The paper discusses some recent suggestions offered by the so-called sensorimotor (or enactivist) theorists as to the problem of the explanatory gap, that is, the alleged impossibility of accounting for phenomenal consciousness in any scientific theory. We argue in the paper that, although some enactivist theorists’ suggestions appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is (dis)solved is much overstated.

The objectivity of representation Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9505-1 Authors Alfredo Paternoster, University of Bergamo, Via Pignolo 123, 24121 Bergamo, Italy Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

According to the semantic view of computation, computations cannot be individuated without invoking semantic properties. A traditional argument for the semantic view is what we shall refer to as the argument from the cognitive science practice. In its general form, this argument rests on the idea that, since cognitive scientists describe computations (in explanations and theories) in semantic terms, computations are individuated semantically. Although commonly invoked in the computational literature, the argument from the cognitive science practice has never been discussed (...) in detail. In this paper, we shall provide a critical reconstruction of this argument and an extensive analysis of its prospects, taking into account some ways of defending it that have never been explored so far. We shall argue that explanatory considerations support at best a weak version of the argument from the cognitive science practice, according to which semantic properties concur with formal syntactic properties in individuating computations in cognitive science, but not a strong version, according to which computation individuation in cognitive science is semantic as opposed to formal syntactic. (shrink)

As I define it, metaphysical naturalism (in the philosophy of mind) is the thesis according to which mental facts supervene in strong sense on neurophysiological states, i.e., the former can be deduced from the latter. In this paper I discuss this thesis by taking into consideration two different kinds of mental states: I shall argue that, while metaphysical naturalism is false for standard propositional attitudes (beliefs and desires), it can be defended in the case of low-level phenomenal states, or raw (...) feelings. As a consequence, since the instantiation of high-order mental states requires those neurophysiological mechanisms that constitute raw feelings, the notion of self has a biological basis, and to this extent we can regard subjectivity as a natural phenomenon. (shrink)

Introduzione Il problema filosofico centrale di Lexical Competence (Marconi 1997 — i riferimenti che faremo sono relativi all’edizione italiana apparsa due anni dopo) è che cosa distingue la comprensione del linguaggio da parte di un agente umano da quella che potrebbe essere attribuita a un sistema artificiale. Nel rispondere a questa domanda Marconi (d’ora in poi, M.) offre una teoria della conoscenza del significato, descrive cioè in che cosa consiste conoscere il significato delle parole...

As I define it, metaphysical naturalism (in the philosophy of mind) is the thesis according to which mental facts supervene in strong sense on neurophysiological states, i.e., the former can be deduced from the latter. In this paper I discuss this thesis by taking into consideration two different kinds of mental states: I shall argue that, while metaphysical naturalism is false for standard propositional attitudes (beliefs and desires), it can be defended in the case of low-level phenomenal states, or raw (...) feelings. As a consequence, since the instantiation of high-order mental states requires those neurophysiological mechanisms that constitute raw feelings, the notion of self has a biological basis, and to this extent we can regard subjectivity as a natural phenomenon. (shrink)

: According to Crane intentionality is nothing less than the mark of the mental. Nonetheless, there are many issues raised by this concept, beginning with the problem of non-existent relata. In this comment-article I discuss the concept of intentionality in its generality, trying to state its ontological status and to assess its explanatory dispensability. In particular, I focus on the argument, addressed by Crane, whereby Wittgenstein eliminates intentionality, characterizing it as a grammatical fiction, a pseudo-entity created by the grammar of (...) the language of mental states ascriptions. I will argue that: although Crane’s specific argument against Wittgenstein is not conclusive, Wittgenstein’s linguistic strategy does not work; and yet we should not be committed to a robust realist account of intentionality. Keywords : Intentionality; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Mark of the Mental; Ontological Commitment; Realism/Anti-realism. L’intenzionalità è sufficientemente reale? Riassunto : Il concetto di intenzionalità è l’autentico cuore della filosofia di Tim Crane, secondo il quale l’intenzionalità è niente di meno che il marchio del mentale. Nondimeno, vi sono diversi noti problemi sollevati da questo concetto. In questo articolo-commento discuto il concetto di intenzionalità nelle sue linee generali cercando, da un lato, di determinarne lo statuto ontologico e, dall’altro, di valutarne la dispensabilità esplicativa. Mi concentro in particolare sull’argomento, discusso da Crane, con cui Wittgenstein elimina l’intenzionalità, caratterizzandola come una finzione grammaticale, una pseudo-entità creata della grammatica del linguaggio con cui attribuiamo stati mentali. Sosterrò che: sebbene lo specifico argomento di Crane non sia conclusivo, la strategia “linguistica” di Wittgenstein non funziona e tuttavia non dovremmo indulgere a una concezione realista “robusta” dell’intenzionalità. Parole chiave : Intentionalità; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Marchio del mentale; Impegno ontologico; Realismo/Anti-realismo. (shrink)

Metaphysical naturalism is the thesis according to which mental states can be reduced to, and thereby explained by, neurophysiological states. In this paper I discuss whether this thesis is plausible taking into consideration different kinds of mental states: propositional attitudes, on the one hand, and phenomenal states, on the other. I shall argue that, while metaphysical naturalism is false for standard propositional attitudes , it can be defended in the case of low-level phenomenal states, or raw feelings. As a consequence, (...) since the instantiation of high-order mental states requires the neurophysiological mechanisms that constitute raw feelings, the notion of self has a biological basis, and in this sense, we can speak of a “natural self”. The structure of the paper is the following. In the first paragraph I shall focus on the naturalization of paradigmatic intentional states . In the second paragraph I move to the discussion of raw feelings and show the consequences of my view for the notion of self. (shrink)

Introduzione Sebbene la nozione di rappresentazione mentale svolga non da ieri un ruolo cruciale in filosofia e in scienza cognitiva, lo statuto ontologico delle rappresentazioni mentali resta tuttora precario. Questa situazione è particolarmente imbarazzante per la scienza cognitiva, fondata come sull’assunto che i processi mentali siano computazioni su rappresentazioni mentali. Nelle recenti Dewey Lectures Hilary Putnam ha sviluppato una critica molto severa del concetto di rappresentazione...

This paper addresses, fundamentally, a single issue: assessing whether the currently very influent approach in cognitive sciences, i.e., Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, is committed to some version of emergentism. The structure of the paper is the following. In the first section I introduce the leading ideas of RECS. In the second section I compare certain standard formulations of emergentism with the main claims of RECS, trying to assess whether the latter involve some emergentist tenets. Some conclusions, in the third section, (...) follow. My conclusion will be that, on the one hand, there are some substantive epistemological analogies between RECS and emergentism, but, on the other hand, the metaphysics of RECS is not of an emergentist kind, in spite of some shallow similarities. Therefore, depending on one’s taking emergentism as an epistemological rather than a metaphysical thesis, RECS will be considered as being committed to emergentism or not. (shrink)

Negli ultimi vent’anni si è instaurato nella filosofia analitica un clima confusamente naturalistico, in cui non sempre si è distinto tra il progetto di riportare ricerche tradizionalmente filosofiche entro l’ambito delle scienze naturali e l’idea che la filosofia stessa sia “continua con la scienza”, cioè che non ci sia una distinzione di principio tra ricerche scientifiche e ricerche filosofiche. Questa seconda idea si contrappone alla tradizionale immagine, che vuole la filosofia come un’i...

The functional role of mirror neurons has been assessed in many different ways. They have been regarded, inter alia, as the core mechanism of mind reading, the mechanism of language understanding, the mechanism of imitation. In this paper we will discuss the thesis according to which MNs are a conceptual mechanism. This hypothesis is attractive since it could accommodate in an apparently simple way all the above-mentioned interpretations. We shall take into consideration some reasons suggesting the conceptualist characterization of MNs, (...) as well as some possible replies. We shall figure out how an argument for the conceptualist hypothesis could be deployed, focusing on the notion of off-line processes, which turns out to be the crucial property necessary to ascribe concept possession. Our conclusion will be that, despite of there being some evidence for the conceptualist account, the issue cannot be definitely settled, because there are both experimental shortages and conceptual difficulties. In particular, there are three distinct senses in which MNs can be regarded as a conceptual mechanism, but we shall argue that only one of these interpretations can be defended. (shrink)

On the traditional view, a sense of selfhood appears relatively late in infancy, since to be, or to possess, a self is taken to require such capacities as language and metacognition. Recent research in psychology, however, shows that there are some rudimentary forms of self-consciousness already in the very first months of life. The exercise of these early abilities in interactional contexts with caretakers shapes gradually a sense of self, or a primitive form of what we also call “personal identity”, (...) following a psychological terminology. In this paper we shall argue that the hypothesis of a very precocious personal identity can accord an important role to the Other in the formation of the Self without being committed to some outdated versions of empiricism or relativism. In the first section we introduce a pair of views about selfhood that seem to lead to relativism. In the second section we present what we call the “precocious identity view”. In the third section we describe the role of the Other in the precocious identity view. Finally, we make some remarks concerning what kind of (self-)consciousness is actually involved in the precocious identity view. (shrink)

This book re-evaluates New Left and Marxist texts from the 1980s, in order to explore problems facing the study of 'class' which have emerged within Australian and international theories. The author contrasts the popular ideas of Connell, Bourdieu and the 'Death of Class' thesis, with those of lesser known texts, concluding that no single definition can account for the various historical meanings of class. Instead, loosely following Castoriadis, the concept of class can best be understood as creatively imagined and institutionalised. (...) Paternoster proposes that class is best studied through historical phenomenology, which can be used to link political economy, cultural sociology and anthropological ethnographies. This approach allows the contributions of Marxist and New Left authors to be reintegrated with contemporary theories. Doing so highlights the significance of labour populism, while cautioning against the ahistorical applications of texts such as Boudieu's Distinction. Reimagining Class in Australia will be of interest to students and scholars across a range of disciplines, including sociology, history, political economy and anthropology. (shrink)

La recepción europea de Gómez Dávila comenzó a desplegarse de manera más amplia a partir de la lectura y difusión realizada por Franco Volpi. Este artículo alude a la manera como dicha lectura concretó las interpretaciones del colombiano, principalmente a la luz de una filosofía práctica y una perspectiva crítica. De dichas posturas, el italiano destaca la vocación vital y el carácter provocador del pensamiento de Gómez Dávila.

The Critique of Pure Reason—Kant’s First Critique—is one of the most studied texts in intellectual history, but as Alfredo Ferrarin points out in this radically original book, most of that study has focused only on very select parts. Likewise, Kant’s oeuvre as a whole has been compartmentalized, the three Critiques held in rigid isolation from one another. Working against the standard reading of Kant that such compartmentalization has produced, The Powers of Pure Reason explores forgotten parts of the First (...) Critique in order to find an exciting, new, and ultimately central set of concerns by which to read all of Kant’s works. Ferrarin blows the dust off of two egregiously overlooked sections of the First Critique—the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method. There he discovers what he argues is the Critique’s greatest achievement: a conception of the unity of reason and an exploration of the powers it has to reach beyond itself and legislate over the world. With this in mind, Ferrarin dismantles the common vision of Kant as a philosopher writing separately on epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics and natural teleology, showing that the three Critiques are united by this underlying theme: the autonomy and teleology of reason, its power and ends. The result is a refreshing new view of Kant, and of reason itself. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...) and epistemology of visual perception. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...) theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza en primera instancia la lectura y consideración hermenéutica que Ernesto Volkening realiza de la obra de Nicolás Gómez Dávila. Tras una presentación de las pautas interpretativas que se dan en el Diario de lectura de Volkening, se considera luego el interés de losautores por la arquitectura y el urbanismo modernos, como claves para la crítica del modo de vida reificante del hombre actual. Posteriormente, se ilustran las pautas que abordan la historia y la historicidad, bajo la idea (...) de una comprensión hermenéutica gestada en los contextos, opuesta a cualquier determinismo y puesta en marcha bajo la impronta de la singularidad e individualidad. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to understand the role of imagination and practical judgment in Kant's moral philosophy. After a comparison of Kant with Rousseau, I explore Kant's moral philosophy itself — unlike Hannah Arendt, who finds in the enlarged mentality of the third Critique the ground for the activity of imagination in a shared world. Instead, I place the concept of moral legislation in its background, the reflection on particulars relevant to deliberation, and discuss the mutual relation of (...) reflection and determination. Not only reflection and determination work together; imagination and judgment imply one another essentially, as interpretation of what is relevant, and as a principle of orientation in the choice of the maxim against the backdrop of a uniform and ordered world. The concepts of analogy and symbolic exhibition turn out to be crucial for how reason represents to itself the reality of ideas in the world. (shrink)

A method for the recursive identification of physiological models of the cardiovascular baroreflex is proposed and applied to the time-varying analysis of vagal and sympathetic activities. The proposed method was evaluated with data from five newborn lambs, which were acquired during injection of vasodilator and vasoconstrictors and the results show a close match between experimental and simulated signals. The model-based estimation of vagal and sympathetic contributions were consistent with physiological knowledge and the obtained estimators of vagal and sympathetic activities were (...) compared to traditional markers associated with baroreflex sensitivity. High correlations were observed between traditional markers and model-based indices. (shrink)