It was to correct common misconceptions about his thought that Jean-Paul Sartre, the most dominent European intellectual of the post-World War II decades, accepted an invitation to speak on October 29, 1945, at the Club Maintenant in Paris. The unstated objective of his lecture was to expound his philosophy as a form of “existentialism,” a term much bandied about at the time. Sartre asserted that existentialism was essentially a doctrine for philosophers, though, ironically, he was about to make (...) it accessible to a general audience. The published text of his lecture quickly became one of the bibles of existentialism and made Sartre an international celebrity. The idea of freedom occupies the center of Sartre’s doctrine. Man, born into an empty, godless universe, is nothing to begin with. He creates his essence—his self, his being—through the choices he freely makes. Were it not for the contingency of his death, he would never end. Choosing to be this or that is to affirm the value of what we choose. In choosing, therefore, we commit not only ourselves but all of mankind. This book presents a new English translation of Sartre’s 1945 lecture and his analysis of Camus’s _The Stranger_, along with a discussion of these works by acclaimed Sartre biographer Annie Cohen-Solal. This edition is a translation of the 1996 French edition, which includes Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre’s introduction and a Q&A with Sartre about his lecture. (shrink)

Drawing on many areas of expertise, from paleontology to psychology, Tomasello offers a plausible, evolutionary story abouthow our ancestors are likely to have developed cooperative behaviors and collaborative lifeways in order to survive and thrive.He also claims that this narrative explains why they would have begun to think in characteristically cooperative and moral ways,developing a “we is greater than me” [we>me] psychological orientation. Do the arguments offered support this extra claim? Thisarticle suggests that they do not. It seeks to alleviate (...) this shortcoming by drawing upon some conceptual resources offered bySartre’s Theory of Practical Ensembles. The centerpiece of the article consists of a detailed analysis of Sartre’s account of the genesisof the “group-in-fusion,” seeking to show that the genesis of a we-way of thinking in a group made up of many requires themediation of what Sartre calls a “third party” (le tiers). After closely examining Sartre’s treatment of the “third party” in theapocalyptic genesis of the “group-in-fusion,” I evaluate the success of this notion in resolving those questions that Tomasello’saccount raises while, at the same time, addressing the ontological question concerning the nature of the individual-grouprelation, in a way that suggests new and significant alternatives to standard dilemmas in contemporary social philosophy. (shrink)

Based on the notion of bad faith, the article seeks to lay the foundations for a diagnosis of contemporaneity, having as an index, on the one hand, the lack of human determination and, on the other, the effectiveness of the world.

This article argues that Sartre’s “What Is Literature?” had a profound and direct influence on David Foster Wallace’s conception of literature. At the very least, a number of factors oblige scholars to take this interpretation seriously. We know that Sartre’s existentialism pervades Wallace’s fiction, that Wallace repeatedly mentioned the Existentialists throughout his work, that he’d learned French to read them in the original, and that Sartre was one of his favorites, as testified by Zadie Smith. Most importantly, (...) a comparative analysis of Sartre’s text and Wallace’s nonfiction shows not only striking parallels but also almost exact repetitions in the writers’ fundamental ideals. In this sense, Sartre’s direct influence on Wallace appears so major as to invest multiple specific details of Wallace’s conception of literature both in its content and in the logical structuring of that content. In this article, we explore the extent of this influence through a structured investigation of its multiple features, showing that many of Wallace’s tenets – the rejection of Realism, the affirmation of meaning-as-use and of literature as a means to human communion and individual and social engagement, and many many more – follow from Sartre’s discourse. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta una interpretación del ser-para-otro en la ontología fenomenológica de Sartre. A partir de un análisis contextual de la fenomenología de la mirada en El ser y la nada, formulamos el problema del ser-para-otro como tercera ek-stasis. Si admitimos que el ser-para-otro surge de una profundización de la segunda ek-stasis (reflexión) y que, por tanto, está siempre condicionado por ella, corremos el riesgo de caer en la ilusión de la primacía del ser-para-sí. En oposición a esta interpretación, (...) presentamos la hipótesis de que el ser para otro tiene una estructura inmediata, y no sólo reflexiva, basada en El ser y la nada y, de manera auxiliar, en el Idiota da familia. (shrink)

El presente artículo examina la concepción del sujeto en el pensamiento de Jean Paul Sartre. Dicho examen se lleva a cabo, por motivos históricos y conceptuales, apelando directa e indirectamente a la filosofía de Heidegger, Husserl, et.al., siendo éste último el bastión, alterno a Sartre mismo, más importante para el desarrollo del presente texto. Así, dicho análisis del concepto de sujeto, y de sus implicaciones y conceptualizaciones fenomenológicas, se lleva a cabo a través del estudio de varias formas (...) de conciencia: la conciencia del objeto, referida a algo distinto de sí misma, y la conciencia de sí, que, al mismo tiempo, se dice de dos formas distintas, a saber: 1. Como conciencia refleja, no reflexiva; y 2. Como conciencia reflexiva. Gracias a esta distinción y análisis de conceptos como Yo, conciencia y sujeto, Sartre se convierte en un crítico de la filosofía moderna del sujeto y, como consecuencia de ello, con el pensamiento sartreano se llega a la convicción de que lo único real es la conciencia, no el mero Yo. Por tanto, el tratamiento husserliano de la conciencia –que Sartre compartirá-, entendida ésta como una constante actividad intencional, devendrá, necesariamente, en el primado del sujeto, pues el sentido de los fenómenos se origina, finalmente, en él. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Picking Up the Pieces of a Shattered Culture:Abandoning Sartre for AquinasR. E. HouserI expect to die in my bed, my successor will die in prison, and his successor will die a martyr in the public square. Then his successor will pick up the shards of a ruined society and slowly help rebuild civilization, as the Church has done so often in human history.—Francis Cardinal George (2010)Here I propose (...) to present a feature of the ethics of Thomas Aquinas, his ethical doctrine of virtue, concentrating on the four cardinal virtues—justice, prudence or good practical judgment, courage, and temperance. Plato first selected them as the four premier virtues, but they go back at least to Homer, for whom wily Odysseus exemplified prudence, warlike Achilles courage, old Nestor justice, Penelope and Telemachus, Odysseus' wife and son, temperance. And I offer them as central to living the morally good life required to "rebuild civilization" in an America that so fair and judicious a man as Cardinal George could call a "ruined society." To see the need for Thomas's solution, we must begin with the problem. Now, all societies depend upon the deep and fundamental ideas of the most important thinkers, prophets and sages, saints, and yes, even philosophers. Their ideas "trickle down" to influence regular folk, like you and me, those who whose hard work actually makes a society thrive, or die. And when those fundamental ideas change, the moral principles of those who embrace those ideas change, and consequently their actions change, and as a result the wider society in which they live changes, for better or worse. Such effects can now be felt across America [End Page 135] by all; but most of us are unaware of the primary intellectual agents of these changes, since they operate at the level of fundamental ideas, not politics or business or day-to-day life. And often their originators have died before the ideas reach full cultural force. So, ignorance of history makes it difficult to deal with present problems caused by those ideas.My first conclusion will be that a major cause of the current coarsening of our culture is the group of ideas of the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, even though most Americans have never heard of him, and most of those who recognize his name have not read his works carefully enough to see the connection. Why Sartre? In the honors program at my university, I had a bright young lady of Muslim heritage who had gone to a lycée, one of France's elite classical secondary schools. "Did you read the classics?" "Yes." Expecting Montaigne or Pascal, I asked, "Who?" Her answer: "Sartre." So let us begin with the theory and practice of Sartre and his long-time lover Simone Beauvoir, whose book The Second Sex was an intellectual spark for the women's liberation movement. Then we turn to some real-life examples of Sartrean influence on ourselves and American culture. Finally, for the best remedy for non-Christian and Christian alike, I recommend Aquinas's doctrine of virtue, when taken in its full scope.Sartre's Ethics of Absolute FreedomIn 1946, the year I was born, Sartre gave a lecture to a meeting of French librarians, which became his most popular book, Existentialism is a Humanism. There he laid out the core of his thought about God, humans, and their ethical behavior. Here I arrange his main ideas in an order that facilitates comparison with Aquinas, beginning with his view of human ontology and proceeding to its impact on the four cardinal virtues.Human OntologySartre turned his back on the traditional metaphysical view that every creature is an individual substance defined by a nature or essence it has in common with all other things of that type. In his "first principle of existentialism," Sartre skips over other animate things, plants and animals, and compares humans to inanimate objects:Let us consider... a book or a paper-cutter: here is an object made by an artisan whose inspiration came from a concept.... One cannot postulate a man who makes a paper-cutter but does not know what it is... (shrink)

En este artículo se revisará el concepto de libertad de Jean-Paul Sartre, así como su permanencia en las sociedades contemporáneas. Esto mediante la definición que Sartre da a conocer en el contexto del existencialismo, en el cual se demuestra que la naturaleza del ser humano es ser libre en esencia. Para ello partiremos de la definición de libertad ofrecida por Sartre, quien, a su vez, indica que se compone de dos momentos: primero, desde la subjetividad del individuo (...) y segundo, la responsabilidad que se tiene frente al otro y que por eso se habla acerca de una libertad social.También consideramos el cómo es que la libertad se ve limitada, a partir de la influencia de las instituciones, y se encargan de enajenar al individuo en las sociedades contemporáneas. Contra ello Sartre propone la emancipación con la unión de los individuos hacia el grupo, mediante la revolución. (shrink)

La tolérance pose certaines questions essentielles aux analyses phénoménologiques de l’intersubjectivité. Tout d’abord, comme Sartre ou Heidegger l’avaient souligné, dans quelle mesure la tolérance ne se retourne-t‑elle pas toujours en une intolérance plus profonde, sous les formes de l’indifférence à l’égard de l’autre ou bien d’une domination qui réduit l’altérité d’autrui à des propriétés imposées, le privant de sa liberté? Mais si l’on prend au contraire le parti de construire un concept positif de tolérance pour penser la relation éthique, (...) alors le problème est de maintenir une double exigence : celle d’accueillir autrui en s’ouvrant à son altérité par rapport à moi, mais aussi celle de ne pas traiter cette altérité comme une différence abstraite. Il s’agit de reconnaître que la manifestation d’autrui est toujours située dans le monde, impliquant un ensemble de valeurs et de croyances susceptibles d’être en inadéquation avec les miennes, et qui doivent être supportées ou endurées malgré tout dans certaines limites sûrement impossibles à fixer a priori. Ainsi le phénomène de la tolérance demande que l’on envisage les normes absolues de la rationalité éthique comme toujours déjà particularisées dans des situations sociales concrètes, avec leurs caractéristiques politiques, culturelles, cultuelles et historiques contingentes. Nous montrons dans cet article que c’est précisément ce que Levinas (et Derrida à sa suite) comprend lorsqu’il aborde la question de l’intersubjectivité à partir du problème du tiers. La tolérance donne ainsi l’opportunité de penser les conditions du cosmopolitisme comme structure phénoménologique de la relation intersubjective (le rapport à l’autre comme rapport situé mondainement), même si l’on pourra alors se demander, en conclusion, si la tolérance abordée dans une perspective de l’émancipation, au sein d’une « histoire universelle d’un point de vue cosmopolitique », n’appartient pas à la vision philosophique des Modernes et de l’ Aufklärung, et si elle est encore tenable dans un monde de plus en plus dominé par l’essence de la technique. (shrink)

O artigo analisa os argumentos de Sartre em torno da violência e do reconhecimento de novos sujeitos na política e a sua crítica ao formalismo dos discursos humanistas a partir do “Prefácio” que ele escreveu para Os condenados da terra, de Frantz Fanon. Para isso, o texto se divide em três partes. A primeira, mais histórica, apresenta o trabalho de Sartre como prefaciador e trata das condições que cercam a redação do “Prefácio” para Fanon; a segunda aborda o (...) problema do reconhecimento de outras vozes no contexto político; a última retoma a crítica sartriana às incoerências do humanismo ocidental. A violência atravessa todos os argumentos ao ocupar um papel capital nos trabalhos de Fanon e nas preocupações de Sartre, particularmente entre as décadas de 1950 e 1960. (shrink)

Der transzendentalen Subjektivität als sinngebender Instanz liegt in der Husserlschen Phänomenologie ein fundamentaler, der Reflexion nicht zugänglicher Bewusstseinsbereich zugrunde: die absolute Subjektivität.Das basale Defizit der epistemisch ausgerichteten Phänomenologie Husserls ist die Unmöglichkeit einer unmittelbaren Selbstreferenzialität in Bezug auf das eigene Selbst-Bewusstsein. Ausgehend von einem ersten Zugang zur Präreflexivität bei Sartre wird auf Grundlage eines radikalisierten phänomenologischen Designs Michel Henrys und Jean-Luc Marions die Struktur dieser basalen Bewusstseinssphäre systematisch entwickelt.

This paper discusses the relevance and the conceptual role, within Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, of a fleeting impression of shame that reverts the threat of solipsism looming over any project of transcendental philosophy. In reading Sartre’s masterpiece, I underscore two methodological points that tend to be bypassed in standard interpretations and lengthy discussions of the book. On the one hand, I safeguard the strictly descriptive core of Sartre’s presentation of the impression of shame and what it reveals (...) about the formal structures of the (pre-reflective) cogito, as Sartre understands it. On the other hand, my analysis explores the different phases of the (conceptual) narrative of the For-Itself, which Sartre inherits from the Idealist tradition in modern philosophy and applies to the concreteness of a phenomenological description of the main stages of one’s experience of the outside world. (shrink)

This book investigates the concept of freedom as it has been defined by Søren Kierkegaard and some of existentialism’s major figures, including Jean-Paul Sartre. In an attempt to delineate an ontology of the human condition, special emphasis is placed on the ideas of choice, responsibility, and transcendence. The second part of the book focuses on existential freedom in what has been its most radical formulation by Sartre. A translation of Il sentimento paralizzante del possibile. La vertigine della libertà (...) in Kierkegaard e Sartre (2022), this book brings cutting-edge contemporary Italian philosophy to English readers. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Objetivo. En este trabajo se plantea como objetivo examinar y comparar las diferentes concepciones de responsabilidad y relación con “el Otro” en dos diferentes autores representativos que han tratado de forma notable estos conceptos, profundizando en la subjetividad, libertad y la experiencia del mundo y de la propia existencia. Diseño. Se trata de un Estudio en forma de breve ensayo con un análisis crítico de la temática analizada. Originalidad /valor. Se trata de un análisis comparativo entre dos grandes filósofos (...) enmarcados en la fenomenología de la existencia en aspectos concretos de su pensamiento. Hallazgos. Los dos autores que analizaremos han conocido la fenomenología de Husserl y Heidegger, que fue para ellos un punto de partida con gran influencia en su pensamiento, no obstante, ambos autores tuvieron un posicionamiento y desarrollo propio y en parte divergente entre ellos en gran parte de su pensamiento, llegando a constituirse como auténticas referencias de su tiempo y que actualmente mantienen un gran interés e influencia en la filosofía contemporánea. Analizaré comparativamente dos grandes autores como son, Emmanuel Lévinas y Jean Paul Sartre. Conclusiones. En ellos veremos formas diferentes y hasta cierto punto complementarias de abordar la libertad, responsabilidad y la relación con el otro, en uno de forma más ontológica y en el otro con una visión desde la ética. (shrink)

It is hard to think of two philosophers less alike than St. Thomas Aquinas and Jean-Paul Sartre. Aquinas, a thirteenth-century Dominican friar, and Sartre, a twentieth-century philosopher and atheist, are separated by both time and religious beliefs. Yet, for philosopher Joseph S. Catalano, the two are worth bringing together for their shared concern with a fundamental issue: the uniqueness of each individual person and how this uniqueness relates to our mutual dependence on each other. When viewed in the (...) context of one another, Sartre broadens and deepens Aquinas’s outlook, updating it for our present planetary and social needs. Both thinkers, as Catalano shows, bring us closer to the reality that surrounds us, and both are centrally concerned with the place of the human within a temporal realm and what stance we should take on our own freedom to act and live within that realm. Catalano shows how freedom, for Sartre, is embodied, and that this freedom further illuminates Aquinas’s notion of consciousness. ​ Compact and open to readers of varying backgrounds, this book represents Catalano’s efforts to bring a lifetime of work on Sartre into an accessible consideration of philosophical questions by placing him in conversation with Aquinas, and it serves as a primer on key ideas of both philosophers. By bringing together these two figures, Catalano offers a fruitful space for thinking through some of the central questions about faith, conscience, freedom, and the meaning of life. (shrink)

Objetivamos, com o artigo proposto, apresentar os principais elementos que fundamentam a proposição metodológica do processo psicoterápico inspirado nos pressupostos filosóficos e psicológicos do filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre. A análise, que é descritiva e compreensiva, terá como pano de fundo a biografia de um personagem criado pelas autoras cujo projeto de ser está inviabilizado pelo seu saber de ser/cogito - o fracassado. A descrição do movimento existencial do personagem/analisando promove reflexões acerca de suas escolhas singulares e familiares e de (...) seu projeto fenomenológico e existencial de ser. Pela análise regressiva e pela síntese progressiva, visamos, primeiramente, à investigação das dimensões antropológicas e sociológicas em que o analisando se encontra, para em um segundo momento, compreender a dimensão psicológica, sendo esta última, constituída a partir do desdobramento das duas primeiras. Por fim, nosso artigo nos leva a refletir sobre as condições universais constituintes do cogito do analisando e a forma como ele se edificou em sua singularidade/universalizada, complicando-se psicofisicamente corpo/consciência em situação. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze's assertion that 'Sartre knew how to invent the New' suggests a vital aspect of the French philosopher, one that departs from the image that has often been presented of him. Criticism of the Soviet Union post 1956, together with the increasing prominence of anti-colonial struggles and a series of experiences that would find their condensation in 1968, pushed Sartre to a continuous rearticulation of his political ideas, on the basis of an intense confrontation with Marx. In (...) Basso's lucid study, here newly translated into English, the expression 'singular universal' seeks to capture the revolutionary potential of individual and collective subjects, illuminating the close but also unstable relationship between history and politics. (shrink)

The paper explores emotional abilities from the (neo-)existentialist perspectives of Jean-Paul Sartre and Richard Moran. First, it reconstructs Sartre’s understanding of emotions as active comportments achieving a magical transformation of the world. Second, it explores what existentialists mean by first-person authority: Regarding my own emotions, I cannot only explore what I feel, but I also need to ask myself what to feel. The claim is that my emotions depend on me committing to them. Third, I highlight a difference (...) between a neo-existentialist account which focuses on reflective self-constitution, and a vintage existentialist approach which focuses on pre-reflective self-awareness. Forth, I point out that (neo-)existentialism helps to make explicit the normative claim which is implied when speaking of abilities regarding one’s emotions. The claim is that it is up to me to either endorse my emotions or to change who I am to feel differently. Finally, I indicate the limits of such an approach when it comes to social structures of inequality and domination. (shrink)