We argue that the problem of violence persists, to a certain degree, because of our refusal or inability to think about traumatic, difficult or “senseless” material systematically. We explore the connection between thinking and violence, and specifically Arendt’s question whether thinking can make men abstain from violence. We are interested in the relationship and tension between knowing and not knowing – as products of thinking – in relation to (also our own capacities for) violence. The tension presents in two main (...) ways. First, thinking is employed to shed light on dark or difficult knowable material, thereby increasing our understanding of ourselves, our place in a troubled society and our relation to violence. Second, thinking bumps up against our ability to know, and it is this unknowability that exposes us to our limits as thinking beings as well as a place of humility and mutual vulnerability. We suggest that paying closer and more nuanced attention to the gender dimensions of the above questions reveals something important about the reasons that gender-based violence persists. We argue, with Arendt, that violence results from non-mastery and that the equation of male power with violence is a lie that violence perpetuates about itself. Similarly, Heberle argues that violence results from the fragile non-cohesiveness of masculine subjectivity and thus also traces the roots of violence to weakness and fragility rather than strength or power. We argue that the antidote for this false mastery and control is thinking. (shrink)

How does science work? Does it tell us what the world is "really" like? What makes it different from other ways of understanding the universe? In Theory and Reality , Peter Godfrey-Smith addresses these questions by taking the reader on a grand tour of one hundred years of debate about science. The result is a completely accessible introduction to the main themes of the philosophy of science. Intended for undergraduates and general readers with no prior background in philosophy, Theory (...) and Reality covers logical positivism the problems of induction and confirmation Karl Popper's theory of science Thomas Kuhn and "scientific revolutions" the views of Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and Paul Feyerabend and challenges to the field from sociology of science, feminism, and science studies. The book then looks in more detail at some specific problems and theories, including scientific realism, the theory-ladeness of observation, scientific explanation, and Bayesianism. Finally, Godfrey-Smith defends a form of philosophical naturalism as the best way to solve the main problems in the field. Throughout the text he points out connections between philosophical debates and wider discussions about science in recent decades, such as the infamous "science wars." Examples and asides engage the beginning student a glossary of terms explains key concepts and suggestions for further reading are included at the end of each chapter. However, this is a textbook that doesn't feel like a textbook because it captures the historical drama of changes in how science has been conceived over the last one hundred years. Like no other text in this field, Theory and Reality combines a survey of recent history of the philosophy of science with current key debates in language that any beginning scholar or critical reader can follow. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

Expands an inquiry to animals at large, investigating the evolution of experience with the assistance of far-flung species. Godfrey-Smith shows that the appearance of the first animal body form well over half a billion years ago was a profound innovation that set life upon a new path.

Introduction i. Adam Smith's Lectures at Glasgow University Adam Smith was elected to the Chair of Logic at Glasgow University on 9 January, and admitted to ...

Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to an agent who may be (...) uncertain about the circumstances in which she acts, and hence is unable to use her standard moral principle directly in deciding what to do. This paper distinguishes two important senses of “moral guidance”; proposes criteria of adequacy for accounts of subjective rightness; canvasses existing definitions for “subjective rightness”; finds them all deficient; and proposes a new and more successful account. It argues that each comprehensive moral theory must include multiple principles of subjective rightness to address the epistemic situations of the full range of moral decision-makers, and shows that accounts of subjective rightness formulated in terms of what it would reasonable for the agent to believe cannot provide that guidance. (shrink)

Explaining the maintenance of communicative behavior in the face of incentives to deceive, conceal information, or exaggerate is an important problem in behavioral biology. When the interests of agents diverge, some form of signal cost is often seen as essential to maintaining honesty. Here, novel computational methods are used to investigate the role of common interest between the sender and receiver of messages in maintaining cost-free informative signaling in a signaling game. Two measures of common interest are defined. These quantify (...) the divergence between sender and receiver in their preference orderings over acts the receiver might perform in each state of the world. Sampling from a large space of signaling games finds that informative signaling is possible at equilibrium with zero common interest in both senses. Games of this kind are rare, however, and the proportion of games that include at least one equilibrium in which informative signals are used increases monotonically with common interest. Common interest as a predictor of informative signaling also interacts with the extent to which agents’ preferences vary with the state of the world. Our findings provide a quantitative description of the relation between common interest and informative signaling, employing exact measures of common interest, information use, and contingency of payoff under environmental variation that may be applied to a wide range of models and empirical systems. © 2013 Godfrey-Smith, Martínez. (shrink)

In this article I argue that evolutionary psychological strategies for making inferences about present-day human psychology are methodologically unsound. Evolutionary psychology is committed to the view that the mind has an architecture that has been conserved since the Pleistocene, and that our psychology can be fruitfully understood in terms of the original, fitness-enhancing functions of these conserved psychological mechanisms. But for evolutionary psychological explanations to succeed, practitioners must be able to show that contemporary cognitive mechanisms correspond to those that were (...) selected for in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, that these present-day cognitive mechanisms are descended from the corresponding ancestral mechanisms, and that they have retained the functions of the ancestral mechanisms from which they are descended. I refer to the problem of demonstrating that these conditions obtain as “the matching problem,” argue that evolutionary psychology does not have the resources to address it, and conclude that evolutionary psychology, as it is currently understood, is therefore impossible. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titles: Introduction Senders and Receivers Content States of the Mind and Brain.

I distinguish paradoxes and hypodoxes among the conundrums of time travel. I introduce ‘hypodoxes’ as a term for seemingly consistent conundrums that seem to be related to various paradoxes, as the Truth-teller is related to the Liar. In this article, I briefly compare paradoxes and hypodoxes of time travel with Liar paradoxes and Truth-teller hypodoxes. I also discuss Lewis’ treatment of time travel paradoxes, which I characterise as a Laissez Faire theory of time travel. Time travel paradoxes are impossible according (...) to Laissez Faire theories, while it seems hypodoxes are possible. (shrink)

In this round table response, we discuss some of the problems inherent in insisting on specific consent for an activity that needs to happen rapidly as part of a package of care. The Human Tissue Authority consider that specific consent is mandatory to assess which antibiotics are appropriate on the neonatal unit, but this insistence may actually limit the autonomy which consent aims to promote. While genetic testing to determine which child will react adversely to particular antibiotics has been available (...) clinically for several years, the research proposed here is to assess whether improving the speed of testing allows decisions to be made before treatment starts. Insisting on specific consent before this activity can take place is likely to delay appropriate care in some cases. On admission to the neonatal unit, the unwell infant is routinely subjected to a range of investigations and treatments. A person with parental responsibility will usually be asked to provide consent to undertake treatments for children who do not have capacity to give consent themselves.1 For the acutely unwell child, consent will usually be sought for a package of care: the urgent nature of neonatal medicine often requires clinicians to make many decisions without explicit consent. Doctors must always act in a child’s best interests: their decisions need to protect the health and well-being of a child and hold the child’s welfare paramount in accordance with the Children Act and General Medical Council guidelines.1 2 Thus, for example, ventilation might be initiated, sedation provided, antibiotics commenced or diagnostic investigations requested without separate consent conversations or …. (shrink)

I critically discuss Strawson's transcendental argument against other minds scepticism, and look at the prospects for a naturalised version of it.

BackgroundImplementation science research, especially when using participatory and co-design approaches, raises unique challenges for research ethics committees. Such challenges may be poorly addressed by approval and governance mechanisms that were developed for more traditional research approaches such as randomised controlled trials.DiscussionImplementation science commonly involves the partnership of researchers and stakeholders, attempting to understand and encourage uptake of completed or piloted research. A co-creation approach involves collaboration between researchers and end users from the onset, in question framing, research design and delivery, (...) and influencing strategy, with implementation and broader dissemination strategies part of its design from gestation. A defining feature of co-creation is its emergent and adaptive nature, making detailed pre-specification of interventions and outcome measures impossible. This methodology sits oddly with ethics committee protocols that require precise pre-definition of interventions, mode of delivery, outcome measurements, and the role of study participants. But the strict requirements of ethics committees were developed for a purpose – to protect participants from harm and help ensure the rigour and transparency of studies. We propose some guiding principles to help square this circle. First, ethics committees should acknowledge and celebrate the diversity of research approaches, both formally and informally ; without active support, their members may not understand or value participatory designs. Second, ground rules should be established for co-design applications and communicated to committee members and stakeholders. Third, the benefits of power-sharing should be recognised and credit given to measures likely to support this important goal, especially in research with vulnerable communities. Co-design is considered best practice, for example, in research involving indigenous peoples in New Zealand, Australia and Canada. (shrink)

What if you're not who you think you are? What if you don't really know the people closest to you? And what if your most deeply-held beliefs turn out to be. wrong? In Stop Being Reasonable, philosopher Eleanor Gordon-Smith tells gripping true stories that show the limits of human reason. Susie realises her husband harbours a terrible secret, Dylan leaves the cult he's been raised in since birth, Alex discovers he can no longer return to his former identity after (...) impersonating someone else on reality TV. All of them radically alter their beliefs about the things that matter most. What makes them change course? What does this say about our own beliefs? And, in an increasingly divided world, what does it teach us about how we might change the minds of others? Stop Being Reasonable is a mind-changing exploration of the murky place where philosophy and real life meet. (shrink)

Recent research on consumer social responsibility highlights the need to examine psychological drivers of environmentally‐friendly consumption choices in a global context. This article investigates consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) more for environmentally‐friendly products across 28 European Union (EU) countries, using a sample of 21,514 consumers. A multigroup structural equation modeling analysis reveals significantly different patterns and relationships, in how (a) subjective knowledge about the product's environmental impact, (b) environmental product attitudes, and (c) the perceived importance of the products’ environmental impact (...) influence consumers’ WTP more for environmentally‐friendly products across countries. The hypothesized model predicts WTP for 20 out of 28 countries and the findings show that a “one‐size‐fits‐all” approach is inadequate in capturing the heterogeneity of EU consumers. Hosfstede's cultural dimensions of uncertainty tolerance and individualism explain differences in WTP for environmentally‐friendly products across EU countries. Business, marketing communications, and policy making implications are discussed. (shrink)

Power is an inescapable aspect of all socialrelationships, and inherently is neither goodnor evil. Doctors need power to fulfil theirprofessional obligations to multipleconstituencies including patients, thecommunity and themselves. Patients need powerto formulate their values, articulate andachieve health needs, and fulfil theirresponsibilities. However, both parties canuse or misuse power. The ethical effectivenessof a health system is maximised by empoweringdoctors and patients to develop `adult-adult'rather than `adult-child' relationships thatrespect and enable autonomy, accountability,fidelity and humanity. Even in adult-adultrelationships, conflicts and complexitiesarise. Lack of (...) concordance between doctors andpatients can encourage paternalism but may bebest resolved through negotiated care. Afurther area of conflict involves the `doubleagency' of doctors for both patients and thecommunity. Empowerment of all players is notalways possible but is most likely where eachparty considers and acknowledges power issues. (shrink)

This paper examines how and why information moved or failed to move within transatlantic botanical networks in the late eighteenth century. It addresses the problem of how practitioners created relationships of trust, and the difficulties they faced in transferring reputations between national contexts. Eighteenth-century botany was characteristically cross-cultural, cosmopolitan and socially diverse, yet in the 1770s and 1780s the American Revolutionary Wars placed these attributes under strain. The paper analyses the British and French networks that surrounded the Philadelphian plant hunter (...) William Young, to show how botanists and plant collectors created and maintained connections with each other, especially when separated by geographical and cultural distance. It highlights in particular the role played by commercial plant traders, and demonstrates how practitioners used objects to transmit social as well as scholarly information. The transnational circulation of information and knowledge in the Enlightenment was determined by culturally specific judgements about trust, confidence, communication and risk. Despite the prominent role played by material culture within these networks, scholars continued to place high value on face-to-face contact as a means of judging the trustworthiness and cooperation of their agents. (shrink)

Some things are living and some are not. Under the heading “living things” come entities at various levels of biological organization. Some are called “organisms.” However, the term “organism” does not pick out organismal entities uniformly—that is, among all the things that are considered to be whole living systems, some are regarded as indisputably organisms, and others are accorded only qualified organismic status. Perhaps this is because it is not clear why some biological systems should count as organisms and others (...) should not. (shrink)

It seems that the Truth-teller is either true or false, but there is no accepted principle determining which it is. From this point of view, the Truth-teller is a hypodox. A hypodox is a conundrum like a paradox, but consistent. Sometimes, accepting an additional principle will convert a hypodox into a paradox. Conversely, in some cases, retracting or restricting a principle will convert a paradox to a hypodox. This last point suggests a new method of avoiding inconsistency. This article provides (...) a significant example. The Liar paradox can be defused to a hypodox by relatively minimally restricting three principles: the T-schema, substitution of identicals and universal instantiation. These restrictions are not arbitrary. For each, I identify the source of a contradiction given some presumptions. Then I propose each restriction as a reasonable way to deal with that source of contradiction. (shrink)

Both the theory that traumatic childhood memories can be repressed, and the reliability of the techniques used to retrieve these memories are challenged in this paper. Questions are raised about the robustness of the theory and the literature that purports to provide scientific evidence for it. Evidence to this end is provided by the demographic and qualitative results of a research study conducted by the authors which surveyed New Zealand families in which one member had accused another (or others) of (...) sexual abuse on the basis of recovered memories. It is shown that a number of these allegations involve very low probability events. Since memory repression theory is not currently scientifically substantiated it is argued that care needs to be taken in the mental health, legal and insurance compensation arenas. Memories recalled during therapy may be treated as metaphorical but, in the absence of corroborative evidence, should not be considered factually true. Clinicians who wish to use memory recovery techniques should inform patients of their experimental and controversial nature, point out potential adverse effects, and obtain consent before proceeding. (shrink)

Both the theory that traumatic childhood memories can be repressed, and the reliability of the techniques used to retrieve these memories are challenged in this paper. Questions are raised about the robustness of the theory and the literature that purports to provide scientific evidence for it. Evidence to this end is provided by the demographic and qualitative results of a research study conducted by the authors which surveyed New Zealand families in which one member had accused another (or others) of (...) sexual abuse on the basis of recovered memories. It is shown that a number of these allegations involve very low probability events. Since memory repression theory is not currently scientifically substantiated it is argued that care needs to be taken in the mental health, legal and insurance compensation arenas. Memories recalled during therapy may be treated as metaphorical but, in the absence of corroborative evidence, should not be considered factually true. Clinicians who wish to use memory recovery techniques should inform patients of their experimental and controversial nature, point out potential adverse effects, and obtain consent before proceeding. (shrink)

Part of the baths regulations preserved on a bronze plaque, engraved more or less identically on each side, from the copper mine at Vipasca, Lusitania. The manager is to wash, clean and grease the waterheating vats once a month. Such vats, as mentioned by Vitruvius in his discussion of public baths , were three in number: aena supra hypocausim tria sunt componenda. They were sizeable articles: Propertius seems to see himself tortured in one: Veneris torrebar aeno. The greasing was to (...) keep aerugo, copper rust, at bay; for this purpose Cato in general recommends amurca, lees of olive oil: ahena omnia amurca unguito…et aerugo non erit molesta; and also for greasing axles amurca axem unguito. For bronze tablets exposed to the weather such as the numerous public records on temple walls and the like Pliny recommends olive oil: aera…robiginem celerius trahunt…nisi oleo perunguantur. The phrase e recenti which occurs in both versions of the text is unexampled, and the CIL editors suggest that it means ex integro, afresh. However I am inclined to think that the engraver had a faulty copy in front of him and we should read adipe recenti. (shrink)

Q. Veranius, the governor of Britain who died in office, assured Nero in his will that he would have subjugated Britain ‘si biennio proximo vixisset’’. Proximo is suspect; if he had lived two years longer they were bound to be the next two. Read si biennio provixisset. For the verb provivere, to live longer, see Ann. 6.25; for the confusion of proximo and pro, see Capelli, p.299; and cf. Iul. Cap., M. Aur. 27 ‘si anno uno superfuisset, provincias ex his (...) fecisset’’. (shrink)

Ann. 11.11: nam is quoque edidit ludos saecularis iisque intentius adfui sacerdotio quindecimvirali praeditus ac tune praetor; quod non iactantia refero sed quia collegio quindecimvirum antiquitus ea cura et magistratus potissimum exequebantur officia caerimoniarum.

Cet ouvrage est né d'une réalité et d'un besoin. La petite Maëlle, enfant autiste, est devenue adolescente, alors il fallait la suivre pour mieux l'accompagner dans cette nouvelle étape de sa vie. Comme cela arrive chez les autres enfants qui entrent dans l'adolescence, tout est remis en question : les idéaux, l'identité, l'amitié, l'amour. Entre-temps, il y a eu la publication de la cinquième version du Manuel diagnostique et statistique des troubles mentaux (DSM-5). Il fallait donc étudier cette entrée dans (...) l'adolescence à partir des données diagnostiques les plus récentes. Autisme et adolescence est la suite de L'autisme, un jour à la fois et d'Accompagner un enfant autiste. Encore ici, la mère Catherine Kozminski et la psychologue Nathalie Poirier entrent en dialogue afin de se mettre à l'écoute des besoins de l'adolescente et d'élaborer les meilleures formes d'accompagnement. Il en résulte un ouvrage plein de sensibilité et rempli de solutions pratiques. (shrink)

Despite the frivolous note implied in the popular expression, ‘The Greeks had a word for it’, the literal truth is that they did! Time and again we find reflected in the terminology developed by these ancient seekers after wisdom, an attention to important distinctions and a faithfulness to the details of actual experience which are truly remarkable. The Greek thinkers had, as every classical scholar and student of Greek philosophy knows, a finely developed philosophical language, one sensitive no less to (...) the unusual, pregnant experience than to the familiar details of ordinary life. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine some of the consequences of the recent advances in neurobiology in terms of the ability of drugs to manipulate the mind. Most laymen are totally ignorant of the general mechanism underlying the brain-mind relationship and therefore of the action of mind-altering drugs. Professor Grahame-Smith considers that one of the intrinsic evils of man's neurobiological make up is that a prime motive of the brain seems to be to bring comfort, security and (...) pleasure for itself. Therefore it is not surprising that drugs - notably the barbiturates and more recently the benzodiazepines (tranquilizers) - have been prescribed to give to the brain that peace of mind that it seeks. However, it can be argued that such drugs cannot replace anxiety with peace of mind or unhappiness or depression with happiness. The action of such drugs upon the molecules of the brain is negative - a placebo effect. (shrink)

At some step in proving the Liar Paradox in natural language, a sentence is derived that seems overdetermined with respect to its semantic value. This is complemented by Tarski’s Theorem that a formal language cannot consistently contain a naive truth predicate given the laws of logic used in proving the Liar paradox. I argue that proofs of the Eubulidean Liar either use a principle of truth with non-canonical names in a fallacious way or make a fallacious use of substitution of (...) identicals. Tarski never committed the first fallacy and may have himself considered it fallacious. Nevertheless, I clarify that it is fallacious. I then argue substitution of identicals needs to be restricted within the scope of the truth predicate. A logic for truth implementing this restriction is a monotonic extension of a classical first order logic, or indeed a formalizable fragment of natural language. Proofs of Tarski’s Indefinability of Truth theorem are invalid in this logic. This approach generalizes to invalidate proofs of Liar-like paradoxes, particularly the predicate form of the Knower paradox. Consequently, such a logic can be further extended in a way that avoids Montague’s theorem for such a system. Yet, the semantic status of a Liar sentence is not fully resolved. It is no longer overdetermined; it is now underdetermined. (shrink)

This paper uses a declarative mapping sentence approach to explore and amend design thinking - a project development and management technique recently disseminated in Africa. We contend that there are problems in the manner in which design thinking has been exported to Africa, namely, that design thinking is rooted in the linear, binary, human-centric systems present in Western philosophy and that the exportation of design thinking is potentially neo-colonial. We, therefore, attempt to ameliorate these difficulties by decoupling design thinking from (...) its Western philosophical perspectives. We will also seek to broaden the understanding of design thinking by adopting the more communitarian perspective found in philosophy that has been developed in Africa. The amended form of design thinking we present considers the user’s existential paradigms and facilitates a flexible and reflexive process void of deliberate finality. Furthermore, we claim that amending design thinking’s philosophical foundations to incorporate a communitarian perspective has the potential to make design thinking more ecologically-centric. (shrink)

The Matrix exposes us to the uncomfortable worries of philosophical skepticism in an especially compelling way. However, with a bit more reflection, we can see why we need not share the skeptic’s doubts about the existence of the world. Such doubts are appropriate only in the very special context of the philosophical seminar. When we return to normal life we see immediately that they are groundless. Furthermore, we see also the drastic mistake that Cypher commits in turning his back upon (...) reality and re-entering the matrix. Not only does reason compel us to admit the existence of the external world, it also requires us to face this world, to build for ourselves meaningful lives within it, and to engage, as adults, in the serious business of living. (shrink)

For a dialetheist, it is rational to believe that true contradictions exist. However, we argue that a dialetheist faces a complex dilemma given some bridge principles for rational beliefs that connect possibility and probability, including the so-called ‘Regularity Principle’. Either her belief is not doxastically possible even for her, or she must assign positive credence to the proposition that dialetheia exists. The former makes her belief prima facie self-defeating. The latter seems to compel her to choose between several more fine-grained (...) options, each of which seems undesirable for a regular and rational probability theory. It is unclear how a dialetheist would stay rationally regular, so we pose this challenge, seeking a response from a dialetheist. (shrink)

Is the set of all self-membered sets, S, a member of itself? In naive set theory, this is Russell’s hypodox. By the Laws of Excluded Middle and Non-contradiction, S is a member of itself xor it is not, but no principle of classical logic or naive set theory determines which. (Herein, ‘xor’ extends English with a specifically exclusive disjunction.) As a hypodox, the Truth-teller is a sentence that says of itself simply that it is true; by the above mentioned principles, (...) the Truth-teller is true xor not true, but no principle of classical logic or naive truth determines which. Many concepts that have paradoxes have related hypodoxes, although the focus here is on these two. I argue that the Truth-teller does not rely on a principle of truth, in particular it does not rely on the T-schema. I also argue that Russell’s hypodox does not rely on Comprehension. Yet I relate Russell’s paradox and hypodox based on involution functions. The Liar and the Truth-teller are also related by means of involutions. Relations based on these involution functions can be represented in duality squares. Although hypodoxes are not paradoxes, these involution functions and duality relations warrant some commonality in a correct solution to a paradox and its dual hypodox. Using this and some other premises, I provide novel arguments supporting non-classical solutions for the Liar paradox and the significance of Russell’s hypodox for solutions to Russell’s paradox. (shrink)

Both the theory that traumatic childhood memories can be repressed, and the reliability of the techniques used to retrieve these memories are challenged in this paper. Questions are raised about the robustness of the theory and the literature that purports to provide scientific evidence for it. Evidence to this end is provided by the demographic and qualitative results of a research study conducted by the authors which surveyed New Zealand families in which one member had accused another of sexual abuse (...) on the basis of recovered memories. It is shown that a number of these allegations involve very low probability events. Since memory repression theory is not currently scientifically substantiated it is argued that care needs to be taken in the mental health, legal and insurance compensation arenas. Memories recalled during therapy may be treated as metaphorical but, in the absence of corroborative evidence, should not be considered factually true. Clinicians who wish to use memory recovery techniques should inform patients of their experimental and controversial nature, point out potential adverse effects, and obtain consent before proceeding. (shrink)