Trait emotional intelligence (trait EI) covers a wide range of self-perceived skills and personality dispositions such as motivation, confidence, optimism, peer relations and coping with stress. In the last few years, there has been a growing awareness that social and emotional factors play an important part in students? academic success and it has been claimed that those with high scores on a trait EI measure perform better. This research investigated whether scores on a questionnaire measure of trait EI were related (...) to school performance in a sample of British pupils. Results showed that high performing students had higher trait EI scores than low performing students and that some aspects of trait EI (motivation and low impulsivity) as well as total trait EI were significant predictors of academic achievement after controlling for prior attainment at school. Therefore, initiatives to develop the emotional and social abilities of schoolchildren might be worthwhile and more effective than concentrating solely on teaching and curriculum activities. (shrink)

Curriculum 2000 has meant significant change for the post-16 sector. New qualifications have been introduced (e.g. the new Advanced Subsidiary examination) and the number of students involved in education and training post-16 has increased. In this scenario how can the standards of new qualifications, particularly the new Advanced Subsidiary examinations, be compared with those of previous qualifications? One method is to use the prior achievement of candidates (i.e. GCSE results) as a basis for comparison of their results on subsequent qualifications (...) (i.e. A levels and AS). This method of comparability and its limitations will be explored using examples with actual data. (shrink)

In his (1981) paper, Stalnaker has revised his old theory of conditionals and has given the revision an interesting defense. Indeed, Stalnaker shows that this new theory meets the standard objections put to the old. However, I argue that the revision runs into difficulties in the context of quantum mechanics: If Stalnaker's theory of the conditional is assumed, then from plausible assumptions certain Bell-like conflicts with experiment can be derived. This result, I go on to argue, is a good (...) reason to reject Stalnaker's theory, at least for the quantum mechanical context. (shrink)

Research on the nature of science and science education enjoys a longhistory, with its origins in Ernst Mach's work in the late nineteenthcentury and John Dewey's at the beginning of the twentieth century.As early as 1909 the Central Association for Science and MathematicsTeachers published an article – ‘A Consideration of the Principles thatShould Determine the Courses in Biology in Secondary Schools’ – inSchool Science and Mathematics that reflected foundational concernsabout science and how school curricula should be informed by them. (...) Sincethen a large body of literature has developed related to the teaching andlearning about nature of science – see, for example, the Lederman and Meichtry reviews cited below. As well there has been intensephilosophical, historical and philosophical debate about the nature of scienceitself, culminating in the much-publicised ‘Science Wars’ of recent time. Thereferences listed here primarily focus on the empirical research related to thenature of science as an educational goal; along with a few influential philosophicalworks by such authors as Kuhn, Popper, Laudan, Lakatos, and others. Whilenot exhaustive, the list should prove useful to educators, and scholars in otherfields, interested in the nature of science and how its understanding can berealised as a goal of science instruction. The authors welcome correspondenceregarding omissions from the list, and on-going additions that can be made to it. (shrink)

Periodically, we take stock of SubStance and provide a brief statement regarding initiatives and priorities in the journal's interests. Three years ago, we announced that "Exploring hybrid writing with theoretical impact is at the center of our current preoccupations."1 Since that time, the journal has made significant changes. This issue marks our fourth issue of publishing with Johns Hopkins University Press in a transition that recognizes our new publisher as a leader among university presses.Our plan also expressed our intent to (...) move toward publishing digital work that exemplifies theoretical thinking in nonlinear, experimental forms. In 2018, we launched Digital SubStance, a platform for "hybrid work that... (shrink)

where f ′ (x) is the derivative of f(x) and A is a quantity whose value depends on both x and δx. Now if it were possible to take δx so small (but not demonstrably identical with 0) that (δx)2 = 0 then (1) would assume the simple form..

A structure is a triple A = (A, {Ri: i ∈ I}, {ej: j ∈ J}), where A, the domain or universe of A, is a nonempty set, {Ri: i ∈ I} is an indexed family of relations on A and {ej: j ∈ J}) is an indexed set of elements —the designated elements of A. For each i ∈ I there is then a natural number λ(i) —the degree of Ri —such that Ri is a λ(i)-place relation on A, (...) i.e., Ri ⊆ Aλ(i). This λ may be regarded as a function from I to the set ω of natural numbers; the pair (λ, J) is called the type of A. Structures of the same type are said to be similar. Note that since an n-place operation f: An → A can be regarded as an (n+1)-place relation on A, algebraic structures containing operations such as groups, rings, vector spaces, etc. may be construed as structures in the above sense. (shrink)

I describe two approaches to modelling the universe, the one having its origin in topos theory and differential geometry, the other in set theory. The first is synthetic differential geometry. Traditionally, there have been two methods of deriving the theorems of geometry: the analytic and the synthetic. While the analytical method is based on the introduction of numerical coordinates, and so on the theory of real numbers, the idea behind the synthetic approach is to furnish the subject of geometry with (...) a purely geometric foundation in which the theorems are then deduced by purely logical means from an initial body of postulates. The most familiar examples of the synthetic geometry are classical Euclidean geometry and the synthetic projective geometry introduced by Desargues in the 17th century and revived and developed by Carnot, Poncelet, Steiner and others during the 19th century. The power of analytic geometry derives very largely from the fact that it permits the methods of the calculus, and, more generally, of mathematical analysis, to be introduced into geometry, leading in particular to differential geometry (a term, by the way, introduced in 1894 by the Italian geometer Luigi Bianchi). That being the case, the idea of a “synthetic” differential geometry seems elusive: how can differential geometry be placed on a “purely geometric” or “axiomatic” foundation when the apparatus of the calculus seems inextricably involved? To my knowledge there have been two attempts to develop a synthetic differential geometry. The first was initiated by Herbert Busemann in the 1940s, building on earlier work of Paul Finsler. Here the idea was to build a differential geometry that, in its author’s words, “requires no derivatives”: the basic objects in Busemann’s approach are not differentiable manifolds, but metric spaces of a certain type in which the notion of a geodesic can be defined in an intrinsic manner. I shall not have anything more to say about this approach. The second approach, that with which I shall be concerned here, was originally proposed in the 1960s by F.. (shrink)

Traditionally, there have been two methods of deriving the theorems of geometry: the analytic and the synthetic. While the analytical method is based on the introduction of numerical coordinates, and so on the theory of real numbers, the idea behind the synthetic approach is to furnish the subject of geometry with a purely geometric foundation in which the theorems are then deduced by purely logical means from an initial body of postulates. The most familiar examples of the synthetic geometry are (...) classical Euclidean geometry and the synthetic projective geometry introduced by Desargues in the 17th century and revived and developed by Carnot, Poncelet, Steiner and others during the 19th century. The power of analytic geometry derives very largely from the fact that it permits the methods of the calculus, and, more generally, of mathematical analysis, to be introduced into geometry, leading in particular to differential geometry (a term, by the way, introduced in 1894 by the Italian geometer Luigi Bianchi). That being the case, the idea of a “synthetic” differential geometry seems elusive: how can differential geometry be placed on a “purely geometric” or “axiomatic” foundation when the apparatus of the calculus seems inextricably involved? To my knowledge there have been two attempts to develop a synthetic differential geometry. The first was initiated by Herbert Busemann in the 1940s, building on earlier work of Paul Finsler. Here the idea was to build a differential geometry that, in its author’s words, “requires no derivatives”: the basic objects in Busemann’s approach are not differentiable manifolds, but metric spaces of a certain type in which the notion of a geodesic can be defined in an intrinsic manner. I shall not have anything more to say about this approach. The second approach, that with which I shall be concerned here, was originally proposed in the 1960s by F. W. Lawvere, who was in fact striving to fashion a decisive axiomatic framework for continuum mechanics.. (shrink)

Call a family F of subsets of a set E inductive if ∅ ∈ F and F is closed under unions with disjoint singletons, that is, if ∀X∈F ∀x∈E–X(X ∪ {x} ∈ F]. A Frege structure is a pair (E.

With precision and profundity born of 30 years of devoted study, John Boyle offers an essential introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas on Scripture, shedding helpful light on the goals, methods, and commitments that animate the Angelic Doctor's engagement with the sacred page. Because the genius of St. Thomas's approach to the Bible lies not so much in its novelty but rather in the fidelity and clarity with which he recapitulates the riches of the preceding interpretive Tradition, this initiation into (...) St. Thomas's vision of Scripture is itself an orientation to the Church's vision of Scripture, from the Fathers through and beyond the Middle Ages. St. Thomas's embeddedness within the Church's Tradition and his own historical context is integral to his approach to Scripture, yet it sets him at some distance from modern readers, for whom his interpretive vision may seem perplexing or even impenetrable. In this Primer, Boyle first provides an acclimation to this medieval context through a survey and explanation of pertinent technical terminology used by St. Thomas and characteristic of the scholastic theology of the time. With an eye to the medieval practice of considering Scripture according to the fourfold division of causes, Boyle builds on this initial foundation by exploring in turn St. Thomas's accounts of the end or use of Scripture (final cause), its divine and human authorship (efficient cause), its order and division (material cause), and its literary styles or genres (formal cause). Drawing on writings from across St. Thomas's corpus, but especially his work On the Commendation and Division of Sacred Scripture and the prologues to his biblical commentaries, Boyle masterfully elucidates both the hermeneutical principles and deep wisdom of the Angelic Doctor's approach to Scripture, imparting invaluable guidance not only for reading and understanding St. Thomas and other great masters of the Tradition, but also-and ultimately-for understanding Scripture in light of this Tradition and reading it with greater benefit and joy. (shrink)

_Studies in Hermias’ Commentary on Plato’s_ Phaedrus is a collection of twelve essays that consider aspects of Hermias’ philosophy, including his notions of the soul, logic, and method of exegesis.

The proofs of the existence of God in part 4 of Descartes’s Discourse on Method may yet surprise us. These arguments appear to be crafted with such ambiguity that their deeper import has rarely been suspected. This essay proposes that, in spite of the text’s conventional appearance, Descartes exposes the error of scholastic metaphysics, namely, that it mistakes the perfectibility of the human mind for a transcendent perfect being. Superficially, the thinker’s “idea of a more perfect being” serves to ground (...) the traditional theology; but surreptitiously, this idea refers to human possibility and supplies the metaphysical basis for scientific progress, freed from theology altogether. This ironic result is obtained not by speculating on Descartes’s irony directly, but by submitting the “idea of a more perfect being” itself to the Cartesian test of truth and falsehood. In that light, the text’s proofs of God reveal their skeptical, philanthropic intent. (shrink)

Whiskey Lao -- Fair warning -- Randomness at large -- We the addicted -- The best possible world -- The importance of being doomed -- Moral responsibility -- The upper limit to the value of possible worlds.

Why was Hensen unsuccesful in the quantification of ecological sampling? No aspect of plankton research itself seems to have hindered quantification; both collecting methods and taxonomy were sufficiently advanced. The reason is probably that at the time he began sampling, Hensen had to devise his own statistical methods for expressing the reproducibility and validity of samples. Hensen might have succeeded in this if he had overcome prevalent nineteenth-century attitudes toward randomness.The statistical literature of medicine and physics with which Hensen was (...) probably familiar gave methods for expressing reproducibility and for comparing differences between means of different sets of observations. For example, a student of Poisson writing on medical statistics advocated using Poisson's limit (standard error 2√2) to test the difference between two means56. Other authors suggested that differences between means were most meaningful if very large numbers of observations were used.57 In his laboratory subsampling, Hensen used the propable error as a limit about means. In this and other ways, he seems most indebted to the physicist Ernst Abbe for statistical methods.58 However, all the methodology available to Hensen had been developed for situations in which errors are a property of the measurement or sampling process, and not of the phenomena themselves. The available methods for measuring reproducibility were based on the assumption that differences from the average were small and that they tended to accumulate about the mean in a bell-shaped pattern. Hensen constantly reinvestigated the distribution of plankton numbers about the average using a different method each time. Westergaard points out that medical statisticians did not make such investigations with their biological data.59To a considerable extent, biological sampling problems forced development of theory because samples afforded the only information on a pattern in water or soil which could not be directly observed. The sampling methods of Laplace and the late nineteenth-century government statisticians contrasted strongly with Hensen's because, either through subjective knowledge of the population sampled or through censuses, they attempted to choose representative or typical samples.60 The high reproducibility and validity of representative sampling is attained by knowing more about a population than a biologist can ordinarily know. The uncertain reproducibility and validity of biological sampling spurred the development of formal sampling theory.A formal sampling theory developed only after change in the general intellectual attitude toward randomness, which was reflected in nineteenth-century statistics.61 The ninteenth-century attitude that randomness is not part of nature changed in the twentieth century to a view of randomness as a property of nature.62 The physicist's incorporation of randomness into physical models in response to this intellectual change late in the nineteenth-century is discussed by Bork.63 In biology, the change was initiated by the attention Darwin focused on morphological variation. The English biometricians — Francis Galton and W. F. R. Weldon, for example — were prominent in developing methods for the analysis of biological variation.64 Most pertinent to the development of sampling theory was Karl Pearson's use of frequency distributions as models of biological variation. In ecology, quantification was brought about by Ronald Fisher more than by anyone else; he incorporated randomness into sampling plans and built upon the methods developed earlier for analysis of individual variation. Fisher's use of random sampling allowed comparison between the sample collections and the collections expected from a model population of known patterning (calculated with a frequency distribution). This is a much more efficient method of determining the validity of a sample than Hensen's comparison of collections with a model uniform collection. Intellectual background and accumulated biological information caused Fisher to find variability where Hensen had seen uniformity.In summary, Victor Hensen became interested in fisheries research because of the economic importance of fishing to Germany. Hensen had considerable understanding of the prerequisites for valid sampling, but the value of his quantitative approach was limited by the general preconceptions shared by most nineteenth-century biologists. Through Hensen's efforts many other biologists were stimulated to undertake quantitative samples, even though the statistical methods for analyzing variation among populations developed only after methods for analyzing variation among individuals had been developed. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402011 00003. (shrink)

This was designed for all instructors who teach aspects of biological evolution in their college courses.

A key philosophical feature of Peter Jackson’s film interpretation of J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings is its use of fantasy to inspire a “recovery” of the actual or, in other words, a reawakening to the beauty of nature and the many possible ways of living in healthier ecological relation to the world. Though none of these ways is perfectly achieved, this pluralistic view is demonstrated in the various lifeways of Hobbits, Elves, Men, and Ents. All of the positive (...) relationships embodied in the films—to trees, mountains, horses, and vegetable gardens—involve loving care and attention, receiving nourishment and livelihood without instrumentalization, or reducing nature to mere resource. The films also vividly display a variety of ugly and destructive ways of using the land to accrue power and wealth. These noxious ways, specifically because they actively destroy the lands that they use, always need more. They will thus eventually annihilate the beautiful ways of being if they are not actively resisted. Some of those who would rather be tending their own trees, gardens, or horses or even wandering in the wild forests must therefore turn their attention to struggle and resistance instead. This is a struggle full of grief, and at times even verging on despair, but it is marked by the refusal to give up hope. Indeed, what Jackson and Tolkien have to say about hope is as important in responding to the ecological crisis as anything they have to say about nature, inasmuch as they help to remind us that even in our own times, “there is still hope.”. (shrink)

IN 1903, commenting on an article he had written more than thirty years before, Charles Peirce said that he had changed his mind on many issues at least a half-dozen times but had "never been able to think differently on that question of nominalism and realism" (1.20). For anyone acquainted with Peirce's writings, this remark alone could justify a study of "that question.".

This article extends earlier research concerning the relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance, with particular emphasis on methodological inconsistencies. Research in this area is extended in three critical areas. First, it focuses on a particular industry, the chemical industry. Second, it uses multiple sources of data-two that are perceptual based (KLD Index and Fortune reputation survey), and two that are performance based (TRI database and corporate philanthropy) in order to triangulate toward assessing corporate social performance. Third, it (...) uses the five most commonly applied accounting measures in the corporate social performance and corporate financial performance (CSP/CFP) literature to assess corporate financial performance. The results indicate that the a priori use of measures may actually predetermine the CSP/CFP relationship outcome. Surprisingly, Fortune and KLD indices very closely track one another, whereas TRI and corporate philanthropy differentiate between high and low social performers and do not correlate to the firm's financial performance. (shrink)

In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?

Jaynes's maximum entropy principle (MEP) is analyzed by considering in detail a recent controversy. Emphasis is placed on the inductive logical interpretation of “probability” and the concept of “total knowledge.” The relation of the MEP to relative frequencies is discussed, and a possible realm of its fruitful application is noted.

It is assumed that experiments yield results that are not isomorphic with reality, but represent a distorted image of reality. Reality is related to observation via a communication channel of finite capacity. Quantum uncertainties are due to the bound on the amount of information available. Use is made of recent results from information and communication theories.

John F. Post argues that physicalistic materialism is compatible with a number of views often deemed incompatible with it, such as the objectivity of values, the irreducibility of subjective experience, the power of the metaphor, the normativity of meaning, and even theism.

Originally published in 1830, this book can be called the first modern work in the philosophy of science, covering an extraordinary range of philosophical, methodological, and scientific subjects. "Herschel's book . . . brilliantly analyzes both the history and nature of science."—Keith Stewart Thomson, American Scientist.

John Ashton, the editor who brought us In Six Days and On the Seventh Day, has done it again with this compelling new book that is a must-read for all ...