Current debate and policy surrounding the use of genetic editing in humans often relies on a binary distinction between therapy and human enhancement. In this paper, we argue that this dichotomy fails to take into account perhaps the most significant potential uses of CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing in humans. We argue that genetic treatment of sporadic Alzheimer’s disease, breast- and ovarian-cancer causing BRCA1/2 mutations and the introduction of HIV resistance in humans should be considered within a new category of genetic protection (...) treatments. We find that if this category is not introduced, life-altering research might be unnecessarily limited by current or future policy. Otherwise ad hoc decisions might be made, which introduce a risk of unforeseen moral costs, and might overlook or fail to address some important opportunities. (shrink)

Freud, the Contemporary Super ego and the West traces the origins of the relationship between the morality of the super ego and the destructive impulse of the death drive in the liberal democracies of the twenty first century. Giosue Ghisalberti begins by refuting the analysis by contemporary social theorists of the phenomenon described as the return of the religious, presenting instead a comprehensive set of ideas as outlined by Freud. Ghisalberti argues that the West has regressed to an (...) infantile and primitive present, driven by an unconscious hostility towards the Oedipus complex and, more comprehensively, the obsessional neuroses. The book reexamines Freuds early psychoanalytic ideas on the nature of obsessions, interpreted from the murder of the primal father in Totem and Taboo, and returns to his grounding ideals and a comprehensive defense of the coming to be human in modernity. Freud, the Contemporary Super-ego and the West will be of great interest to psychoanalysts in practice and in training. It will also be key reading for academics and scholars of psychoanalytic studies, philosophy, political theory and the humanities. (shrink)

Michael Palmer provides a detailed account of two of the most important theories of religion in the history of psychology--those of Freud and Jung. The book first analyzes Freud's claim that religion is an obsessional neurosis, a psychological illness fueled by sexual repression. He then considers Jung's rejection of Freud's theory, and his own assertion that it is the absence of religion, not its presence, which leads to neurosis.

A reassessment of Freud's central concept of the Oedipus complex, using the interlocking perspectives of biography, intellectual history and Greek tragedy. The study establishes how Freud reached his formulation through his own self-analysis and clinical work.

In this highly acclaimed book, one of the most prominent theologians in the world offers a theological and psychoanalytic assessment of Freud's atheism and of its implications for current psychoanalytic practice.

Freud’s famous essay “The ‘Uncanny’” is often poorly understood. In this paper, I clear up the popular misconception that Freud identifies all uncanny phenomena with the return of repressed infantile complexes by showing that he offers not one but two theories of the uncanny: “return of the repressed,” and another explanation that has to do with the apparent confirmation of “surmounted primitive beliefs.” Of the two, I argue that it is the latter, more often overlooked theory that faces (...) fewer serious objections and carries greater explanatory power in respect of the uncanny. (shrink)

Le discours psychiatrique s’établit au XIXe siècle par un corps médical qui reproduit des relations de pouvoir : dans le cas de l’hystérie, le corps médical (majoritairement masculin) impose un discours de vérité sur un corps féminin qui est celui de la patiente. C’est la dimension genrée de ce phénomène que nous chercherons à clarifier en ce qui a trait aux relations de pouvoir, en avançant la thèse que les hystériques se dressent comme figure de résistance devant le pouvoir psychiatrique (...) – cette résistance étant rendue possible par la réappropriation d’une parole dérobée dans la production d’un discours de vérité. Pour ce faire, nous présenterons en premier lieu les démarches de Charcot, puis de Freud et Breuer dans les études sur l’hystérie. Nous emprunterons ensuite le cadre conceptuel foucaldien pour analyser les relations de pouvoir qui se trouvent au cœur de ces deux exemples, et nous tenterons finalement de montrer comment les hystériques peuvent être vues comme « militantes », à partir d’une perspective critique et féministe. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud Some Views of Humankind Scientism and the Freudian Model of Personality The Social Sciences beyond Freud Evolution and the Social Sciences Freud and Revolutions in Thought Reading List Essay Questions.

While Freud and Heidegger were antipathetic towards one another’s ideas, a number of commentators have argued that the Freud–Heidegger relation is actually quite complementary. This paper contributes to this position by engaging with the relationship through the mediation of their respective views on the ‘origins’ of sexuality; a topic that is implicit to Freudian psychoanalytic theory and which is often taken to be absent from Heidegger’s, with the consequence that it has been ignored when bringing them into conversation. (...) Having shown that in the 1928 lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger does in fact address the question of sexuality in relation to the neutrality of Dasein outlined in the previous year’s Being and Time, I bring Freud and Heidegger into conversation on the question of the ‘origins’ of sexuality to suggest that there is a strong affinity between the two on this issue, insofar as both argue against any form of sexual essentialism by depending upon a processual ontology and affirming an originary sexual indeterminateness, which in the case of Freud takes the form of an initial bisexuality and in the case of Heidegger an ontological sexual neutrality, before concluding that, while Freud’s initial bisexuality forecloses sexuality within a binary framework, Heidegger’s notion of an ontological sexual neutrality does not, and so goes furthest in laying the ground for a rethinking of sexuality in non-essentialist, non-binary terms. (shrink)

Freud supone el inicio de una escuela psicológica y filosófica. Ambos aspectos estan relacionados en sus escritos. La creacion de una metapsicología, sustituta de la metafísica, como una suerte de hermenéutica, es el núcleo de las observaciones de Leonardo Polo. Sus apreciaciones muestran un profundo conocimiento del psicoanálisis y de sus limitaciones intrinsecas. Ofrece también, sugerencias para abordar el estudio de la psicología como una ciencia coherente con el contexto científico en el que se halla su objeto propio.

Freud propôs uma teoria da personalidade a partir do estabelecimento da psicanálise. Nosso objetivo é percorrer alguns de seus primeiros textos, os quais foram escritos em conjunto com Breuer, buscando delimitar o que Freud compreendeu a respeito de alterações da personalidade, tal como a múltipla personalidade. Este fenômeno ganhou um importante destaque no século XIX, gerando discussões no campo da psicologia e da filosofia, uma vez que implicava ruptura da unidade da personalidade. Freud, por sua vez, ofereceu (...) uma interpretação original de tais alterações à luz de suas investigações sobre a histeria. Para explicar os desdobramentos da personalidade, Freud focou numa teoria da defesa, colocando o recalque (_Verdrängung_) como um mecanismo modelo para compreender a personalidade e suas patologias. (shrink)

Freud began university intending to study both medicine and philosophy. But he was ambivalent about philosophy, regarding it as metaphysical, too limited to the conscious mind, and ignorant of empirical knowledge. Yet his private correspondence and his writings on culture and history reveal that he never forsook his original philosophical ambitions. Indeed, while Freud remained firmly committed to positivist ideals, his thought was permeated with other aspects of German philosophy. Placed in dialogue with his intellectual contemporaries, Freud (...) appears as a reluctant philosopher who failed to recognize his own metaphysical commitments, thereby crippling the defense of his theory and misrepresenting his true achievement. Recasting Freud as an inspired humanist and reconceiving psychoanalysis as a form of moral inquiry, Alfred Tauber argues that Freudianism still offers a rich approach to self-inquiry, one that reaffirms the enduring task of philosophy and many of the abiding ethical values of Western civilization. (shrink)

As Derrida showed in a later essay on Foucault’s relationship to psychoanalysis, Foucault displayed a marked ambivalence toward Freud, sometimes putting him on the side of the exclusion of madness and sometimes putting him on the side of those eager to listen to it. Yet, in the final stages of Foucault’s work, this ambivalence hardened into a resistance. By the time of The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Freud is situated squarely on the side of power. It is (...) precisely in leaving Freud behind, Foucault suggests in Volume 1’s final pages, that we might begin to imagine “a different economy of bodies and pleasures”. In the late Foucault, what is necessary is thus not a reinvigorated... (shrink)

Freud (and later commentators) have failed to explain how the origins of psychoanalytical theory began with a positivist investment without recognizing a dual epistemological commitment: simply, Freud engaged positivism because he believed it generally equated with empiricism, which he valued, and he rejected ‘philosophy’, and, more specifically, Kantianism, because of the associated transcendental qualities of its epistemology. But this simple dismissal belies a deep investment in Kant’s formulation of human reason, in which rationality escapes natural cause and thereby (...) bestows humans with cognitive and moral autonomy. Freud also segregated human rationality: he divided the mind between (1) an unconscious grounded in the biological and thus subject to its own laws, and (2) a faculty of autonomous reason, lodged in consciousness and free of natural forces to become the repository of interpretation and free will. Psychoanalysis thus rests upon a basic Kantian construction, whereby reason, through the aid of analytic techniques, provides a detached scrutiny of the natural world, i.e. the unconscious mental domain. Further, sovereign reason becomes the instrument of self-knowing in the pursuit of human perfection. Herein lies the philosophical foundation of psychoanalytic theory, a beguiling paradox in which natural cause and autonomous reason — determinism and freedom — are conjoined despite their apparent logical exclusion. (shrink)

Freud and the Politics of Psychoanalysis is a sympathetic critique of Freud's work, tracing its political content and context from his early writings on hysteria to his late essays on civilization and religion. Brunner's central claim is that politics is a pervasive and essential component of all of Freud's discourse, since Freud viewed both the psyche and society primarily as constellations of power and domination. Brunner shows that when read politically, Freud's discourse can be seen (...) to unite mechanics and meaning into a plausible, fruitful and internally consistent theory of the mind, therapy, family and society. Part one deals with the medical and political background of Freud's work. It explains how Freud postulated mental principles that were the same for all races and nations. The second part is concerned with the logic and language of Freud's theory of the mind. Brunner also details how Freud introduced dynamics of dominance and subjugation into the very core of the psyche. Part three addresses dynamics of power in the clinical setting, which Freud forged out of a curious blend of authoritarian and liberal elements. Brunner focuses on how this setting creates an arena for verbal politics. He also examines various social factors that influenced the therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis, such as class, gender and education. Part four explores Freud's analysis of the family and large-scale social institutions. Though Brunner is critical of the authoritarian bias in Freud's social theory, he suggests that it provides a useful vocabulary to unmask hidden psychological aspects of domination and subjection. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive study of Freud's relationship with philosophy.

Freud, Psychoanalysis and Symbolism offers an innovative general theory of symbolism, derived from Freud's psychoanalytic theory and relocated within mainstream scientific psychology. It is the first systematic investigation of the development of Freud's treatment of symbolism throughout his published works, and discovers in those writings a broad theory which is far superior to the widely accepted, narrow, 'official' view. Agnes Petocz argues that the treatment of symbolism must begin with the identification and clarification of a set of (...) logical constraints and psychological requirements which any general theory of symbolism must respect, and that these requirements have been neglected by existing accounts across a number of disciplines. Her newly proposed 'Freudian broad' theory of symbolism, by contrast, does meet these requirements, but only after it has been rehabilitated within a revised psychoanalytic context, encompassing major changes to our understanding of the concepts of unconscious and repression and the role of language. (shrink)

In this fully updated second edition, Jonathan Lear clearly introduces and assesses all of Freud's thought, focusing on those areas of philosophy on which Freud is acknowledged to have had a lasting impact. These include the philosophy of mind, free will and determinism, rationality, the nature of the self and subjectivity, and ethics and religion. He also considers some of the deeper issues and problems Freud engaged with, brilliantly illustrating their philosophical significance: human sexuality, the unconscious, dreams, (...) and the theory of transference. Lear’s approach emphasizes the philosophical significance of Freud’s fundamental rule – to say whatever comes to mind without censorship or inhibition. This binds psychoanalysis to the philosophical exploration of self-consciousness and truthfulness, as well as opening new paths of inquiry for moral psychology and ethics. The second edition includes a new Introduction and Conclusion. The text is revised throughout, including new sections on psychological structure and object relations and on Freud’s critique of religion and morality. One of the most important introductions and contributions to understanding this great thinker to have been published for many years, _Freud, second edition_ will be essential reading for anyone in the humanities, social sciences and beyond with an interest in Freud or philosophy. (shrink)

Le ça freudien correspond-il au soi nietzschéen? Ces deux notions consistent en effet en instances psychiques qui dictent leur désir au sujet rationnel. Chez Freud elle est dualisme et chez Nietzsche jeu de forces. Dans les deux cas, elles sont le lieu d'un conflit. Toutefois, pour Freud, il incombe au moi d'imposer sa domination au ça, alors que chez Niezsche, la perfection serait atteinte lorsque la conscience s'efface devant le soi. Dans le paradigme freudien, ça et moi diffèrent (...) dans leur fonctionnement même, alors que dans la Volonté de puissance, la conscience n'est qu'une version simplifiée du soi. Cette distinction sépare radicalement les deux penseurs : le psychanalyste conserve un dualisme dans lequel la rationalité cherche à s'imposer au chaos, alors que le philosophe s'ingénie à présenter le monde chaotique du devenir comme seule réalité. (shrink)

A major volume in the Collected Works, presenting the substance of Jung's published writings on Freud and psychoanalysis between the years 1906 and 1916. Two later papers which clarify and reappraise Jung's views are also included. The work traces out carefully the issues that led to the famous break between Freud and Jung. Jung's statement of his disagreements with Freud also provides a helpful context for understanding his theory of psychological types.--G. E. S.

Con la psicoanalisi di Freud sembra davvero realizzarsi una delle aspirazioni più antiche della filosofia: quella di ricercare e mettere a disposizione degli uomini un’efficace medicina per curare i mali dell’anima e per raggiungere la felicità possibile. La riflessione e la pratica filosofica, non solo negli ambiti specifici dell’etica o dell’antropologia, hanno infatti sempre tratto la loro motivazione più profonda dall’esperienza del limite che, nelle forme del dolore, della sofferenza, dell’ingiustizia e della morte, le persone si trovano quotidianamente di (...) fronte nelle loro situazioni di vita. Il rapporto di Freud con la filosofia si è sempre nutrito di una profonda ambivalenza: da un lato la confessione di un’irresistibile attrazione; dall’altro quasi la necessità di rassicurare se stesso e gli altri su una propria «incapacità costituzionale» alla pura speculazione e sulla sua ferma volontà di sottrarsi – proprio lui, formidabile affabulatore - al fascino delle narrazioni filosofiche. Eppure, ad oggi, la creatura intellettuale di Freud, in attesa degli sviluppi di alcune sue intuizioni che sembrano promettere le neuroscienze, appare sempre più destinata a trovare riparo e conforto nel grembo ampio e inclusivo della filosofia. A ben vedere la responsabilità di quella che T.S. Szasz definisce la “palude medica” nella quale è oggi impantanata la cura delle anime è in realtà solo in parte attribuibile a Freud e al suo assillo di guadagnare una legittimazione scientifica alla psicoanalisi. Nell’opera del fondatore, molto più che nella successiva scolastica psicoanalitica, si possono anzi trovare gli antidoti alla medicalizzazione cui la pratica della cura dell’anima è andata incontro, soprattutto negli ultimi decenni. (shrink)

Freud may never have set foot in Cambridge - that hub for the twentieth century's most influential thinkers and scientists - but his intellectual impact there in the years between the two World Wars was immense. This is a story that has long languished untold, buried under different accounts of the dissemination of psychoanalysis. John Forrester and Laura Cameron present a fascinating and deeply textured history of the ways in which a set of Freudian ideas about the workings of (...) the human mind, sexuality and the unconscious affected Cambridge men and women - from A. G. Tansley and W. H. R. Rivers to Bertrand Russell, Bernal, Strachey and Wittgenstein - shaping their thinking across a range of disciplines, from biology to anthropology, and from philosophy to psychology, education and literature. Freud in Cambridge will be welcomed as a major intervention by literary scholars, historians and all readers interested in twentieth-century intellectual and scientific life. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je montre que le concept du double joue un rôle crucial, mais secret dans le Moïse de Freud. Freud prétend que Moïse a été assassiné par son peuple pour être remplacé ultérieurement par un autre Moïse. Cependant, je soutiens que cette logique d’assassinat et de dédoublement caractérise toutes les figures héroïques qui ne sont que des doubles les unes des autres. Le véritable objectif de Freud est de s’établir lui-même comme le double héroïque de (...) Moïse. De cette manière, il tente de garantir la survie de son héritage puisque, même s’il meurt, d’autres doubles viendraient pour continuer son œuvre. (shrink)

Cet article revient sur le surréalisme pour montrer de quelles façons la psychanalyse a fourni une lingua franca internationale à la critique de l’humanisme européen et du racisme colonial du milieu du siècle dernier. La Première Guerre mondiale a initié une remise en question des valeurs européennes, qui a été exacerbée par le modernisme de l’entre-deux-guerres et la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les écrits de Freud ont contribué à cette remise en question. Cela a non seulement été le cas pour (...) l’École de Francfort et la philosophie française, mais également pour les intellectuels et artistes surréalistes des deux côtés de l’Atlantique. Entre leurs mains, des concepts tels que l’inconscient, l’aliénation et le mythe ont proposé un vocabulaire commun pour s’attaquer à la hiérarchie raciale et esquisser un nivellement culturel entre l’Europe et ses autres. Lire le surréalisme en même temps que ses ramifications, de la négritude au structuralisme, permet aux théoriciens contemporains de renouer le dialogue avec ces ancêtres qui ont été oubliés à mesure que l’influence de Freud s’affaiblissait au cours du xxe siècle. (shrink)

Examines modern controversies over Freud and Freudian thought while questioning the theory of infantile sexuality and showing where Freud consistently misdiagnosed his patients and failed to make his claimed cures.

With respect to the reproach by habermas and ricoeur that freud will fall prey to a "scientistic self-misunderstanding" i submit that it was not freud, but these hermeneuticians themselves, who forced the clinical theory of psychoanalysis onto the procrustean bed of a philosophical ideology demonstrably alien to it. as against the generic "disavowal" of causal attributions advocated by some hermeneuticians, i maintain that it is a nihilistic, if not frivolous, trivialization of freud's entire clinical theory. far from (...) serving as a new citadel for psychoanalytic apologetics, the embrace of such hermeneuticians is, i submit, the kiss of death for the legacy that was to be saved. (edited). (shrink)

Freud uses paradoxical and conflictual rhetoric to create an unstable and conflictual picture of the mind. Thus he diverges from both dominant traditions of thought in the West: the Judeo-Christian way of filling all gaps in meaning by putting a single omnipotent divinity in charge of them, and the Enlightenment quest for a final, causal language to describe reality. By both suggesting and displacing a plurality of perspectives on the unconscious, Freud’s text mirrors what it claims happens in (...) our minds, in which unconscious impulses undermine the pretense of total rational self-control. Though Freud suggests that a mechanistic description of the mind may bring us nearer to the reality of the unconscious, he also explains that this reality will remain dark. He not only develops an ostensibly mechanistic vocabulary for unconscious mental processes, but also clarifies that his terminology is most fictional precisely when it seems most scientific. Hence, Freud’s science of the unconscious cannot be assimilated to an empiricist position; its philosophical underpinnings are both Kantian and Nietzschean, with metaphors and analogies playing a crucial role. Two dramatic images, in which the mind appears as a domain of warring gods and a realm of political conflict, demonstrate that Freud did not regard the unconscious as some kind of true inner self. He depicts the mind in general and the unconscious in particular as a pagan, conflictual universe over which no god or goddess can gain exclusive control and where no rigid dictatorship is possible. (shrink)

Freud's Mass Psychology examines one of the key concepts in the theory of the psyche. Surprenant treats it as an epistemological issue rather than exclusively as a socio-political issue. Focusing on this neglected concept enables the author to raise anew the question of the 'application' of psychoanalysis, beyond a mechanistic understanding of this term and of Freud's writings. This study brings together important topics associated with psychoanalysis, recent French philosophy, and political thought. The original arguments that it develops (...) should interest anyone preoccupied with the relevance of psychoanalytic concepts in philosophy and in related disciplines, notably in the field of literary studies. (shrink)

Freud was the first author to conceive internal motivational conflict in economic terms. Although behaviorists have often rejected his concepts because the findings that gave rise to them were based on subjective methods, they are largely compatible with behavioral data on motivation, and indeed predicted by Herrnstein's matching law. Psychoanalysis is much closer to behavioral than to cognitive psychology, which does not conceive self-contraditory behavior as a motivational problem.

For three decades Frank Cioffi has been at the center of the debate over Freud's legacy and the legitimacy of psychoanalysis.

Freud seems to have been torn between a literary and a scientific model for his enterprises. On the one hand he stresses the scientific nature of his researches to an extent which makes the suspicious reader wonder whether he protests too much. On the other hand it is well known that he regarded many writers, though predominantly Shakespeare, as anticipating his findings on the unconscious. In one famous passage in the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis he places his discovery of (...) the unconscious on a par with the discoveries of Darwin and Copernicus in their effect upon man's picture of himself. He is justified, of course, and if we add Marx to this triumvirate we add a figure even closer to Freud in claiming a scientific status for his work, a scientific status which is, to the uncommitted, dubious. Theodore Mischel argues that Freud increasingly construes neurotic behaviour upon the model of ordinary intentional behaviour and, though he continued to show interest in the view that the unconscious impulses which are repressed are physiological in nature, this ideal of a reduction of the psychological to the physiological became a less active ingredient in his published work as his collaboration with Fliess receded into the past. So although he may have paid lip service to some form of psycho-physical identity, believing that mental phenomena are ultimately no more or less than physical happenings in the neurones of the brain, in mature Freud this seems to have been an idly spinning wheel. Roy Schafer has recently pointed out that many of Freud's followers use the concepts of natural science , whilst simultaneously retaining traces of anthropomorphism in their metapsychology. For instance Heinz Hartmann emphasizes the concept of a ‘higher organizing function’ which resists formulation in the mechanistic metapsychology he favours. Similar difficulties obtrude in the work of Waelder and Kohut. The significance of these conflicts leads Schafer to frame basic Freudian insights in terms of the theory of action, stressing the manner in which an action may be described in differing ways and thus allowing us to present the fact that a patient's behaviour may both tell and not tell us of his deepest anxieties. Yet curiously Schafer denies that freedom plays any part in his account whereas we would have expected a concept so central to agency to have an equally central role in any recasting of psycho-analysis in terms of the theory of action. (shrink)

Acknowledging the power of the id-drives, Freud held on to the authority of reason as the ego’s best tool to control instinctual desire. He thereby placed analytic reason at the foundation of his own ambivalent social theory, which, on the one hand, held utopian promise based upon psychoanalytic insight, and, on the other hand, despaired of reason’s capacity to control the self-destructive elements of the psyche. Moving beyond the recourse of sublimation, post-Freudians attacked reason’s hegemony in quelling disruptive psycho-dynamics (...) and, focusing upon the social domain, they sought strategies to counter the oppressive (repressive) social restrictions and conformist impositions impeding individual freedom that result from thwarted desire. Postmodern celebration of desire at the expense of reason and sublimation leaves the Enlightenment prospects altogether and moves psychoanalysis into a new terrain, where the very notion of rationality and an autonomous ego upon which much of Freudianism rests has been deconstructed. Thus the debate that begins with Freud’s social theories reflects the deeper divisions, which arose with postmodern ethics and discarded Cartesian–Kantian notions of personal identity. Here we consider the moral framework in which Freudian social theory sits and a contrasting understanding of agency that confronts his modernist conception. In that debate, we discern the larger humanist confrontation with postmodernity. Yet, all who engaged Freud shared some version of his utopian ethos, albeit radically restructuring the theory upon which social reform might occur. (shrink)

Acknowledging the power of the id-drives, Freud held on to the authority of reason as the ego’s best tool to control instinctual desire. He thereby placed analytic reason at the foundation of his own ambivalent social theory, which, on the one hand, held utopian promise based upon psychoanalytic insight, and, on the other hand, despaired of reason’s capacity to control the self-destructive elements of the psyche. Moving beyond the recourse of sublimation, post-Freudians attacked reason’s hegemony in quelling disruptive psycho-dynamics (...) and, focusing upon the social domain, they sought strategies to counter the oppressive (repressive) social restrictions and conformist impositions impeding individual freedom that result from thwarted desire. Postmodern celebration of desire at the expense of reason and sublimation leaves the Enlightenment prospects altogether and moves psychoanalysis into a new terrain, where the very notion of rationality and an autonomous ego upon which much of Freudianism rests has been deconstructed. Thus the debate that begins with Freud’s social theories reflects the deeper divisions, which arose with postmodern ethics and discarded Cartesian–Kantian notions of personal identity. Here we consider the moral framework in which Freudian social theory sits and a contrasting understanding of agency that confronts his modernist conception. In that debate, we discern the larger humanist confrontation with postmodernity. Yet, all who engaged Freud shared some version of his utopian ethos, albeit radically restructuring the theory upon which social reform might occur. (shrink)

This article retrieves Freud’s Paul as a forgotten predecessor and untapped critic of the “return to Paul” in contemporary political theology and continental philosophy. Given that Sigmund Freud published Moses and Monotheism in 1939 having barely escaped from Vienna, the text’s reception has justly been dominated by the question of Freud’s identification with Moses and the relationship between psychoanalysis and Judaism. However, I argue that this narrow focus has obscured the more fundamental problem of the connection between (...) religion and Freud’s enigmatic notion of “historical truth,” which he works out not through Moses but through Saint Paul. To do so, I first show how Freud’s genealogy of monotheism is modeled on the pathogenesis of hysterical symptoms. I then trace how Freud deepens his investigation into the etiology of symptom-formation until he arrives at the notion of historical truth and the archaic heritage that transmits it. Lastly, I demonstrate that Freud presents himself less as a Pauline figure than he does Paul as a proto-analyst. Through this staging, I contend that Freud parochializes the claims of Christianity as symptomatic of a more archaic historical truth that psychoanalysis alone is able to access. Freud’s Paul demonstrates that it is not a question of whether but how ostensibly modern secular discourses inherit the theological traditions in which they are imbedded. Reading Freud as a philosopher of religion ultimately offers an indictment of any philosophy or emancipatory politics naively modeled on theological universalism. (shrink)