This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving consequences” (...) and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic. (shrink)

The Tibetan Buddhist logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge devoted a large part of his discussion on argumentation to arguments by consequence. Phya pa distinguishes in his analysis arguments by consequence that merely refute the opponent and arguments by consequence that qualify as probative. The latter induce a correct direct proof which corresponds to the reverse form of the argument by consequence. This paper deals with Phya pa’s classification of probative consequences based on the type of the logical reason (...) involved. I first establish the basis of Phya pa’s classification—the typology of logical reasons in inference-for-oneself—with a special attention to logical reasons consisting in the ‘apprehension of something incompatible [with the negandum]’ and among them the specific case of the ‘apprehension of the cause of something incompatible [with the negandum]’. The treatment of the latter is shown to be instrumental in Phya pa’s classification, as well as in explaining the divergences that occur in the models adopted by his successors, such as gTsang nag pa brTson ʾgrus seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge. Turning to Phya pa’s effective application of this typology when he resorts himself to arguments by consequence, I examine Phya pa’s rephrasing, in the form of four arguments by consequence, of the discussion on the relation between the two realities found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and relate it to a parallel discussion in an earlier Madhyamaka work by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags. I compare the variant versions of these four arguments in three Madhyamaka works of Phya pa and show that the differences pertaining to the identification of the type of the logical reason result from apparently insignificant variations in the formulation of each of the arguments. In the conclusion, I discuss the potential philosophical or practical interest of such a classification. (shrink)

This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition ( prameya ) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya , and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya . It inquires into the relationship between validity ( prāmāṇya ), reliability ( avisaṃvāda ) and causal efficacy ( arthakriyā ) and suggests that (...) the discussion on non-existent prameyas in Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 provides an alternative to an overall “practicalist” reading of Dharmakīrti, practicalist in the sense that pramāṇas are primarily oriented toward human aims and hence bear on objects capable of fulfilling them through their causal capacities. Considering the views of Dharmakīrti’s interpreters, it shows how Dharmottara (8th c.), rejecting such an alternative, strives to reconcile claim (iii) with a practicalist interpretation, while Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (12th c.) generalizes the application of a criterion of validity superseding an arthakriyā -oriented framework by bringing to the fore the notion of “non-opposition” ( abādhana ) introduced by Dharmakīrti with regard to non-existent prameyas and suprasensorial objects. (shrink)

This paper examines a passage of the eleventh chapter of the Rigs gter of Sa skya Paṇḍita on the division of arguments by consequence of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” with respect to the type of relation between P and Q. This passage appears in quite different versions in several available recensions of the Rigs gter, all of which are problematic to some extent. The different interpretations of the commentators can be shown to (...) derive from their reliance on different versions of the text, which they strove to make sense of through two distinct strategies. Following up on the examination of a division of arguments by consequence along the same line in the works of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Tibetan predecessors, in particular Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge :883–938, 2016b), I evaluate the diverging versions of the Rigs gter against a coherent logical scenario founded on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s discussion pertaining to the types of logical reasons in inference in the tenth chapter of his work and comparison with the classification by Phya pa. I offer a hypothesis regarding the genesis of the problematic versions of the passage on the classification of consequences in the Rigs gter based on the comparison with the classification found in mTshur ston’s epistemological work. I propose that the composition of this portion of the Rigs gter might have involved a textual reuse of mTshur ston’s classification, even though mTshur ston and Sa skya Paṇḍita disagree on background issues. This very disagreement imposed changes to the reused text that led to problematic readings. (shrink)

The works of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) make abundant use of a particular type of argument that I term ‘argument by parallels’. Their main characteristic is that the instigator of the argument, addressing a thesis in a domain A, introduces a parallel thesis in an unrelated domain B. And in the ensuing dialogue, each of the instigator’s statements consists in replicating his interlocutor’s previous assertion, mutatis mutandis, in the other domain (A or B). I (...) show that such a dialogue involves two parallel arguments that develop in an intersecting zigzag pattern, and discuss the principles involved in the establishment of the conclusion from the perspective of parity of reasoning and analogical argument. I examine the overall rhetorical strategy directing the use of arguments by parallels and the pedagogical and explanatory functions they can serve. I also evaluate the plausibility of their use in Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s works mirroring a contemporary practice of oral debate, and reflect on the status of such arguments in the framework of Indo-Tibetan logic. (shrink)

This paper examines the modalities and mechanism of text-use pertaining to Indian and Tibetan material in a selection of Tibetan Buddhist epistemological treatises written between the eleventh and the thirteenth century. It pays special attention to a remarkable feature of this corpus: the phenomenon of “repeat,” that is, the unacknowledged integration of earlier material by an author within his own composition. This feature reveals an intellectual continuity in the tradition, and is found even for authors who claim a rupture from (...) their predecessors. Regarding acknowledged text re-use in the form of quotations, I consider which factors condition the identification of the source or the lack thereof, and what role quotations play for the respective authors. In particular, I discuss whether any inference can be drawn, from the presence or absence of quotations, about an author’s knowledge of the corresponding source. (shrink)

This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” ( apoha ), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X, which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in this paper (...) two strategies aiming at “breaking the circle”: (i) conceding the precedence of a positive understanding of X, from which a negative understanding (i.e., the understanding of “non-X”) is derived by contrast, and (ii) denying any precedence by proposing a simultaneous understanding of both X and non-X. I consider how these two options are articulated respectively by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika cum Svavṛtti and by one of his Tibetan interpreters, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and examine the requirements for their workability. I suggest that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s motivation to opt for an alternative solution has to do with his criticism of notions shared by his Tibetan predecessors, an outline of which is given in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, I present the surprising use of the charge of circularity by an early Tibetan logician against his coreligionists. (shrink)

This book explores the contributions to the philosophy of mind made by the Tibetan Buddhist thinker Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) in his seminal text, the “Dispeller of the Mind’s Darkness.” This study, which includes a critical edition and English translation of those portions of the “Dispeller” devoted to explicating the nature of mental episodes and their objects, contributes to a deeper understanding of Tibetan intellectual history, while also facilitating a wider appreciation of both Phya pa’s theory of (...) mind and its significance within the global history of philosophy. (shrink)

L’excellent ouvrage de Pascale Barthélémy constitue un nouveau titre, très bienvenu, dans la floraison d’études dévolues à ce que Gregory Mann a appelé « la relation contrainte particulière » entre la France et l’Afrique. Pascale Barthélémy s’est penchée sur la petite minorité d’Africaines – à peine un millier au total – issues de la fédération d’Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) et formées par les Français pour devenir sages-femmes, infirmières-visiteuses (jusqu’en 1938) ou encore institut...

This article explores how Levinas’s analysis of family relations (paternity, filiality, fecundity, and maternity) and the ethical relationship to the other (requiring both a paradoxical process of separation and the aptitude to be ethically ordained) can retrospectively enlighten our understanding of King Lear. It first shows how, in the Shakespearean tragedy, Levinas’s ethical answer, “here I am,” cannot be dissociated from fearless speech, which becomes the manifestation of the ethical relationship to the other. It then focuses on the Levinasian paradox (...) of “separation” as a prerequisite to the ethical relationship, and sees how this is radically distorted in the families presented in King Lear. It finally considers Levinas’s idea of maternity as a responsibility for others to the point of substitution, to questions the absence of mothers in King Lear and argue that the denouement of the tragedy can be regarded as a gender-reversed variation on the mater dolorosa motif. (shrink)

This article seeks to explain how and why groups and networks of undocumented migrants mobilizing in Berlin, Montréal, and Paris since the beginning of the 2000s construct different types of claims. The authors explore the relationship between undocumented migrants and state authorities at the local level through the concept of the citizenship regime and its specific application to undocumented migrants. Despite their common formal exclusion from citizenship, nonstatus migrants experience different degrees and forms of exclusion in their daily lives, in (...) terms of access to certain rights and services, recognition, and belonging within the state. As a result, they have an opportunity to create different, specific forms of leeway in the society in which they live. The concurrence of these different degrees of exclusion and different forms of leeway defines specific conditions of mobilization. The authors demonstrate how the content of their claims is influenced by these conditions of mobilization. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dispelling the Myth of the Non-Singer:Embracing Two Aesthetics for SingingLouise M. PascaleI entered the Music Workshop course with trepidation. Of all the courses in my Master's program, I feared this one the most. My experiences with music have always been negative ones. As I entered the classroom, memories surfaced of the time I was told to mouth the words so I would not throw the rest of the class (...) off key and when I was laughed off the stage after a friend and I attempted a rendition of "Rolling O'er the Billows." After that, I was convinced I should not sing.1Maxine Greene reminds us how easy it is to get caught in the "main text of life," one that is "negotiated mostly by convention, routine, habit, duty and one we have very little choice in."2 Our long-held acceptance of the "singer" and "non-singer" provides a perfect example of Greene's metaphor. The traditional meaning of "singing" is created out of convention and habit, perpetuated by the "main text" (white, middle class) values of American society.Singing, as it is understood in today's educational settings, settled into its role in American music education as a result of a number of significant decisions made as early as the 1600s by prominent leaders of the church.3 Each of these decisions added to the growth and strength of the view of singing that became [End Page 165] what I refer to as a "taproot"4 in music education. This taproot continued to settle comfortably into the groundwork of music education and has had major and long-lasting effects on how we generally perceive and experience singing.The Western perspective of singing is wedded to a multitude of assumptions and beliefs and, over a period of time, has taken on complex meaning. It is associated with subtle nuances, such as valuing the high, lilting soprano voice over the alto. It is connected to various philosophies and strongly held convictions, such as improving vocal performance through the mastery of musical literacy, and even exclusionary practices, such as selecting out the "better singers" and suggesting that others refrain from singing at all.Perhaps the most profound consequence of this entrenched taproot is that it has left American society with a very limited perception of "singing." This singular, well-supported root, albeit strong, impenetrable, and closely connected with a number of cultural and societal assumptions, effectively narrows the scope of our perceptions, our language, our philosophy, and our teaching practices in the domain of singing in education. Illustration of the powerful ways music relates to and directly expresses the social attitudes and cognitive processes of a culture are found in the work of John Blacking and John Miller Chernoff.5 Their work provides an opportunity to reflect on the cultural and societal influences of the "taproot" philosophy of music education and the ways these have created limitations on who expresses themselves musically, why, how, and for whom.One of the most critical of those limitations is that we have classroom teachers who rarely, if ever, sing with their students. The gap between those in education who sing and offer musical activities to their students and those who do not is greater than ever. The "non-singer" mentality persists in educational communities and is not being addressed in music education circles. Singing continues to be considered, by most educators, to be a complicated skill that must be learned and requires training in breathing, vocal technique, and diction, and a basic knowledge of note reading.Many have strong feelings about singing; it is not a neutral subject. When the topic of singing is brought up, some involved in the conversation are likely to personalize it and be eager to share stories about their singing ability and to express their opinions about whether or not they qualify as a "singer." Sometimes the reactions can be extreme. Some people shy completely away from singing, to the point of running from the room at the mere suggestion that they might be asked to participate in singing in public. Others have an opposite reaction and experience singing as an enjoyable activity... (shrink)

La porno straight est un genre littéraire, photographique et cinématographique socialement et historiquement situé, facilement accessible, jusque dans l’univers domestique – le câble – et le domaine professionnel – les écrans de veille. Je ne connais pas la pornographie..

Nous voulons réfléchir sur ce que Sénèque choisit de révéler et de taire, de montrer et de cacher sur la scène tragique, à travers l'étude de deux situations de Phèdre. En étudiant la parole de la protagoniste lors de deux moments cruciaux (face à Hippolyte à qui elle veut avouer son amour et face à Thésée à qui elle doit expliquer son souhait de mourir), nous mettons en lumière le processus de métamorphose du personnage à l'acte II, scandé par trois (...) occurrences du verbe miserere. Phèdre insère dans sa tirade des signa amoris de plus en plus explicites, jusqu'à la révélation finale qui la consacre en tant qu'amans. Cela s'accompagne de la métamorphose d'un objet, l'épée d'Hippolyte, qui, tout d'abord absente et symbolique, apparaît ensuite sur scène et reçoit un rôle significatif : des mains du jeune homme, elle passe à celles de sa belle-mère, devenant tour à tour arme qui peut blesser, objet souillé, gage d'amour et de mort, puis preuve qui accuse – pignus sceleris – grâce aux indices savamment distillés par la nourrice et par Phèdre. (shrink)

Die Betrachtungen, die ich Ihnen im Folgenden vortragen möchte, konzentrieren sich auf den Begriff der Gesellschaft in Fichtes Philosophie und überschneiden sich unvermeidlich mit einer Neubewertung des Begriffs des Politischen, wie er sich bei Fichte abzeichnet. Ausgangspunkt ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat: eine Unterscheidung, die philosophiegeschichtlich in Hegel ihren wichtigsten Exponenten hat, doch, obgleich nicht immer überlegt und vollständig ausgearbeitet, bereits in die Schriften vieler Autoren als Voraussetzung eingeflossen war. Und darüber hinaus war dies ein Gedanke, der auf (...) einer anderen, wenn man so will, niedrigeren Reflexionsebene in der deutschen Publizistik insbesondere gegen Ende des 18. Jh./anfang des 19. Jh. schon allgemein verbreitet war, das heißt zu einer Zeit, als das Thema der Staatsbildung in den größeren Ländern auf der Tagesordnung stand. Das Thema von einer Neubewertung des Begriffs des Politischen bei Fichte ist vornehmlich aus zwei Gründen von Bedeutung. Einerseits zeigt sich, wenn wir einfach auf das Wort »Politik« achten, daß es bei Fichte nicht oft zu finden ist: es steht in Verbindung mit Eigenschaften wie »Klugheit« oder »Geschicklichkeit« und bezeichnet alles andere als das Ergebnis einer wissenschaftlichen Forschung. Die Politik nimmt daher in Anbetracht der theoretischen Vorannahmen, die Fichtes Philosophie kennzeichnen, und des geringen Gewichts, das er der geschichtlichen Kontingenz bei der Forschung beimißt, nur eine bescheidene Stellung ein. Und in der Tat scheint der Zuständigkeitsbereich der Politik in der Rechtswissenschaft äußerst begrenzt: in ihn fällt nur eine geringe Anzahl von Fragestellungen, deren wichtigste die verschiedenen Regierungsformen betrifft, was jedoch keineswegs ein ausschlaggebendes Problem darstellt, sofern die »Wissenschaft« ihre Prinzipien richtig aufgestellt und in angemessener Weise miteinander verknüpft hat. Allerdings ist zu erwähnen, daß bei genauerer Betrachtung die Zahl der Fragestellungen, deren Lösung Fichte tatsächlich der Politik anvertraut, deutlich größer ist und sich auch auf eine Vielzahl von Bereichen erstreckt - bis hin zur wirtschaftlichen Organisation innerhalb eines Staates, um nur ein Beispiel zu nennen. In jedem Fall aber ist der Bereich der praktischen Politik und nicht der der politischen Theorie betroffen. Betrachtet man das Thema schließlich in Hinblick auf die aktiv an der Politik Beteiligten, stellt man fest, daß ihre Zahl sehr gering ist, da die politischen Rechte, sowohl was das aktive als auch das passive Wahlrecht anbetrifft, nur in begrenztem Maße anerkannt werden. (shrink)

Die Betrachtungen, die ich Ihnen im Folgenden vortragen möchte, konzentrieren sich auf den Begriff der Gesellschaft in Fichtes Philosophie und überschneiden sich unvermeidlich mit einer Neubewertung des Begriffs des Politischen, wie er sich bei Fichte abzeichnet. Ausgangspunkt ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat: eine Unterscheidung, die philosophiegeschichtlich in Hegel ihren wichtigsten Exponenten hat, doch, obgleich nicht immer überlegt und vollständig ausgearbeitet, bereits in die Schriften vieler Autoren als Voraussetzung eingeflossen war. Und darüber hinaus war dies ein Gedanke, der auf (...) einer anderen, wenn man so will, niedrigeren Reflexionsebene in der deutschen Publizistik insbesondere gegen Ende des 18. Jh./anfang des 19. Jh. schon allgemein verbreitet war, das heißt zu einer Zeit, als das Thema der Staatsbildung in den größeren Ländern auf der Tagesordnung stand. Das Thema von einer Neubewertung des Begriffs des Politischen bei Fichte ist vornehmlich aus zwei Gründen von Bedeutung. Einerseits zeigt sich, wenn wir einfach auf das Wort »Politik« achten, daß es bei Fichte nicht oft zu finden ist: es steht in Verbindung mit Eigenschaften wie »Klugheit« oder »Geschicklichkeit« und bezeichnet alles andere als das Ergebnis einer wissenschaftlichen Forschung. Die Politik nimmt daher in Anbetracht der theoretischen Vorannahmen, die Fichtes Philosophie kennzeichnen, und des geringen Gewichts, das er der geschichtlichen Kontingenz bei der Forschung beimißt, nur eine bescheidene Stellung ein. Und in der Tat scheint der Zuständigkeitsbereich der Politik in der Rechtswissenschaft äußerst begrenzt: in ihn fällt nur eine geringe Anzahl von Fragestellungen, deren wichtigste die verschiedenen Regierungsformen betrifft, was jedoch keineswegs ein ausschlaggebendes Problem darstellt, sofern die »Wissenschaft« ihre Prinzipien richtig aufgestellt und in angemessener Weise miteinander verknüpft hat. Allerdings ist zu erwähnen, daß bei genauerer Betrachtung die Zahl der Fragestellungen, deren Lösung Fichte tatsächlich der Politik anvertraut, deutlich größer ist und sich auch auf eine Vielzahl von Bereichen erstreckt - bis hin zur wirtschaftlichen Organisation innerhalb eines Staates, um nur ein Beispiel zu nennen. In jedem Fall aber ist der Bereich der praktischen Politik und nicht der der politischen Theorie betroffen. Betrachtet man das Thema schließlich in Hinblick auf die aktiv an der Politik Beteiligten, stellt man fest, daß ihre Zahl sehr gering ist, da die politischen Rechte, sowohl was das aktive als auch das passive Wahlrecht anbetrifft, nur in begrenztem Maße anerkannt werden. (shrink)

The standard view in philosophy is that responsibility entails causation. Most philosophers treat this entailment claim as an evident insight into the ordinary concepts of responsibility and causation. Further, it is taken to be equally obvious that the reversal of this claim does not hold: causation does not entail responsibility. In contrast, Sytsma and Livengood have put forward an account of the use of ordinary causal attributions (statements like “X caused Y”) that contends that they are typically used interchangeably with (...) responsibility attributions (statements like “X is responsible for Y”). Put in terms of the concepts at play in these attributions, this account suggests that the reversal of the entailment claim may also hold, and, a fortiori, there would be mutual entailment between the ordinary concepts of responsibility and causation. Using the cancellability test, we report the results of three pre-registered studies providing empirical evidence that causation and responsibility are mutually entailed by each other. (shrink)

Recent research on thick terms like “rude” and “friendly” has revealed a polarity effect, according to which the evaluative content of positive thick terms like “friendly” and “courageous” can be more easily canceled than the evaluative content of negative terms like “rude” and “selfish”. In this paper, we study the polarity effect in greater detail. We first demonstrate that the polarity effect is insensitive to manipulations of embeddings (Study 1). Second, we show that the effect occurs not only for thick (...) terms but also for thin terms such as “good” or “bad” (Study 2). We conclude that the polarity effect indicates a pervasive asymmetry between positive and negative evaluative terms. (shrink)

The effects of aging on the cognitive and affective dimensions of theory of mind , and on the latter’s links with other cognitive processes, such as information processing speed, executive functions and episodic memory, are still unclear. We therefore investigated these effects in young , middle-aged and older adults , using separate subjective and objective assessment tasks. Furthermore, a novel composite task probed participants’ abilities to infer both cognitive and affective mental states in an interpersonal context. Although age affected the (...) objective ToM tests, results revealed a direct aging effect on the second-order ToM, but an indirect one on the first-order cognitive ToM, mediated mainly by age-related declines in executive functions. This study supports the notion of an age-related distinction between subjective and objective assessments of ToM, and confirms that ToM is a complex mental ability with several characteristics reliant to some extent on executive processes. (shrink)

Organizational purpose has flourished in the professional management literature, yet despite increased scholarly interest, academic knowledge and empirical research on the topic remain scarce. Moreover, studies that have been conducted contain important oversights including the lack of a clear conceptualization and misinterpretations that hinder the further development and understanding of organizational purpose. In view of these shortcomings, our interview study aimed to contribute to academic and societal conversations on the contemporary meaning and function of organizational purpose considering the voices and (...) perspectives of 44 global experts. Employing template analysis, we defined organizational purpose as “an organization’s reason for being characterized by significance, aspiration, direction, unification, and motivation.” Moreover, we proposed an explanatory conceptual model, including drivers and outcomes of purpose, important boundary conditions, and explanatory mechanisms. Drawing on self-determination theory, person–organization fit theory, job characteristics theory, and conservation of resources theory, we were able to explain how and under what conditions these concepts are related to organizational purpose. In doing so, our research contributes to advancing the knowledge and understanding of organizational purpose and its effects on human lives within and outside organizations. Our study thereby enhances the understanding of the role of organizations in society and helps in evaluating whether organizations take responsibility by living their purpose in the society they are part of. As such, our study provides important insights for theory development, scale development, and further empirical research on organizational purpose and its effects in different streams such as OB, HRM, marketing, leadership, and strategy. (shrink)

In the three essays that make up this stimulating and often startling book, Jacques Derrida argues against the notion that the basic ideas of psychoanalysis have been thoroughly worked through, argued, and assimilated. The continuing interest in psychoanalysis is here examined in the various "resistances" to analysis—conceived not only as a phenomenon theorized at the heart of psychoanalysis, but as psychoanalysis's resistance to itself, an insusceptibility to analysis that has to do with the structure of analysis itself. Derrida not only (...) shows how the interest of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic writing can be renewed today, but these essays afford him the opportunity to revisit and reassess a subject he first confronted in 1966. They also serve to clarify Derrida's thinking about the subjects of the essays—Freud, Lacan, and Foucault—a thinking that, especially with regard to the last two, has been greatly distorted and misunderstood. The first essay, on Freud, is a tour de force of close reading of Freud's texts as philosophical reflection. By means of the fine distinctions Derrida makes in this analytical reading, particularly of _The Interpretation of Dreams,_ he opens up the realm of analysis into new and unpredictable forms—such as meeting with an interdiction. Following the essay that might be dubbed Derrida's "return to Freud," the next is devoted to Lacan, the figure for whom that phrase was something of a slogan. In this essay and the next, on Foucault, Derrida reencounters two thinkers to whom he had earlier devoted important essays, which precipitated stormy discussions and numerous divisions within the intellectual milieus influenced by their writings. In this essay, which skillfully integrates the concept of resistance into larger questions, Derrida asks in effect: What is the origin and nature of the text that constitutes Lacanian psychoanalysis, considering its existence as an archive, as teachings, as seminars, transcripts, quotations, etc.? Derrida's third essay may be called not simply a criticism but an appreciation of Foucault's work: an appreciation not only in the psychological and rhetorical sense, but also in the sense that it elevates Foucault's thought by giving back to it ranges and nuances lost through its reduction by his readers, his own texts, and its formulaic packaging. (shrink)

We examine the influence of face-based judgments of CFO and CEO honesty on earnings management for the largest publicly traded companies in America. After controlling for incentives and opportunities to manage earnings, CFOs perceived to be less honest engage in higher levels of accruals earnings management and real earnings management. The beneficial impact of perceived honesty on earnings quality is most pronounced when both the CFO and the CEO are perceived to be more honest. Findings are consistent with our conjecture (...) that both the CFO and CEO contribute to a firm’s financial reporting environment. (shrink)

Homophobia has decreased in past decades, but gut-level disgust towards gay men lingers. It has been suggested that disgust can be reduced by inducing its proposed opposite emotion, elevation. Rese...

Artificial intelligence-driven technology increasingly shapes work practices and, accordingly, employees’ opportunities for meaningful work (MW). In our paper, we identify five dimensions of MW: pursuing a purpose, social relationships, exercising skills and self-development, autonomy, self-esteem and recognition. Because MW is an important good, lacking opportunities for MW is a serious disadvantage. Therefore, we need to know to what extent employers have a duty to provide this good to their employees. We hold that employers have a duty of beneficence to design (...) for opportunities for MW when implementing AI-technology in the workplace. We argue that this duty of beneficence is supported by the three major ethical theories, namely, Kantian ethics, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. We defend this duty against two objections, including the view that it is incompatible with the shareholder theory of the firm. We then employ the five dimensions of MW as our analytical lens to investigate how AI-based technological innovation in logistic warehouses has an impact, both positively and negatively, on MW, and illustrate that design for MW is feasible. We further support this practical feasibility with the help of insights from organizational psychology. We end by discussing how AI-based technology has an impact both on meaningful work (often seen as an aspirational goal) and decent work (generally seen as a matter of justice). Accordingly, ethical reflection on meaningful and decent work should become more integrated to do justice to how AI-technology inevitably shapes both simultaneously. (shrink)

The most common approach to understanding the semantics of the concept of pain is third-person thought experiments. By contrast, the most frequent and most relevant uses of the folk concept of pain are from a first-person perspective in conversational settings. In this paper, we use a set of linguistic tools to systematically explore the semantics of what people communicate when reporting pain from a first-person perspective. Our results suggest that only a pluralistic view can do justice to the way we (...) talk about pain from a first-person perspective: The semantic content of the folk concept of pain consists of information about both an unpleasant feeling and a disruptive bodily state. Pain linguistics thus provides new insights into ordinary pain language and poses an interesting challenge to the dominant unitary views of pain. (shrink)