ZusammenfassungNach einer historischen Übersicht über die Entwicklung der naturwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen in den vergangenen Jahrhunderten wird auseinandergesetzt, dass wir seit der Quantentheorie einige frühere Theorien, wie etwa die Newton'sche Mechanik, als abge‐schlossene Theorien bezeichnen. Der Sinn dieser Begriffsbildung wird besprochen, ebenso die Bedingungen, unter denen eine Theorie als abgeschlossen bezeichnet werden kann.

To us today, it seems intuitive that an ideal society would secure for its citizens some time for leisure that is, some time to do “whatever they want” after having attended to their various responsibilities and natural needs. But, in this essay, I argue that—in 19th century social philosophy—the status of leisure (Muße) in an ideal society was actually surprisingly controversial: whereas J.G. Fichte makes a strong case for leisure as part of an ideal society (going even so far as (...) considering it its central good), G.W.F. Hegel implicitly argues against this idea. For him, leisure is a crook that we only need as long as the social conditions are not sufficiently ideal—whereas a truly rational society would create a new type of work that subsumes the benefits of leisure into work itself. In this essay, I reconstruct this largely forgotten disagreement and argue that although both positions contain an important overstatement, each includes an important lesson for the contemporary debate on leisure and society. (shrink)

This paper argues that spacetime visualisability is not a necessary condition for the intelligibility of theories in physics. Visualisation can be an important tool for rendering a theory intelligible, but it is by no means a sine qua non. The paper examines the historical transition from classical to quantum physics, and analyses the role of visualisability and its relation to intelligibility. On the basis of this historical analysis, an alternative conception of the intelligibility of scientific theories is proposed, based on (...) Heisenberg 's reinterpretation of the notion of Anschaulichkeit. (shrink)

Our purpose in this essay is twofold: to explore John Deely’s “semiotic” or “contextualized animal” as also a “contextualizing animal”, one that not only responds in context but one that changes first the context so as later to change itself—as all living things do; and to explore how this context-shifting “semiotic animal” has caused to emerge the very “signs upon which”, as Deely writes, “the whole of life depends”. Environmental ethics are inseparable from personal ethics, then, because (1) we are (...) in fact ourselves environments for others, (2) we carry models of our environments within us (our genetic / ontogenetic selves), and (3) even our free will (the basis of ethical choice) is an “environmental” phenomenon, as Martin Heisenberg argues in Nature (14 May 2009: 164–165) and as Deely writes in Semiotic Animal: “signs do not fall strictly among the things objectified by perceptions of sense but act prior to that perception to enable it to reconstruct the physical environment along objective lines that are meaningful to the species” (Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of Human Being Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism [2010]: 119). (shrink)

IN the Byzantinische Zeitschrift xxi. 52 Paul Maas states: ‘Es ist das Verdienst von H. B. Dewing, zuerst erkannt zu haben, dasz Prokop seine Satzschliisse rhythmisch reguliert.’ That this is only partly true appears from the remark of Heisenberg in the Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift, 1901, Sp. 1481, who comments on it, and that in a case of text–criticism, and likewise from a remark of Cronert in the Rheinisches Museum, 54, 1899, 593. Dewing was the first to point out the (...) connection between the rhythm of Procopius and Meyer's law and to collect specific statistical material, although his numbers are to a great extent of no practical value. Compare in this connection Maas B.Z. xix. 593 . It appears to me that the correct statement of the end–rhythm of Procopius is that given by Maas for Constantinus Manasses, B.Z. xi. 505: ‘Im Ausgang der Satzglieder musz die Zahl der zwischen den letzten beiden Hochtonen stehenden Silben eine gerade sein,’ on condition that 0 is considered as an even number. (shrink)

This article analyses an episode in the earlyhistory of quantum theory: the controversy betweenPauli and Heisenberg about the anomalous Zeemaneffect, which was a main stumbling block for the oldquantum theory of Bohr. It is argued that theindividual philosophical views of both Pauli andHeisenberg directed their attempts to solve theanomaly and decisively influenced the solutions theyproposed. The results of this case study arecompared with the assertions of four theories ofscientific change, namely those of Kuhn, Lakatos,Laudan and Giere.

We use a new, distinctly “geometrical” interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) to argue for the fundamentality of the 4D blockworld ontology. We argue for a geometrical interpretation whose fundamental ontology is one of spacetime relations as opposed to constructive entities whose time-dependent behavior is governed by dynamical laws. Our view rests on two formal results: Kaiser (1981 & 1990), Bohr & Ulfbeck (1995) and Anandan, (2003) showed independently that the Heisenberg commutation relations of NRQM follow from the relativity (...) of simultaneity (RoS) per the Poincaré Lie algebra. And, Bohr, Ulfbeck & Mottelson (2004a & 2004b) showed that the density matrix for a particular NRQM experimental outcome may be obtained from the spacetime symmetry group of the experimental configuration. This shows how the blockworld view is not only consistent with NRQM, not only an implication of our geometrical interpretation of NRQM, but it is necessary in a non-trivial way for explaining quantum interference and “non-locality” from the spacetime perspective. Together the formal results imply that contrary to accepted wisdom, NRQM, the measurement problem and so-called quantum non-locality do not provide reasons to abandon the 4D blockworld implication of RoS. But rather, the deep non-commutative structure of the quantum and the deep structure of spacetime as given by the Minkowski interpretation of special relativity (STR) are deeply unified in a 4D spacetime regime that lies between Galilean spacetime (G4) and Minkowski spacetime (M4). Taken together the aforementioned formal results allow us to model NRQM phenomena such as interference without the need for realism about 3N Hilbert space, establishing that the world is really 4D and that configuration space is nothing more than a calculational device. Our new geometrical interpretation of NRQM provides a geometric account of quantum entanglement and so-called non-locality free of conflict with STR and free of interpretative mystery. In section 2 we discuss the various tensions between STR and NRQM with respect to the dimensionality of the world. Section 3 is devoted to an explication of the Kaiser et al. results and their philosophical implications. Likewise, the Bohr et al. results and their implications are the subject of section 4. In section 5, we present our geometric interpretation of quantum entanglement and “non-locality.”. (shrink)

This paper studies the model of the quantum electrodynamics (QED) of a single nonrelativistic electron due to W. Pauli and M. Fierz and studied further by P. Blanchard. This model exhibits infrared divergence in a very simple context. The infrared divergence is associated with the inequivalence of the Hilbert spaces associated with the free Hamiltonian and with the complete Hamiltonian. Infrared divergences that are visible in the perturbative description disappear in the space of the clothed electrons. In this model when (...) the Hamiltonian is expressed in terms of the “physical” fields that create the electron together with its cloud of soft photons, the variational principle suggested earlier can be applied. At finite time the Heisenberg field of the model acts in the space of the perturbative electron together with a finite number of perturbative photons, while the “physical” field can be chosen to act in the space of the exact (“physical”) electron eigenstates together with a finite number of physical photons. The space of the physical (or clothed) electron states can be chosen to be a Fock space. (shrink)

A recent proposal by Dr. W. H. McCrae, cosmologist and mathematician, to the effect that decisions between such cosmogonies as those of Hoyle and of Gamow are experimentally impossible by virtue of a general cosmological indeterminacy principle, is here examined and elaborated upon. Some comments on the "antinomies" in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" are made in reference to this principle as well as to the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle. If McCrae's principle is accepted, we will have moved a long (...) way toward Kant's conclusion that a logically consistent understanding of an underlying "ultimate reality" is outside the confines of science--whatever one may think of Kant's own line of reasoning. (shrink)

G. Breit's original paper of 1929 postulates the Breit equation as a correction to an earlier defective equation due to Eddington and Gaunt, containing a form of interaction suggested by Heisenberg and Pauli. We observe that manifestly covariant electromagnetic Two-Body Dirac equations previously obtained by us in the framework of Relativistic Constraint Mechanics reproduce the spectral results of the Breit equation but through an interaction structure that contains that of Eddington and Gaunt. By repeating for our equation the analysis (...) that Breit used to demonstrate the superiority of his equation to that of Eddington and Gaunt, we show that the historically unfamiliar interaction structures of Two-Body Dirac equations (in Breit-like form) are just what is needed to correct the covariant Eddington Gaunt equation without resorting to Breit's version of retardation. (shrink)

The publication of the EPR paper in 1935 prompted Heisenberg to draft a manuscript on the question of the completability of quantum mechanics. We give here the English translation of this manuscript with a brief introduction and bibliography.

A mecânica quântica instituiu uma linguagem matemática inteiramente inédita. Essa mudança na física exigiu que físicos e filósofos repensassem os conceitos pelos quais se podiam representar a realidade, uma vez que as noções clássicas se revelaram limitadas na compreensão dos fenômenos atômicos. O filósofo francês G. Bachelard e o físico alemão W. Heisenberg são autores que discorreram acerca das grandes modificações que ocorreram no seio da física, e, com isso, trataram do problema da linguagem na mecânica quântica. Neste artigo, (...) o objetivo é recorrer aos argumentos de ambos os autores para evidenciar relações entre suas ideias acerca da temática referida. Destaca-se que Bachelard e Heisenberg criticam a aplicação da linguagem usual e dos conceitos filosóficos da modernidade na nova física, mas, mediante sua noção de ruptura, o filósofo francês propõe que a mecânica quântica se restrinja à linguagem matemática. Ideia esta que vai contra ao princípio de complementaridade de Bohr, admitido por Heisenberg na compreensão dos fenômenos quânticos e para uma interpretação da física quântica. (shrink)

Příspěvek se zaměřuje na zavádějící příběh o tzv. kodaňské interpretaci kvantové mechaniky, již jako údajně nerozpornou či jednotnou vytvořili a sdíleli na základě tzv. kodaňského ducha kvantové teorie její tvůrci v roce 1927. Článek bude vycházet z role, kterou v tomto příběhu sehráli především N. Bohr a W. Heisenberg. První část příspěvku seznamuje s variacemi toho, co se v literatuře považuje za kodaňskou interpretaci. Druhá část odhaluje, že zatímco kvantová mechanika vznikla ve dvacátých letech 20. století, kodaňská interpretace je (...) veskrze problematickým a především Heisenbergovým produktem z let padesátých. Jednou z hlavních motivací, kvůli níž vystoupil s tzv. kodaňskou interpretací, byla obrana vůči množícím se kritikám obhájců kvantové teorie. Jelikož mezi členy tzv. kodaňské školy nepanovala žádná jednotná či nerozporná interpretace kvantové mechaniky, zaměřuje se poslední část příspěvku na několik vybraných rozdílů hlavně mezi Bohrovým a Heisenbergovým výkladem kvantové teorie. (shrink)

In this paper we critically analyse W. Heisenberg’s arguments against the ontology of point particles following trajectories in quantum theory, presented in his famous 1927 paper and in his Chicago lectures (1929). Along the way, we will clarify the meaning of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation and help resolve some confusions related to it.

Presents German physicist Werner Heisenberg's 1958 text in which he discusses the philosophical implications and social consequences of quantum mechanics and other physical theories.

Könnten Sie wohl einen Sonderdruck Ihrer Arbeit an Prof. W. Pauli, Zürich, Gloriastr. 35 schicken; der hat mich darum gebeten.

The goal of this paper is to critically examine the objections of John Locke’s contemporaries against the theory of substance or substratum. Locke argues in Essay that substratum is the bearer of the properties of a particular substance. Locke also claims that we have no knowledge of substratum. But Locke’s claim about our ignorance as to what substratum is, is contentious. That is, if we don’t know what substratum is, then what is the point of proposing it as a bearer (...) of properties? This question underlies the criticism Locke’s contemporaries raise against the notion of substratum. In section I, I lay out the context for Locke’s theory of substratum by pointing out his main motivation in proposing his theory. In section II, I give a brief analysis of the theory of substratum. In section III, I discuss the objections of Locke’s contemporaries against the theory of substratum.1 I focus on Edward Stillingfleet, Lee Henry, G. W. Leibniz and John Sergeant. In section IV, I conclude that there is no warrant to dismiss Locke’s theory of substance. (shrink)

The seminal work by one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, Physics and Philosophy is Werner Heisenberg's concise and accessible narrative of the revolution in modern physics, in which he played a towering role. The outgrowth of a celebrated lecture series, this book remains as relevant, provocative, and fascinating as when it was first published in 1958. A brilliant scientist whose ideas altered our perception of the universe, Heisenberg is considered the father of quantum physics; (...) he is most famous for the Uncertainty Principle, which states that quantum particles do not occupy a fixed, measurable position. His contributions remain a cornerstone of contemporary physics theory and application. (shrink)

The seminal work by one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, Physics and Philosophy is Werner Heisenberg's concise and accessible narrative of the revolution in modern physics, in which he played a towering role. The outgrowth of a celebrated lecture series, this book remains as relevant, provocative, and fascinating as when it was first published in 1958. A brilliant scientist whose ideas altered our perception of the universe, Heisenberg is considered the father of quantum physics; (...) he is most famous for the Uncertainty Principle, which states that quantum particles do not occupy a fixed, measurable position. His contributions remain a cornerstone of contemporary physics theory and application. Book jacket. (shrink)

The contributions of few contemporary scientists have been as far reaching in their effects as those of Nobel Laureate Werner Heisenberg.

Hegel's Philosophy of Right is one of those texts that make it easy to miss the forest for the trees. On the argumentative journey from private property and punishment, via the "emptiness" of Kant's moral law to Hegel's vision of a rational social order, it is easy to lose sight of the overall arch of Hegel's argument. Indeed, this kind of problem is confounded by an ever-growing literature on individual ideas and sections of the text (from Hegel's conception of agency (...) to his argument for the market economy), which, while interesting and rewarding on their own, direct our attention to parts of his argument, rather than to the Philosophy of Right as a whole.Dean Moyar's new book is devoted to making us see the... Read More. (shrink)