I. THE TASK OF DOGMATICS As a theological discipline dogmatics is the scientific self- examination of the Christian Church with respect to the content of ...

Dogmatic Metaphysics and Tschirnhaus's M ethodology MARTIN SCHONFELD ACCORDING TO STANDARD COMMENTARIES, Tschirnhaus's main work, Medicina mentis, ~ supposedly furnished the methodological basis for the Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics. ~ Christian Wolff and his disciples, at any rate, preferred to think so. Wolff taught classes on Tschirnhaus and claimed that he had developed his own tenets on the basis of Tschirnhaus's ideas; Johann Christoph Gottsched praised the Medicina mentis as the basic methodology of the Wolffian enlightenment.3 Mirroring these views, W. Wundt and (...) H. J. de Vleeschauwer saw in Tschirnhaus the inventor of the "geometric method" adopted by the School Philosophers.4 According to M. ' Medicina Mentis, sive Tentamen genuinae Logicae, in qua disseritur de Methodo detegendi incoKaitas veritates, Amsterdam, 1687. Second and revised edition, Medicina Mentis, sive Artis inveniendi Praecepta generalia, Leipzig, 1695. ~For example, cf. Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte der Philosophie, 3~o-33 and 356; Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, III: ~95-97, 3 x~ 34o-43; A. Robert Caponigri, A History of Western Philosophy (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame.. (shrink)

What awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber? On the traditional narrative, he was awakened by Hume's challenge to our cognition of causal connections. A more recent narrative claims that he was awakened by Hume's challenge to our cognition of non‐logical connections more generally. In this paper, I argue that a key part of Kant's awakening was far wider‐reaching: he came to realize that all dogmas must be abandoned. An oft‐overlooked technical notion, dogmas are non‐logical principles cognizable to unaided human reason. (...) I detail how Kant repudiated dogmas by the mid‐1760's in engaging with his German predecessor, Christian Crusius. This repudiation lays the foundation for his critical project. For once liberated of dogmas, reason must look beyond itself for the principles that would enable rational cognitionof non‐logical connections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Dogmatic Slumber ofHume Scholarship Nicholas Capaldi State of the Art If one were to enumerate the issues that have received the most attention in Hume scholarship during the last half century, the list would undoubtedly feature the so-called principle ofinduction, causal necessity, the self, the relationship offact and value, scepticism, and the argument from design. If one were to ask what is the popular consensus on Hume's position (...) vis-à-vis these issues, the answer would be something Uke the following: Hume in his Treatise, first challenges his reader to produce a single simple idea that is not a copy of a corresponding impression. And he then abandons the inductive pattern of argumentation so as tobe free to use his inductively supported principle—the principle that every simple idea is a copy of a previous impression—as the foundation of his deductive arguments that we have no rational title to believe in the existence of causal connexions, objective moral values, continuing selves, or physical processes independent of our experience.1 Depending on how they are understood, each of these assertions about Hume could be either false or misleading. We note, for example, that Hume made complex ideas and not simple ideas the centre ofhis philosophy; thatcomplex ideas are not whollyreducible to simple ideas, and therefore not analysable without remainder into component impressions; that complex ideas were explicated by Hume in terms of the natural relations that spring from the mind's association of ideas (Hume claimed that "the principle of the association of ideas" was his major innovation in philosophy);2 that the associative activity of the mind is an instance, in Hume, ofthe self, notits denial; that the positive Humean conception ofthe selfis given in book 2 on the passions, which many never read; that Hume's entire Newtonian programme in the Treatise is based on the assumption that there are physical processes independent of human experience; that Hume did not deny causal connections, only the philosophical "necessity" that others ascribe to causal connections, and that he did so in the interest ofexplicating how Volume XVIII Number 2 117 NICHOLAS CAPALDI Newton's physicshadreplacedAristotelian physics; and, finally, Hume argued for the intersubjective validity ofconventional moral values on transcendental grounds. Few, ifany, ofthese positive points made here about Hume are new, mosthaving already appeared somewhere in the secondary literature. Yet these points have had little cumulative impact. The reason for this is that we are all always working under or against a pervasive misrepresentation of Hume. The thesis ofthis paper is that despite the best efforts ofa number of writers, starting all the way back with Kant and including John Davis, a canonic misreading of Hume continues to haunt textbooks, courses in the history of philosophy and philosophical education in general, journals, endless dreary dissertations, programme committees, and the minds of Hume scholars. We hope that by identifying and spelling out the programmatic nature of the canonic misreading, Hume scholarship will be awakened from its dogmatic slumber. What is the origin of the present canonic misreading of Hume?3 Some clue can be gained by noting the kind of unity the misreading quoted above imposes on Hume. The misreading derives all ofHume's positions in neat deductive order from Hume's supposed epistemology. Itmakesitappearasifeverypositionis the natural logical consequence of Hume's alleged empiricism. The recent origin of this canonic misreading ofHume is analytic philosophy. The Origin ofthe Canonic Misreading ofHume Analytic philosophy has been and remains the dominant school of philosophy in the twentieth century in the English language cultures where Hume is most hkely to be read. Analytic philosophy is itself a product of, and the twentieth century voice of, the Enlightenment Project.4 As an eighteenth century writer, Hume is not only associated with the Enlightenment Project but it is claimed by analytic philosophers that Hume is one of the progenitors of that project5 and therefore one of the progenitors of analytic philosophy itself. In short, the present canonic misreading of Hume originates in the analytic misappropriation of Hume to its own version of the Enlightenment Project. What is the Enlightenment Project? It is generally said that the Enlightenment replaced authority, faith, and tradition with reason... (shrink)

A familiar complaint about conciliatory approaches to disagreement is that they are self-defeating or incoherent because they ‘call for their own rejection’. This complaint seems to be influential but it isn’t clear whether conciliatory views call for their own rejection or what, if anything, this tells us about the coherence of such views. We shall look at two ways of developing this self-defeat objection and we shall see that conciliatory views emerge unscathed. A simple version of the self-defeat objection leaves (...) conciliatory views untouched. A subtle version of the objection contains a subtle but overlooked flaw. If the conciliatory view is right, it might be right to be dogmatically conciliatory (i.e., to continue to be conciliatory however objectionable this might seem to ourselves and to others). (shrink)

Graham Haydon; Dogmatic Liberalism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 115–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1988.

Graham Haydon; Dogmatic Liberalism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 115–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1988.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:SOME DOGMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF PAUL F. KNITTER'S UNITARIAN THEOCENTRISM PAUL D. MOLNAR St. John's University Jamaica, New York EACTIONS TO Paul Knitter's No Other Nanie? vary from criticizing his "unitarian theocentrism" 1 and his sliding away from "creedal Chrisitology" 2 to unequivocail endorsement of his" less Christocentric approach to a theo1ogy of religions;" 3 this shows the challenge Knitter poses to current dogmatics. This 1arHcile w1ll explore three (...) critical dogmatic issues related to Knitter's non-normative ChristoJogy. First, can the idea that Jesus is one savior among others be defonded froni within the Christian-Catholic 1tradition without yie1ding the truth of Christology? Second, if "Jesus remains universailly normativ ;e " for Christians while " other revelations or rev;ea:lers might also be universaUy normative," then does this not p:vomote some form of docetic Christology and lead to a unitarianism, exduded by the naiture of the God revealed in Christ? Third, on the basis of " l'eligious experience " Knitter olaims to perceive an" evolution from ecolesiocentrism to chrfatocentrism to theocentrism" and finally to "soteriooentrism." 4 Is there 1!1ea1ly such an evolution? And if there is noit, oan those who de- ~end the tradition succeed by arguing from experience and praxis rather than from revelation and faith? 5 Moreover, if 1"Review Symposium: Paul Knitter's No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of OMistian Attitudes toward the World Religions," in Horizons 13 (1986): 116-135. This is the view of Daniel Sheridan, p. llS. 2 This is the view of Denise Carmody. Ibid., p. 122. s This is the view of William Cenkner. Ibid., p. 127. 4 Ibid., pp. 133-34. 5 Denise Carmody, e.g., believes that we should stress praxis more than 449 450 PAUL D. MOLNAR we think the tradition should not be defended, have we not ceased to think about theological truth? Rather, have we not made divinity itself indis:tingiuishab1e from our human experiences and praxis at the outset? And does this not open the door to both polytheism allJd pantheism? By making God hut noit Christ normative, Knitter's " nonnormati ¥e" Christology re-1transiates the truth of Jesus' oonsubstantiality with the Father into the content of a myth, an experienice or a vailue judgment having no re1ality in itseH.6 It then defines :reveiLation and salvation.aocording to a unitarian view of God. While Knitter denies this,7 his reasoning aictuaUy is unitarian: In my proposed model, Jesus remains universally normative, but I am asking whether Christians can recognize that other revelations or revealers might also be universally normative. Could there be a complementary uniqueness among the religious traditions of the world? To try to answer that question, 'intellectual conversion;... is a requisite. But it will have to be an intellectual conversion that walks more than' the way to Nicea and Chalcedon'... only on the basis of the praxis of authentic dialogue-grounded in intellectual, moral, and religious conversion-can we know the unique~ ness of Christ.8 doctrine without relativizing Christ. Thus, for her, Rahner's Christology does not mean " that Christians cannot be open to the Buddha or Lord Krishna," Ibid., p. 126. The problem is that this very thinking already relativizes Christ. 6 Even theologians who do not intend the radical views of John Hick run a similar risk by beginning Christology from below in the manner of Paul Knitter. Cf., e.g., Edward L. Krasevac, O.P., "' Christology From Above' And 'Christology From Below '," The Thomist, 51 (1987) : 299-306, arguing that "Christological faith is an apostolic faith that has its origins in a historical process which began with the public ministry of our Lord...." (p. 300) causes us to ask what makes Christology true? Is it "the actual apostolic process " (306) or is it Jesus as the Lord who is and remains the sole foundation and validation for faith in any age? Does this approach not leave the door open to the kind of evolution which Knitter claims to have discovered in Christianity, which then enables him to move beyond Jesus as the only Lord and Savior? 1 Review Symposium, Horizons, p. 131. s Ibid., p. 133. KNITTER'S UNITARIAN THEOCENTRISM 451 Here the ha:.sis... (shrink)

This paper addresses the epistemological problem of the myth of “the given” from an evidentialist and pragmatic perspective concerning the attribution of knowledge: if the evidence supporting p may be based on «the given» for S, how can “the given” be considered the basis of the evidence if it is a myth? The principal objective is to introduce a pragmatic solution to the above question. The main thesis is that there is a dogmatic relationship between the evidence necessary for the (...) legitimacy of our attribution of knowledge and «the given»; however, this dogma does not suggest that these attributions are irrational. (shrink)

When Kuhn first published his _Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ he was accused of promoting an “irrationalist” account of science. Although it has since been argued that this charge is unfair in one aspect or another, the early criticism still exerts an influence on our understanding of Kuhn. In particular, normal science is often characterized as dogmatic and uncritical, even by commentators sympathetic to Kuhn. I argue not only that there is no textual evidence for this view but also that normal (...) science is much better understood as being based on _epistemically justified_ commitment to a paradigm and as _pragmatic_ in its handling of anomalies. I also argue that normal science is an example of what I call Kuhn’s program of _revisionary rational reconstruction_. (shrink)

The authors expose a challenge that legal dogmatics represents to our legal institutions. Legal dogmatics often claims that it plays a necessary role in identifying legal rules and in solving their indeterminacies. Thus, legal dogmatics is to be viewed as an indispensable complement to legislation. Like legislation, dogmatics also attempts to provide judges with precise guidelines to help them pass the right decisions and avoid the arbitrary ones. Only under this assumption does dogmatics help to (...) make more predictable decisions. However, the problem of dogmatics consists that the search for precision which is to intended to limit the arbitrariness of judicial decisions calls for distinctions that are per se arbitrary ones. In some cases, this arbitrariness results from an indeterminacy generated by vague rules, while in other cases the application of precise rules leads to arbitrariness because officials depart from the reasons that ground them. The challenge of dogmatics is to show that its contribution to rationality can be perceived as an improvement on the legislator’s contribution. That is, dogmatics must show why its rules can succeed where legislation inevitably fails for conceptual reasons. The authors of this paper claim the opposite. The application of dogmatic rules has the same conceptual difficulties as the application of legislated rules alone.Moreover, dogmatic solutions often contend with other formal justifications, i.e., reasons which ground legislated rules. (shrink)

Die moderne Theologie hat den dogmatischen Erörterungen des Kanons der christlichen Kirche vergleichsweise wenig Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. Dieser Aufsatz bietet ein dogmatisches Portrait des Kanons im Rahmen der trinitarischen, speziell christologisch und pneumatologisch zu bestimmenden Wirklichkeit von Gottes heilsschaffender Selbstmitteilung. Ein dogmatisches Portrait erfordert mehr als eine kirchlich-theologische Kommentierung der soziologischen Aspekte des Gebrauchs von Texten. Vielmehr muß versucht werden, den dogmatischen Begriff des Kanons in seinen Verknüpfungen zu anderen Teilen christlicher Lehre zu entfalten. Die notwendigen Elemente einer solchen dogmatischen Kontextualisierung (...) werden hier diskutiert: der kommunikative Charakter des Heilshandelns Gottes; die Heiligung von Texten in den komplexen Prozessen ihrer Geschichte; die theologische Bestimmung der Kanonisierung als einer kirchlichen Handlung; das Wirken Gottes in der Formung des Lesers des Kanons. Weiterhin werden zwei einflußreiche Denkströmungen kritisch diskutiert, die zur Deplazierung des Kanons im Zusammenhang christlicher Theologie beigetragen haben. So wird dem dogmatischen Portrait eine Erörterung der Naturalisierung des Kanons und der z. T. ebenso problematischen Versuche, ihr zu begegnen, vorangestellt. (shrink)

Karl Popper lamented the prevalence of dogmatic argument in philosophy and commended the kind of critical argument that is found in the sciences. David Miller criticises the uncritical nature of so-called critical thinking because of its attachment to dogmatic arguments. I expound and clarify Popper’s distinction between critical and dogmatic arguments and the background to it. I criticise some errors in Miller’s discussion. I reaffirm the need for philosophers to eschew dogmatic arguments in favour of critical ones.

More than current scholarship in argumentation suggests, successful defense of standpoints depends on learning. As long as arguers comply with a minimum co-operativity, argumentation has genuinely an epistemic interest insofar as any position agreed upon becomes agreeable, i.e., intersubjectively shared because those who did not share it have learned why it is agreeable. Since the epistemic interest of argumentation is absent from most of current scholarship, `intersubjectification' is basically treated as being always possible. In this paper I argue that `intersubjectification' (...) – the `matching of the arguers' communicative backgrounds,' as I will term it – is not a given, but a communicative activity which may or may not succeed. Hence, different types of arguing come into being, depending on how and what arguers are prepared to learn. In the paper, examples are given for unproblematic `intersubjectification,' for `intersubjectification' that requires considerable argumentative co-operation, and for `intersubjectification' that fails utterly. From the analyses, a continuous scale of types of communicative processes of arguing is presented that ranges from one extreme case, termed `dogmatic arguing,' to another extreme case, termed `emergent arguing.'. (shrink)

May we speak, in the present age, of holy scripture? And what validation of that claim can be offered, robust enough to hold good for both religious practice and intellectual enquiry? John Webster argues that while any understanding of scripture must subject it to proper textual and historical interrogation, it is necessary at the same time to acknowledge the special character of scriptural writing. His 2003 book is an exercise in Christian dogmatics, a loud reaffirmation of the triune God (...) at the heart of a scripture-based Christianity. But it is written with intellectual rigour by a theologian who understands the currents of modern secular thought and is able to work from them towards a constructive position on biblical authority. It will resonate with anyone who has wondered or worried about the grounds on which we may validly regard the Bible as God's direct communication with humanity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS new appreciation of his thought. The differences between thirteenth-century and Renaissance humanism complicate the problem, but a more accurate and sensitive understanding of Aquinas's thought is by no means impossible. It is high time that Protestants put the old division behind them, high time they reclaim this part of their heritage-and they can rightly claim Aquinas as part of their heritage, since he did live and work (...) in the context of a still undivided Christendom. He is one of the teachers we can ill afford to do without as we attempt to meet the challenges of our own day (p. 174).' Whether Professor Vos achieves this objective can only be judged by those to whom the work is primarily addressed. Many of the misperceptions pointed out can be traced to misuse of St. Thomas's works in the era when he was the mandated author for Roman Catholic studies in philosophy and theology. Those who value the genuine thought of St. Thomas and regret the continuation of these misrepresentations by so-called Catholic traditionalists will welcome the contribution made by this book. THOMAS c. O'BRIEN Chambersburg, Pennsylvania Christian Dogmatics. By CARL BRAATEN (editor), GERHARD 0. FORDE, PHILIP J. HEFNER, ROBERT \V. JENSEN (editor) HANS SCHWARZ, and PAUL R. SPONHEIM. Two Volumes. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984, xxii + 569 (Vol. 1) and xvii+ 621 (Vol. 2). Recent years have seen the proliferation among American Protestants of a seemingly odd genre: group dogmatics. For whatever reason, the present generation of' systematic theologians has not produced a dogmatics or systematic theology text that the theology teachers of' America seem to be happy with. So, a variety of' groups have banded together to divide all theology into so many parts,and as a team produce a usable theology text. The best known of' these group texts is Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks, edited by Peter G. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), but there have also been Methodist and Conservative Evangelical versions. Christian Dogmatics is the latest example of' the genre, and an ambitious one. While the authors are all teachers at American Lutheran seminaries, their audience is the entire Christian Church. Their goal is to produce a " complete dogmatics " which will serve as " a textbook in theological instruction and a resource for those who practice the arts of ministry." (!,xvii-xviii). The volumes are organized in twelve loci, where a locus is " a point at which the historic teachings and theological investigations of BOOK REVIEWS 153 the church are brought into focus" (I, xix) : Prolegomena to Christian Dogmatics (Braaten, 78 pp.), The Triune God (Jenson, 114 pp.), The Knowledge of God (Sponheim, 76 pp.), The Creation (Hefner, 94 pp.), Sin and Evil (Sponheim, 104 pp.), The Person of Jesus Christ (Braaten, 104 pp.), The Work of Christ (Forde, 100 pp.), The Holy Spirit (Jenson, 78 pp.), The Church (Hefner, 70 pp.), The Means of Grace (Schwarz and Jenson, 142 pp.), Christian Life (Forde, 80 pp), and Eschatology (Schwarz, 116 pp.). Each locus consists of 4 to 7 chapters, each chapter beginning with a few summarizing sentences. The authors sometimes organize the loci "systematically" (e.g., the knowledge of God is organized according to questions that parallel Aristotle's four causes); more often the author's combine the systematic and the historical, moving through Seriptures and tradition and modernity as well as providing a conceptual frame for their topic. A lengthy index of names and subjects in volume two (II,591-621) helps the reader track the overlap between these loci. A variety of threads tie the disparate contributions together. The six authors share a common outlook on contemporary theology, which might be called a theological version of "the radical middle." Decisive for this outlook is the conviction that there is a doctrinal core to the faith which it is the central task of dogmatics to explicate (I,5). Although the problems and conceptualities of the modern world are addressed throughout the text, they are not allowed to set the interpretative agenda. In keeping their eyes fixed on this interpretative task, the authors avoid both the left and right. Liberation theology, process... (shrink)

The vanity of dogmatizing.--Scepsis scientifica.--Essays on several important subjects in philosophy and religion.

The Vanity of Dogmatizing was the first work of Joseph Glanville to be printed in 1661. This edition remains much the same except for some rearrangement and minor stylistic changes.

_Review of: Anderson, Abraham, _Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber_, New York, Oxford University Press, 2020, 180+xxii, 978-0-19-009674-8_.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DOGMATICS HE APPEARANCE of a new dogmatics is always ause for hope, hope sorely needed in Anglo-Saxon ountries where the tradition of systematic theology is an especially delicate growth. In the lands of the British Commonwealth, whence all the contributors to the series which I shall discuss have so come, the cultural and educational tone has been set very largely by the English, and (...) England, for reasons bound up with the peculiar development of Anglican theology, has never put forth much the way of a dogmatictheological shoot.1 Thus Dr. Alister McGrath, in his recent The Making of 11/Iodern German Christology, has opined that the last great English theologian was William of Ockham.2 Although McGrath's reviewers have made out a case in this regard for S. T. Coleridge and J. H. Newman, it must be admitted that the writing neither man could really be called systematic. How, then, has Catholic theology in these countries preserved, if at all, that dogmatic systematicness which is an accepted aspect of the coherence of Christian teaching in the Catholic tradition? Either, it may said, through creating the institutional enclaves of its own seminaries and religious studia; or,by participating in foreign, largely clerical, faculties of theology ; or by entering into contact with the mainstream, largely Anglican, academic theology of the Universities and hoping for the best, in the knowledge that here at any rate is an expertise in biblical studies, patristics and Church history whose use can 1 See S. IV. Sykes, 'Germany and England: An Attempt at Theological Diplomacy ', in ibid. (ed.), England and Germany. Stttdies in Theological Diplomacy Frankfurt am-Main and Berne 1982), pp. 158-159, for an explanation of this phenomenon. 2A. McGrath, 'l'he iliaki:ng of Modern German Ohristology (Oxford 1986), P· 5. 96 A BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DOGMATICS 97 only be beneficial.3 The volumes which have so far appeared of the new Chapman Introduction to Catholic Theology bear marks of all three types of influence. The foreword to the new series, setting the tone for what will follow, is by Canon Michael Richards. For many years the editor of the pastoral monthly The Clergy Review, now renamed Priests and People, Canon Richards is currently a parish priest in that opulent district of the West End of London distinguished for the elegant jeunesse doree known as ' Sloane Rangers'. As general editor of the new dogmatics he does not, however, allude to the institutional background which I have sketched, with its particular conjunction of limitations and possibilities. Instead, he chooses to help the reader locate what is being offered in terms of the call for a renewal of Catholic theology made in the documents of the Second Vatican Council. The Council, Richards sugests, ' provided the Church with a fundamental revision of its way of life in the light of a thorough investigation of Scripture and of our history, and with fresh guidelines for studying and reflecting upon the Christian message itself.4 Without citing chapter a.nd verse of the Council documents, Richards spells out these ' guidelines' in the following terms. Post-conciliar theology should: (a) maintain scientific or scholarly rigor; (b) succeed in expressing the Catholic tradition; (c) utilise the contributions of other religions, and other churches, to an understanding of God and the world; (d) report on the insights made possible by drawing on a number of different philosophical and methodological approaches. At the same time, Richards promises, the books that compose the series will each supply the appropriate quantity of informational material and reflective stimulus that might reasonably a For a discussion of the cultural context of theology in Britain, and especially England, see J. Coulson (ed.), Theology and the Unwe'rsity. A.n lilaumenioal Investigation (London 1964), passim. 4 M. Richards, "Forword ", reprinted with different pagination, in each volume of the series. 98 AIDAN NICHOLS, O.P. be assumed for any book purporting to be a text-hook in the area which it covers. This amounts to a very tall order, and two questions at once suggest themselves. First, are these the desiderata of theological method suggested by the Council? Secondly, are they actually realised in the books... (shrink)

Hans Ulrich's Wie Geschöpfe leben is examined from the perspective of Christian dogmatics, in order to make explicit the conception of the Christian gospel upon which the book is based. Wie Geschöpfe leben focuses upon the economy of God's works in relation to creatures, laying particular emphasis upon the realisation of God's acts in time. Ulrich resists `static' or `general' anthropology, which he overcomes by attending to creaturely becoming, hearing and learning as aspects of the new creation which determines (...) human being. Accordingly, the concern of theological ethics is exploration of human history with God. Ulrich's work offers a corrective to excessive claims about the significance of moral ontology in theological ethics. Dogmatic reflection upon the book's achievement might consider a number of topics: (1) the need for closer description of the identity of the triune God, both in se and pro nobis, since Trinitarian teaching plays little discernible role in the proposal; (2) the significance for Christian ethics of the relation of the work of Christ to his person, as conceptualised in incarnational teaching; (3) the relationship between original creation and new creation; (4) the absence of any extended discussion of soteriology. (shrink)