O artigo se propõe a refletir sobre a relação entre Estado, desenvolvimento no continente africano e pandemia da Covid-19. De caráter ensaístico, espera-se demonstrar que, além de simbolizarem o avanço da solidariedade africana vide integração como meio para a solução dos desafios africanos, as ações para mitigar o avanço da Covid-19 no continente africano, em verdade, refletem, em maior ou menor intensidade, o distanciamento do Estado africano com relação ao neoliberalismo. Para tal feito, a metodologia adotada será de abordagem qualitativa (...) e de caráter interpretativo, baseada na revisão da literatura e no uso de documentos oficiais, sendo o artigo estruturado, juntamente a essa introdução e as considerações finais, em mais três seções. Na primeira, buscaremos discorrer sobre as principais características da relação entre Estado e desenvolvimento econômico no continente africano durante a Guerra Fria. Em seguida, analisaremos o avanço do neoliberalismo e seus impactos na relação entre Estado e desenvolvimento nos países africanos. Por fim, na terceira seção o principal objetivo será destacar o modo de atuação dos países africanos na luta contra a pandemia da Covid-19. (shrink)

In this paper we examine theoretical utility arguments in metaphysics. While philosophers claim a procedural continuity with science when using such arguments, we argue that examining famous instances from the history of science expose their fundamental flaws. We find that arguments from theoretical utility invoke considerations that are not truth conducive and that justifications for claims that a theory possesses theoretical virtues often assume the truth of the theory such virtues are supposed to support. We conclude that theoretical utility arguments (...) provide no epistemic grounds for metaphysical inquiry. (shrink)

Preschoolers naturally form mental representations that capture generic knowledge about object kinds. These have been considered to pose a special explanatory and learning challenge. We here argue for a new deductive model of them, where (i) the representations in question have a linguistic format from the start; (ii) they are inherently structurally simpler compared to reference to individuals or quantifications; and (iii) formed in communicative contexts because communication in humans is linked to language. In this model, specific language‐related resources explain (...) the scope and limits of the forms of knowledge obtained, illustrating how language and cognition develop in tandem. (shrink)

Scientific pluralism is the view according to which there is a plurality of scientific domains and of scientific theories, and these theories are empirically adequate relative to their own respective domains. Scientific monism is the view according to which there is a single domain to which all scientific theories apply. How are these views impacted by the presence of inconsistent scientific theories? There are consistency-preservation strategies and inconsistency-toleration strategies. Among the former, two prominent strategies can be articulated: Compartmentalization and Information (...) restriction. Among the inconsistency-toleration strategies, we have: Paraconsistent compartmentalization and Dialetheism. In this paper, I critically assess the adequacy of each of these four views. (shrink)

In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our be-liefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoher-ent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a co-herence theory (...) has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonian skepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy. (shrink)

How is that when scientists need some piece of mathematics through which to frame their theory, it is there to hand? What has been called 'the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics' sets a challenge for philosophers. Some have responded to that challenge by arguing that mathematics is essentially anthropocentric in character, whereas others have pointed to the range of structures that mathematics offers. Otavio Bueno and Steven French offer a middle way, which focuses on the moves that have to be made (...) in both the mathematics and the relevant physics in order to bring the two into appropriate relation. This relation can be captured via the inferential conception of the applicability of mathematics, which is formulated in terms of immersion, inference, and interpretation. In particular, the roles of idealisations and of surplus structure in science and mathematics respectively are brought to the fore and captured via an approach to models and theories that emphasize the partiality of the available information: the partial structures approach. The discussion as a whole is grounded in a number of case studies drawn from the history of quantum physics, and extended to contest recent claims that the explanatory role of certain mathematical structures in scientific practice supports a realist attitude towards them. The overall conclusion is that the effectiveness of mathematics does not seem unreasonable at all once close attention is paid to how it is actually applied in practice. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Logical Consequence Logical Pluralism Applications of Logic Conclusion References.

ABSTRACT For a long time, the question of the existence of free will has fueled philosophical debate with no definitive solution. Libet’s paradigm (1983) seemed to demonstrate that simple and apparently voluntary movements could be triggered not by consciousness, but by preconscious or random brain processes. Such findings had wide repercussions in the academic and scientific circles, triggering an extensive discussion among neuroscientists, philosophers and jurists. Exploring the interfaces between neuroscience and free will, the present work aims to formulate an (...) updated synthesis of the diverse problematizations about the Libetian findings. It appears that Libet’s essay, although repeatedly analyzed and replicated in recent decades, still lacks a definitive interpretation, in part due to methodological controversies and specific conceptual shortcomings. The deepening of these investigations, combined with the new discoveries offered by neuroscience, can enrich research on free will in the coming years. (shrink)

_Thinking about Science, Reflecting on Art: Bringing Aesthetics and Philosophy of Science togethe_r is the first book to systematically examine the relationship between the philosophy of science and aesthetics. With contributions from leading figures from both fields this edited collection engages with such questions as: Does representation function in the same way in science and in art? What important characteristic do scientific models share with literary fictions? What is the difference between interpretation in the sciences and in the arts? Can (...) there be a science of aesthetics? In what ways can aesthetics and philosophy of science be integrated? Aiming to develop the interconnections between the philosophy of science and the philosophy of art more broadly and more deeply than ever before this volume not only explores scientific representation by comparison with fiction but extends the scope of interaction to include metaphysical and other questions around methodology in mainstream philosophy of science, including the aims of science, the characterisation of scientific understanding, and the nature of observation, as well as drawing detailed comparisons between specific examples in both art and the sciences. (shrink)

Current versions of nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics have the benefit of avoiding commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. But this comes with the cost of not taking mathematical theories literally. Jody Azzouni's _Deflating Existential Consequence_ has recently challenged this conclusion by formulating a nominalist view that lacks this cost. In this paper, we argue that, as it stands, Azzouni's proposal does not yet succeed. It faces a dilemma to the effect that either the view is not nominalist (...) or it fails to take mathematics literally. After presenting the dilemma, we suggest a possible solution for the nominalist. (shrink)

In this paper, we compare two theories, modal Meinongianism and object theory, with respect to several issues that have been discussed recently in the literature. In particular, we raise some objections for MM, undermine some of the objections that its defenders raise for OT, and we point out some virtues of the latter with respect to the former.

Both the spirituality in organizations and managerial issues have been addressed through different religion-based beliefs. In this article, one intends to enlarge it through the perspective of the Spiritist Doctrine (SD). Thus, it reviews the SD literature, as well as spirituality in organizations theory to find common views. In addition, it (1) argued that SD tenets, codified by Allan Kardec, also bring helpful contributions to work settings that differ from the traditional religion approaches and (2) discussed its implications to managers' (...) spiritual development. It is posited that the SD tenets, while building on and expanding Jesus Christ's teachings, disclose us some severe implications related to our future. In a broader view, SD tenets provide important warnings that encompass people work lives as well. Finally, we depict a framework that embraces corporate life coupled with some factors that may likely build and enhances one's spiritual progress, the potential spiritual rewards derived from these factors, and the loci where the rewards are enjoyed. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta e comenta três dezenas de casos de utilização das armas portuguesas nas portadas de livros quatrocentistas e quinhentistas. Esta utilização enquadra-se no âmbito da heráldica tipográfica, com força expressiva equivalente à dos símbolos pessoais ou familiares, quase sempre porque editores, impressores ou livreiros entendiam que o escudo nacional dignificava sobremaneira o seu trabalho.

De acordo com o estruturalismo matemático, a matemática não consiste no estudo de objetos matemáticos, mas de estruturas. Ao afastar-se dos objetos, o estruturalista reivindica uma posição que lhe permite resolver o problema do “acesso”: é possível explicar a possibilidade do conhecimento matemático sem exigir qualquer acesso aos objetos em questão. Fraser MacBride criticou a resposta estruturalista, argumentando que esta enfrenta um dilema na tentativa de resolver o problema em apreço. Neste artigo, argumento que o dilema de MacBride pode ser (...) resistido e que, especialmente na versão articulada por Michael Resnik, o estruturalismo pode resolver o problema do “acesso”. Mostro exatamente como o dilema de MacBride falha, argumentando que esta falha nos fornece uma oportunidade para destacar uma característica importante do estruturalismo, a saber: a maneira pela qual ele articula uma imagem fundamentalmente diferente da epistemologia matemática com relação àquela sugerida pela epistemologia tradicional. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende explicar como Meinecke e Cassirer entendem o maquiavelismo de Hegel enquanto a ‘legitimação de um bastardo’, estabelecendo um forte ponto de concordância no plano histórico-interpretativo ao reconhecerem um mesmo processo histórico, que se inicia com Maquiavel, passa pela teoria do Direito Natural dos séculos XVII e XVIII, e finaliza com Hegel. Para tanto, recorre-se a uma reconstrução e comparação de momentos relevantes de _O mito do Estado _, de Cassirer, e de _A ideia de Razão de (...) Estado na história moderna _, de Meinecke. Por fim, busca-se explicitar que, apesar de haver concordância quanto ao plano histórico-interpretativo do maquiavelismo de Hegel entre Meinecke e Cassirer, a valoração ético-política dada por estes intérpretes a este processo histórico é distinta em se considerando a crítica de Cassirer à _Lebensphilosophie _quanto ao seu potencial de resistência ao fascismo_. _. (shrink)

ResumoO artigo aponta o reducionismo da determinação exclusivamente socioeconômica do povo e dos grandes na interpretação de McCormick sobre Maquiavel. Este reducionismo resulta em uma leitura limitada de O Príncipe, não examinando satisfatoriamente os capítulos I ao III e o problema da inovação neles expresso. Defende-se que estes capítulos e este problema podem ser examinados pela tematização do conflito, quando se considera a questão da desunião entre grandes e povo para além do seu caráter socioeconômico.Uma comparação entre as leituras de (...) Pocock e Lefort é mobilizada para tanto, pois elas examinam os capítulos iniciais de O Príncipe e reconhecem neles o problema da inovação. O que as diferencia é Lefort reconhecer o tema do conflito enquanto implícito nos capítulos em questão. Com esta comparação, deixa-se indicado que Lefort permite ampliar o horizonte interpretativo visado por McCormick, permitindo uma compreensão mais complexa e dinâmica do conflito entre classes em Maquiavel.AbstractThis article indicates a reductionism on the exclusively socioeconomic determination of the popolo and the grandi in McCormick’s interpretation of Machiavelli. This reductionism results in a limited reading of The Prince, one that does not satisfactorily examine chapters I to III and the problem of innovation therein expressed. I defend that these chapters and this problem can be examined through the thematization of conflict, if one considers the question of the disunion between grandi and popolo beyond its socioeconomical character. A comparison between Pocock’s and Lefort’s interpretations is mobilized for it, for they examine the initial chapters of The Prince and recognize the problem of innovation therein. What differentiates them is that Lefort recognizes the theme of conflict as implicit in the initial chapters of The Prince. Through this comparison I indicate that Lefort allows us to broaden McCormick’s interpretative horizon, allowing a more complex and dynamic comprehension of conflict. (shrink)

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, (...) but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it’s perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it’s not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality. (shrink)

Crucial to Hilary Putnam’s realism in the philosophy of mathematics is to maintain the objectivity of mathematics without the commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. Putnam’s indispensability argument was devised as part of this conception. In this paper, I reconstruct and reassess Putnam’s argument for the indispensability of mathematics, and distinguish it from the more familiar, Quinean version of the argument. Although I argue that Putnam’s approach ultimately fails, I develop an alternative way of implementing his form of realism (...) about mathematics that, by using different resources than those Putnam invokes, avoids the difficulties faced by his view. (shrink)

Batterman raises a number of concerns for the inferential conception of the applicability of mathematics advocated by Bueno and Colyvan. Here, we distinguish the various concerns, and indicate how they can be assuaged by paying attention to the nature of the mappings involved and emphasizing the significance of interpretation in this context. We also indicate how this conception can accommodate the examples that Batterman draws upon in his critique. Our conclusion is that ‘asymptotic reasoning’ can be straightforwardly accommodated within the (...) inferential conception. 1 Introduction2 Immersion, Inference and Partial Structures3 Idealization and Surplus Structure4 Renormalization and the Stability of Mathematical Representations5 Explanation and Eliminability6 Requirements for Explanation7 Interpretation and Idealization8 Explanation, Empirical Regularities and the Inferential Conception9 Conclusion. (shrink)

Conrad-Martius’ philosophy can be defined as a non-orthodox position in phenomenological ontology. This position can be considered such in a different sense from Heidegger’s ontology and may be treated as an extension of Husserl’s phenomenology in view of the following three elements. (1) Seiendes (entity) is considered anything that has consistence in the larger sense of the word, including all entities, such as fantastical entities (spirits, fairy-tale beings), soul, ideas and others, that can be used to obtain the phenomenological description. (...) (2) The phenomenological description that occurs through a new definition of “phenomenological reduction” and epoché, in such a way that a realistic solution is emphasized in the analysis of being; being is not considered as the residuum of a system of noema, but, following medieval philosophy, as having the eminent character of reality, through which any of the others can be derived. (3) The analysis of being gives a stratification of various entities, through which each finds definition by means of its relative allocation in an “ontological space”. (shrink)

This paper aims at the construction of a structural coupling between object-oriented philosophy and Whitehead’s philosophy of organism by making a case for the primacy of the ontological principle through the proposal of a social object hypothesis. The social object here differs from traditional renderings of sociology, which are centered on humans’ activity and personalities, by way of recuperating Tarde’s social theory of associations. This theory provides us with a non-anthropocentric reading of sociality. This hypothesis will be furthered by the (...) introduction of the systemic category of internal/external, or system/environment, as a self-enclosure feature of social objects. Equipped with these two notions, we will discuss Graham Harman’s paper “Whitehead and Schools X, Y, and Z,” while rerouting his assessments to our own social object hypothesis. The final idea is to propose an alliance through the conception of a macro-ontological approach to philosophy of organism. We intend to show that this is not only coherently feasible regarding Whitehead’s own categoreal scheme, but also meets the requirements of being a real object in object-oriented ontology’s directives. (shrink)

Na primeira parte, argumento que o descritivismo proposto por Moritz Schlick não compreende adequadamente a função dos juízos morais. Na segunda parte, argumen-to que o emotivismo não apresenta uma explicação adequada para o papel da razão na ética. Na terceira parte, argumento que o prescritivismo universal proposto por R. M. Hare avança na solução dos problemas do emotivismo, porque amplia o papel da razão na ética, e na solução dos problemas do descritivismo, porque compreende a função dos juízos morais na (...) linguagem ordinária. (shrink)

Identity is arguably one of the most fundamental concepts in metaphysics. There are several reasons why this is the case: Identity is presupposed in every conceptual system: without identity, it is unclear that any conceptual system can be formulated. Identity is required to characterize an individual: nothing can be an individual unless it has well-specified identity conditions. Identity cannot be defined: even in systems that allegedly have the resources to define identity. Identity is required for quantification: the intelligibility of quantification (...) presupposes the identity of the objects that are quantified over. These are only four considerations in support of identity's fundamental role. In this paper, I examine and defend them. I then examine a challenge that has been raised against identity's fundamentality: one from the metaphysics of physics—based on a significant interpretation of non-relativist quantum mechanics—according to which certain quantum particles lack identity conditions. After responding to this challenge, I consider the nature of the commitment to identity, and argue that it turns out to be very minimal. In fact, a very deflationary form of metaphysics can accommodate it. In arguing that identity is fundamental, one need not overstep the boundaries of even a very minimal empiricist metaphysics. Or so I argue. (shrink)

'Deus no Século XXI e o Futuro do Cristianismo' é uma colectânea de textos organizada por Anselmo Borges de grande interesse e qualidade. Reúne comunicações ao Congresso Internacional com o mesmo título realizado no Seminário da Boa Nova, Valadares, de 8 a 11 de Setembro de 2005, no âmbito das comemorações do 75o Aniversário da Sociedade Missionária Portuguesa.

Amie Thomasson has articulated a novel conception of ontological debates, defending an easy approach to ontological questions as part of the articulation of a deflationary metaphysical view (Thomasson, 2015). After raising some concerns to the approach, we sketch a neutralist alternative to her ontological framework, offering an even easier way of conducting ontological debates.

A number of people have recently argued for a structural approach to accounting for the applications of mathematics. Such an approach has been called "the mapping account". According to this view, the applicability of mathematics is fully accounted for by appreciating the relevant structural similarities between the empirical system under study and the mathematics used in the investigation ofthat system. This account of applications requires the truth of applied mathematical assertions, but it does not require the existence of mathematical objects. (...) In this paper, we discuss the shortcomings of this account, and show how these shortcomings can be overcome by a broader view of the application of mathematics: the inferential conception. (shrink)

A aliança entre a Filologia e a História do Livro é indiscutível, do ponto de vista metodológico, e valiosíssima para a compreensão mesológica de qualquer edição, sendo certo que nenhum livro se publica sem estar inscrito numa dada moldura ecológica da cultura. Por isso mesmo, ultrapassando os limites próprios da actividade bibliográfica, o historiador do livro não pode prescindir da leitura dos textos que se escondem sob a opacidade do objecto livro.

The aim of this work is to show how Edgar Morin chose Vico and Hegel as cultural points of reference while elaborating a new method as an alternative to classical scientific knowledge. The French philosopher did this specifically when he tried to re-propose the problem s of history and the event in human sciences. The origins of sociology arose from the explicit extension of the scientific method to the socio-anthropological world; that is, with the intention of studying society as a (...) natural phenomenon to which the laws of physical and biological sciences must be applied. As a tendency against this, at the end of the 1970s Morin began a process of putting sociology into historical context, which led him to a methodological revolution of sociology itself. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hrsg. von Georg Mohr und Marcus Willaschek. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1998, 680 Seiten . María Jesús Vázquez Lobeiras: Die Logik und ihr Spiegelbild. Das Verhältnis von formaler und transzendentaler Logik in Kants philosophischer Entwicklung. Frankfurt on the Main, Berlin, Berne, New York, Paris, Vienna: Peter Lang 1998, xiv + 254 pp. Rae Langton: Kantian Humility. Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998, xiv + 232 Seiten.