This short essay aims at discussing the opposition between two different views on limits in legal interpretations: I will call them “no-limits option” and “pro-limits option”. As for, it is based on a widely diffused understanding of individual freedom: that of an unceasing breaking of all limits. This idea involves nowadays not only a number of once accepted moral limits, nor the material or social limits suffered by people, but also the limits of conceptual determinations. As for, it is based (...) on the conjecture that limit would be the condition of “no longer, not yet”—as such, a matter of authentic freedom. The “no-limits option” can easily lead, in legal interpretation, to a radical contextualism according to which there would be unlimited meanings for a syntactically and semantically same legal text. The “pro-limits option”, on the contrary, maintains that the existence of limits is reasonable, and that reasonableness is itself a limit to interpretation. In other words, the undetermined space of “no longer, not yet” in which the limits consist of is open to exploration on and beyond through appropriate procedures of reason-giving. According to the “pro-limits option”, a reasonably common core-meaning of a legal text should be sought also when cases of application vary—and that would be precisely the nature of legal interpretation. Arguments in favor of this thesis can be found in Western philosophy from Aristotle to contemporary neurosciences. A remarkable consequence of my discussion on these two options deals with the concept of normativity, given that option conceives normativity only as an expression of will, whereas option links normativity to reasonableness. (shrink)

An analysis of the history and social role of mobile phones today is followed by a proposal of a philosophical theory of objects, which is meant to be complementary to Searle's 'collective intentionality', that places writing at the basis of social reality.

The target article shows that the application of the evolutionary theory to psychopathology should not necessarily consist in finding hidden adaptive benefits for each psychiatric syndrome. However, in rejecting lax adaptationism, Darwinian psychiatrists should not forget that the search for adaptive behavioral polymorphisms can be a powerful antidote against the normative attitude of mainstream psychiatry and its growing tendency to medicalize human diversity. (Published Online November 9 2006).

Studies of the activation of the behavioral immune system triggered by the coronavirus disease-2019 pandemic have demonstrated that evolutionary explanations of individual differences in self-protection should not be based only on parental investment and sexual selection theory. An evolutionary model must also incorporate individual differences that arise within each sex as a result of life history strategies and attachment patterns.

A philosophical exchange broadly inspired by the characters of Berkeley’s Three Dialogues. Hylas is the realist philosopher: the view he stands up for reflects a robust metaphysic that is reassuringly close to common sense, grounded on the twofold persuasion that the world comes structured into entities of various kinds and at various levels and that it is the task of philosophy, if not of science generally, to “bring to light” that structure. Philonous, by contrast, is the anti-realist philosopher (though not (...) necessarily an idealist): his metaphysic is stark, arid, dishearteningly bone-dry, and stems from the conviction that a great deal of the structure that we are used to attribute to the world out there lies, on closer inspection, in our head, in our “organizing practices”, in the complex system of concepts and categories that unrerlie our representation of experience and our need to represent it that way. (shrink)

In this essay I try to give some overall statements in order to show that new realism is to be understood as a kind of positive philosophy. Against constructivism, I argue that there is a prevalence of the objects themselves on our understanding of them because reality offers a resistance to our attempt to grasp it depending on its level of dependence from our own understanding, which is different in the case of natural objects, ideal object and social object. This (...) negativity leads to an ontological necessity of facticity. In the second part of this paper I will describe – through the exposition of three key concepts of new realism, i.e. “unamendability”, “interaction” and “affordance” – an ascending path for which the negative and the resistance turn into positivity. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of the project through a tragic but significant example, namely Albert Speer’s project. Speer, like any architect worthy of the name, does not drop his designs from some hyperuranium of creativity, nor does he confine them to a drawing board for the benefit not of the inhabitants, but of the readers; and even more, unlike a machine, he does not merely execute the prescriptions of an algorithm. It is, on the contrary, rooted in a soil. (...) By defending himself, by digging a hole of words, by invoking devices and programmes, by hiding behind a Diktat, Speer opens up a path that will be beaten after him, that, to express himself with Heidegger, of the ‘thrown project’, of the fact that all our designing is nothing but the execution of a Message from the Emperor, the submission to the injunctions of technology. But the project, if it is a project, is lagging behind the programme, and conversely a programme that is not lagging behind (the laws of nature or trains when it goes well) is not a project. The project has a constitutive delay, it always has a delay, and that is why it is the delay, it does not have a delay. (shrink)

This is a sequel to our dialogue "Che cosa c'è e che cos'è (2003), focusing on the interplay between what there is and what there could be—between actuality and possibility—from the perspective of Hylas (here: the realist philosopher) and from the perspective of Philonous (here: the conventionalist anti-realist).

The essay concerns the notion of realism and its relationship with the notion of perception. The ontological meaning of aesthetics as aisthesis is in fact in the non-amendable nature of perception. From this non-amendability the essay outlines four traces through which aisthesis leads to realism: “nonconceptual content”, “object”, “naivety”, “ontology”.

The aim of this paper is to redefine the role of media in contemporary society, in the light of the theories of new realism and documentality. The chapter starts by refuting the view that everything is socially constructed and that the media actually produce reality (postmodernism). It argues that, instead, both media and social reality emerge from a solid ground of reality that is independent of thought (new realism). The chapter also claims that (contrary to Searle’s view) the fundamental rule (...) of social reality is that of documentality: that is to say, documents produce social reality as a whole, including media. Finally, it posits that human thought (and, therefore, social reality, which is one of its sophisticated products) ultimately does not only depend on being, but also emerges out of it. (shrink)

[ES] La posibilidad de definir una ontología del arte —indagando, por tanto, cuál género de cosas sería un objeto de arte— recorre dos horizontes alternativos: aquél de una metafísica prescriptiva y aquél de una metafísica descriptiva. [EN] The possibility of defining an ontology of art —asking, therefore, which kind of things would be a work of art— follows two alternative horizons: that of a prescriptive Metaphysics, and that of a descriptive Metaphysics.