This paper responds to the debate between John Burbidge, Edward Halper, and William Maker about the nature of Hegel’s idealism, and in particular of the relationship between Hegel’s logic and Realphilosophie. I argue that Maker’s position is the one most consistent with both what Hegel says about philosophy and Hegel’s own philosophical practice. I begin by highlighting the essential differences that separate the three interpretations and then turn to Hegel’s texts, to identify the passages that pose difficulties for the (...) readings of Burbidge and Halper. I conclude by considering, and ultimately rejecting, the objections that Burbidge and Halper raise to Maker’s interpretation. (shrink)

This book outlines the realist and pluralist philosophy of John Anderson, Australia's most original thinker. His teaching at Sydney University and his arti6es have deeply influenced Australian intellectual life. Several main themes run through his work, but Anderson never gave an overall account of his views. This is remedied here: exhibiting the range of Anderson's thought from logic, epistemology and theory of mind, to language and social theory, this volume sketches realism as a systematic philosophical position, while showing (...) something of the history of ideas in Australia. (shrink)

Can Pellegrino and Thomasma's book, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice (1981), rightfully claim to be a step forward towards a systematic philosophy of medicine? We try to answer this question by focusing our comment upon three related aspects of the book, namely (1) the problem of philosophical method(s), (2) the alleged Aristotelian-Thomistic orientation, (3) the view of philosophical anthropology of the authors. It is first argued that it is doubtful whether there is as much philosophical method in (...) the authors' book as their reflections on philosophical method suggest. Second, we argue that if Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy is important to the authors, it is not so much because of its methods and content, as because it supplies them with a very convenient framework for didactically ordering and transmitting their views about what they consider to be — philosophically speaking — basic about medicine. Third we argue that the authors' conception of philosophical anthropology bears (in point of method and ontology) more resemblance to the humanistic naturalism of John Dewey, than to any of the European philosophical traditions (Aristotelism, (Neo)Thomism, Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology) listed in support of their philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

Apart from scholarly studies of other philosophers, most of my work in philosophy has been confined to the theory of human rights. I have never tried to develop a system in the sense that, say, Whitehead and Santayana did, yet I think of myself as a systematic philosopher. In what sense can I claim that my theory of what I call “operative rights” and my application of this theory are systematic? Is there a difference between a philosophic (...) system and the systematic treatment ofphilosophic topics? (shrink)

This book outlines the realist and pluralist philosophy of John Anderson, Australia's most original thinker, whose articles and teaching at Sydney University have deeply influenced Australian intellectual life. Several main themes run though his work, but Anderson never gave an overall account of his views. This is remedied here: in exhibiting the range of Anderson's thought, from logic, epistemology and theory of mind, to language and social theory, Baker's work sketches realism as a systematic philosophical position and shows (...) something of the history of ideas in Australia. This book will be of particular interest to historians of modern philosophy and those studying realism. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

"Presents, and in part develops, a systematic philosophy as the universal science, or the theorization of the unrestricted universe of discourse, explicitly including being as such and as a whole. Argues that complete exploration of the theoretical domain requires such a science"--Provided by publisher.

Hegel and the Future of Systematic Philosophy critically rethinks and extends Hegel's project for systematic philosophy without foundations, engaging the most important contemporary debates concerning logic, epistemology, metaphysics, nature, mind, economic justice, political freedom, globalization, and literary theory.

In this provocative work, the author asks us to understand Hegel's system as a new approach to human linguistic communication.

This volume begins with important critical, comparative, and historical assessments of the contemporary problems in metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, ethics, social thought, and philosophy of religion, of history, and ...

A magisterial work in the grand tradition of systematic philosophy not seen in this country perhaps since Alfred North Whitehead’s _Process and Reality _, this book by a leading German philosopher aims to resurrect systematic philosophy as an essential part of the theoretical enterprise. In Lorenz Puntel’s vision, philosophy as the universal science can be holistic without being imperialistic. The book presents theoretical frameworks as indispensable for any and all theorizing. It argues that there can (...) be truths only relative to sufficiently determinable theoretical frameworks, and that all such frameworks are genuinely revelatory ontologically. No problematic relativism results, however, because such frameworks can be compared and thereby ranked with respect to their theoretical adequacy. _Structure and Being _contributes to the reconciliation of analytic and continental philosophy by insisting upon clarity and precision, as the former does, while aiming for comprehensiveness, as the latter often does. (shrink)

Moral values are real—we don't just make them up. Beauty is in the world—it's not just in the eye of the beholder. You are free—what you do is not always determined by electrochemical processes in your brain. And the universe we live in is God's creation. These are radical claims. But they are widely rejected in contemporary philosophy because they are almost always considered in relative isolation from one another. This book shows that when they are considered in conjunction, (...) they gain mutual support. And it shows this both clearly and concisely. But its systematic approach to philosophy also reveals that various philosophical positions currently widely accepted and defended can appear plausible and perhaps even compelling only when they are considered in relative isolation—as they, too, almost always are. When the issues on which these positions are taken are considered in conjunction, problems come into view and the alternative positions defended in this book emerge as superior. Toward a Philosophical Theory of Everything is a ground-breaking work that shows the importance of systematic thinking, while also defending positions, on central philosophical issues, that are widely rejected in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Hegel thought that systematicity was both a necessary condition for a body of thought to be recognized as philosophy and a normative principle by which progress in the history of philosophy can be evaluated. I argue that Hegel’s idiosyncrasies in the interpretation of thinkers who he considers to be philosophers can be explained by referring to the structure of his own philosophical system. I also argue that Hegel’s conception of philosophy as (...) being essentially systematic leads him to claim that traditions that do not have systematic philosophy do not have philosophy at all and this leads to their marginalization. Finally, I identify the role of Hegel’s assumptions in shaping the self-understanding of philosophers through the shaping of the philosophical canon. (shrink)

I believe that the sort of disagreements we encounter in philosophy—disagreements that often take the form that I have elsewhere called system- atic peer disagreements—make it unreasonable to think that there is any knowledge, or even justified belief, when the disagreements themselves are systematic. I readily acknowledge that this skeptical view is quite controversial; I suspect many are unconvinced. However, I will not be defending it here. Rather, I will be exploring a worry, or set of worries, that (...) arise on the assumption that this view is correct. For if it is unreasonable to think that there is justified belief in contexts of systematic philosophical disagreements, by what right do we continue to advance philosophical claims in such contexts? Indeed, by what right do we believe the philosophical claims we advance? And if we don’t believe them, why do we advance them in the first place? An inability to respond to these worries would leave us with the dis- tinct impression that the practice or activity of philosophy is quite suspect: what sort of practice or activity would have us believe unreasonably, assert unwarrantedly, and perhaps exhibit insincerity to boot? (shrink)