Gibt es objektive Werte oder Wertüberzeugungen? Worin manifestieren sie sich? In diesen Fragen besteht das Problem moralischen Wissens. Die etablierten metaethischen Theorien beanspruchen zwar plausible Antworten geben zu können, halten dabei jedoch an zwei problematischen Voraussetzungen fest: Ihnen liegt explizit oder implizit ein propositionaler Wissensbegriff und eine Dichotomie von Fakten und Werten zugrunde. In Anschluss an die Philosophie Hegels entwickelt Florian Heusinger von Waldegge ein alternatives Theorieangebot, das die Dogmen der Moralphilosophie hinter sich lässt, ohne eine relativistische oder nonkognitivistische (...) Rückzugsposition einnehmen zu müssen. (shrink)

Gibt es objektive Werte oder Wertüberzeugungen? Worin manifestieren sie sich? In diesen Fragen besteht das Problem moralischen Wissens. Die etablierten metaethischen Theorien beanspruchen zwar plausible Antworten geben zu können, halten dabei jedoch an zwei problematischen Voraussetzungen fest: Ihnen liegt explizit oder implizit ein propositionaler Wissensbegriff und eine Dichotomie von Fakten und Werten zugrunde. In Anschluss an die Philosophie Hegels entwickelt Florian Heusinger von Waldegge ein alternatives Theorieangebot, das die Dogmen der Moralphilosophie hinter sich lässt, ohne eine relativistische oder nonkognitivistische (...) Rückzugsposition einnehmen zu müssen. (shrink)

The editors of the Applied Logic Series are happy to present to the reader the fifth volume in the series, a collection of papers on Logic, Language and Computation. One very striking feature of the application of logic to language and to computation is that it requires the combination, the integration and the use of many diverse systems and methodologies - all in the same single application. The papers in this volume will give the reader a glimpse into the problems (...) of this active frontier of logic. The Editors CONTENTS Preface IX 1. S. AKAMA Recent Issues in Logic, Language and Computation 1 2. M. J. CRESSWELL Restricted Quantification 27 3. B. H. SLATER The Epsilon Calculus' Problematic 39 4. K. VON HEUSINGER Definite Descriptions and Choice Functions 61 5. N. ASHER Spatio-Temporal Structure in Text 93 6. Y. NAKAYAMA DRT and Many-Valued Logics 131 7. S. AKAMA On Constructive Modality 143 8. H. W ANSING Displaying as Temporalizing: Sequent Systems for Subintuitionistic Logics 159 9. L. FARINAS DEL CERRO AND V. LUGARDON 179 Quantification and Dependence Logics 10. R. SYLVAN Relevant Conditionals, and Relevant Application Thereof 191 Index 245 Preface This is a collection of papers by distinguished researchers on Logic, Lin guistics, Philosophy and Computer Science. The aim of this book is to address a broad picture of the recent research on related areas. In particular, the contributions focus on natural language semantics and non-classical logics from different viewpoints. (shrink)

Epsilon terms indexed by contexts were used by K. von Heusinger to represent definite and indefinite noun phrases as well as some other constructs of natural language. We provide a language and a complete first order system allowing to formalize basic aspects of this representation. The main axiom says that for any finite collection S 1,…,S k of distinct definable sets and elements a 1,…,a k of these sets there exists a choice function assigning a i to S i (...) for all i≤k. We prove soundness and completeness theorems for this system S ε i fin. (shrink)

It is widely held that our beliefs can be epistemically faultless despite being morally flawed. Theories of moral encroachment challenge this, holding that moral considerations bear on the epistemic status of our attitudes. According to attitude-based theories of moral encroachment, morality encroaches upon the epistemic standing of our attitudes on the grounds that we can morally injure others with our epistemic practices. In this paper, I aim to show that current attitude-based theories have asymmetric mechanisms: moral features only make it (...) harder for attitudes to secure epistemic merits. I argue that, if attitudes can incur moral injury, failure to form attitudes can too. To make sense of this, I contend, attitude-based accounts require symmetric mechanisms, allowing that moral considerations make it both harder and easier for attitudes to attain epistemic merits. I maintain that, once we recognize this, attitude-based encroachment views must soon concede that they sometimes demand we believe against the evidence. (shrink)

It is a recurring mantra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite (...) similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Arbeit enthält Bemerkungen über den Intuitionismus and über seine Beziehungen zu anderen Gebieten der Grundlagenforschung. Innerhalb der intuitionistischen Mathematik werden, im Anschluss an die Kritik von Griss gegen den Gebrauch der Negation, Evidenzstufen unterschieden, abhängend von der Art, in der bedingte Konstruktionen zugelassen werden. Auch werden gewisse Schwierigkeiten in der Theorie der endlichen Spezies diskutiert. Was die Grundlagenforschung im Aligemeinen betrifft, wird bemerkt, dass sie die klassische Mathematik weitgehend in ihre intuitiven, formalen and platonischen Bestandteile zerlegt hat. Es wird (...) näher eingegangen auf die These von Church in der Theorie der rekursiven Funktionen.RésuméL'article contient des remarques sur l'intuitionisme et sur ses rapports avec les autres directions dans la recherche des fondements. Dans la mathématique intuitioniste, et en connexion avec la critique de Griss contre l'usage de la négation, on distingue des degrés d'évidence, dépendant de l'espèce de constructions conditionnées qui est admise. En outre, on discute certaines difficultés dans la théorie des espèces finies. Concernant la recherche des fondements en général, on remarque que les mathématiques classiques ont été scindées en leurs éléments intuitifs, formels et platonistes. Quelques remarques sur la thèse de Church dans la théorie des fonctions récursives terminent l'article.The paper contains remarks on intuitionism and its relations with other domains of foundational research. Inside the intuitionistic mathematics, in connection with Griss' criticism against the use of negation, different degrees of evidence are distinguished, depending upon the way in which conditioned constructions are admitted. Some difficulties in the theory of finite species are discussed. Concerning the foundational research in general it is observed that it has separated intuitive, formal and platonistic constituents in classical mathematics. Some remarks are made on Church's thesis in the theory of recursive functions. (shrink)

Humans ought to do much more in order to remedy the severe harm caused by climate change. While there seems to be an overall consensus that governments and other national and international political agents need to resolve the problem, there is no agreement yet on the role and responsibility of individuals in this process. In this paper, I suggest an argument of integrity that offers strong pro tanto moral reasons for individuals to reduce their personal greenhouse gas emissions. Hourdequin (2010) (...) has presented an argument of integrity to justify a corresponding obligation. In this paper, I argue that even though Hourdequin’s argument is appealing, it has important limitations. I advance the argument in light of the current literature so that it is not subject to these limitations and establishes an overall more comprehensive justification for why individuals ought to reduce their personal emissions. (shrink)

I (mostly) accept Ancell’s argument that my proposal for dealing with the radical behavioral challenge entails what he calls ‘the excessive recusal problem’. I argue that this is no reason to reject my proposal, but rather an opportunity for further reflection on what behavioral and normative ethicists can learn from each other. I make some suggestions for future lines of inquiry for both fields.

Leibniz holds that creatures require divine concurrence for all their actions, and that this concurrence is 'special,' that is, directed at the particular qualities of each action. This gives rise to two potential problems. The first is the problem of explaining why special concurrence does not make God a co-author of creaturely actions. Second, divine concurrence may seem incompatible with the central Leibnizian doctrine that substances must act spontaneously, or independently of other substances. Concurrence, in other words, may appear to (...) jeopardize creaturely substancehood. I argue that Leibniz can solve both of these problems by invoking final and formal causation. The creature is the sole author of its actions because it alone contributes the formal and final cause to these actions. Similarly, because it contributes the formal and final cause, the creature possesses what I call explanatory spontaneity. Leibniz, I contend, considers this type of spontaneity sufficient for substancehood. (shrink)

Some have tried to make miracles compatible with the laws of nature by re-defining them as something other than interventions. By contrast, this article argues that although miracles are divine interventions, they are not violations of the laws of nature. Miracles are also not exceptions to the laws, nor do the laws not apply to them. The laws never have exceptions; they never are violated or suspended, are probably necessary and unchangeable, and apply also to divine interventions. We need to (...) reconsider not miracles but laws. The main claim of this article is that laws of nature do not entail regularities, and therefore that miracles do not violate the laws. We need a new theory of the laws of nature: the tendency theory. (shrink)

What seem to be Kurt Gödel’s first notes on logic, an exercise notebook of 84 pages, contains formal proofs in higher-order arithmetic and set theory. The choice of these topics is clearly suggested by their inclusion in Hilbert and Ackermann’s logic book of 1928, the Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik. Such proofs are notoriously hard to construct within axiomatic logic. Gödel takes without further ado into use a linear system of natural deduction for the full language of higher-order logic, with formal (...) derivations closer to one hundred steps in length and up to four nested temporary assumptions with their scope indicated by vertical intermittent lines. (shrink)

Includes "Coldness and Cruelty," by Gilles Deleuze, a study of masochism and sadism, as well as "Venus in Furs," the original novel by Leopold von Sacher-Masoch.

The claim of this article is that no event can determine a later event and that in this sense there cannot be sufficient causes. Therefore the causal structure of the world does not exclude free will, even if there are no chance processes.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

ZusammenfassungObwohl in neuerer Zeit das transzendentale Denken auch in der Ethik angewendet wird, fehlt selbst in der Kant‐Forschung eine genauere Untersuchung der Frage, wie sich das transzendentale Programm zu Kants eigener Intention einer praktischen Vernunftkritik verhält. Die folgenden Überlegungen zeigen erstens, dass das transzendentale Philosophieren nicht bloss in der Erkenntnis‐ und Gegenstandstheorie, sondern auch in der Theorie der Sittlichkeit sinnvoll ist. Sie erörtern zweitens, welche Elemente der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft tatsächlich auf die transzendentalen Fragestellung zurückgehen. Da wesentliche Teile der (...) Kantischen Ethik das transzendentale Programm grundsätzlich sprengen, wird drittens Kants Idee einer vernunftkritischen Ethik entwickelt, um schliesslich jene Teile, die nicht durch den transzendentalen Ansatz erklärt werden können, vom Programm einer praktischen Vernunftkritik her zu verstehen. Die Abhandlung leistet zugleich einen Beitrag zur systematischen Ethik‐Diskussion. Denn sie zeigt, dass eine sachgerechte philosophische Ethik sich weder auf das analytische oder hermeneutische noch auf das transzendentale Programm festlegen lässt, vielmehr nur durch das Ineinandergreifen mehrerer Verfahren möglich wird. (shrink)