, for Hegel, the Absolute "absorbs" the contingencies, contradictions, and tensions in existence. Forbes appropriately stresses the "concrete universal" as the unity of the universal and the particular in history, a unity which preserves the particular as particular, the contingent as contingent. Even though Forbes overreaches himself at times, his defenses of Hegel’s interpretation of meaning in history are provocative and lively. This fine translation of Hoffmeister’s edition of the introduction to the lectures presents Hegel’s vision of history in a lucid, accessible form and captures the nuances of the thought of a philosopher who has been as often misunderstood as maligned.—G.J.S. (shrink)