Este escrito se inscribe dentro de la teoría extática del amor según Duns Escoto, la que está influenciada por la doctrina de San Anselmo respecto de las dos inclinaciones o afectos de la voluntad: la affectio commodi y la affectio iustitiae. El objetivo del mismo es mostrar cómo Juan Duns Escoto logra superar la aparente contradicción que cabe entre tender por naturaleza a Dios y elegir a Dios a partir de la reflexión sobre los dos afectos que (...) conforman la voluntad humana. (shrink)

As everyone who discusses Scotus's moral theory points out, Scotus recognized two fundamental inclinations in the will: the affectio commodi and the affectio iustitiae. Everyone agrees that these two affectiones play an important role in his moral theory, and there is virtual unanimity about what that role is. I contend that the standard view is misguided, and that it obscures the true character of Scotus's very un-medieval moral theory. I shall begin by laying out the context in (...) which Scotus develops his theory of the two affectiones. The standard interpretation, I shall then argue, fails to appreciate that context; moreover, it can actually be shown to be contrary to Scotus's explicit statements. I shall then argue for my own interpretation of the two affectiones, which assigns to morality a role altogether independent of human flourishing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:And Thy Neighbor as Thyself:The Elastic Self in the Moral Psychology of John Duns ScotusJoseph Dowd (bio)1. IntroductionAccording to Anselm of Canterbury, God gave human beings two affectiones: the affectio commodi and the affectio iustitiae. For Anselm, these two affectiones are largely equivalent to egoistic motivation and non-egoistic (specifically, moral) motivation: the affectio commodi motivates one to seek one's own advantage (commodum), while the (...) class='Hi'>affectio iustitiae motivates one to seek justice (iustitia) for its own sake. Two centuries after Anselm, John Duns Scotus appropriated the terms affectio commodi and affectio iustitiae but made some changes to Anselm's account of the affectiones. Anselm thinks that human beings lost the affectio iustitiae when Adam sinned1 and can regain it only through divine grace,2 but Scotus regards the affectio iustitiae as innate to human beings.3 Also, [End Page 53] Scotus integrates his account of the affectio commodi into the Aristotelian natural teleology commonly accepted at his time, associating the affectio commodi with one's inclination toward one's natural end.4Although Scotus modifies Anselm's account of the affectiones, many interpreters think that he preserves the affectio commodi's association with egoism and the affectio iustitiae's association with non-egoism. I call this interpretation of Scotus's two affectiones "the Standard Reading." On the Standard Reading, the affectio commodi is one's inclination to will things for one's own benefit.5 The Standard Reading's proponents disagree about what exactly the affectio iustitiae is. Some interpret the affectio iustitiae as one's inclination to will or love things because they are good in themselves.6 Others interpret it as one's inclination to love others for their own sake (as opposed to loving them as means to one's own benefit).7 Despite this disagreement, all versions of the Standard Reading agree that the affectio iustitiae enables one to aim at goals other than one's own good.8 [End Page 54]As I argue in this article, some of Scotus's remarks suggest another reading of the two affectiones, one that I call "the Alternative Reading." On this reading, the affectio iustitiae enables one to love both oneself and other beings, and the affectio commodi inclines one to desire things for the benefit of both oneself and other beings that one loves. To be precise, the affectio commodi is an inclination to will what the mind represents as appealing. This inclination, I argue, inclines one to desire what one regards as beneficial to the beings that one loves. Hints of this reading appear in the work of Cruz González-Ayesta,9 but, to my knowledge, no one has drawn special attention to the reading.As I show in this article, both the Standard Reading and the Alternative Reading have textual support, and I regard the support for each as conclusive.10 Therefore, I believe that Scotus accepts both readings. This does not make Scotus inconsistent; I end the article by offering an interpretation that makes both readings true simultaneously. My interpretation is as follows. The affectio commodi is egoistic in that it inclines one to desire what one perceives as beneficial to oneself. The affectio iustitiae is non-egotistic in that it enables one to love a being, whether oneself or something else, for its own sake, as a response to its own objective goodness. But, by loving the being, one comes to see the being's good as part of one's own. Thus, in inclining one to desire things for one's own benefit (as the Standard Reading claims), the affectio commodi inclines one to desire things for the benefit of the beings that one loves (as the Alternative Reading claims) because one perceives their good as part of one's own.To my knowledge, this interpretation of Scotus has not been proposed before. John Hare and Matthew D. Mendham have attributed to Aristotle the view that the self is "elastic": one's own good "stretches" to include the good of one's loved ones. However, they specifically deny that Scotus holds such a view and, in fact, use Aristotle's view as a foil for... (shrink)

In the thought of Duns Scotus, the distinction of active potencies into will and nature takes on a fundamental systematic significance. It distinguishes free and self-determining causality from natural and necessary causality. The purpose of this article is to show to what extent this distinction underlies large parts of Duns Scotus’ moral psychology, ethics, metaphysics and Trinitarian theology.

L'article vise à placer les rapports entre affectio et affectus au centre de l ’unité architectonique de l'Éthique. La définition d’affectus permet de connaître la vraie nature de l'affection, montrant que ce concept ne peut pas signifier un état mais doit désigner une disposition, ou une variation de la puissance. Ainsi le couple affectio/affectus articule toutes les parties de l'Éthique, en régissant non seulement la construction du problème éthique, mais aussi sa solution chez Spinoza.

Pensar na graça de Deus e na liberdade do homem, ao mesmo tempo, tem sido sempre essencial, embora difícil para a reflexão cristã. Anselmo considerou com frequência essa dificuldade, que é semelhante à que nasce do uso da sola ragione numa postura de oração. Na sua obra De Concordia, terceira parte, cap. 11, o Doutor Magnígico constrói uma representação da vontade que assume as exigências máximas da reflexão cristã. Este capítulo distingue três aspectos na vontade: instumentum, aptitudo e usus; a (...) aptitudo é chamada de affectio. No seu De libero arbitrio, Anselmo distinguia, em vez, o instrumento e o uso, sem considerar a affectio. Com um atenção especial à fenomenologia contemporânea, o presente artigo destaca tanto por que o tema da afeição deve ser introduzido quanto o signifcado desta introdução tardia na obra de Anselmo. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to present and analyse one of the most intriguing and unique elements of Leibniz’s philosophy of right—the relationship between love and justice —mainly based on selected excerpts from the Elementa Iuris Naturalis and the preface to the Codex Iuris Gentium Diplomaticus. The author presents the characteristics of this close connection and she tries to answer the question about the reasons for this relationship referring to the metaphysical assumptions and principles of Leibniz’s philosophy. (...) With respect to the latter the author also explains significance of the connection between love and justice in Leibniz’s philosophy of right as a part of his whole philosophical system. (shrink)

The concept of hexis, in Latin habitus, is of great importance in Aristotle’s ethics. In this paper, I ask the question whether habitus has its place, and which one it is, when the will is said to be free. I examine the doctrines of three thinkers in whose thought the idea of the freedom of the will occupies a crucial place. Firstly, Augustine knows the moral sense of habitus, but does not use it to explain freedom; reading the Categories, he (...) understands that the term “habitus” refers to an accident, and uses this concept to explain modification. Secondly, describing the will, Anselm favours the word affectio, which designates a disposition which is not permanent; indeed, Anselm focuses on the dependence of the rational creature. Finally, Duns Scotus uses the Aristotelian concept of habitus, when he shows how the will, which is a rational power, determines itself freely. Thus, it can be said that Aristotle was a central and unavoidable source for the medieval developments of the concept of habitus and its use in relation with the doctrine of the will. (shrink)

At first glance, the function that Kant ascribes to iustitia distributiva in private law is simply to facilitate the judge’s decision by cutting off disputes on difficult matters of fact. But only one of the four examples that Kant gives in order to illustrate the effects of distributive justice is a case in which there are two equally founded solutions available and Kant declares the easier one to be prevailing on the grounds of iustitia distributiva. In the three other cases (...) the solution assigned to distributive justice is not merely facilitating the jugdement, but is also the systematic one and opposed to a solution which has no basis in fundamental private law rules. Iustitia distributiva, thus, works through, and not against, private law system. The guideline for the distribution of rights is dogmatics, not equity. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 191-220.

‘Was ist Wahrheit?’ — diese Frage des Pilatus bezeichnet eines der Grundprobleme menschlicher Existenz. Anders als das Tier ist der Mensch genötigt, sein Leben zu führen. Angesichts der Unwägbarkeiten, die seine Lebensführung bedrohen, hat er ein vitales Interesse daran, seinem Leben Sicherheit und Zuverlässigkeit zu geben, Gewissheiten zu finden, auf die er bauen kann. Das, was ihm bei seiner Suche nach Sicherheiten als fest und verbindlich aufscheint, das, was ihm Orientierung gibt, pflegt er mit dem Wort ‘wahr’ zu bezeichnen.

Die Grundidee der iustitia protectiva besagt: Der verletzliche Mensch hat ein Recht auf Schutz vor Übergriffen auf seine Integrität. Der Mensch ist infolge seiner Verletzlichkeit des Schutzes bedürftig und infolge seiner Würde des Schutzes wert. Wenn er des Schutzes wert ist, hat er dann nicht auch ein Recht auf Schutz? Und wenn die Sicherung eines Rechts Angelegenheit der Gerechtigkeit ist, ist dann nicht die Gewährleistung des Rechts auf Schutz ihre Aufgabe? Ist mithin nicht eine schützende Gerechtigkeit erforderlich? Im Gefüge der (...) Gerechtigkeit ist die iustitia protectiva jedoch nahezu unbekannt. Aus diesem Grund sei in einem ersten Teil ein allgemeines Konzept von ihr entwicke. (shrink)

In connection with his discussion of the three Ulpian formulae, Kant introduces three “leges,” namely the “lex iusti,” the “lex iuridica,” and the “lex iustitiae,” which he then defines in § 41 of the Doctrine of Right. The three “leges” correspond to the attributes “right,” “juridical,” and “established as right.” These three attributes in turn relate to the possibility, the reality, and the (material) necessity of our rights and juridical duties. The three “leges” and attributes have certain consequences for (...) the division of public justice, public justice being constitutive of the juridical state, into “iustitia tutatrix,” “iustitia commutativa,” and “iustitia distributiva.” This article provides a comprehensive account of all these concepts from § 41 of the Doctrine of Right. It also explains what until now has seemed to be a rather cryptic comment Kant makes at the end of his discussion of the Ulpian formulae regarding internal and external legal duties, and those legal duties that contain the derivation of the external legal duties from the principle of the internal legal duties through subsumption. Indeed the article provides the key to understanding the entire Doctrine of Right from a totally new perspective. (shrink)

El hecho de que la doctrina de la justificación llegara a convertirse en el núcleo teológico fundamental de la Reforma y la tradición protestante ha estado estrechamente vinculado al descubrimiento de la justicia de Dios como acontecimiento de salvación. El presente artículo explora los límites de las concepciones clásicas de justicia con las que Martín Lutero se encontró en su tiempo, y el modo en que la lectura de la Epístola a los romanos propició una nueva comprensión de la _iustitia (...) Dei _y, consecuentemente, de la justificación por la fe_. _Al situar al Evangelio como clave interpretativa, se produce un desbordamiento de las nociones de justicia heredadas de la tradición filosófica en la medida que se retorna a las fuentes bíblicas. Este giro hermenéutico fue mucho más que un hecho anecdótico; representó un punto de inflexión no solamente para la labor de Lutero como reformador, sino también para el posterior desarrollo de la teología protestante. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 47 Heft: 1 Seiten: 239-272.

This paper studies the concept of memory as understood in Spinoza’s body of work, focusing mainly on E 2P18. The main features of memory’s functioning are explained across three conceptual axes: affectio, vestigium and concatenation. These shape Spinoza’s own argumentation in the cited proposition and also recall Aristotle’s theory on memory’s function and functioning. The link between both theories helps transversely to elucidate Spinoza’s position regarding the problem of the identity of the individual.

Does organizational governance contribute to academic quality? Two top research universities are observed in-depth: Berkeley and the MIT. Three key factors are listed that help generate consistent and lasting high performance. Priority is allocated to self-evaluation and to the development of talent. Values and norms such as community membership, commitment to the affectio societatis, mutual respect and trust strongly regulate the behaviors of the faculty. Complex inner organizational processes are at work making integration and differentiation compatible. Each of these (...) factors contributes to produce top academic quality in a synergetic way. (shrink)

Could the notion of compromise help us overcoming – or at least negotiating – the frequent tension, in normative political theory, between the realistic desideratum of peaceful coexistence and the idealistic desideratum of justice? That is to say, an analysis of compromise may help us moving beyond the contrast between two widespread contrasting attitudes in contemporary political philosophy: ‘fiat iustitia, pereat mundus’ on the one side, ‘salus populi suprema lex’ on the other side. More specifically, compromise may provide the backbone (...) of a conception of legitimacy that mediates between idealistic (or moralistic) and realistic (or pragmatic) desiderata of political theory, i.e. between the aspiration to peace and the aspiration to justice. In other words, this paper considers whether an account of compromise could feature in a viable realistic conception of political legitimacy, in much the same way in which consensus features in more idealistic conceptions of legitimacy (a move that may be attributed to some realist theorists, especially Bernard Williams). My conclusions, however, are largely sceptical: I argue that grounding legitimacy in any kind of normatively salient agreement does require the trappings of idealistic political philosophy, for better or – in my view – worse. (shrink)

Kant's ethics do not include a discussion of justice as a specific virtue, and the "Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right" appear to deal only with private and public law, but not with justice. In fact, Kant's ethics in the three Critiques and later relevant writings is dependent on God's iustitia distributiva as the highest good and the institution of the state is labelled as "public justice". This article attempts to explain this connection and to provide a contribution (...) to the topic of Kantian justice. The Epilogue to this article discusses a letter dated November 6, 1790, which Kant wrote in one of his official capacities at the University of Königsberg and which as of yet has remained unpublished. Innerhalb der Kantischen Ethik wird die Gerechtigkeit nicht als besondere Tugend erörtert, und die "Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre" scheinen nur vom privaten und öffentlichen Recht, nicht jedoch von der Gerechtigkeit zu handeln. Tatsächlich ist die Ethik in den drei Kritiken und den späteren einschlägigen Schriften auf eine iustitia distributiva Gottes als höchstem Gut angewiesen, und die rechtliche Institution des Staates wird als "öffentliche Gerechtigkeit" bezeichnet. Die Arbeit sucht diesen Zusammenhang zu klären und einen Beitrag zu dem im Titel angegebenen Thema zu leisten. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas can be read as challenging the legal principle that everybody must be treated in the same way without fear of favor, no matter who they are or what status they hold. He did so by highlighting the private suffering that goes unnoticed if justice is blind, as is suggested by the image of Iustitia wearing a blindfold. What this unspeakable suffering means for justice is explored through a reading of Jean Améry’s At the Mind's Limit and Jill Stauffer’s (...) Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not Being Heard. (shrink)

The article presents Richard Kilvington’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views on the concept of justice. Richard Kilvington was a fourteenth century philosopher and theologian who commented on various Aristotle’s works including Nicomachean Ethics. Kilvington’s commentary on Nicomachean Ethics was composed in 1325-1326 at Oxford University. It contains, among others, a question Utrum iustitia sit virtus moralis perfecta, which is devoted to the concept of justice. In his investigations Kilvington always uses logic as a major analytical tool, and mathematics as a method (...) to discuss the issues and settle between opposite points of view, which is common for Kilvington’s commentaries. These techniques allow him to indicate all the contradictions in Aristotle’s analyses. Kilvington’s concept of justice clearly points to twofold order: horizontal and vertical. In the horizontal one Kilvington’s distinguishes the virtue of absolute justice that is a perfect model for all kinds of justice. In the vertical one he presents a model of a just man that is such a man who is ‘perfectly harmonious’. He also indicates the order of justice existing in the world, visible in human relationships, and regulated by three kinds of justice viz. compensatory, distributive and political. Kilvington’s investigations complete Artistotle’s opinions on justice, however they remain in the field of Aristotelian analyses and his concept of morality implemented in society. In this question Kilvington consistently separates the supernatural order and the order of natural reason, and, in his ethics, he never refers to theological issues concerning the relation between God and created world, which was uncommon for medieval theoretical practice. (shrink)