El universo que conocemos es un producto de la mente humana. En la experiencia fenomenológica primordial, que el hombre tiene de si mismo, se imponen dos hechos fenomenológicos: la experiencia de un mundo estable de objetos y la experiencia de un mundo de campos de realidad. El ejercicio de la razón, que le viene dada al hombre evolutivamente, lleva a preguntar cuáles son las causas reales que producen esos dos mundos. Igualmente, cuál es la verdad última del universo. La ciencia (...) moderna produce un conocimiento racional (científico) que ofrece la base para responder esas preguntas. La mecánica clásica explica qué es y cómo se produce un mundo macroscópico de objetos estables. La mecánica cuántica qué son y cómo se producen los campos de realidad, a los que accede el hombre desde su psique humana. Todo ello nos lleva a entender que el universo tiene una ontología (un modo de ser real) holístico. El hombre, ya por su auto-experiencia primordial, pero también por los resultados de la ciencia, queda abierto al conocimiento del holismo cósmico. La naturaleza holística del universo es la clave para abordar las preguntas en torno a su verdad última. El holismo sigue haciendo posible la hipótesis atea de un universo sin Dios. Pero también es verdad que, más allá del reduccionismo decimonónico, el holismo hace hoy mucho más verosímil la hipótesis de la existencia de Dios. A modo de sugerencia, el artículo concluye con una referencia a la imagen de Dios, y de la creación del universo en Dios, según el discurso alegórico de la kabala judía. (shrink)

The facts and inferences exposed in this writing, and the arguments that support it, allow us to conclude that the «extension of the mind», opened during the evolutionary process, since always and today accelerated by the work of human intervention, in no case authorizes us to consider that the «extension of mind» has changed human nature, as we have always known it. Therefore, there is no justification to speak of transhumanism, as if a new man, a «transhuman», had appeared at (...) the moment of the Singularity, whose nature had undergone substantial changes in relation to the usual human nature. For this reason, we consider that we should continue speaking of an «extensive humanism». No more. (shrink)

Los programas de computación, ante todo la ingeniería de la visión artificial y la programación de los sensores somáticos, ya han permitido, y lo harán con mayor perfección en el futuro, construir con alta perfección androides o cyborgs que colaborarán con el hombre y abrirán sin duda nuevas reflexiones morales sobre como respetar en su dignidad ontológica las nuevas máquinas humanoides. Además, tanto los hombres actuales como los nuevos androides estarán en conexión con inmensas redes de computación externa que harán (...) crecer de forma casi increíble la eficacia en el dominio del propio cuerpo y de la naturaleza. Sin embargo, nuestro conocimiento científico actual, por una parte, del hardware y del software que sostendrá tanto las máquinas humanoides como las redes de computación externa hechas con la ingeniería existente y, por otra, nuestro conocimiento científico sobre el comportamiento animal y humano desde las estructuras biológico-neuronales que producen un sistema psíquico, nos permiten establecer que no existe fundamento científico que permita hablar de una identidad ontológica entre las máquinas computacionales y el hombre. En consecuencia, diversas ontologías producirán sistemas funcionales diversos. Podrá haber simulación, pero nunca identidad ontológica. Estas ideas son esenciales para valorar el pensamiento transhumanista de Ray Kurzweil. (shrink)

J. Monserrat constituye el representante más significativo y consistente del paradigma emergentista en nuestro entorno cultural, defendiendo un emergentismo humanista, que ha ido profundizando desde el nivel de los engramas neuronales hasta adherirse a las tesis de la neurología cuántica de Penrose y Hameroff. A lo largo de este artículo se presentan los principales planteamientos defendidos por J. Monserrat, dentro del horizonte del amplio paradigma del emergentismo sistémico, advirtiéndose como dicho paradigma le permite defender de un modo más (...) adecuado un modelo antropológico humanista y creyente. (shrink)

While punishment is a longstanding object of philosophical scrutiny, other controversial aspects of the justice system, such as policing, have flown under the radar. In this paper, we consider possible reasons why philosophers interested in crime and punishment have neglected policing. We make the case for a broader account of the political morality of the justice system, with a particular emphasis on policing. We sketch the outlines of an egalitarian version of such a theory, highlighting parallels between policing and the (...) welfare state. Finally, we turn to recent calls for police abolition. Evaluating such radical claims requires, we argue, going beyond the traditional confines of the philosophy of punishment and considering a more holistic and interdisciplinary theory of criminal justice. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a complete Natural Kind Semantics for an Essentialist Theory of Kinds. The theory is formulated in two-sorted first order monadic modal logic with identity. The natural kind semantics is based on Rudolf Willes Theory of Concept Lattices. The semantics is then used to explain several consequences of the theory, including results about the specificity (species–genus) relations between kinds, the definitions of kinds in terms of genera and specific differences and the existence of (...) negative kinds. First, I show under which conditions the Hierarchy principle, which has been subjected to counterexamples in the literature, holds. I also show that a different principle about the species–genus relations between kinds, namely Kant’s Law, follows from the essentialist theory. Second, I introduce two new operations for kinds and show that they can be used to provide traditional definitions of kinds in terms of genera and specific differences. Finally, I show that these operations of specific difference induce, for each kind, a uniquely specified contrary kind and a uniquely specified subcontrary kind, which can be used as semantic values for non-classical predicate negations of kind terms. (shrink)

Trabajar por la construcción de la paz, promover una educación de calidad para todos, y conceder mayor atención a las necesidades especiales de los países en situaciones de conflicto y crisis, son tres de los diecisiete objetivos de la Agenda 2030 de la Unesco. Pero ¿Quién y cómo lo hará posible? Tenemos una tarea. Hoy, aquí, desde este escenario que promueve el libre pensamiento desde la filosofía teórica y práctica, estamos haciendo una parte de la tarea. Si no lo hacemos (...) nosotros o pensamos que no se puede hacer, alguien más lo hará. A través de la historia muchos han sido los pensadores, cuya inspiración ha trascendido en el tiempo, llamando nuestra atención, causando reflexión, y hasta molestia. El primero va dirigido a quienes somos conscientes de que la educación de calidad solo es posible en un entorno de paz, y, el segundo señala a quienes la paz les incomoda, el concepto de educación les es indiferente, pero el de turbulencia les suena más familiar. (shrink)

En el Gorgias, Platón distingue el modo de ser y actuar propio del filósofofrente al modo de ser y actuar propio del retórico. Para esto, usa comocriterio a la misma retórica a partir de la distinción retórica aduladora – retóricacientífica. Frente a esto, Aristóteles realiza una toma de posición quereformula las críticas platónicas referentes a la posibilidad de una technêretórica. El presente texto confrontara las condiciones que según el Gorgiasdebe cumplir la retórica para llegar a ser technê con las características (...) que,según Aristóteles, tiene la retórica a partir de su relación con la dialéctica. (shrink)

Este libro es un estudio sobre las teor as del desarrollo social y un an lisis de las estrategias, instituciones y pol ticas econ micas de los ltimos tiempos en varios pa ses.

El ser humano se ha debatido entre lo que ha creído, cree y seguirá creyendo; pero, particularmente sobre la existencia de Dios, lo hace a su conveniencia. Cuando observan la naturaleza o el universo pueden preguntarse si surgió de una explosión hace millones de años o es creación de Dios. Filósofos, científicos y personas del común siguen buscando respuestas a sus preguntas. Es “el hombre en busca de sentido como lo propone Víctor Frank, y agrega, que, … hay en él (...) [en el hombre] una espiritualidad inconsciente: la presencia ignorada de Dios”. Es el ser humano que ha decidido ignorar, poner en duda, o negar radicalmente, la existencia de Dios, más aún cuando el mal prevalece en el mundo. No se podría negar la existencia de algo, o de alguien, que no existe. “Nadie niega a Dios, sino aquel a quien no le conviene que Dios exista” (Agustín de Hipona). “Es un nuevo ateísmo enfrentando la fe y la razón” (Antonio Cruz). “La existencia de Dios es evidente en sí misma” (Tomas de Aquino). “Tiene que haber una causa inexorable de lo creado… y ese ser sería Dios” (Aristóteles). “Mi conciencia está ligada a la palabra de Dios” (Martin Lutero). “… desde la creación del mundo conocieron a Dios, pero no quisieron adorarlo como Dios ni darle gracias. En cambio, comenzaron a inventar ideas necias sobre Dios” (Romanos 1). “Yo Soy el que Soy” (Éxodo 3:14), así define Dios Su propia existencia, creíble y conveniente. (shrink)

Bourrat and Griffiths :33, 2018) have recently argued that most of the evidence presented by holobiont defenders to support the thesis that holobionts are evolutionary individuals is not to the point and is not even adequate to discriminate multispecies evolutionary individuals from other multispecies assemblages that would not be considered evolutionary individuals by most holobiont defenders. They further argue that an adequate criterion to distinguish the two categories is fitness alignment, presenting the notion of fitness boundedness as a criterion that (...) allows divorcing true multispecies evolutionary individuals from other multispecies assemblages and provides an adequate criterion to single out genuine evolutionary multispecies assemblages. A consequence of their criterion is that holobionts, as conventionally defined by hologenome defenders, are not evolutionary individuals except in very rare cases, and for very specific host-symbiont associations. This paper is a critical response to Bourrat and Griffiths’ arguments and a defence of the arguments presented by holobiont defenders. Drawing upon the case of the hologenomic basis of the evolution of sanguivory in vampire bats, I argue that Bourrat and Griffiths overlook some aspects of the biological nature of the microbiome that justifies the thesis that holobionts are evolutionarily different to other multispecies assemblages. I argue that the hologenome theory of evolution should not define the hologenome as a collection of genomes, but as the sum of the host genome plus some traits of the microbiome which together constitute an evolutionary individual, a conception I refer to as the stability of traits conception of the hologenome. Based on that conception I argue that the evidence presented by holobiont defenders is to the point, and supports the thesis that holobionts are evolutionary individuals. In this sense, the paper offers an account of the holobiont that aims to foster a dialogue between hologenome advocates and hologenome critics. (shrink)

Contemporary biological research has suggested that some host–microbiome multispecies systems (referred to as “holobionts”) can in certain circumstances evolve as unique biological individual, thus being a unit of selection in evolution. If this is so, then it is arguably the case that some biological adaptations have evolved at the level of the multispecies system, what we call hologenomic adaptations. However, no research has yet been devoted to investigating their nature, or how these adaptations can be distinguished from adaptations at the (...) species-level (genomic adaptations). In this paper, we cover this gap by investigating the nature of hologenomic adaptations. By drawing on the case of the evolution of sanguivory diet in vampire bats, we argue that a trait constitutes a hologenomic adaptation when its evolution can only be explained if the holobiont is considered the biological individual that manifests this adaptation, while the bacterial taxa that bear the trait are only opportunistic beneficiaries of it. We then use the philosophical notions of emergence and inter-identity to explain the nature of this form of individuality and argue why it is special of holobionts. Overall, our paper illustrates how the use of philosophical concepts can illuminate scientific discussions, in the trend of what has recently been called metaphysics of biology. (shrink)

Symbiosis plays a fundamental role in contemporary biology, as well as in recent thinking in philosophy of biology. The discovery of the importance and universality of symbiotic associations has brought new light to old debates in the field, including issues about the concept of biological individuality. An important aspect of these debates has been the formulation of the hologenome concept of evolution, the notion that holobionts are units of natural selection in evolution. This review examines the philosophical assumptions that underlie (...) recent proposal of the hologenome concept of evolution, and traces those debates back in time to their historical origins, to the moment when the connection between the topics of symbiosis and biological individuality first caught the attention of biologists. The review is divided in two parts. The first part explores the historical origins of the connection between the notion of symbiosis and the concept of biological individuality, and emphasizes the role of A. de Bary, R. Pound, A. Schneider and C. Merezhkowsky in framing the debate. The second part examines the hologenome concept of evolution and explores four parallelisms between contemporary debates and the debates presented in the first part of the essay, arguing that the different debates raised by the hologenome concept were already present in the literature. I suggest that the novelty of the hologenome concept of evolution lies in the wider appreciation of the importance of symbiosis for maintaining life on Earth as we know it. Finally, I conclude by suggesting the importance of exploring the connections among contemporary biology, philosophy of biology and history of biology in order to gain a better understanding of contemporary biology. (shrink)

Given one conception of biological individuality (evolutionary, physiological, etc.), can a holobiont – that is the host + its symbiotic (mutualistic, commensalist and parasitic) microbiome – be simultaneously a biological individual and an ecological community? Herein, we support this possibility by arguing that the notion of biological individuality is part‐dependent. In our account, the individuality of a biological ensemble should not only be determined by the conception of biological individuality in use, but also by the biological characteristics of the part (...) of the ensemble under investigation. In the specific case of holobionts, evaluations of their individuality should be made either host‐relative or microbe‐relative. We support the claim that biological individuality is part‐dependent by drawing upon recent empirical evidence regarding the physiology of hosts and microbes, and the recent characterization of the ‘demibiont’. Our account shows that contemporary disagreements about the individuality of the holobiont derive from an incorrect understanding of the ontology of biological individuality. We show that collaboration between philosophers and biologists can be very fruitful in attempts to solve some contemporary biological debates. (shrink)

According to the cohabitation account, all the persons that result from a fission event cohabit the same body prior to fission. This article concerns a problem for this account. Suppose Manuel and Jimena are suffering from an equally painful migraine. Unlike Jimena, however, Manuel will undergo fission. Assuming you have a spare painkiller, whom should you give it to? Intuitively, you have no more reason to give it to one or the other. The problem is that the cohabitation account suggests (...) otherwise. According to the account, there are two persons cohabiting Manuel’s body, in which case you should arguably give them the pill, since doing so alleviates the pain of more beings. One response argues that the two persons cohabiting Manuel’s body share one pain. Thus, giving them the pill alleviates no more pain than giving it to Jimena, and therefore you have no more reason to do one or the other. The goal of this article is to show that this response fails. (shrink)

Lewis has objected to Armstrong's notion of a structural universal on the grounds that it violates the Principle of Uniqueness of Composition, which says that given some parts, there is only one whole that they compose. This paper reviews Armstrong's case for structural universals, and then attempts to reconcile structural universals with PUC by arguing for the existence of arrangement universals. The latter are not only a key to defending structural universals against Lewis' objection, but are in fact essential to (...) Armstrong's conception of structural universals in general. Three objections to my proposal are deflected, and two alternative proposals are shown to be inferior to it. (shrink)

Este estudio es una aproximación al tema del trabajo desde el pensamiento sociológico de Zygmunt Bauman. Uno de los textos más conocidos de Bauman al respecto es Trabajo, consumismo y nuevos pobres; sin embargo, este es un tema que el sociólogo trata en otras obras. Aquí se pretende dar una visión en la que se tienen en cuenta la globalidad de sus escritos. Además, se dan unas claves que permiten comprender el enfoque que Bauman tiene del trabajo: se hace una (...) breve explicación de su perspectiva sociológica y de la importancia de la modernidad en su pensamiento. Por último, se expone cómo el trabajo cambia de sentido e importancia en la modernidad sólida y en la líquida. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es desarrollar una relectura al mecanicismo moderno. Esto implica que una adecuada comprensión de este consiste, ante todo, en considerarlo como un proyecto antes que un sistema doctrinal consolidado. Para ello se toma como eje la filosofía de Leibniz, la cual, a diferencia del cartesianismo, identifica las inconsistencias que implica concebir el mecanicismo como un sistema filosófico completo, principalmente al pretender justificar mecánicamente el mundo natural, esto es, a partir de la figura, el tamaño y (...) el movimiento. Todo lo anterior no implica un rechazo completo del mecanicismo por parte de Leibniz, sino que permite concebirlo como un medio para desarrollar su filosofía, proponiendo una complementariedad entre la causa final y la causa eficiente. de este modo, el mecanicismo es reubicado como un problema metodológico para la ciencia natural antes que como un problema metafísico. This article aims to develop a second reading to the modern mechanicism. This implies that an appropriate understanding of mechanicism consists, above all, in considering it as a project, instead of a consolidated doctrinal system. To do so, we take Leibniz's philosophy as our building blocks, since unlike the Cartesianism, it does identify the inconsistencies implied when we conceive mechanicism as a complete philosophical system, mainly under the pretension to justify the natural world mechanically, that is, based on the figure, size and movement. It does not imply that Leibniz rejects entirely mechanicism, but allows us to understand it as a mean to develop his philosophy, proposing a complementary relationship between final cause and efficient cause. This way, mechanicism is re-posed as a methodological issue for the natural science instead of a metaphysical issue. (shrink)

The paper defends an interactive theory of the distinctiveness of criminal law. It argues that criminal law’s distinctive behavior can be connected to the interaction between five traits: it is an institutional practice administered by a large and special bureaucracy, playing a substantial role in authorizing the use of coercive police force, leading to a harsh sanctioning regime linked, at least in part, with core wrongs and notions of personal responsibility. Although none of these features is exclusive to criminal law, (...) their interaction leads to modes of behavior that set it apart from other institutions. The paper argues that putting attention on the effects of this interaction provides us with powerful tools to both understand and asses the value and problems of criminal law. (shrink)

Jonathan Schaffer has provided three putative counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding, and has argued that a contrastive treatment of grounding is able to provide a resolution to them, which in turn provides some motivation for accepting such a treatment. In this article, I argue that one of these cases can easily be turned into a putative counterexample to a principle which Schaffer calls differential transitivity. Since Schaffer's proposed resolution rests on this principle, this presents a dilemma for the contrastivist: (...) either he dismisses the third case, which weakens the motivation for accepting his treatment of grounding, or else he accepts it, in which case he is faced with a counterexample to a principle that his proposed resolution to the original cases depends on. In the remainder of the article, I argue that the prima facie most promising strategy the contrastivist could take, which is to place some restriction on which contrastive facts are admissible so as to rule out the purported counterexample to differential transitivity, faces some important difficulties. Although these difficulties are not insurmountable, they do pose a substantial challenge for the contrastivist. (shrink)

Kris McDaniel has recently defended a criterion for being an ontological pluralist that classifies the quantifier variantist as one. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. There is an important difference between the two views, which is sometimes obscured by a common view in the metaphysics of fundamentality. According to the simple analysis, a language is ideal—it allows for a maximally metaphysically perspicuous description of reality—just in case all its primitives are perfectly natural. I argue that this (...) analysis struggles to distinguish quantifier variance from ontological pluralism, and then I discuss various accounts that can do better. I then propose a criterion for being an ontological pluralist that does not misclassify the quantifier variantist. Finally, I discuss some additional advantages of my proposal. (shrink)

Como alternativa a los múltiples acercamientos y estudios sobre la filosofía de Nishida Kitarõ, en este trabajo se quiere presentar un avance de investigación sobre una cuestión normalmente obviada en las interpretaciones de la obra del filósofo. Se querrá mostrar cómo una mirada atenta a la idea de símbolo y las menciones a la poesía simbolista en la obra de Nishida ofrecen una clave plausible para una mejor comprensión de su sistema de la autoconciencia en obras como Intuición y reflexiónen (...) la autoconciencia o Los problemas de la conciencia. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractThis paper discusses how our bad reading habits are starting to influence how we write. This short abstract and the picture next to it summarize the arguments in this paper. Just kidding, they do not. One really needs to read the paper for that.

The example of the bees, as they appear in Plato’s Phaedo, taken up again in Aristotle’s Politics and in Hobbes’ commentary contained in Leviathan, shows the potential of the phenomenological reading of examples as a method of understanding the basis on which philosophical thought is determined. Sign and communication are peculiar to gregarious and political animal life. In seeking to embody the Aristotelian concept of lógos in the context of a living community, as the basis for interaction and co-existence, we (...) must be sure that our interpretation does not reduce it to what, according to Aristotle, is simply animal behaviour. The Platonic sequence “ass, wolf, bee, god” situates the model of political life between a life in injustice and a life in wisdom. The Aristotelian variationdetermines the lógos on what is just and what is unjust as a natural increment in lucidity, compared with the mere exercising of gregariousness and sociability. Hobbes’ inversion of the Aristotelian example considers a natural reality in the light of the distortions that complicate and make it impossible. Hobbes thus shifts human politics towards artificiality that renders it viable. In each case, the example holds up a different mirror to the same reality. (shrink)

Eric Voegelin's Political Readings fills a critical void by providing a original approach to studying the work of Eric Voegelin, one of the major political philosophers of the twenty first century. Across six chapters a group of experts guide the reader from classical to modern times presenting six political philosophers who have had an impact on the life and philosophical production of Eric Voegelin. Philosophers examined include Plato, Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Hobbes, Weber and Kelsen. Through this innovative structure the chapters (...) collectively illustrate how Voegelin was an exceptional thinker through his engagement with political philosophers both modern and antique. The plurality of unique, academic perspectives and voices enriches our understanding of Voegelin's own thought while also encouraging a re-think of ancient and modern thinkers, and the transformation and continuity between these. Designed for students and scholars alike, Eric Voegelin's Political Readings will appeal to all those with an interest in Voegelin as well as readers familiar with classical and modern political philosophers. (shrink)

Philippe Huneman has recently questioned the widespread application of mechanistic models of scientific explanation based on the existence of structural explanations, i.e. explanations that account for the phenomenon to be explained in virtue of the mathematical properties of the system where the phenomenon obtains, rather than in terms of the mechanisms that causally produce the phenomenon. Structural explanations are very diverse, including cases like explanations in terms of bowtie structures, in terms of the topological properties of the system, or in (...) terms of equilibrium. The role of mathematics in bowtie structured systems and in topologically constrained systems has recently been examined in different papers. However, the specific role that mathematical properties play in equilibrium explanations requires further examination, as different authors defend different interpretations, some of them closer to the new-mechanistic approach than to the structural model advocated by Huneman. In this paper, we cover this gap by investigating the explanatory role that mathematics play in Blaser and Kirschner’s nested equilibrium model of the stability of persistent long-term human-microbe associations. We argue that their model is explanatory because: i) it provides a mathematical structure in the form of a set of differential equations that together satisfy an ESS; ii) that the nested nature of the ESSs makes the explanation of host-microbe persistent associations robust to any perturbation; iii) that this is so because the properties of the ESS directly mirror the properties of the biological system in a non-causal way. The combination of these three theses make equilibrium explanations look more similar to structural explanations than to causal-mechanistic explanation. (shrink)

According to the cohabitation account, all the persons that result from a fission event cohabit the same body prior to fission. This article concerns a problem for this account. Suppose Manuel and Jimena are suffering from an equally painful migraine. Unlike Jimena, however, Manuel will undergo fission. Assuming you have a spare painkiller, whom should you give it to? Intuitively, you have no more reason to give it to one or the other. The problem is that the cohabitation account suggests (...) otherwise. According to the account, there are two persons cohabiting Manuel’s body, in which case you should arguably give them the pill, since doing so alleviates the pain of more beings. One response argues that the two persons cohabiting Manuel’s body share one pain. Thus, giving them the pill alleviates no more pain than giving it to Jimena, and therefore you have no more reason to do one or the other. The goal of this article is to show that this response fails. (shrink)

Lewis has objected to Armstrong's notion of a structural universal on the grounds that it violates the Principle of Uniqueness of Composition (PUC), which says that given some parts, there is only one whole that they compose. This paper reviews Armstrong's case for structural universals, and then attempts to reconcile structural universals with PUC by arguing for the existence of arrangement universals. The latter are not only a key to defending structural universals against Lewis' objection, but are in fact essential (...) to Armstrong's conception of structural universals in general. Three objections to my proposal are deflected, and two alternative proposals are shown to be inferior to it. (shrink)