Recent research has begun treating the perennial philosophical question, “what makes a person the same over time?” as an empirical question. A long tradition in philosophy holds that psychological continuity and connectedness of memories are at the heart of personal identity. More recent experimental work, following Strohminger & Nichols (2014), has suggested that persistence of moral character, more than memories, is perceived as essential for personal identity. While there is a growing body of evidence supporting these findings, a critique by (...) Starmans & Bloom (2018) suggests that this research program conflates personal identity with mere similarity. To address this criticism, we explore how loss of someone’s morality or memories influence perceptions of identity change, and perceptions of moral duties towards the target of the change. We present participants with a classic ‘body switch’ thought experiment and after assessing perceptions of identity persistence, we present a moral dilemma, asking participants to imagine that one of the patients must die (Study 1) or be left alone in a care home for the rest of their life (Study 2). Our results highlight the importance of the continuity of moral character, suggesting lay intuitions are tracking (something like) personal identity, not just mere similarity. (shrink)

In this chapter, we outline the interdisciplinary contributions that philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience have provided in the understanding of the self and identity, focusing on one specific line of burgeoning research: the importance of morality to perceptions of self and identity. Of course, this rather limited focus will exclude much of what psychologists and neuroscientists take to be important to the study of self and identity (that plethora of self-hyphenated terms seen in psychology and neuroscience: self-regulation, self-esteem, self-knowledge, self-concept, self-perception, (...) and more). We will likewise not engage with many canonical philosophical treatments of self and identity. But we will lay out a body of research that brings together classic themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to raise empirically tractable philosophical questions, and philosophically rigorous empirical questions about self and identity. More specifically, in section 4.2, we will review some recent research that has treated traditional philosophical questions about self and identity as empirical questions. Within this body of work, we will be primarily concerned with the finding that morality (more so than memory) is perceived to be at the core of self and identity. Then, in section 4.3, we raise and respond to a variety of questions and criticisms: first, about the operationalization of identity concepts in the empirical literature; second, about the generalizability of the moral self effect; third, about the direction of change; fourth, about connections with recent work in neuroscience; and fifth, about the target of evaluation. Finally, in section 4.4, we consider a variety of implications and applications of this work on the moral self. Throughout, we aim to highlight connections between classical themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, while also suggesting new directions for interdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic has shed more light on the difficulty of making health care decisions integrating scientific knowledge and values associated to life and death issues, human suffering, quality of life, economic losses, liberty of movement, etc. But the difficulties related to health care decisions and the use of innovative drugs or technologies are not new, and many countries have created agencies that have the mandate to evaluate new technologies in health care. Health Technological Assessment (HTA) reports’ aim is (...) to guide the decision makers in these difficult matters. There are two ethical components in HTA. The first is the report’s presentation of an ethical evaluation of the technology. The second is the value-ladenness of the HTA decision-making process itself. When implicit value judgments are not elicited, the justification of the final decision cannot be transparent. The present paper aims to identify and elicit the implicit value-judgments related to each step of the HTA process. This research is grounded on an applied ethics decision-making paradigm based on the role of value judgments in the decision-making process. The first part discusses two different approaches to values and value judgments in HTA. In the second part, citations mentioning value judgments extracted from a systematic review on the integration of ethics into HTA were categorized to elicit the value judgments and their criteria for each different HTA decision-making steps. The results show that there are 18 decision-making steps in the HTA process where 23 implicit value-judgments can be recognized. The range of these value judgments encompasses the whole HTA process: from the initial request, the presenting of the principal issues, to the final report’s dissemination. Since stakeholders need to understand which value judgments the conclusion of a report relies on, eliciting the implicit value judgments in the HTA decision-making process should yield more transparency. (shrink)

Background: Recent literature on addiction and judgments about the characteristics of agents has focused on the implications of adopting a ‘brain disease’ versus ‘moral weakness’ model of addiction. Typically, such judgments have to do with what capacities an agent has (e.g., the ability to abstain from substance use). Much less work, however, has been conducted on the relationship between addiction and judgments about an agent’s identity, including whether or to what extent an individual is seen as the same person after (...) becoming addicted. Methods: We conducted a series of vignette-based experiments (total N = 3,620) to assess lay attitudes concerning addiction and identity persistence, systematically manipulating key characteristics of agents and their drug of addiction. Conclusions: In Study 1, we found that US participants judged an agent who became addicted to drugs as being closer to ‘a completely different person’ than ‘completely the same person’ as the agent who existed prior to the addiction. In Studies 2-6, we investigated the intuitive basis for this result, finding that lay judgments of altered identity as a consequence of drug use and addiction are driven primarily by perceived negative changes in the moral character of drug users, who are seen as having deviated from their good true selves. (shrink)

Two popular models of trustworthiness have garnered support over the years. One has postulated three aspects of trustworthiness as state-based antecedents to trust. Another has been interpreted to comprise two aspects of trustworthiness. Empirical data shows support for both models, and debate remains as to the theoretical and practical reasons researchers may adopt one model over the other. The present research aimed to consider this debate by investigating the factor structure of trustworthiness. Taking items from two scales commonly employed to (...) assess trustworthiness, we leveraged structural equation modeling to explore which theoretical model is supported by the data in an organizational trust context. We considered an array of first-order, second-order, and bifactor models. The best-fitting model was a bifactor model comprising one general trustworthiness factor and ability, benevolence, and integrity grouping factors. This model was determined to be essentially unidimensional, though this is qualified by the finding that the grouping variables accounted for significant variance with for several organizational outcome criteria. These results suggest that respondents typically employ a general factor when responding to items assessing trustworthiness, and researchers may be better served treating the construct as unidimensional or engaging in scale parceling of their models to reflect this response tendency more accurately. However, the substantial variance accounted by the grouping variables in hierarchical regression suggest there may be contexts in which it would be acceptable to consider the theoretical factors of ability, benevolence, and integrity independent of general trustworthiness. (shrink)

Le fondateur du positivisme ne s'est pas contente d'exposer ses theories dans deux series de grandes oeuvres constructives, il en a presente aussi des sortes de syntheses, de resumes exoteriques, destines a un public plus large. Le Discours sur l'esprit positif (1844), discours preliminaire au Traite philosophique d'astronomie populaire, avait ainsi ete concu par Comte comme une sorte de manifeste systematique de la nouvelle ecole. La grande loi sur l'evolution intellectuelle de l'humanite vers l'esprit positif y est developpee jusque dans (...) ses consequences sociales, educatives et emancipatrices. C'est dans les lois des phenomenes que consiste reellement la science, a laquelle les faits proprement dits, quelques exacts et nombreux qu'ils puissent etre, ne fournissent jamais que d'indispensabes materiaux. Or, en considerant la destination constante de ces lois, on peut dire, sans aucune exageration, que la veritable science, bien loin d'etre formee de simples observations, tend toujours a dispenser, autant que possible, de l'exploration directe, en y substituant cette prevision rationnelle qui constitue, a tous egards, le principal caractere de l'esprit positif. (shrink)

Although Auguste Comte is conventionally acknowledged as one of the founders of sociology and as a key representative of positivism, few new editions of his writings have been published in the English language in this century. He has become virtually dissociated from the history of modern positivism and the most recent debates about it. Gertrud Lenzer maintains that the work of Comte is, for better or for worse, essential to an understanding of the modern period of positivism. This collection (...) provides new access to the work of Comte and gives practitioners of various disciplines the possibility of reassessing concepts that were first introduced in Comte's writings. Today much of the ordinary business of academic disciplines is conducted under the assumption that the realm of science is essentially separate from the realms of politics and science. A close reading of Comte will reveal how deeply such current ideas and theories were originally embedded in a particular political context. One of his central methodological principles was that the theory of society had to be removed from the arena of political practice precisely in order to control that practice by means of these same sciences. It is in Comte's work that the reader will be able to observe how the forces of social and political reaction began to be powerfully organized to combat the critical forces in its own and later eras. Auguste Comte and Positivism will be of importance to the work of philosophers, sociologists, political theorists, and historians. (shrink)

This article investigates the causal efficacy of social properties, which faces the following puzzle. First, for both intuitive and scientific reasons, it seems social properties have causal import. But, second, social properties are also characteristically extrinsic: to have some social property depends, in typical cases, on what one’s society is like around them. And, third, there is good reason to doubt that extrinsic properties make a genuine causal contribution. After elaborating on these three claims, I defend the following resolution to (...) the puzzle: social causation occurs at the level at which social properties are intrinsic. (shrink)

In this chapter I argue that choosing to live forever comes with the threat of an especially pernicious kind of boredom. However, it may be theoretically possible to circumvent it by finding ways to pursue an infinite number of projects consistent with one’s personality, taking on endlessly pursuable endlessly interesting projects, or by rekindling old projects once you’ve forgotten about them. However, each of these possibilities is contingent upon having certain traits that you are likely not currently in a good (...) position to assess. I therefore argue that no one is in a good position to be confident about her prospects for living forever. (shrink)

1891. Comte, a French philosopher, was the founder of Positivism. Positivism is a philosophical system of thought maintaining that the goal of knowledge is simply to describe the phenomena experienced, not to question whether it exists or not. Comte sought to apply the methods of observation and experimentation, as was beginning to be used in the hard sciences, to a field that we now know as sociology. This is one of his later works. Contents: Explanation of the Worship; Explanation of (...) the Doctrine; Explanation of the Regime, or System of Life; and General History of Religion. (shrink)

t. 1. Les religions de l'Inde, et Bulletins des religions de l'Inde (1880-1885) -- t. 2. Bulletins des religions de l'Inde (1889-1902) -- t. 3. Comptes rendus et notices (1872-1886) -- t. 4. Comptes rendus et notices (1887-1898) -- t. 5. Comptes rendus et notices (1899-1911). Bibiliographie. Index général.

This paper advances a new agentially undemanding account of the conditions of attributability, the Minimal Approval account, and argues that it has a number of advantages over traditional Deep Self theories, including the way in which it handles agents with conditions like addiction, Tourette syndrome, and misophonia. It is argued that in order for an agent to be attributionally responsible, the mental process that leads to her action must dispose her to be such that she would, upon reflec-tion, approve to (...) some minimal degree of being moved to action by the motive on which she in fact acts. (shrink)

Orthodoxy holds that the difference between weakness of will and compulsion is a matter of the resistibility of an agent's effective motivation, which makes control-based views of agency especially well equipped to distinguish blameworthy weak-willed acts from non-blameworthy compulsive acts. I defend an alternative view that the difference between weakness and compulsion instead lies in the fact that agents would upon reflection give some conative weight to acting on their weak-willed desires for some aim other than to extinguish them, but (...) not to their compulsive desires. This view allows identificationist theorists of moral responsibility to explain why weak-willed actions, but not compulsive actions, are attributable to agents such that they can, in theory, be praised or blamed for them. After motivating and presenting the view in detail, I show how it has unique resources for explaining the ethics of managing one's compulsions. (shrink)

Much of the literature on impairment to self-governance focuses on cases in which a person either lacks the ability to protect herself from errant urges or cases in which a person lacks the capacity to initiate self-reflective agential processes. This has led to frameworks for thinking about self-governance designed with only the possibility of these sorts of impairments in mind. I challenge this orthodoxy using the case of melancholic depression to show that there is a third way that self-governance can (...) be undermined: an agent may fail to form the desire she most wants to act on. (shrink)

CHAPTER I THE INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER OF POSITIVISM The object of The object of all true Philosophy is Philosophy is to frame a system which shall compre- to ...

In A General View of Positivism French philosopher Auguste Comte gives an overview of his social philosophy known as Positivism. Comte, credited with coining the term 'sociology' and one of the first to argue for it as a science, is concerned with reform, progress and the problem of social order in society. In this English edition of the work, published in 1865, he addresses the practical problems of implementing his philosophy or doctrine, as he also refers to Positivism, into (...) society. He believes that society evolves through a series of stages that are ruled by social laws and culminate in a superior form of social life. During this reorganisation of society, which will find its greatest supporters among women and the working class, a 'new moral power' will emerge. Under the motto 'love, order and progress' Comte wishes humanism to replace organised religion as the object of spiritual worship. (shrink)

In this revolutionary work, the author sets the stage for the science of the 21st Century, pursuing an unprecedented synthesis of fields previously considered unrelated. Beginning with simple classical concepts, he ends with a complex multidisciplinary theory requiring a high level of abstraction. The work progresses across the sciences in several multidisciplinary directions: Mathematical logic, fundamental physics, computer science and the theory of intelligence. Extraordinarily enough, the author breaks new ground in all these fields. In the field of fundamental physics (...) the author reaches the revolutionary conclusion that physics can be viewed and studied as logic in a fundamental sense, as compared with Einstein's view of physics as space-time geometry. This opens new, exciting prospects for the study of fundamental interactions. A formulation of logic in terms of matrix operators and logic vector spaces allows the author to tackle for the first time the intractable problem of cognition in a scientific manner. In the same way as the findings of Heisenberg and Dirac in the 1930s provided a conceptual and mathematical foundation for quantum physics, matrix operator logic supports an important breakthrough in the study of the physics of the mind, which is interpreted as a fractal of quantum mechanics. Introducing a concept of logic quantum numbers, the author concludes that the problem of logic and the intelligence code in general can be effectively formulated as eigenvalue problems similar to those of theoretical physics. With this important leap forward in the study of the mechanism of mind, the author concludes that the latter cannot be fully understood either within classical or quantum notions. A higher-order covariant theory is required to accommodate the fundamental effect of high-level intelligence. The landmark results obtained by the author will have implications and repercussions for the very foundations of science as a whole. Moreover, Stern's Matrix Logic is suitable for a broad spectrum of practical applications in contemporary technologies. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

Increasingly, scholarly journals have begun retracting published articles for reasons other than those described by advisory organizations such as the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). Numerous research articles have been retracted of late due to political concerns. Additionally, some articles have been retracted for behavioral misconduct, which was also the subject of a recent COPE discussion forum. ‘Behavioral misconduct’ denotes harmful or immoral behavior of one or more authors that is unrelated to the article’s findings or content. We investigated whether (...) federally funded research scientists considered behavioral misconduct a valid reason for retracting published findings and whether the type of behavioral misconduct involved, the level of the expected scientific impact of the article in question, or the kind of editorial action taken affected their support of retraction. Of the 464 participants who took our survey, we found that researchers largely oppose retraction of a published article or removing an author when scientists commit behavioral misconduct, regardless of the type of misconduct involved. However, there was greater support for retraction when the misconduct was financial as compared to racial or sexual misconduct. Not surprisingly, researchers were more likely to use the published information in question in their own work when its impact was high. Future studies should investigate the extent to which these findings are moderated by researchers’ editorial experience and other demographic factors. (shrink)

In Almost Over: Aging, Dying, Dead, Frances Kamm seeks to make sense of people’s widely variant choices about which lives they would choose to continue living. She does this by defending the Prudential Prerogative, which, in analogy to the Moral Prerogative, holds that in a fairly wide range of conditions we are under no intrapersonal rational obligation to choose either to die or to live on. I argue against Kamm's case for the Prudential Prerogative in favor of Life Holism, the (...) view that you ought to live the life that would be best for you as an individual when each potential life is considered as a whole. I argue that the features of the Moral Prerogative that make it an attractive principle do not transfer to the Prudential Prerogative, and that Life Holism can better account for the perspectival and non-summative features of the normative phenomena Kamm wants to capture while retaining a tight connection between reasons and goodness. (shrink)

" Pour devenir un parfait philosophe, il me manquait surtout une passion, a la fois profonde et pure, qui me fit assez apprecier la partie affective de la nature humaine " note Auguste Comte dans ses " Prieres quotidiennes " redigees peu apres 1845, cette " annee sans pareille " au cours de laquelle il rencontre, frequente et voit disparaitre Clotilde de Vaux a laquelle il voue un amour eperdu. Cette relation aussi profonde et intense que physiquement ephemere ne (...) bouleverse pas seulement la vie privee du fondateur du positivisme. La decouverte du role preponderant de l'affectivite dans les relations humaines et sociales inflechit de maniere definitive la doctrine positiviste dont la nouvelle devise devient L'amour pour principe, l'ordre pour base et le progres pour but. L'edifice theorique qu'est le Systeme de politique positive developpe l'idee d'un " nouveau pouvoir spirituel " qui prendra la forme d'une " religion de l'Humanite " a laquelle l'ordre et le progres doivent etre subordonnes, de meme que l'esprit au cur. Ce numero explore sous differents angles les implications de cet inflechissement majeur a l'uvre dans la philosophie positive, et sa complexe actualite. (shrink)

Research Ethics, Volume 18, Issue 1, Page 84-91, January 2022. The purpose of the traditional peer review process is to provide a more constructive and scientifically rigorous critical review of scholarly research that builds scientific rigor and validity within diverse academic disciplines. Peer review has received criticism as the demand for publications in a variety of competitive journals has significantly increased while the number of individuals who are both willing and qualified to conduct thorough reviews is significantly declining. The purpose (...) of this topic piece is to examine the overall efficacy of the peer review process and provide recommendations toward a more collaborative, transparent, and interdisciplinary communication process. (shrink)

Temps et sujet : Sujet du temps? Temps du sujet? De quel temps peut-on parler? Où sont les temps? Comment les sciences sociales et plus particulièrement la psychologie peuvent-elles s'emparer des temps subjectifs? Peut-on parler d'une construction psychique de la perception du temps? L'Institut de Psychologie et Sciences Sociales d'Angers (IPSA) a constitué un groupe de recherche sur le thème du temps du sujet, de sa perception du temps et de son appréhension de la durée. Approches psychanalytique, anthropologique, philosophique se (...) mélangent, se coupent et se recoupent. Suite à des discussions contradictoires sur plus d'une année, ce sont neuf contributions qui tentent de définir ce que pour elles peut être le temps. Par ailleurs vous trouverez un index des différentes figures du temps et de ses signifiants dans l'œuvre de Lacan. (shrink)

Comment peut-on faire bon usage de la pensée interstitielle? Son interprétation et son statut ne sont ni énigmatiques, ni controversés. Descriptive, normative, prescriptive, rétrospective, intégrative, prospective, la pensée interstitielle est l'une des pistes les bien moins explorées, aujourd'hui. Pourtant, elle se donne au nouvel esprit scientifique sous un quintolet épistémologique : « épistémologiser », « complexifier », « problématiser », « formaliser », « éthiciser ». Ces approches donnent du sens à « la psychologie du pluriel ». Enrichie par le (...) biais philosophique du métalangage scientifique en construction, la mise en avant analytique des termes scientifiques signifiés et signifiants rend possible la pensée interstitielle qui prend la figure éclatée d'une pharmacie de la science. Ce n'est donc pas un mauvais pas rationnel. (shrink)

Pandemic-related restrictions can be especially tragic for people whose lives are ending; it seems that the needs and desires of people who are dying should be given extra consideration. Given an additivist view of well-being, however, the last weeks of a person's life can only matter so much relative to the rest of the life they had. This article reflects on the end of my mother's life during the Covid-19 pandemic in order to make the case that the additive view (...) of well-being is part of a broader trend of dehumanizing emergency ethics. (shrink)

Over the years, companies have adopted hiring algorithms because they promise wider job candidate pools, lower recruitment costs and less human bias. Despite these promises, they also bring perils. Using them can inflict unintentional harms on individual human rights. These include the five human rights to work, equality and nondiscrimination, privacy, free expression and free association. Despite the human rights harms of hiring algorithms, the AI ethics literature has predominantly focused on abstract ethical principles. This is problematic for two reasons. (...) First, AI principles have been criticized for being vague and not actionable. Second, the use of vague ethical principles to discuss algorithmic risks does not provide any accountability. This lack of accountability creates an algorithmic accountability gap. Closing this gap is crucial because, without accountability, the use of hiring algorithms can lead to discrimination and unequal access to employment opportunities. This paper makes two contributions to the AI ethics literature. First, it frames the ethical risks of hiring algorithms using international human rights law as a universal standard for determining algorithmic accountability. Second, it evaluates four types of algorithmic impact assessments in terms of how effectively they address the five human rights of job applicants implicated in hiring algorithms. It determines which of the assessments can help companies audit their hiring algorithms and close the algorithmic accountability gap. (shrink)