"This volume offers a new translation of the Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius' commentary on the chapters concerning place and time in Aristotle's Physics, Book Four. Written after the closing of the Athenian Neoplatonist school in A.D. 529, the commentary clarifies the structure and meaning of Aristotle's arguments and provides a rich account of 800 years of interpretation." "Surprisingly, in the first five chapters of Book Four Aristotle shows place as two-dimensional: one's place is the two-dimensional inner surface of one's surroundings. (...) He also suggests that the upward motion of air and fire and the downward motion of earth and water are partly explained by the natural places to which they tend. Place thus has power (dunamis) of its own. In his last five chapters, Aristotle argues that if time did not entail change its passage would be undetectable, and that time, by definition countable, requires the existence of conscious beings to do the counting. Among the many relevant views that Simplicius records are those of Galen, who attacks this claim, and of Eudemus, who rebuts the Pythagorean theory that history will repeat itself exactly. J. O. Urmson's translation serves as a companion to his earlier translation of the Corollaries on Place and Time, in which Simplicius sets forth his own views as distinct from those of Aristotle." "A major sourcebook for the interpretation of Aristotle, this volume will be welcomed by scholars and students in the fields of classics, ancient philosophy, ancient history, and medieval studies."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

"Aristotle's Physics Book 3 covers two subjects: the definition of change and the finitude of the universe. Change, which enters into the very definition of nature as an internal source of change, receives two definitions in chapters 1 and 2, as involving the actualization of the potential or of the changeable. Alexander of Aphrodisias is reported as thinking that the second version is designed to show that Book 3, like Book 5, means to disqualify change in relations from being genuine (...) change. Aristotle's successor Theophrastus, we are told, and Simplicius himself, prefer to admit relational change."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

Much of contemporary research concerning the Platonic schools of late antiquity is philological and historical in approach. This research is needed, since late antiquity is a period that has long been neglected in the historiography of philosophy, which means that many facts and documents still await examination and publication in reliable form. Much rarer is a philosophical approach to Neoplatonism based on sound historical knowledge rather than on the cliches that until recently have masked ignorance. Such an approach is proposed (...) in the present book, whose important task it is to analyze the logical and metaphysical structures that constitute Neoplatonic philosophy. Lloyd brings together and develops ideas he has explored over many years. He takes account of a very wide range of thinkers. Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus play a major role, of course. But many others are also considered: Simplicius, Philoponus, Damascius, Elias--the list extends to include Neoplatonists of the Byzantine period. While allowing for the differences between these philosophers, Lloyd successfully shows how they share and elaborate on certain theories which he examines systematically, bringing out the difficulties and dilemmas that these theories often contain. One might compare his approach with that of S. Gersh, whose interests however are not exclusively philosophical, and who, like Lloyd, stresses the importance of Aristotelian ideas in the constitution of Neoplatonic philosophy. (shrink)

Moral philosophers tend to discriminate, explicitly or implicitly, three types of action from the point of view of moral worth. First, they recognize actions that are a duty, or obligatory, or that we ought to perform, treating these terms as approximately synonymous; second, they recognize actions that are right in so far as they are permissible from a moral standpoint and not ruled out by moral considerations, but that are not morally required of us, like the lead of this or (...) that card at bridge; third, they recognize actions that are wrong, that we ought not to do. (shrink)

Philosophical Analysis Its Development between the Two World Wars.

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is not a counsel to perform mean or moderate actions. It states that excellence of character is a mean state with regard to the having and displaying of emotions. All emotions are morally neutral; character is shown by displaying emotions on the right occasions, Not too often or too rarely, Not too strongly or too weakly, For sufficient and only sufficient reasons, Etc. The difficulties for such a view presented by justice and such bad emotions (...) as envy are discussed. The conclusion is that basically aristotle's theory can resist critical scrutiny. (shrink)

The work of the later Greek neo-Platonists remains largely inaccessible to the modern philosopher. Many of the extant texts have not yet been translated from the Greek, and in some cases the texts that have survived are of lesser importance than those that have not, and so must be reconstructed on the basis of reports in later authors. This task of recovery has been undertaken recently in the case of the Syrian Greek Iamblichus by J. M. Dillon, and by Larsen (...) in this, his Aarhus University doctoral dissertation. Larsen collects the historical evidence concerning Iamblichus’ life and literary output. He then analyzes from the point of view of literary form and philosophic significance both the extant works of Iamblichus, and those which survive only in the form of quotations and reports in later authors. He also gives a useful bibliography and his detailed Table of Contents may make up partially for the absence of an Index. In a separate volume, the author brings together the texts of the major quotations and reports in Proclus, Simplicius, et al. on which he bases his account of Iamblichus’ commentaries. (shrink)

Peter Kivy argues that Handel was the first composer to be regarded as a genius and that only in the eighteenth century was the philosophical apparatus in place that would enable any composer to be conceived of as a musical genius. According to Kivy, a Longinian conception of genius transformed Handel into a genius. A Platonic conception of genius was used to classify Mozart as a genius. Then Kant adopted a Longinian conception of genius and this shaped the perception of (...) Beethoven. Kivy is wrong on all counts. Composers were thought to be geniuses long before Handel. The emergence of philosophical aesthetics in the eighteenth century did little to shape conceptions of musical genius. More specifically, Kivy misrepresents Kant's conception of genius and the role that it plays in the recognition of Beethoven as a musical genius. (shrink)

J. O. Urmson; VIII*—A Defence of Intuitionism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 111–120, https://doi.org/10.1093/.

Instrumentalism is an approach to science that treats a theory as a tool and only as a tool for computation; it dispenses with the concept of truth.Conventionalism treats a theory as true by convention if it forms a pattern of observations from which correct predictions can be made.Operationalism denies meaning to the concepts of a theory unless they can be defined operationally. It is argued in this paper that truth-value is indispensable to science, because a theory can be rejected only (...) if an empirical consequence is false and if falsity of a conclusion entails falsity of a premise. This undermines the above positions. The fourth interpretation isinduction. Induction, by contrast, uses the notion of truth-value. What is focused on here is its reliance on the ultimacy ofobservation. The present thesis is that instrumentalism, conventionalism, and induction are different attempts to handle observations. The common problem is the gap between data and theory.All these interpretations share a philosophy of observationalism. The aim of this paper is to show that the several orthodox interpretations of science all fail to solve the problem of the data-theory gap, and to show that they all presuppose a philosophy of observation. (shrink)

J. O. Urmson; VIII*—A Defence of Intuitionism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 111–120, https://doi.org/10.1093/.

The essays in this volume explore current work in central areas of philosophy, work unified by attention to salient questions of human action and human agency. They ask what it is for humans to act knowledgeably, to use language, to be friends, to act heroically, to be mortally fortunate, and to produce as well as to appreciate art. The volume is dedicated to J. O. Urmson, in recognition of his inspirational contributions to these areas. All the essays but one have (...) been specially written for this volume. (shrink)

Philosophical Analysis Its Development between the Two World Wars.

Tradução para o português do capítulo 5 do livro "Berkeley" (Oxford University Press, 1982), Cap. 5, p. 47-57. Republicado em The British Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Oxford University Press, 1992).

The influence of J. L. Austin on contemporary philosophy was substantial during his lifetime, and has grown greatly since his death, at the height of his powers, in 1960. Philosophical Papers, first published in 1961, was the first of three volumes of Austin's work to be edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Together with Sense and Sensibilia and How to do things with Words, it has extended Austin's influence far beyond the circle who knew him or read (...) the handful of papers he published in journals. (shrink)