Psychological egoism is the doctrine that all of our actions are ultimately motivated by self-interest, even including seemingly altruistic actions. Although this view is commonly referred to as \vacuous" or \trivially true" because of its immunity to counterexamples, I argue that there are possible observations that can refute this thesis. I describe the experiments, identify the results that could in principle falsify the strongest possible version of psychological egoism and formulate a probabilistic argument against this view. Ultimately, I conclude that (...) a \trivially true" formulation of psychological egoism is an empirical theory that is in all likelihood false. (shrink)

The skeptical puzzle consists of three allegedly incompatible claims: S knows that O, S doesn’t know that ~U, and the claim that knowledge is closed under the known entailment. I consider several famous instances of the puzzle and conclude that in all of those cases the presupposition that O entails ~U is false. I also consider two possible ways for trying to make it true and argue that both strategies ultimate fail. I conclude that this result at least completely discredits (...) any solution that denies the principle of epistemic closure. At most, denying that O entails ~U can itself be seen as a novel solution to the puzzle, preferred to any other solution: it accommodates both non-skeptical and skeptical intuitions but does not require us to give up the principle of closure, embrace contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, or deny any commonly accepted principle of epistemology or logic. (shrink)

Virtually all epistemologists agree that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge. Assuming that our three-dimensional world is nested within a higher-dimensional space, I use multidimensional geometry to present a type of case which undermines this fundamental principle of epistemology. I further argue that we would be unlikely to revise our epistemic practices in light of new discoveries even if our world turned out to be substantially different and many of our beliefs turned out to be false.

_ Source: _Page Count 14 One common problem with anti-skepticism and skepticism alike is their failure to account for our sometimes conflicting epistemic intuitions. In order to address this problem and provide a new direction for solving the skeptical puzzle, I consider a modified version of the puzzle that is based on knowledge claims about appearances and does not result in a paradox. I conclude that combining the elements of both the original and modified puzzle can potentially guide us towards (...) solutions that can fully explain the conflict of epistemic intuitions. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 14 One common problem with anti-skepticism and skepticism alike is their failure to account for our sometimes conflicting epistemic intuitions. In order to address this problem and provide a new direction for solving the skeptical puzzle, I consider a modified version of the puzzle that is based on knowledge claims about appearances and does not result in a paradox. I conclude that combining the elements of both the original and modified puzzle can potentially guide us towards (...) solutions that can fully explain the conflict of epistemic intuitions. (shrink)

It is widely thought that knowledge is factive – only truths can be known. However, this view has been recently challenged. One challenge appeals to approximate truths. Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri argue that false-but-approximately-true propositions can be known. They provide experimental findings to show that their view enjoys intuitive support. In addition, they argue that we should reject the factive account of knowledge to avoid widespread skepticism. A second challenge, advanced by Nenad Popovic, appeals to multidimensional geometry (...) to build a case where it seems intuitive that a person knows p even though p is false. In addition, Popovic argues that we should reject the factive account of knowledge because most of us would not become widespread skeptics if we discovered that ordinary objects in our world are actually four-dimensional. In this paper, we defend the factive account of knowledge against these arguments by challenging the intuitive appeal of the cases and arguing that there is no real threat of widespread skepticism for the factive account of knowledge. (shrink)

This book offers a readable introduction to the main aspects of thought experimenting in philosophy and science. It presents the main options in understanding thought experiments, from empiricism to Platonism, and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. However, it also provides some original perspectives on the topic. Firstly, it provides a new definition and analysis of thought experimenting that brings it closer to laboratory experimenting. Secondly, it develops the author’s earlier theory of “mental modelling”, proposed some decades ago by him, and (...) some other researchers in the field as the crucial procedure in thought experimenting. The mental modelling approach links work with thought experimenting to cognitive science and to research on mental simulation which is a hot topic in present-day research. Thirdly, it proposes a principled way to respond to criticism of thought experimenting by “experimental philosophers” as they have been dominating the present-day debates. The response suggests a possible ameliorative, self-help project for thought experimenting. Finally, the book provides a way to systematize the history of important thought experiments in science and philosophy and thus connects, in an original way, the systematic investigation of experimenting to the historical work of famous thought experiments. It is of interest to scholars interested in history of ideas and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Xenophobia is one of the key drivers of marginalisation, discrimination, and conflict, yet many prominent machine learning fairness frameworks fail to comprehensively measure or mitigate the resulting xenophobic harms. Here we aim to bridge this conceptual gap and help facilitate safe and ethical design of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions. We ground our analysis of the impact of xenophobia by first identifying distinct types of xenophobic harms, and then applying this framework across a number of prominent AI application domains, reviewing the (...) potential interplay between AI and xenophobia on social media and recommendation systems, healthcare, immigration, employment, as well as biases in large pre-trained models. These help inform our recommendations towards an inclusive, xenophilic design of future AI systems. (shrink)

The main goal of this essay is to provide an in-depth analysis of the trajectory of the Colourful Revolution in North Macedonia as a social movement. From a more general perspective, the paper engages with the growing interest in the literature that explores the correlation between social movements and democratisation processes, especially in societies that fall into the category of hybrid regimes. The Colourful Revolution is a good example of a protest movement that has created effective regime change. It presented (...) a complex social movement encompassing many fragmented social and political groups gathered around the idea of a common adversary. Additionally, the Colourful Revolution has one particularity: it is a social movement that has undergone a full developmental circle - formation through utilization of political opportunity frameworks, a period of activity and success and dissolution. Drawing on literature of the political process, opportunity frameworks and cycles of social movements, the paper argues that social movements such as the Colourful Revolution are not just temporary and unstable structures but are also highly dependent on the existence of a common target of the social activism in question. The removal from power of political actors that have been the reason for mobilisation of a complex and diverse network of social and political activism resulted in an absence of an adhesive factor holding together all the parts of this complex system. The absence initiated gradual discord and dissolution of different factions within the social movement and reveals its true nature - temporary, ideologically diverse, conflictual, and even undemocratic in some respects. (shrink)

Explaining intuitions in terms of “facts of our natural history” is compatible with rationally trusting them. This compatibilist view is defended in the present paper, focusing upon nomic and essentialist modal intuitions. The opposite, incompatibilist view alleges the following: If basic modal intuitions are due to our cognitive make‐up or “imaginative habits” then the epistemologists are left with a mere non‐rational feeling of compulsion on the side of the thinker. Intuitions then cannot inform us about modal reality. In contrast, the (...) paper argues that there are several independent sources of justification which make the feeling of compulsion rational: the prima‐facie and a priori ones come from the obviousness of our basic modal intuitions and our not being able to imagine things otherwise, others, a posteriori, from the epistemic success of these intuitions. Further, the general scheme of evolutionary learning is reliable, reliability is preserved in the resulting individual's cognitive make‐up, and we can come to know this a posteriori. The a posteriori appeal to evolution thus plays a subsidiary role in justification, filling the remaining gap and removing the residual doubt. Explaining modal intuitions is compatible with moderate realism about modality itself. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the consequences of Mamou’s recent solution to the so-called problem of reindividuation. The problem is first proposed by John Broome as an argument against the Humean view of rationality and subjective decision theory. Essentially, Broome argues that the reindividuation of outcomes must be constrained in some way if the axioms of rationality are not to be vacuous, but the constraints on individuation cannot be consistent with the Humean view of rationality. Mamou offers an elegant Humean (...) solution to this problem. We do not need such rules for reindividuation since the subjective decision theory operates under the assumption of maximal relevance of description, and only under that assumption do the axioms tell anything. Thus the problem of reindividuation dissolves in a quite natural and simple way. However, I argue that if we connect this solution to the topic of justification for the requirements of rationality, problems arise. I examine the influence of the solution on the common argument for the axioms of decision theory, the so-called money-pump arguments. These arguments are a staple in the justification of the axioms of subjective decision theory. I argue that they are in collision with Mamou’s solution. This collision brings us to the dilemma: either accept Broome’s conclusions or lose the money-pump arguments as an effective tool for justification of the axioms. I conclude that neither of the options is really good for the defenders of the Humean view of rationality. (shrink)

Kant?s legal and political philosophy is essential for understanding and advancing international order. The article aims to posit arguments that confront the claims that Kant was just war theorist. Since that is the most opposed part of Kant?s political philosophy, mostly due to the misleading interpretation of his argumentation, the author presents Kant?s standpoint on the matters of just war and international order and discusses potential ambiguities between Kant?s and his critics? theories. Furthermore, the consequences of opponents? arguments considering states (...) of states, world republic and cosmopolitan democracy in contemporary political philosophy are debated. Finally, the possibility of consent between the three model solutions which are arising from the contemporary international order theory and Kant?s position are compared and analysed. (shrink)

Nenad Miščević; IX*—Computationalism and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 215–23.

Translated by Aleksandar B. Nedeljkovi? Since the end of the conflict in the Balkans in 1995, there has been an uneasy peace between the rival factions. What were the causes of the tragic disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and what is likely to happen next? Nenad Kecmanovi?, who witnessed and actively participated in many of the key events in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, offers a perceptive, seasoned analysis of the many challenges that threaten political stability in this powder keg region (...) of Eastern Europe. Both a professor of political science and a former politician who served in many high-ranking posts, Kecmanovi? brings rich, first-hand knowledge—theoretical and practical—to his discussion of the many explanations proposed for the troubles in the former Yugoslavia. Among the issues he considers are the renewal of ancient tribal hatreds, the emergence of nationalism as the last stage of communism, how the interests of outside powers have complicated the situation, whether the conflict represents a clash of civilizations, the difficulties of building democracy on the basis of an authoritarian political culture, and the possibility that democracy in this region acts as a great solvent that dissolves former political unions. Looking to the future, he discusses the rapid and potentially explosive developments in Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there is continuing unrest among ethnic minorities. In conclusion, he assesses the chances that the European Union will someday incorporate the individual states of the former Yugoslavia vs. the potential for another outbreak of war. This sobering, in-depth overview of the current tense situation in the Balkans is must reading for anyone with an interest in the future of Europe. (shrink)

Explaining intuitions in terms of "facts of our natural history" is compatible with rationally trusting them. This compatibilist view is defended in the present paper, focusing upon nomic and essentialist modal intuitions. The opposite, incompatibilist view alleges the following: If basic modal intuitions are due to our cognitive make-up or "imaginative habits" then the epistemologists are left with a mere non-rational feeling of compulsion on the side of the thinker. Intuitions then cannot inform us about modal reality. In contrast, the (...) paper argues that there are several independent sources of justification which make the feeling of compulsion rational: the prima-facie and a priori ones come from the obviousness of our basic modal intuitions and our not being able to imagine things otherwise, others, a posteriori, from the epistemic success of these intuitions. Further, the general scheme of evolutionary learning is reliable, reliability is preserved in the resulting individual's cognitive make-up, and we can come to know this a posteriori. The a posteriori appeal to evolution thus plays a subsidiary role in justification, filling the remaining gap and removing the residual doubt. Explaining modal intuitions is compatible with moderate realism about modality itself. (shrink)

The problem of responsibility has always been an important factor in moral teachings, for this is a problem not only of theory but of everyday practical life. Any system of moral precepts will be lifeless if it does not postulate some measure of responsibility of an individual for his acts. An unselfish, disinterested life becomes morally damaging if a person cannot foresee the moral consequences of his acts and their effects on the lives of those around him, or if the (...) individual's behavior does not correspond to his convictions and good will but is dictated only by external circumstances. (shrink)

Many authors have argued that we should make a clear conceptual distinction between mononational and multinational states. Yet the number of empirical examples they refer to is rather limited. France or Germany are usually seen as mononational, whereas Belgium, Canada, Spain and the UK are considered multinational. How should we classify other cases? Here we can distinguish between (at least) two approaches in the literature: statistical (i.e., whether significant national minorities live within a larger state and, especially, whether they claim (...) self-government) and subjective (i.e., when citizens feel allegiance to sub-state national identities). Neither of them, however, helps us to resolve the problem. Is Italy multinational (because it contains a German-speaking minority)? Is Germany really mononational (in spite of the official recognition of the Danes and the Sorbs in some Länder)? On the other hand, is Switzerland the “most multinational country” (Kymlicka)? Let us assume that there is no definite answer to this dilemma and that it is all a matter of degree. There are probably few (if any) clearly mononational states and few (if any) clearly multinational states. Should we abandon this distinction in favour of other concepts like “plurinationalism” (Keating), “nations-within-nations” (Miller), “postnational state” (Abizadeh, Habermas), or “post-sovereign state” (MacCormick)? The article discusses these issues and, in conclusion, addresses the problem of stability and shared identity “plural” societies. (shrink)

The paper joins Horwich’s criticism of stipulationist accounts of a priori knowledge, and raises some problems for his own account of the a priori. It first questions the assumed separability of scientific investigation and non-scieentific assertoric practices in regard to norms of adequacy. It also questioned Horwich’s Restriction Assumption according to which only the former are answerable to the standards of empirical adequacy and overall simplicity (which threaten apriority in the case of science). Finally, it criticises his argument that inability (...) to think otherwise might guarantee apriority, pointing to science-driven reflective revisability of possibly innate beliefs. (shrink)

This article explores contemporary approaches to the understanding and interpretation of the formation of inclusive society. The focus is on the investigation of the everyday experiences of individuals who face various limitations in their living conditions such as limited opportunities, special needs, and disabilities. The paper highlights the importance of considering the unique aspects of subjective time when systematically analyzing the functional characteristics and existential mechanisms of an inclusive society, which constitutes the living environment for people with disabilities. It points (...) out that the temporal intentionality of a mentally challenged individual manifests in a unique form of ordering, synchronization, and existence within various phenomena and events within the individual's mental imagery and inner experiences. The authors emphasize the necessity to differentiate two primary stages in an individual's perception and understanding of their actual existence—the evaluation stage and the stage of identifying prospects. The study shows how intentional temporality inherently transforms into individual time, revealing the peculiarities of internal experiences and the unique aspects of an individual's mental imagery. These are integral steps in the formation of a system of social events that are marked within the individual consciousness. The novelty of this study lies in the examination of intentionality within the framework of a disabled person's subjective time, a characteristic that is fundamentally individual yet resonates with the collective daily consciousness of disabled individuals within an inclusive micro-society. (shrink)

The evolution of belt conveyors, as an important type of continuous conveying machinery, is examined here in a historical perspective. For this purpose, the selected period is from the ancient time, i.e. occurrence of conveying equipment, and up to the end of the nineteenth century. The basic postulation of a modern machine, including conveyors, is often interlinked to that of its ancestor, which may be simple and primitive. Ancient machines and principles of their work were the basis for later improvements (...) which also brought the inventions in engineering. For instance, Archimedes lifted water to high altitude with a screw, which was regarded as the ancestor of today’s screw conveyor and essentially his design has not changed since then. Bucket elevators also have their predecessors dating back to ancient times. In the concrete case of belt conveyors, a first trace can be found in the beginning of the seventeenth century, even classified as primitive example. During the Industrial Revolutions, various machines, such conveyors, appeared. The first modern-like belt conveyors are dedicated to the late eighteenth century due to the invention of Oliver Evans in USA and to the nineteenth century, by Lyster in England, Lopatine in Russia and Thomas Robins in USA. The technical solutions developed by the end of the nineteenth century were forerunners of the today’s belt conveyors, while the key operational principles have not changed. (shrink)

The first, critical part of the paper summarizes J. R. Brown’s Platonic view of thought experiments (TEs) and raises several questions. One of them concerns the initial, particular judgments in a TE. Since they seem to precede the general insight, Brown’s Platonic intuition, and not to derive from it, the question arises as to the nature of the initial particular judgment. The other question concerns the explanatory status of Brown’s epistemic Platonism. The second, constructive descriptive-explanatory part argues for an alternative, (...) i.e. the view of TE as reasoning in, or with help of, mental models which can accommodate all the relevant data within a non-aprioristic framework (or, at worst, within a minimally “aprioristic”, nativist one). The last part turns to issues of justification and argues that the mental model proposal can account for justification of intuitional judgments and can also support the view of properly functioning intuition as an epistemic virtue, all within a more naturalist framework than the one endorsed by Brown. (shrink)

Nenad Miščević; IX*—Computationalism and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 215–23.

Das Ziel dieses Textes ist, die Aufmerksamkeit auf einige Voraussetzungen, die als wichtig für besseres Verständnis des Denkens scheinen, das zusätzlich als „kritisches“ bezeichnet wird, zu richten. Zuerst wird einleitend konstatiert, dass die Rede vom „kritischen“ Denken im Kontext der Ausbildung aufgetreten ist, und es wird daran erinnert, dass „Kritisches“ ein wesentlicher Bestandteil des Denkens überhaupt ist. Deshalb werden verschiedene Vernunfttypen vorgestellt, aus denen sich verschiedene Rationalitäts- und Denktypen entwickeln. Dabei wird an zeitgenössische Kritik an der Absolutierung der westlichen dihairetischen (...) Rationalität erinnert, wonach es gezeigt wird, wie sich aus der Einheit der Vernunft die Pluralität von Rationalitäten entwickelt hat. Im folgenden Abschnitt wird die ursprüngliche Vernunft als Einheit von Logos und Mythos dargestellt, fortgesetzt von der Thematisierung dessen, was aus der Perspektive der dihairetischen Rationalität nicht als der Vernunft Zugehöriges anerkannt wird – das Andere der Vernunft. Darauf folgt die Darstellung der Anerkennungsmöglichkeit der Rationalität des Anderen der Vernunft, welche sich in der Metapher und der analogischen Rationalität zeigt. Nächstes Kapitel diskutiert einige Folgemanifestierungen der dihairetischen Rationalität und mit diesen Folgen verbundene Schwierigkeiten in Bezug auf Voraussetzungen der Fähigkeitsentwicklung des kritischen Denkens. Zum Schluss werden einige Bedingungen für kritisches Denken dargestellt. (shrink)

Application of Einstein special theory of relativity in chemistry seems to be superfluous; energies are too low. The average velocity of electron in hydrogen atom is 1/135 c, making its actual mass only 26,6 ppm bigger than the rest mass. However, for heavier elements relativistic effects have to be taken into account and, more, many phenomena cannot be explained without ascribing new mass to electrons, in accordance with Einstein theory. In this paper such phenomena are described: color of metallic gold (...) and Bi and Pb compounds, contraction of Ln-X bond of lanthanide trihalides, voltage of lead-acid and Zn/HgO battery, and the shape of gold clusters. Besides, essentials of Einstein theory and quantum chemistry were problems concerning the validity of Lavoisier law. (shrink)

A strong, strictly virtue- based , and at the same time truth-centered framework for virtue epistemology (VE) is proposed that bases VE upon a clearly motivating epistemic virtue, inquisitiveness or curiosity in a very wide sense, characterizes the purely executive capacities-virtues as a means for the truth-goal set by the former, and, finally, situates the remaining, partly motivating and partly executive virtues in relation to this central stock of virtues. Character-trait epistemic virtues are presented as hybrids, partly moral, partly purely (...) epistemic. In order to make the approach virtue- based , it is argued that the central virtue (inquisitiveness or curiosity) is responsible for the value of truth: truth is valuable to cognizers because they are inquisitive, and most other virtues are a means for satisfying inquisitiveness. On can usefully combine this virtue-based account of the motivation for acquiring knowledge with a Sosa-style analysis of the concept “knowledge”, which brings to the forefront virtues-capacities, in order to obtain a full-blooded, “strong” VE. (shrink)

Philosophy should avoid isolation, and should return to being curious and enthusiastic about explanation: about why- and how possibly-questions. The analytic and continental philosophical cultures should establish a dialogue, where each side brings out the distinctive qualities of its work while widening the scope of its concerns.

Cognitive relativists‐pragmatists (Stich, Churchland) claim that human cognitive strategies, lacking a common goal, are in addition divergent to the point of incommensurability. They appeal to the study of reasoning heuristics for evidence on cognitive diversity and incorrigibility. It is here argued that no such evidence is offered by the research, which, on the contrary (1) presents heuristics as uniform across great variations; (2) offers advice for correcting and improving human reasoning; and (3) very often postulates a uniformity of core logical (...) strategies, built into reasoning competence. Cognitive research thus supports a moderate rationalism rather than relativism‐pragmatism. (shrink)