“Exercise starts and ends in the brain”: this was the title of a review article authored by Dr. Bengt Kayser back in 2003. In this piece of work, the author highlights that pioneer studies have primarily focused on the cardiorespiratory-muscle axis to set the human limits to whole-body exercise tolerance. In some circumstances, however, exercise cessation may not be solely attributable to these players: the central nervous system is thought to hold a relevant role as the ultimate site of exercise (...) termination. In fact, there has been a growing interest relative to the “brain” response to exercise in chronic cardiorespiratory diseases, and its potential implication in limiting the tolerance to physical exertion in patients. To reach these overarching goals, non-invasive techniques, such as near-infrared spectroscopy and transcranial magnetic stimulation, have been successfully applied to get insights into the underlying mechanisms of exercise limitation in clinical populations. This review provides an up-to-date outline of the rationale for the “brain” as the organ limiting the tolerance to physical exertion in patients with cardiorespiratory diseases. We first outline some key methodological aspects of neuromuscular function and cerebral hemodynamics assessment in response to different exercise paradigms. We then review the most prominent studies, which explored the influence of major cardiorespiratory diseases on these outcomes. After a balanced summary of existing evidence, we finalize by detailing the rationale for investigating the “brain” contribution to exercise limitation in hitherto unexplored cardiorespiratory diseases, an endeavor that might lead to innovative lines of applied physiological research. (shrink)

So in this outburst of Cornelia should line 104 be punctuated. For the poenas crudelis compare VII. 431 ‘quod semper saeuas debet tibi Parthia poenas’ and Verg. A. 6. 501 quis tam crudelis optauit sumere poenas? whence, or from ib. 585, ‘uidi et crudelis dantem Salmonea poenas’ we may suppose Lucan derived it. The feeble vulgate punctuation which puts the comma after crudelis, supposed to be vocative, well exemplifies the mischievous influence of propinquity.—I now find the correct punctuation in W. (...) E. Weber's Corpus, but with the needless alteration of crudel e s. (shrink)

The MS. hie tunc of V. 6 has no friends. L. Mueller's hoc tunc is weak and flat, and L. Rank, Mnemosyne 40. 51, is justly dissatisfied with the hietans of M. Havet's larger and smaller editions, to which the hians of Verg. Aen. 12. 754 lends no sufficient support, as there the dog is opening its mouth before it bites. Add to this that it is by no means certain that Phaedrus would either have used the word or used (...) it in the simple sense of opening the mouth. Rank's own proposal, ‘heu’ tunc, fails also to carry conviction. There is however a word which belongs to our author's vocabulary and is as near to the manuscripts as either of the above, and which hits the sense at which hietans aims. This is rictus. The word is often used of the opened mouths of dogs, Lucr. 5. 1064, Ovid Met. 13. 568. Juvenal 10. 271 sq. ‘canino latrauit rictu,’ and of other animals. That it is appropriate with dimisit ‘let go’ may be seen from the counterpart expression of Martial 1. 48. 1 ‘rictibus his tauros non eripuere magistri.’. (shrink)

The MS. hie tunc of V. 6 has no friends. L. Mueller's hoc tunc is weak and flat, and L. Rank, Mnemosyne 40. 51, is justly dissatisfied with the hietans of M. Havet's larger and smaller editions, to which the hians of Verg. Aen. 12. 754 lends no sufficient support, as there the dog is opening its mouth before it bites. Add to this that it is by no means certain that Phaedrus would either have used the word or used (...) it in the simple sense of opening the mouth. Rank's own proposal, ‘heu’ tunc, fails also to carry conviction. There is however a word which belongs to our author's vocabulary and is as near to the manuscripts as either of the above, and which hits the sense at which hietans aims. This is rictus. The word is often used of the opened mouths of dogs, Lucr. 5. 1064, Ovid Met. 13. 568. Juvenal 10. 271 sq. ‘canino latrauit rictu,’ and of other animals. That it is appropriate with dimisit ‘let go’ may be seen from the counterpart expression of Martial 1. 48. 1 ‘rictibus his tauros non eripuere magistri.’. (shrink)

So in this outburst of Cornelia should line 104 be punctuated. For the poenas crudelis compare VII. 431 ‘quod semper saeuas debet tibi Parthia poenas’ and Verg. A. 6. 501 quis tam crudelis optauit sumere poenas? whence, or from ib. 585, ‘uidi et crudelis dantem Salmonea poenas’ we may suppose Lucan derived it. The feeble vulgate punctuation which puts the comma after crudelis, supposed to be vocative, well exemplifies the mischievous influence of propinquity.—I now find the correct punctuation in W. (...) E. Weber's Corpus, but with the needless alteration of crudel e s. (shrink)

The doctrine of the Incarnation, that Jesus Christ was both truly God and truly human, is the foundation and cornerstone of traditional Christian theism. And yet this traditional teaching appears to verge on incoherence. How can one person be both God, having all the perfections of divinity, and human, having all the limitations of humanity? This is the fundamental philosophical problem of the Incarnation. Perhaps a solution is found in an analysis of what the traditional teaching meant by person, divinity, (...) and humanity, or in understanding how divinity and humanity were united in a single person. This Element presents that traditional teaching, then returns to the incoherence problem to showcase various solutions offered to it. (shrink)

The wine referred to in the second line of the epigram was produced near Verona, at the foot of the Rhaetian Alps. It was well regarded by most and was a favourite of the Emperor Augustus: for references see Mynors at Verg. G. 2.96 and my note at Mart. 14.100.2. It appears, however, to have undue prominence in this poem, supposedly about the earthenware drinking vessels which, presumably, were manufactured in the same area. There is also the question of why (...) Martial refers to Verona in such a circumlocutory way. Is he merely following a well established elegiac/epigrammatic convention in associating Verona with Catullus , or does his circumlocution here have any particular point? (shrink)

When Charles Darwin (1859, 482) wrote in the Origin of Species that he looked to the “young and rising naturalists” to heed the message of his book, he likely had in mind individuals like Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), who responded warmly to the invitation (Haeckel, 1862, 1: 231-32n). Haeckel became part of the vanguard of young scientists who plowed through the yielding turf to plant the seed of Darwinism deep into the intellectual soil of Germany. As Haeckel would later observe, the (...) seed flourished in extremely favorable ground. The German mind, he would write (1868), was predisposed to adopt the new theory. The great philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804), for instance, was on the verge of accepting a transmutational view in his Third Critique (1790; 1957, 538-39), though he stepped gingerly back from the temptation. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), about the same time, dallied with transmutational ideas, at least Haeckel would convince Darwin that the Englishman had an illustrious predecessor. Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck’s (1744-1829) conceptions had taken hold among several major German thinkers in the first few decades of the nineteenth century in a way they had not in England and France. Among those ready to declare themselves for the new dispensation was Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902), Haeckel’s teacher at Würzburg—though, this very political scientist would prove Haeckel’s nemesis later in the century. So Haeckel’s estimate of the ripeness of German thought was not off the mark. Darwinism took hold in the newly unified land, though not without some struggle; but at last it became the dominant view in the biological sciences. But with its success did it foster the malign racist ideology that transfixed Adolf Hitler (1889-1945)? (shrink)

On the verge of the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the American Association of University Professors, we examine the organization’s focus on academic freedom, shared governance, and the challenges the AAUP faced during its early years. The history is a fairly uncontested one: higher education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States was the context for the struggle over academic freedom and shared governance. Dismissed professors, resignations by colleagues, and the struggle of professionalization (...) characterize the period.1 A century later, we wonder about the state of academic freedom and shared governance. We argue that higher education is currently so.. (shrink)

I do not for a moment question the fact that many people have experiences of a special type which may be termed “religious”, The extent to which religious experience may be regarded as a reasonably common phenomenon in present-day Britain is shown clearly by David Hay in his Exploring Inner Space, Harmondsworth 1982. that such experiences often involve reference to something which appears to display a radical unlikeness to all else and that they are therefore in some sense inexpressible. Doubtless (...) the ideas I have put forward about the possible source of such unlikeness and ineffability might suggest models of God which would not find much theological approval, at least within any mainstream theistic tradition, since some sort of pantheism seems inevitably to be implied. But however this might be, the concept of radical unlikeness as it has been analyzed here can, I think, help us towards understanding certain problematic areas in religion quite apart from the issue of intelligibility, which has been the focus of this discussion. To begin with, radical unlikeness suggests a way in which the historical continuity of concepts of the transcendent might be upheld against the discontinuity suggested by the diversity of interpretations through which they have moved. Ancient and modern outlooks on, say, God differ enormously, as indeed do the range of co-temporal accounts at many particular moments. But, by and large, theologians firmly maintain that it is a single and unchanging phenomenon which is being dealt with. Unless we can point to some common element which is both specific enough to create a binding sense of common tradition, yet never completely expressed by any attempt at understanding it within that tradition (thus persistently demanding new attempts to apprehend it), then given the widely differing views of God within, for example, the Christian community, it is difficult to see how we could assume that in fact they all stemmed from the same source and were talking about the same thing. The idea of radical unlikeness could provide an element with just these required characteristics: it could be seen as what all the accounts attempt to net, with varying degrees of adequacy, within their offered interpretations. It could be seen as what remains constant, constantly elusive yet constantly generative of fresh attempts to apprehend it, throughout a history of intra-religious diversity. This sort of explanation could, presumably, be applied to the intra-religious diversity of the non-Christian traditions too.Secondly, radical unlikeness might suggest a possible way of understanding inter-religious diversity in a way which allows that whilst such diversity exists, whilst the differences between religions are real, they are grounded in a similar root-experience. It may, at first sight, seem difficult to continue thinking of the various religious traditions as truly separate phenomena if they are taken as being grounded on experiences whose ineffability stems from the unlikeness of experiencing things as a whole. Here we must stress again that if they are to be considered intelligible, radically unlike experiences cannot be considered completely so - or putting this another way, we cannot more than approach experience of totality. Sense can be given to religious claims of ineffability by suggesting experience of near totality, where we reach the last point on the scale of inclusiveness which complies with the logical criteria demanded of something for it to be possible for us to be aware of it. We might thus attempt an explanation of inter-religious diversity based on the view that Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam etc. acquire their differences from the different elements included in their experience of near totality. Taking totality to be represented by the scale of one to ten, Hinduism might be seen as grounded on experience of 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-9-10, Buddhism on experience of 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 and so on. The resulting dissimilarities are thus centred not on different types of experience, but on different areas of inclusiveness. This is, of course, to suppose that the various religious traditions are all based on the same degree (as opposed to the same elements) of inclusiveness, but it is by no means clear that such a supposition is justified. Continuing with our decimal analogy, might it not be suggested that whilst Christianity stemmed from experience of 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10, Jainism was founded on a less extensive encounter with the divine (say 4-5-6-7-8-9-10)? It is, however, uncertain how we can compare and evaluate different religious traditions in such a way as to be able to comment on such claims. A definite danger of comparative religion is that by concentrating on establishing and exploring inter-religious likenesses, it may obscure the radical unlikeness of religious phenomena. It should be borne firmly in mind that such likenesses as may be established within comparative studies may not win religious phenomena a place within our understanding comparable to objects of more everyday concern. Statements found in the Old Testament, the Qur'an and the Vedas, for example, may, on occasion, be alike, but at the end of the day such things are often alike only, or chiefly, in so far as they display the same radical unlikeness in relation to the non-religious elements in our outlook.The analysis of radical unlikeness and ineffability which has been advanced might also suggest a way in which certain passages in religious writings could be understood, passages which at first sight can be seriously perplexing. If, for example, to return to the quotation given in the introductory section of this paper, we continue to think of accounts of the nature of Shiva as being attempts to describe some discrete, objective entity, then it is inevitable that either we will share the Puranic writer's puzzlement or that much of what we read about Shiva will appear as the muddled and extravagant thinking thrown up by an uncritical and over-fertile mythological imagination, consisting of little more than a hotch-potch of contradictory elements. But if we see such accounts as attempting to say something about everything, as symbols of near totality stemming from experiences which verge on the holistic, then what we read - with all its ambiguities - may become somewhat more meaningful. Thus W.D. O'Flaherty comments that Shiva “embodies all of life in all its detail at every minute” (Asceticism and Eroticism in the Mythology of Shiva, London 1973, p. 315). Similarly Alain Dani41ou sees Shiva, ultimately, in terms of his being "the supreme state of reality" beyond whom there is only "non-existence" (Hindu Polytheism, London 1964, p. 190).This analysis of ineffability and intelligibility seeks to introduce for debate a possible way of understanding the radical unlikeness which accounts of religious experience apparently attempt to speak about. It does not, however, claim to present an exhaustive treatment of the issues raised, on the contrary, I am conscious of many shortcomings and omissions. For instance, it remains to be seen under precisely what conditions something counts as being an elucidating likeness (presumably all experiences are, for example, temporal, yet temporality alone would not seem to offer a particularly elucidating comparison). Moreover, the degree to which appeal to likeness is allowed operation in actual accounts of religious experience needs to be explored. In addition, the notion of categorizing experiences according to the extent to which they approach a point of total inclusion requires careful clarification. To begin with, according to what criteria could we establish that one experience was more inclusive than another? However, such issues can only be mentioned here, any adequate consideration of them would require a separate paper.In conclusion, I would suggest that to use radical unlikeness and/or ineffability simply as devices by which to halt any process of investigation, proclaiming that the thing in question is not like anything and so is beyond all words, risks making unintelligible and placing beyond all further inquiry an important and extensive area of human experience. As William Alston put it, to label something ineffable in an unqualified way is to shirk the job of making explicit the ways in which it can be talked about. William P. Alston, “ineffability”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 522. It is surely more accurate to take ineffability as a “qualifier”I.T. Ramsey, Models and Mystery (Oxford 1964), p. 60. which “multiplies models without end”Ibid. than as an absolute which prevents the construction of any elucidating models. (shrink)

In this response, the Australian Health Ethics Committee (AHEC) indicates that it shares, and has strategies in place to address, the majority of the concerns identified by Susan Dodds. AHEC believes it is too early to assess the full impact of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (1999) or to call for a major review of the ethics committee process. While some Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs) are over-stretched, the system is not on the verge of (...) collapse. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to the CommentariesIan Wright, Aaron Sloman, and Luc BeaudoinWe are very grateful for the care with which the commentators have read our paper, and the sympathy with which they treated what we acknowledged to be at best a preliminary attempt to make sense of a range of phenomena involving grief and other emotions in terms of our draft architecture. We are fortunate to have commentators that are so (...) much in sympathy with what we have written.The comments of Castelfranchi and Miceli draw attention to a problem that we expect many readers to bring up, namely that there is a notion of “information processing” that cannot carry the explanatory weight that we attach to our information processing architecture. We believe that there is a concept of “information processing” such as is used by engineers who design software systems to perform such tasks as controlling an aircraft. We claim that within an appropriate system architecture, information processing states can have all the causal powers that we require for states like pain, pleasure, and the like. However this is not obvious, and defending this claim will have to await another occasion.Lloyd helpfully illustrates the relevance of our proposed architecture even to the effects of imagining the death of a loved one. He also makes the useful observation that second-order states can arise when a person who is suffering because events violate some important motivator, discovers that nothing can be done about the cause of the suffering, and then suffers even more because of feeling helpless in that situation. We acknowledge that these are phenomena that the architecture will have to accommodate, and accept the challenge to demonstrate this in due course.We believe that there is enough commonality between the commentators and ourselves to support our view that the research community is on the verge of an important new breakthrough in the study of mind, in which philosophers, psychologists, therapists, brain scientists, and AI researchers can collaborate fruitfully, and from which profound practical and theoretical consequences will follow.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional EpisodesCommentary: Commentary by LloydCommentary: Commentary by Miceli and CastelfranchiCommentary: Commentary by BodenResponse: Response to the CommentariesCopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

En el ámbito de la educación superior virtual de la Universidade de Vigo (UVigo, España) existe un servicio de videoconferencia masiva, integrado en el Campus Remoto, que puede emplearse para la docencia virtual; y, opcionalmente, también para la grabación automática de dichas clases en vídeos. La aparición de nuevas tecnologías como la del ultrafalso y la traducción cara a cara permitirán, además de la traducción/doblaje del audio en dicha videoclases, la manipulación de la imagen para que no se note el (...) cambio de idioma al hablar; de manera que la sincronización de labios se realice también de manera automatizada. (shrink)

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...) plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo es caracterizar, desde diferentes puntos de vista, el grupo humano del estudiantado universitario que se vio afectado por la pandemia de la COVID-19. Para ello, en primer lugar, buscaremos qué rasgos distintivos comparten y trataremos de asignarles un nombre, letras y/o etiquetas distintivas. Y, en segundo lugar, analizaremos la posibilidad de poder catalogarlos como “generación”, con todo lo que ello implica. Para ello, sin embargo, deberemos establecer previamente qué es lo entendemos por “generación”.

La loi dite loi Taubira fut votée le 10 mai 2001 par les élus de la République. L’article 1 de cette loi précisait : « La République française reconnaît que la traite négrière transatlantique et l’ esclavage perpétrés à partir du XVe siècle contre les populations africaines déportées en Europe, aux Amériques et dans l’océan Indien constituent un crime contre l’humanité.

Protagoras, of all the ancient philosophers, has perhaps attracted the most interest in modern times. His saying ‘Man is the measure of all things’ caused Schiller to adopt him as the patron of the Oxford pragmatists, and has generally earned him the title of the first humanist. Yet the exact delineation of his philosophcal position remains a baffling task. Neumann, writing on Die Problematik des ‘Homo-mensura’ Satzes in 1938,2 concludes that no certainty whatever can be reached on the meaning of (...) the dictum, since ‘man’, ‘measure’, and ‘things’ are all ambiguous, nor can we tell which of the three is the predicate. The time is past when it was believed that a man's philosophy could be understood apart from the events of his life and the circumstances of his age: yet in the case of Protagoras the historical method of approach has hardly been attempted, although the impact of environment was perhaps more decisive in the formation of philosophical concepts in the Greek world than anywhere else. The reality about which the Greek philosopher spoke had three aspects: it was either the one universe of physics, or the political unity, or God. For example, the book of Heracleitus Περ φσεως was divided into three chapters or logoi, About the Whole, a political, and a theological. Neither physics nor theology supplies from its own subject-matter the form in which this reality was described. (shrink)

Many issues in ethics arise in relation to the contexts in which psychologists work. However, most ethical decision-making models reproduce the way in which psychologists tend to approach ethics by focusing on ethical dilemmas and proposing a step-by-step response to deal with them. Although these models might be useful, their emphasis on reactive approaches and their lack of contextualization constitute significant limitations on their applicability. In this article, an approach to ethical decision making that highlights the importance of the context (...) in developing proactive strategies to solve ethical issues is proposed. This approach is further explained through its application to medical and rural settings. The implications of these suggestions to the training in ethics are finally discussed. (shrink)

During the Algerian struggle, Fanon warned us about the influence on politics of ‘the few European colonialists, powerful, intractable, those who have at all times instigated repressions, broken the French democrats, blocked every endeavor within the colonial framework to introduce a modicum of democracy into Algeria’. Is this remark still pertinent? How does Frantz Fanon help us understand current reactionary politics in France? Is his analysis of the French Left still pertinent? How does colonial discourse weigh on the postcolonial present? (...) In this article, I explore current expressions of French postcolonial reactionary politics focusing on an event in Reunion Island, a French postcolonial territory. I argue that it is important to observe what is happening in French postcolonial territories because they remain laboratories for repressive policies and discourses. What I call the discourse of ‘French Algeria’, a mix of revisionist history, resentment, wounded narcissism and racism, embodies a political trend that seeks to counter the small progress made in rewriting history from the point of view of the colony in France. (shrink)

In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such (...) a way that it will fit in the modern biology and psychology, which are becoming increasingly physicalistic. (shrink)

Verges' manifesto argues that feminists should no longer be accomplices of capitalism, racism, colonialism and imperialism: it is time to fight the system that created the boss, built the prisons and polices women's bodies. The author grapples with the central issues in feminist debates today: from Eurocentrism and whiteness, to power, inclusion and exclusion. Delving into feminist and anti-racist histories, Verges also assesses contemporary activism, movements and struggles, including #MeToo and the Women's Strike. Centering anticolonialism and anti-racism within an intersectional (...) Marxist feminism, the book puts forward an urgent demand to free ourselves from the capitalist, imperialist forces that oppress us. --From publisher description. (shrink)

The general argument of this essay is that poetry is an everyday ambition and an everyday accomplishment. The evidence for this – a good bit of which I will amass enthusiastically in what follows – is everywhere in our language. I explore this according to three guiding intuitions: (i) people, at least some of the time, want to give their words a similar intensity or fullness and show the same skill in unleashing verbal power, as poets do – seeking words (...) that will carry their voices; (ii) people say things give me the same aesthetic bliss and ache of gratitude that poetry gives me; and (iii) there seems to be a poetic or aesthetic dimension to all of language, without which words would not have the significance for us that they do. I end the essay by saying why the poetry in our everyday speech complicates the relation between the ordinary and (different versions of) the extraordinary as other philosophers have imagined it. (shrink)

This article explores the politics and culture of Creole cosmopolitanism, which emerged in the French post-slavery colonies. It argues that Creole cosmopolitanism offers a framework to imagine oneself in the world. As a form of resistance to the French assimilative project, to absolutist ethnicisms and to abstract universalism, Creole cosmopolitanism imagines a world of trans-local solidarities, a way of being-in-the-world that acknowledges difference and diversity.

Living out of silence, out of a fully functioning, lovingly attentive mind, and not just out of thought, out of a partially functioning mind, is requisite for depth or profundity in living or relating. A fully attentive, truly silent or meditative mind sees that there is real dualism of time and the timeless and that time and the timeless each has its own unique value. The timeless, or real silence, that which alone can make for depth in one's living and (...) relating, can be there only when, in one's awareness, time and all that is related to time, have come to an end. An examination of a wide variety of statements made by writers, both past and present, shows that these understandings are seldom there in contemporary writings, just as they were not there in writings that have come down to us from the past. 'Living beyond the One and the Many' invites readers to consider the possibility that what is presented in it can bring deep meaning to one's way of living in the world"--Publisher's description, back cover. (shrink)

The central part of this article deals with the morality of secession. We present the three main "pure" theories about the morality of secession and suggest the greatest justifying power of an "impure" or mixed theory. At the same time, however, we advocate the need for a proper understanding of the question of the morality of secession. More specifically, we suggest that the best way to raise it is by introducing the notion of "reasonableness" into the question itself.

Se presentan los resultados de una investigación multicéntrica de evaluación de los Comités de Ética de Investigación (CEI) en Panamá, la cual busca mecanismos que ayuden a fortalecer su capacidad para evaluar, desde un enfoque de bioética y derechos humanos, los protocolos de los ensayos clínicos financiados por la industria farmacéutica o por los centros extranjeros de investigación, así como monitorear la implementación de los protocolos aprobados. Se revisó documentación suficiente y se hicieron entrevistas a miembros de cuatro CEI. A (...) partir de ahí, se concluye que en Panamá los CEI respetan las normas internacionales de funcionamiento y de revisión de protocolos, y que los problemas encontrados guardan relación con su experiencia, el contexto social y la evolución de los intereses de las compañías farmacéuticas. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's genius, John Wisdom has suggested, was uniquely revealed in his ability to formulate such questions as ‘Could one play chess without the queen? Would it still be chess?’ The central questions raised by Richard Rorty's work may be cast in a parallel form: ‘Could one do philosophy without the notion of truth as “correspondence with the Real”? Would it still be philosophy?’ Both pairs of questions, Wittgenstein' and Rorty's, are quintessentially anti-essentialist. The scope and ingenuity of Rorty's ‘philosophy without (...) mirrors’ has challenged philosophers to reconf ront basic questions about the nature and purposes of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Spatial aspects of words are associated with their canonical locations in the real world. Yet little research has tested whether spatial associations denoted in language comprehension generalize to their corresponding images. We directly tested the spatial aspects of mental imagery in picture and word processing (Experiment 1). We also tested whether spatial representations of motion words produce similar perceptual-interference effects as demonstrated by object words (Experiment 2). Findings revealed that words denoting an upward spatial location produced slower responses to targets (...) appearing at the top of the display, whereas words denoting a downward spatial location produced slower responses to targets appearing at the bottom of the display. Perceptual-interference effects did not obtain for pictures or for words lacking a spatial relation. These findings provide greater empirical support for the perceptual-symbols system theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). (shrink)

Traite et esclavage appartiennent toujours au temps « précolonial » et pré-moderne. ils demeurent des objets marginalisés dans l'histoire coloniale. ils n'appartiennent pas encore au temps colonial, toujours majoritairement conçu comme le temps court du colonialisme post-abolitionniste. La mémoire a constitué un espace de résistance contre un récit historique qui s'écrivait en niant l'existence de cet événement. Cependant, le temps est venu pour les descendants de captifs et d'esclaves de faire appel à la mémoire pour revendiquer une identité particulière et (...) la reconnaissance du drame terrible, un « crime contre l'humanité » qu'ont vécu leurs ancêtres.Slavery and the Slave Trade have always been considered as belonging to a "pre-colonial" and pre­-modern time, and are marginalised in colonial history. They are not yet seen as part of the colonial age, which is still mainly considered in terms of the short period of post-abolitionist colonialism. Memory has made it possible to resist a historical narrative that denies the existence of events even as it is written. But for the descendants of captives and slaves, the lime has come to cali on memory to daim their specifie identity and to plead for recognition of the dreadful tragedy, the " crime against humanity", that their ancestors suffered. (shrink)

La tradition éthique en économie politique a été régénérée par l’Ecole de Salamanque, mais nous ne sommes pas habitués à associer le libéralisme aux scholastiques qui avaient élaboré une théorie du juste prix de validité universelle. Le marché a perdu sa dimension morale avec le rationalisme et, non dans une moindre mesure, à travers le biais religieux de la théorie de la valeur travail. Quand elle fut redécouverte en tant qu’origine véritable de la valeur, l’utilité ne recouvrit pas sa portée (...) morale, en raison du traitement mathématique qu’on lui réserva. Le rationalisme a supprimé toute conception d’évolution sociale en même temps qu’il a favorisé l’intervention. Cependant, dans cette ère de corruption, un retour à l’acception de sens commun des prix requiert, selon l’auteur, le franchissement d’une étape supplémentaire, celui de maintenir l’ancrage éthique du juste prix ou du prix du marché.The ethical tradition in political economy was regenerated by the School of Salamanca, but we are not used to associating liberalism with these Scholastics who built a theory of the just price with universal validity. The market lost its moral dimension with rationalism, not least through the religious bias of the labor theory of value. When rediscovered as the correct source of value, utility did not regain its former moral significance because of mathematical treatment. Rationalism has suppressed any concept of social evolution while promoting intervention, but, in the age of corruption, a return to the common sense of prices, the author argues, requires the further step of upholding the ethical standards of the just price or market price. (shrink)

In a famous passage in A Theory of Justice, Rawls had an interesting view on fraternity. However, he did not develop it further. The first aim of this article is to show that there are at least two possible interpretations of what Rawls wrote about fraternity: the narrow interpretation and the wide interpretation. We will focus on the narrow interpretation and attract attention to the kinds of problems it presents. In the last section we will assert that there are different (...) ways of conceptualising the ideal of fraternity and that Rawls’s general approach to the issue was just one of them and maybe not the most attractive one. (shrink)