All the paradoxes in the Engberg-Pedersen interpretation and all the present-day discussions about whether energeia is an activity or a state, are not, in my opinion, the result of a defective reading of Aristotle but, rather, the influence of the prevailing values of our industrial society. These values - held, as it seems, by these commentators - are conspicuously teleological: they prevent us from grasping the qualitative difference between praxis and poesis and between energeia and kinesis. Indeed, since (...) these teleological values do not take this difference into account, the commentators only ask, when Aristotle distinguishes between praxis and poesis, how much time praxis takes, or if it takes time at all, which is totally irrelevant. Duration in time is incompatible with praxis, not because praxis does not take time nor because it is a state, but because duration in time relates only to purposeful thinking and productive activity, which praxis is not. Commentators fail therefore to analyze successfully the meaning of the expression “actions in which the end (telos) inheres.” It is not clear to them what is meant by activities that are ends in themselves. Failing to grasp this fact, they resort to analysing the temporality of the activity, which is irrelevant to it.Time is a measure of efficiency, and therefore relevant in poesis which is concerned with achievement. The relation of poesis to time is an inverse one: the shorter the time taken for an activity the better the poesis.In ancient-Greek consciousness a valuable activity was that which was undertaken for its own sake and therefore without concern for the amount of time employed in its performance; whereas an action taken as a means to an end was regarded as immoral. In modern society, on the other hand, utilitarian values tend to make it almost incomprehensible that something should be done for its own sake: every human action is evaluated by its result, and when the focus is on the result the criteria of efficiency and utility are obviously relevant. The Greeks valued praxis more than poesis, whereas our culture values poesis and techne more than praxis. The understanding of Aristotle's concept of praxis is useful therefore not only in order to understand ancient-Greek culture, but also to understand better our own presuppositions. (shrink)

I adapt Robert Sinnerbrink's notion of cinematic poesis by arguing that Terrence Malick's The Thin Red Line constitutes an example of ecological cinematic poesis: a style of filmmaking that works in concert with the limits and potentialities of the filmmaking as a medium. This cinematic bearing emerges in a new way following Malick's return to Hollywood, where a combination of factors spur the emergence of a radical Emersonian practice of cinematic receptivity. I draw on oral histories, and the (...) film itself, to demonstrate how Malick's creative process consistently tends towards an ethos of poverty. To further pattern and illuminate the ecological stakes of this Emersonian stance, I draw on the complementary framework of second-order systems theory, and in particular, on Niklas Luhmann's concept of simultaneity. In so doing, I outline the layered nature of Malick's cinematic praxis – a doubled Emersonian receptivity which not only invites defamiliarizing depictions of warfare and the nonhuman, but also welcomes, and toys with, the otherness haunting technical images and human cognition. As such, The Thin Red Line, and its immediate counterparts, perform the ecological work of reframing the conditions of wonder, asking us to marvel not at what we have seen, but what we haven’t. (shrink)

La separación del platonismo antiguo en platonismo medio y neoplatonismo es relativamente reciente. La base conceptual de esta separación fue cimentada en el trabajo pionero Historia critica philosophiae (1742-67) de Jacob Brucker. En las décadas de 1770 y 1780, el término “neoplatonismo” fue acuñado a partir del análisis de Brucker. Tres conceptos historiográficos fueron decisivos para Brucker: “sistema de filosofía”, “eclecticismo” y “sincretismo”. Valiéndose de estos conceptos, caracterizó al platonismo medio y al neoplatonismo como movimientos filosóficos opuestos, siendo el primero (...) una forma genuina de platonismo y el segundo una falsa. No obstante, esta separación es insostenible y deberíamos abandonarla. (shrink)

In the Physics, Aristotle defines motion as 'the actuality of what is potentially, qua potential' (Phys. 201b5). This definition has been interpreted countless times and has been the subject of heated controvery. At issue today is whether ὲντελέχεια refers to motions as a process or a state. Accordingly, if the idea of ὲντελέχεια is believed to refer to a process, it is translated to mean actualization. If on the other hand it is taken to refer to a state, it is (...) translated as meaning actuality. In the first instance, known as the 'state-view', a change is defined as being the state of a changing object when it is actually potentially F, for some F. In the second, or 'process-view', a change is defined as the actualization of a potentially. It seems to me that both views mistakenly assume that Aristotle succeeded in defining motion as motion. As a consequence, the discussion has focused on a presumed content that the definition does not offer. Indeed, were it the case that Aristotle's definition was adequate, there would hardly be any point in even considering the question of whether he had intended to regard motion as being a state or a process. In this paper I examine both of these views and offer an alternative interpretation of my own that differs markedly from either. Additionally, I shall show that just as Aristotle's definition represents a projection of his particular attitude toward nature - so also recent interpretations of his definition represent a projection of the attitudes of modern thinker's toward Aristotle's philosophy. (shrink)

This paper's philosophical ideas are developed from a General Nursing Council for England and Wales Trust‐funded study to explore nursing knowledge and wisdom and ways in which these can be translated into clinical practice and fostered in junior nurses. Participants using Carper's (1978) ways of knowing as a framework experienced difficulty conceptualizing a link between the empirics and ethics of nursing. The philosophical problem is how to understand praxis as a moral entity with intrinsic value when so much of (...) value seems to be technical and extrinsic depending on desired ends. Using the Aristotelian terms poesis and praxis can articulate the concerns that the participants as well as Carper (1978) and Dreyfus (in Flyvbjerg, 1991) among others share that certain actions or ways of knowing important for nursing are being devalued and deformed by the importance placed on quantitative data and measurable outcomes. The sense of praxis is a moralized one and most of what nurses do is plausibly on any account of normative ethics a morally good thing; the articulation of the idea of praxis can go some way in showing how it is a part of the discipline of nursing. Nursing's acts as poesis can be a part of how practitioners come to have praxis as phronesis or practical wisdom. So to be a wise nurse, one needs be a wise person. (shrink)

O artigo esboça o desenvolvimento da hermenêutica filosófica de Paul Ricoeur a partir de sua fenomenologia da vontade em direção a uma hermenêutica da revelação, mostrando como o projeto radical de destranscendentalizar a subjetividade, subjacente à recepção francesa copntemporânea de uma hermenêutica da suspeita, terma por favorecer um retorno pós-hegeliano a Kant e reformula a filosofia transcendental numa correlação histórica e socialmente mediada entre linguagem e subjetividade, juntamente com uma dialética entre poesis e práxis.

Since culture is a form of poēsis and thus carries the danger of monologism and domination, and since today political “conflicts are increasingly defined from a cultural standpoint,” the question this paper addresses is whether culture can affect politics other than as a form of conflict and political aestheticism. Put differently: can culture become a source of communication and dialogue in politics? The answer this paper proposes is that culture can do so not by uncompromisingly divorcing praxis from any (...) association with poēsis, but by making a distinction between two forms of poēsis. I argue that there are good grounds in Hannah Arendt's conception of the human condition and of the life of the mind to think that a distinction is possible between, on the one hand, technical, and thus non-creative, making and, on the other hand, metaphorical, imaginative, and creative making. It is the work of art that, through the joint employment of taste and polyphonic authorship, brings culture into politics in a manner that creatively and dialogically serves the purpose of augmenting the world. Through taste one is receptive to particulars and thus capable of judging their worldly suitability, while keeping one's mind open. Through polyphonic authorship one anticipates the unfinalized and open character of ideas and thus, the ongoing need to speak with other ideas, with the ideas of others. (shrink)

This dissertation examines a central tenet of Hannah Arendt's political philisophy--that the failure to distinguish between the social and the political, both theoretically and practically, obfuscates the nature and location of freedom in the modern world. The very tenability of the distinction as well as Arendt's historically-grounded method of drawing it has proven problematic. Some critics accuse her of elitism because they believe that, for Arendt, freedom entails the existence of poverty. Others, like Jurgen Habermas, charge that Arendt's analysis deprives (...) politics of its power. Recent proponents of civil society decry her "negativity" with regard to social movements and the institutional level of politics. But Arendt's discussion of "the social question" in On Revolution, her interpretation of the distinction between praxis and poesis found primarily in The Human Condition, but also in her political philosophy generally, and her nuanced drawing of appropriate distinctions throughout her work, provide evidence that, in her view, poverty mitigates against freedom, strategic violence can justifiably be eliminated from politics and advocates of civil society fail to draw certain important and necessary distinctions. ;In examining these texts, I argue that the key to understanding Arendt's interpretation of the social/political distinction is provided by her emphasis on the profound importance of public spaces--that is, on how their use or abuse may compromise, threaten, and redefine freedom in the modern world. (shrink)

How should we understand the categorical distinction Aristotle draws between praxis and poesis? If this distinction gains its meaning only in a specific social and cultural context, what does this tell us about another famous Aristotelian distinction, namely, the distinction he draws between two types of justice: corrective and distributive? In particular, what is the orienting role of this distinction (and what should we make of this) in accounts of justice based on Kantian right and accounts based on (...) Rawls’ principles of justice? (shrink)

La teología desarrollada en el Timeo de Platón constituye la base del lógos cosmológico. En ese sentido, el discurso mítico que recorre el diálogo intenta esbozar una explicación plausible del predominio de la razón, la belleza y el orden en el mundo (kosmos) por encima del azar y la necesidad. Esta tesis se sustenta en el análisis filosófico de la función que cumple el demiurgo divino, en contraste con el Dios cristiano y con la deidades de la poesía griega. En (...) el primer punto, no se habla de una creación exnihilo, sino del ordenamiento de un material predado; en el segundo punto, no se trata de un dios antropomórfico, sino de un "dios filantrópico", responsable de la existencia de un kosmos cognoscible, que además constituye un modelo de la praxis humana. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 13.1 (2005) 111-114 [Access article in PDF] Response to Elvira Panaiotidi, "The Nature of Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts in Music Education" Janice Waldron Michigan State University Elvira Panaiotidi makes a strong case that MEAE and praxialism represent, respectively, the poesis and praxis strands of the Aristotelian conception of art and that, consequently, one cannot conclude that the two accounts are ontologically incompatible. (...) At this point I wish only to respond to an implication which I believe may be present and discuss its relevance. That is that the search for ontological explanations has historically preceded (or at least should precede) the development of music education theory. A brief look at the historical record indicates that the development of music education theory seems to have been dominated by the search for axiological more than ontological explanations. Panaiotidi lists both aspects as integral parts of the theoretical kernel, however, the need to justify music education in terms of value has, at least in the United States, apparently preceded any search for meaning.Michael Mark recounts a report of the Boston School Committee in 1837, at which certain arguments of Aristotle were invoked in order to persuade the commitee of the value of music instruction.1 The entire transcript of that meeting amounts to a polemic about the value of music, resulting from its supposed effects on the spirit, character, or health, yet the record is devoid of any discussion of what might actually constitute music.2 Marie McCarthy describes how the search for aesthetic foundations over a century later was fostered by a need to "explain [music education's] importance in the curriculum."3 Of the scholars of this period, Abraham Schwadron in particular was quite explicit in articulating how his theory of aesthetics was motivated by what he considered an appalling inability for music educators to validate their field's existence.4This is not to imply that the authors of our current philosophies were not searching for or failed to provide strong ontological arguments for music education or to insist that they have always framed the question: What is valuable about music? as the question: What is music? in order to address these ideological [End Page 111] and political pressures. I am merely suggesting that the search for ontological explanations has generally followed the search for value. The historical pattern is one of reaction to various pressures, followed by the eventual development of an aesthetic philosophical framework which was intended, directly or indirectly, to respond to those pressures. The magnitude of such pressures to justify the place of music in the curriculum would seem to differentiate music education paradigms from those of the social sciences and humanities, of which, the author asserts, they are hybrids. Combined with the marked differences in social and political pressures which are found in various times and places in America, it would also account for the emotional tone of the debate, to which the author also alludes. Presumably, such emotion results not only from various scholars' attachments to their ontological beliefs, but from the practical consequences which occur when a theory is ultimately rejected or implemented at the classroom level, based on its perceived ability to define what is valuable in music education.Although this differentiation is subtle and does not detract from the strength of Panaiotidi's central argument, it has implications for the eventual implementation of any unitary theory. Specifically, if we accept that, ontologically speaking, praxialism and aestheticism are two sides of the same coin, it is likely that the argument will simply transform into an axiological question concerning which side is more valuable, a fact to which the author also alludes. Considering past evidence, the overriding concern for value justification may make implementing any unitary theory difficult, regardless of the benefits that could potentially be gained through such a "balanced music education." Consider, for example, that a unitary theory would be less susceptible to ideological use because of its breadth. In other fields such as literature or science, this would be a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 13.1 (2005) 111-114 [Access article in PDF] Response to Elvira Panaiotidi, "The Nature of Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts in Music Education" Janice Waldron Michigan State University Elvira Panaiotidi makes a strong case that MEAE and praxialism represent, respectively, the poesis and praxis strands of the Aristotelian conception of art and that, consequently, one cannot conclude that the two accounts are ontologically incompatible. (...) At this point I wish only to respond to an implication which I believe may be present and discuss its relevance. That is that the search for ontological explanations has historically preceded (or at least should precede) the development of music education theory. A brief look at the historical record indicates that the development of music education theory seems to have been dominated by the search for axiological more than ontological explanations. Panaiotidi lists both aspects as integral parts of the theoretical kernel, however, the need to justify music education in terms of value has, at least in the United States, apparently preceded any search for meaning.Michael Mark recounts a report of the Boston School Committee in 1837, at which certain arguments of Aristotle were invoked in order to persuade the commitee of the value of music instruction.1 The entire transcript of that meeting amounts to a polemic about the value of music, resulting from its supposed effects on the spirit, character, or health, yet the record is devoid of any discussion of what might actually constitute music.2 Marie McCarthy describes how the search for aesthetic foundations over a century later was fostered by a need to "explain [music education's] importance in the curriculum."3 Of the scholars of this period, Abraham Schwadron in particular was quite explicit in articulating how his theory of aesthetics was motivated by what he considered an appalling inability for music educators to validate their field's existence.4This is not to imply that the authors of our current philosophies were not searching for or failed to provide strong ontological arguments for music education or to insist that they have always framed the question: What is valuable about music? as the question: What is music? in order to address these ideological [End Page 111] and political pressures. I am merely suggesting that the search for ontological explanations has generally followed the search for value. The historical pattern is one of reaction to various pressures, followed by the eventual development of an aesthetic philosophical framework which was intended, directly or indirectly, to respond to those pressures. The magnitude of such pressures to justify the place of music in the curriculum would seem to differentiate music education paradigms from those of the social sciences and humanities, of which, the author asserts, they are hybrids. Combined with the marked differences in social and political pressures which are found in various times and places in America, it would also account for the emotional tone of the debate, to which the author also alludes. Presumably, such emotion results not only from various scholars' attachments to their ontological beliefs, but from the practical consequences which occur when a theory is ultimately rejected or implemented at the classroom level, based on its perceived ability to define what is valuable in music education.Although this differentiation is subtle and does not detract from the strength of Panaiotidi's central argument, it has implications for the eventual implementation of any unitary theory. Specifically, if we accept that, ontologically speaking, praxialism and aestheticism are two sides of the same coin, it is likely that the argument will simply transform into an axiological question concerning which side is more valuable, a fact to which the author also alludes. Considering past evidence, the overriding concern for value justification may make implementing any unitary theory difficult, regardless of the benefits that could potentially be gained through such a "balanced music education." Consider, for example, that a unitary theory would be less susceptible to ideological use because of its breadth. In other fields such as literature or science, this would be a... (shrink)

Paulo Freire : the educator, his oeuvre, and changing contexts -- Holistic interpretations of Freire's work : a critical review -- Critical literacy, praxis, and emancipatory politics -- "Remaining on the same side of the river" : neo-liberalism, party movements, and the struggle for greater coherence -- Reinventing Freire in a Southern context : the Mediterranean -- Engaging with practice : a Freirean reflection on different pedagogical sites.

In Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Daniel Andrés López reassembles Lukács’s philosophy of praxis on a Hegelian basis, as a conceptual-historical totality, both defending him and proposing an unprecedented, immanent critique that raises problems for Marxian philosophy as a whole.

Résumé La poésie est essentiellement liée au silence et peut être conçue dans ce sens comme une sorte de résistance contre le bruit de l’actualité ou de rébellion contre le lieu commun. Àl’affût du son originel qui voyage à travers les cultures, elle s’efforce d’exprimer l’inexprimable. Car la poésie est le jeu des possibilités. En se jouant des possibilités, elle incite l’être humain à habiter son monde différemment.

Sensible au problème de l'art et de la littérature, Marcel Conche ne lit pas l'Iliade comme le manifeste d'une idéologic de guerre, mais il montre, à l'arrière-plan d'un conflit démesuré, le développement d'une anthropologie archaïque, conçue dans ses liens avec les dieux, le destin, les relations entre les humains — notamment l'amitié — éclairées par l'amour et la beauté. L'Iliade est l'histoire d'un déchirement de l'âme humaine, tout homme pouvant s'y reconnaître. L' « avenir grec » de la pensée est (...) l'horizon insurpassable de l'aventure humaine. (shrink)

Praxis, Language, Dialogue Human engagement with the world develops and evolves into increasingly social, complex, and explicit modes. This essay examines the evolution of meaningful human engagement from simple embodied activity, to language-less social praxis, and then to praxis incorporating increasingly rich forms of linguistic action, culminating in theory. Each mode of meaningful engagement creates a space in which new modes of meaning can develop. These new ways of experiencing, acting, and communicating create their own meaning contexts, (...) which provide the settings for the further evolution of humans' phenomenological, hermeneutic, and practical involvements. Each mode of meaning gives rise to its successors, allowing humans to acquire new powers to understand and manipulate their environments and each other. This increase and refinement of human power raises ethical issues that we address using the Gadamerian concept of dialogue. (shrink)

Razón, poesía, historia.--La cuestión del estoicismo español.--El querer.

Resenha do livro de Erickson, Sandra S. F., e Erickson, Glenn W. Logos & poesis: neoplatonismo e literatura. Natal: EDUFRN, 2006. 193 páginas.

From the Introduction: This inquiry is concerned with the themes of praxis and action in four philosophic movements: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy. It is rare that these four movements are considered in a single inquiry, for there are profound differences of emphasis, focus, terminology, and approach represented by these styles of thought. Many philosophers believe that similarities among these movements are superficial and that a close examination of them will reveal only hopelessly unbridgeable cleavages. While respecting the (...) genuine fundamental differences of these movements, this inquiry is undertaken in the spirit of showing that there are important common themes and motifs in what first appears to be a chaotic babble of voices. I intend to show that the concern with man as an agent has been a primary focal point of each of these movements and further that each contributes something permanent and important to our understanding of the nature and context of human activity. (shrink)

Il s’agit de mettre en regard les domaines à la fois proches et différents de la poésie, de la philosophie et de la mystique, en conjuguant démarche diachronique et synchronique. Après avoir exploré les sources grecques et patristiques, l’analyse essaie de montrer, à partir d’auteurs comme Jean de la Croix, Pascal, Péguy, R. Tagore…, comment la philosophie s’approfondit à la rencontre de la poésie, comment la poésie s’élève à la rencontre de la pensée. Réunies l’une à l’autre par l’esprit, philosophie (...) et poésie s’accomplissent dans la mystique. La fidélité au mystère incline la pensée vers le poème et le poème vers la sagesse. The attempt is made here to confront the fields at once close and different of poetry, philosophy and mysticism, joining together a diachronic and a synchronic approach. Having explored Greek and Patristic sources, the analysis tries to show, starting from authors such as John of the Cross, Pascal, Péguy, R. Tagore…, how philosophy acquires greater depth through contact with poetry, and how poetry reaches in turn greater heights thanks to its contact with thought. Brought together by spirit, philosophy and poetry culminate in mysticism. Faithfulness to mystery draws thought to the poem and the poem to wisdom. (shrink)

Comment la création poétique s'accommode-t-elle du savoir religieux qui l'inspire ? la question sera étudiée à l'aide d'illustrations prises chez des poètes chrétiens d'avant-guerre ou d'après-guerre . On testera à cet effet une typologie qui distingue une poésie « confessionnelle », une autre « confessante », et un troisième type « indirect », selon les réminiscences verbales qu'on y trouve ou les innovations de langage ou le jeu des références à l'expérience spirituelle. Il devrait apparaître finalement que la ligne de (...) démarcation de la créativité poétique sépare moins les deux premiers types du troisième qu'elle ne passe entre le premier et les deux autres, quand ces deux derniers préservent l'ouverture de la référence à des interprétations diverses.How does poetical creation adapt to the religions knowledge that inspires it ? The question will be treated with the help of illustrations taken from pre-war Christian poets - Claudel, Reverdy – or post-war ones – La Tour du Pin, Lemaire, Mambrino –. To that effect, a typology distinguishing a « denominational » poetry, a « confessing » one, and a third, indirect type, will be tested, according to the verbal influences that are to be found, or to the language innovations, or to the interaction of the references to the spiritual experience. It should eventually be obvious that the boundary line of the poetical creativity does not separate the first two types from the third one, as much as it runs between the first one and the two others, when the latter enable various interpretation. (shrink)

From the Introduction: This inquiry is concerned with the themes of praxis and action in four philosophic movements: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy. It is rare that these four movements are considered in a single inquiry, for there are profound differences of emphasis, focus, terminology, and approach represented by these styles of thought. Many philosophers believe that similarities among these movements are superficial and that a close examination of them will reveal only hopelessly unbridgeable cleavages. While respecting the (...) genuine fundamental differences of these movements, this inquiry is undertaken in the spirit of showing that there are important common themes and motifs in what first appears to be a chaotic babble of voices. I intend to show that the concern with man as an agent has been a primary focal point of each of these movements and further that each contributes something permanent and important to our understanding of the nature and context of human activity. (shrink)

This volume deals with the appropriations, criticism and transformation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s positions about theory, practice and the contemplative life, including their epistemological and metaphysical foundations, from ...

Kameron Carter’s reading of Black life as matter, as the imaginary, and as an innovation of possibilities enmeshes Black theology, Black womanist/feminist thought, Black Diaspora and Black American Studies, Philosophy, and Queer of Color Critique to reveal how the project of the western world erases Black physical and intellectual legacy. A project that is anti-black, anti-other, anti-difference that erases the legacy of the physical and intellectual aspects of Black contributions to the western world. His book is an invitation to think (...) through what Black ontology would look like outside of white western constructions of religion and social scripts. Carter’s radical shift from being beyond the long durée of enslavement, colonization, segregation, and its afterlives scripts an (anti)blackening because of the western project of erasure works to undo such a project. The book is working against the social ontology of being a fragmented object that is plasticized, fetishized, and dissolved into a state of non-being. It is a project that disrupts and decolonizes previously constructed (anti)blackening architecture by creating a blueprint that asks for Black matter as an incomplete project because it must include imagination and innovation. (shrink)

Rien n’est plus faux que l’image de Dante comme génie isolé, tranchant sur son époque. Il appartient au contraire à une génération d’intellectuels italiens très caractéristique: laïes, souvent actifs dans plus d’un domaine, pratiquant abondamment l’expression poétique, engagés dans l’action politique, ces savants-citoyens partagent également une forte conscience historique. Leur inventivité se manifeste, en philosophie, en médecine et en droit, autant que dans l’expression littéraire. Outre des facteurs endogènes, une clé de ce phénomène tient à la réception active du savoir (...) naturaliste élaboré à Paris, qui est lu en Italie hors du contrôle des théologiens. Les parcours parallèles d’une douzaine de personnalité hors du commun montrent la nécessité d’élargir les cadres habituels de l’histoire intellectuelle médiévale. (shrink)

The archive is the place for the storage of documents and records. With the emergence of the modern state, it became the storehouse for the material from which national memories were constructed. Archives also housed the proliferation of files and case histories as populations were subjected to disciplinary power and surveillance. Behind all scholarly research stands the archive. The ultimate plausibility of a piece of research depends on the grounds, the sources, from which the account is extracted and compiled. An (...) expanding and unstable globalizing archive presents particular problems for classifying and legitimating knowledge. Increasingly the boundaries between the archive and everyday life become blurred through digital recording and storage technologies. Not only does the volume of recordable archive material increase dramatically, but the volume of material seen worthy of archiving increases too, as the criteria of what can, or should be, archived expands. Life increasingly becomes lived in the shadow of the archive. (shrink)

From the Introduction: This inquiry is concerned with the themes of praxis and action in four philosophic movements: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy. It is rare that these four movements are considered in a single inquiry, for there are profound differences of emphasis, focus, terminology, and approach represented by these styles of thought. Many philosophers believe that similarities among these movements are superficial and that a close examination of them will reveal only hopelessly unbridgeable cleavages. While respecting the (...) genuine fundamental differences of these movements, this inquiry is undertaken in the spirit of showing that there are important common themes and motifs in what first appears to be a chaotic babble of voices. I intend to show that the concern with man as an agent has been a primary focal point of each of these movements and further that each contributes something permanent and important to our understanding of the nature and context of human activity. (shrink)