Stanley, M.C., A Π12 singleton incompatible with 0#, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 66 27–88. A non-constructible Π12 singleton that is absolute for ω-models of ZF is produced by class forcing over the minimum model.

It is shown that there is no satisfactory first-order characterization of those subsets of ω 2 that have closed unbounded subsets in ω 1 , ω 2 and GCH preserving outer models. These “anticharacterization” results generalize to subsets of successors of uncountable regular cardinals. Similar results are proved for trees of height and cardinality κ + and for partitions of [ κ + ] 2 , when κ is an infinite cardinal.

It is proved (Theorem 1) that if 0♯ exists, then any constructible forcing property which over L adds no reals, over V collapses an uncountable L-cardinal to cardinality ω. This improves a theorem of Foreman, Magidor, and Shelah. Also, a method for approximating this phenomenon generically is found (Theorem 2). The strategy is first to reduce the problem of `disabling' forcing properties to that of specializing certain trees in a weak sense.

0$^{\sharp}$ can be invisibly class generic.

It is shown that if κ is an uncountable successor cardinal in L[ 0 ♯ ], then there is a normal tree T ∈ L [ 0 ♯ ] of height κ such that $0^\sharp \not\in L\lbrack\mathbf{T}\rbrack$ . Yet T is $ -distributive in L[ 0 ♯ ]. A proper class version of this theorem yields an analogous L[ 0 ♯ ]-definable tree such that distinct branches in the presence of 0 ♯ collapse the universe. A heretofore unutilized method for (...) constructing in L[ 0 ♯ ] generic objects for certain L-definable forcings and "exotic sequences", combinatorial principles introduced by C. Gray, are used in constructing these trees. (shrink)

A collection of five essays in which the religious experiences and activities of individuals, communities, and cultures are seen as preeminently rational responses to reality. Of interest to students and scholars of technology and philosophy.

Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

This white paper outlines the plans of the History Philosophy Culture Working Group of the Next Generation Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration.

In August 1976 the research seminar 'Decision-making in business' was organized at Nijenrode, The Netherlands School of Business. More than fifty scientists and practitioners from nine countries presented research papers in one of the six discussion groups. Some ofthem also presented some of their ideas in front of a large mixed audience at a one-day symposium. Many of the papers presented at Nijenrode were of such a high quality that the decision to publish a selection of them was an easy (...) one. At the same time the new series Nijenrode studies in business was initiated. All who were involved, the policy committee 'Of the Nijenrode studies, the advisory and editorial board of the series, the publisher, and the organizing committee of the seminar and symposium, acclaimed the idea of publishing three volumes in the new series. A collection of eleven papers could be grouped under the title Trends in managerial andfinancial accounting, and has been published as volume 1 of this series. A collection of fourteen papers has been published as the second volume under the title Trends in financial decision making, while this volume, consisting of twelve papers (and an introduction) explores the theme Trends in business ethics. The introduction by Stanley L. Jakiwas written for the symposium. It suggests why the papers of Pjotr Hesseling, Antoine Kreykamp, and Richard H. Viola, which were not presented at Nijenrode, are introduced here. (shrink)

According to an accepted view of the nature of evaluation, which many trace to Hume, knowledge does not provide us with the criteria for judging whether something is good. For this, it is said, we need something like a pro-attitude such as C. L. Stevenson argues for, or a decision such as R. M. Hare argues for. Some act of the will is required to create the criteria for evaluation. I shall argue against this view. I shall argue that the (...) criteria for evaluating something are identical with the criteria for classifying it and that, therefore, the knowledge which provides us with the criteria for classification provides us with the criteria for evaluation.In Section I, I give a brief account of the way in which knowledge provides the criteria for a classification and the significance of borderline cases and degree differences in classification. In Section II, I develop the idea of degree differences in classification and tie it to the idea of evaluation. In Section III, I defend my account of evaluative criteria by contrasting it with R. M. Hare's account, and I argue that the criteria for the class concept of man are at the basis of moral evaluation. I end with a brief illustration of my thesis from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:69. A PROPOS D'UNE DIFFICULTE LOGIQUE DANS L'ARGUMENT DE CLEANTHE L'argument de Cléanthe ("the Argument from Design", c'est-à-dire la preuve de Dieu par le dessein du monde) se fonde sur le principe que "des effets semblables prouvent des causes semblables" pour montrer que la ressemblance entre le dessein du monde et le dessein des machines amène la conclusion que la cause du dessein du monde ressemble à l'intelligence humaine. (...) Dans l'attaque de Philon contre cet argument, nous trouvons deux passages dans les Parties IV et V consacrés aux difficultés qui proviennent de l'anthropomorphisme de Cléanthe. Et le raisonnement par l'absurde de Philon prend pour point de départ cette conception anthropomorphique de Dieu: Et que dites-vous des découvertes d'anatomie, de chimie, de botanique?... - Ce ne sont certes pas là des objections, répondit Cléanthe; elles découvrent seulment de nouveaux exemples d'art et d'industrie. C'est encore l'image de l'esprit que réfléchissent sur nous d'innombrables objets. - Ajoutez: un esprit pareil à l'esprit humain, dit Philon. - Je n'en connais point d'autre, répondit Cléanthe. - Et plus it est pareil, mieux cela vaut? insista Philon. - Bien sûr, dit Cléanthe. (p. 53) La première étape de son argument s'ensuit: Eh bien, Cléanthe, dit Philon, avec un air d'allégresse et de triomphe, remarquez les conséquences. Premièrement, par cette méthode de raisonnement, vous renoncez à toute prétention à l'infinité en aucun des attributs de la Divinité. Car, puisque la cause doit seulement être proportionnée à l'effet, et que l'effet, pour autant qu'il tombe sous notre connaissance, n'est pas infini, quel droit avons-nous, selon vos suppositions, de prêter cet attribut à l'Etre divin? Vous soutiendrez encore 70. qu'en l'éloignant à ce point de toute similitude avec les créatures humaines, nous donnons dans l'hypothèse la plus arbitraire, et, en même temps, affaiblissons toutes les preuves de son existence. (p. 53) On pourrait croire que l'argument de Philon est inadmissible, soit à cause de son pyrrhonisme, soit à cause de sa doctrine sur la causalité (celle de Hume lui-même) qui n'admet pas la connaissance a priori des causes. Mais en fait l'argument déployé par Philon ne représente pas sa propre position (et n'entre donc pas en conflit avec son pyrrhonisme), et en tant qu'il fait appel à la causalité, n'est point valable. Pour voir qu'il en est ainsi, on n'a qu'à regarder sa phrase préliminaire "par cette méthode du raisonnement" ainsi que la phrase "selon vos suppositions" qui montrent que cette première étape s'ensuit de la position de Cléanthe. Pourquoi Philon met-il en avant cet argument? Ou plutôt, qu'a dit Cléanthe pour amener Philon à mettre cet argument à son compte? La response se trouve dans la version de Cléanthe de la preuve de Dieu par le dessein, dans la Partie II: "Puis donc que les effets se ressemblent entre eux, nous sommes conduits à inférer, d'après toutes les règles de l'analogie, que les causes se ressemblent également, et que l'auteur de la nature est quelque peu semblable à l'esprit de l'homme, quoique doué de facultés bien plus vastes, proportionnées à la grandeur de l'oeuvre qu'il a exécutée. Par cet argument a posteriori, et par cet argument seul, nous prouvons à la fois l'existence d'une Divinité et sa similitude avec l'esprit et l'intelligence de l'homme." (p. 26 les italiques sont de moi) C'est donc Cléanthe qui peu après le début voudrait que, dans ces cas où seul l'effet se fait observer, nous devions proportionner la cause à l'effet. 71. On pourrait m'objecter que je n'ai pas encore montré que l'argument de Philon ne l'engage pas à poser un Dieu fini qui conviendrait à l'effet fini (le dessein du monde), que son propos que "la cause devrait être proportionnée à l... (shrink)

Bambrough, R. Essay on man.--Quinton, A. Has man an essence?--Warnock, G. J. Kant and anthropology.--Honderich, T. On inequality and violence, and the differences we make between them.--Cherry, C. Agreement, objectivity and the sentiment of humanity in morals.--Gregory, I. Psycho-analysis, human nature and human conduct.--Gosling, J. The natural supremacy of conscience.--Scruton, R. Reason and happiness.--Wollheim, R. Needs, desires, and moral turpitude.--Hollis, M. My role and its duties.--Watkins, J. Three views concerning human freedom.--Letwin, S. R. Nature, history, and morality.--Passmore, J. Attitudes to (...) nature.--Benson, J. Hog in sloth, fox in stealth: man and beast in moral thinking.--Hare, R. Contrasting methods of environmental planning.--Self, P. Techniques and values in policy decisions. (shrink)

Followers of Wittgenstein allegedly once held that a meaningful claim to know that p could only be made if there was some doubt about the truth of p. The correct response to this thesis involved appealing to the distinction between the semantic content of a sentence and features attaching to its use. It is inappropriate to assert a knowledge-claim unless someone in the audience has doubt about what the speaker claims to know. But this fact has nothing to do with (...) the semantic content of knowledgeascriptions; it is entirely explicable by appeal to pragmatic facts about felicitous assertion. (shrink)

Books Reviewed in this Article: Transforming Bible Study. By Walter Wink. Pp.175, London, SCM Press, 1981, £3.50. Isaiah 1–39. By R.E. Clements. Pp.xvi. 301, London, Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1980, £3.95. Isaiah 40–66. By R.N. Whybray. Pp.301, London, Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1975, Reprinted 1981, £3.95. Die Gestalt Jesu in den synoptischen Evangelien. By Heinrich Kahlefeld. Pp.264, Frankfurt, Verlag Josef Knecht, 1981, no price given. Following Jesus: Discipleship in the Gospel of Mark. By Ernest Best. Pp.283, Sheffield, JSOT Press, 1981, (...) £15.00, £5.95. The Origin of Paul's Gospel. By Seyoon Kim. Pp.xii, 391, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1981, 78 DM. An die Römer. By Ernst Käsemann. Pp.xvi, 411, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1980, 48 DM. Les Récits de Resurrection des Morts dans le Nouveau Testament. By Gerard Rochais. Pp.xv, 252, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £15.00. Prêtres Anciens, Prétre Nouveau selon le Nouveau Testament. By Albert Vanhoye. Pp.366, Paris Editions du Seuil, 1980, no price given. Woman in the World of Jesus. By Evelyn and Frank Stagg. Pp.292, Edinburgh, The St Andrew Press, 1981, no price given. Jesus, Man and the Church. By Karl Rahner. Pp.260, London, Darton Longman & Todd, 1981, £14.50. Jesus Lord and Savior: A Theopathic Christology and Soteriology. By William M. Thompson. Pp.ix, 287, Leominster, Fowler Wright, 1981, £7.45. God and World in Schleiermacher's ‘Dialektik’ and ‘Glaubenslehre’. Criticism and the Methodology of Dogmatics. By John E. Thiel. Pp.xiv, 239, Bern, Frankfurt and Las Vegas, Peter Lang, 1981, SF 49.50. Ministry: A Case for Change. By Edward Schillebeeckx. Pp.ix, 165, London, SCM Press, 1981, £4.95. The Sacraments: Readings in Contemporary Sacramental Theology. Edited by Michael J. Taylor. Pp.274, New York, Alba House, 1981, $7.95. Believing in the Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith. A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England. Pp.ix, 310, London, SPCK, 1981, £8.50. Confessing the Faith in the Church of England Today. By R.T. Beckwith. Pp.36, Oxford, La timer House, 1981, £1.00. A Kind of Noah's Ark? The Anglican Commitment to Comprehensiveness. By J.I. Packer. Pp.39, Oxford, Latimer House, 1981, £1.00. Reasonable Belief: A Survey of the Christian Faith. By Anthony Hanson and Richard Hanson. Pp.xii, 283, Oxford University Press, 1981, £8.50. Doctrine in the Church of England. The 1938 Report with a new introduction by G.W.H. Lampe. Pp.lx, 242, London, SPCK, 1982, £8.50. The Divine Right of the Papacy in Recent Ecumenical Theology. By J. Michael Miller. Pp.xvi, 322, Rome, Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1980, 18,000 Lire. Der heilige Geist in der Theologie von Heribert Mühlen: Versucheiner Darstellung und Würdigung. By John B. Banawiratma. Pp.ix, 310, Frankfurt and Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1981, SFr. 60.00. Standing Before God: Studies on Prayer in Scriptures and Tradition with Essays in Honor of John M. Oesterreicher. Edited by Asher Frinkel and Lawrence Frizzell. Pp.410, New York, Ktav Publishing House, 1981, $29.50. Judaism and Healing. By J. David Bleich. Pp.xiii, 199, New York, Ktav, 1981, $15.00. The Diversity of Moral Thinking. By Neil Cooper. Pp.x, 303, Oxford, Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1981, £15.00. L'Homme: Sujet ou Objet? By Jacques Croteau. Pp.260, Montreal, Bellarmin: Tournai, Desclée et Cie, 1981, $15.00. The Texture of Knowledge: An Essay on Religion and Science. By James W. Jones. Pp.97, Washington, University Press of America, 1981, no price given. Cosmos and Creator. By Stanley L. Jaki. Pp.xii, 168, Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1980, £6.75. Dante, Philomythes and Philosopher: Man in the Cosmos. By Patrick Boyde. Pp.vii, 408, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £30.00. Dissidence et Philosophie au Mayen Âge. By E.L. Fortin. Pp.201, Montreal, Bellarmin, 1981, $12.00. The Philosophy of John Norris of Bemerton. By Richard Acworth. Pp.x, 388, Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1979, 74 DM. Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought. By David Miller. Pp.xii, 218, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, £15.00. Hegelianism. By John Edward Toews. Pp.x, 450, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, £25.00. One Hundred Years of Thomism. Edited by V.B. Brezik. Pp.210, Houston, Centre for Thomistic Studies, 1981, no price given. Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process. By J.V. Femia. Pp.xiii, 303, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, £17.50. Greek and Roman Slavery. By Thomas Wiedemann. Pp.xvi, 284, London, Croom Helm, 1981, £10.95, £5.95. Prophecy and Millenarianism. Essays in Honour of Marjorie Reeves. Edited by Ann Williams. Pp.x, 355, London, Longman, 1980, £25.00. Of Prelates and Princes: A Study of the Economic and Social Position of the Tudor Episcopate. By Felicity Heal. Pp.xv, 353, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, £17.50. Radical Religious Movements in Early Modern Europe. By Michael Mullett. Pp.xxiv, 193, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1980, £10.50. The Jesuits. By J.C.H. Aveling. Pp.390, London, Blond and Briggs, 1981, £16.95. The Beginnings of Ideology. By Donald R. Kelley. Pp.xv, 351, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £24.00. Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing 1516–1700. By J.C. Davis. Pp.x, 427, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £25.00. Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917–1979. By Hansjakob Stehle. Pp.466, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1981, £16.20, £8.10. Structuralism or Criticism? By Geoffrey Strickland. Pp.viii, 209, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £17.50. The Call of God: The Theme of Vocation in the Poetry of Donne and Herbert. By Robert B. Shaw. Pp.xiii, 123, Cambridge, Mass., Cowley Publications, 1981, $5.00. John and Charles Wesley: Selected Prayers, Hymns, Journal Notes, Sermons, Letters and Treatises. Edited by Frank Whaling. Pp.xx, 412, London, SPCK, 1981, £8.95. The Trickster in West Africa: A Study of Mythic Irony and Sacred Delight. By Robert D. Pelton. Pp.312, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980, £15.00. (shrink)

Since the 1930s, scientists studying the neurological disease scrapie had assumed that the infectious agent was a virus. By the mid 1960s, however, several unconventional properties had arisen that were difficult to reconcile with the standard viral model. Evidence for nucleic acid within the pathogen was lacking, and some researchers considered the possibility that the infectious agent consisted solely of protein. In 1982, Stanley Prusiner coined the term `prion' to emphasize the agent's proteinaceous nature. This infectious protein hypothesis was (...) denounced by many scientists as `heretical'.This essay asks why the concept of an infectious protein was considered controversial. Some biologists justified their evaluation of this hypothesis on the grounds that an infectious protein contradicted the `central dogma of molecular biology'. Others referred to vague theoretical constraints such as molecular biology's `theoretical structure' or `framework'. Examination of the objections raised by researchers reveals exactly what generalizations were being challenged by a protein model of infection.This two-part survey of scrapie and prion research reaches several conclusions: (1) A theoretical framework is present in molecular biology, exerting its influence in hypothesis formation and evaluation; (2) This framework consists of several related, yet separable, generalizations or `elements', including Francis Crick's Central Dogma and Sequence Hypothesis, plus notions concerning infection, replication, protein synthesis, and protein folding; (3) The term `central dogma' has stretched beyond Crick's original 1958 definition to encompass at least two other `framework elements': replication and protein synthesis; and (4) From the study of scrapie and related diseases, biological information has been delineated into at least two classes: sequential and what I call `conformational'.In Part I of this essay, a brief review of the central dogma, as outlined by both Francis Crick and James Watson, will be given. The developments in scrapie research from 1965 to 1972 will then be traced. This section will summarize many of the puzzling, non-viral-like properties of the scrapie agent. Alternative hypotheses to the viral explanation will also be presented, including early versions of a protein-only hypothesis. Part II of this essay will follow the developments in scrapie and prion research from the mid 1970s through 1991. The growing prominence of a protein-only model of infection will be balanced by continued objections from many researchers to a pathogen devoid of nucleic acid. These objections will help illuminate those generalizations in molecular biology that were indeed challenged by a protein-only model of infection. (shrink)

In “The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art,” Arthur Danto argues that there were two stages to the platonic critique of the arts: ephemeralization and takeover. Danto's philosophy of art sought a rescue by detaching art from the philosophy of art in a manner that would give back to the arts the very dangerousness that so alarmed Plato in the first instance. This chapter draws Danto's theory into conversation with Stanley Cavell's and T.W. Adorno's philosophies of modernism. Ugliness or terribleness is (...) constitutive of how these artworks mean to sustain the acts of visual attention they invite. Art can only fail to demonstrate the authority of art's own forms and modes of claiming because being mere art is the historical mechanism of art's continuing disenfranchisement, which explains why one school of the intractable avant‐garde sought the immediate re‐unification of art with everyday practice in order to end art. (shrink)