David Balme's major critical edition of Aristotle's largest and perhaps least studied treatise is based on a collation of the 26 known extant manuscripts and a study of the early Latin translations. Begun in 1975, with his work towards the Loeb editio minor of books VII–X, this edition of all ten books, including a very full apparatus criticus, was largely complete by 1989 when Professor Balme died, but it needed extensive work to put it in publishable form. This work has (...) been carried out by Allan Gotthelf, Balme's friend and associate. Volume I of the edition contains the complete text of the Historia Animalium, the critical apparatus, and Balme's introduction to the manuscripts, expanded and updated with the assistance of Friederike Berger, and in consultation with the editors of forthcoming editions of the extant medieval translations. A substantial index to the text has been provided by Liliane Bodson in collaboration with Professor Gotthelf. (shrink)

A Distinction of four species of tragedy and epic poetry is laid down, though not explained at length, in two passages of the Poetics, and, as I hope to show, mentioned in another. At the end of the treatise, Aristotle positively says that he has given an explanation of both the species and the component parts of tragedy and epic poetry.

Machine generated contents note: -- Part I -- 1. Portrait of the psychiatrist as a young man 1927-1960 -- 2. Portrait of the psychiatrist as an intellectual. Laing's early, notebooks, personal library, essays, papers, and talks -- 3. Laing and psychiatric theory -- 4. Laing and existential-phenomenology -- 5. Laing and Religion -- 6. Laing and the Arts -- Part II -- 7. Laing in the Army -- 8. Gartnavel Hospital and the 'Rumpus Room' -- 9. Individual patients at Gartnavel (...) -- 10. Laing at the Southern General Hospital -- 11. Laing in London -- 12. The Divided Self. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 30.3 (2000) 40-52 [Access article in PDF] Hugo's le Dernier Jour d'un Condamné The End as Contamination Allan Stoekl How does one end a story? What does it mean to end a story? What is the relationship between the end of a story and that which precedes it? These, in many ways, are among the central concerns of nineteenth-century fiction, for this period saw extensive experimentation not (...) only in the areas of narration, point of view, and style, but in the realm of what is often called narrative "closure."This term, one we are all familiar with from television news accounts—everyone wants closure nowadays, whatever that is—is already contested in much of nineteenth-century fiction. The happy certainties of, say, a Sherlock Holmes story are hardly corroborated by the dismal fates of Emma Bovary or Thérèse Raquin. Indeed, one of the goals of much "realism" of the period can be seen as a desire to formulate another type of ending, one that provides not happy consolation—closure in the contemporary sense of the term—but simply an ending as cessation, a hanging-fire that offers only the silence, and emptiness, of the tomb. And even the emptiness of the character: after all, when Charles Bovary is opened up in order to determine the cause of his death, the doctors "find nothing": he was as empty as the ending of his wife's story. Indeed the discovery of that emptiness is the end (such as it is). Charles's emptiness has opened the story, it closes it, and in between there are only episodes that make obvious the end to come: disillusionment in the power of stories, the death-in-life of a life that tries to ape adventures. The end, the end of stories in general, comes to occupy and reconfigure (in its own nonimage) the entire story.As Montaigne put it, there is only a bout rather than a but: an end as mere cessation rather than as goal or conclusion.1 This endlessness of the end—as simple extinction—suffuses all that comes before it: it is not so much that events lead up to an end, but rather that the end casts back on the events that precede it its own void, its fundamental unknowability.Sartre, of course, was eager to continue this Flaubertian critique (as he continued so much else started by Flaubert); in La nausée (Nausea) his hero, Roquentin, refuses any belief in the reality of "adventures"—his own or anyone else's—because they are essentially false: they are stories, with beginnings and endings selected to provide an illuminating or pleasurable experience. They are no more "real" than are the objects [End Page 40] around us, which are fabricated and chosen with a subjective, and selfish, end in view. In lived adventures, as in stories in novels or films, it is the end that gives sense to what comes before it: the economy of narrative, so to speak, requires that everything that figures in a story be of use in contributing to a satisfying and totalizing end (a but). In his diary, Roquentin writes:And in reality you have started at the end. It was there, invisible and present, it is the one which gives to words the pomp and value of a beginning. "I was out walking, I had left the town without realizing it, I was thinking about my money troubles." This sentence, taken simply for what it is, means that the man was absorbed, morose, a hundred leagues from an adventure, exactly in the mood to let things happen without noticing them. But the end is there, transforming everything. For us, the man is already the hero of the story. [...] And the story goes on in reverse: instants have stopped piling themselves up in a lighthearted way one on top of the other, they are snapped up by the end of the story which draws them and each one of them in turn, draws out the preceding instant: "It was night, the street... (shrink)

The following article shows what Tacitus Ann. 15,44 thought of the role of the Chrestiani at the burning of the Roman capital A.D. 64 and why they themselves as punishment of their,,crime“ were crucified and burned. In order to demonstrate this the textus receptus is first analysed linguistically and its content interpreted in its historical and sociological context. It is ethnohistorically established as a fact that Tacitus counted the Chrestiani as a minority of the Iudaei. Linguistically it is proved that (...) the words aut flammandi atque ubi are corrupt and have to be emended ad flammas dati, ut, cum why some of the Chrestiani as part of their punishment were given to the flames, i.e. Latine: ad flammas dati. (shrink)

While the essays on this web site, taken together, explain most of the essentials of my metaphysical system, some material is not covered, and the different essays take quite different approaches. The essays were mostly written for undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy at the University of Toronto and York University. Thus, each essay is slanted to the issues that were addressed in whatever course it was written for. However, I hope soon to pull all this material together into a (...) cohesive, single work that will explain my system more fully and with more focus, which will serve as my Ph.D. dissertation. In the meantime this brief overview gives the broad picture of what my philosophical system is, and how the various essays on these pages are inter-related. For those who do not wish to read through this entire page, the Quantum Phenomenology essay is probably the one you should read if you only have time to read one, as it is the closest to being comprehensive. (shrink)

Introduction; A.Hazlett Quantification, Naturalness, and Ontology; R.P.Cameron Two Problems of Composition in Collective Action; S.R.Chant Another Look at the Reality of Race, By Which I Mean Racef; J.Glasgow Bringing Things About; N.Judisch Interpretation: Its Scope and Limits; U.Kriegel Empirical Analyses of Causation; D.Kutach Brutal Individuation; A.Hazlett Ghosts in the World Machine? Humility and Its Alternatives; R.Langton& C.Robichaud Is Everything Relative? Anti-Realism, Truth, and Feminism; M.Mikkola Minimalism and Modality: The Nature of Mathematical Objects; K.Miller Are There Fundamental Intrinsic Properties?; A.Ney On (...) the Very Idea of an Ecosystem; J.Odenbaugh The Prince of Wales Problem for Counterfactual Theories of Causation; C.Sartorio Index. (shrink)

The phrase ei mihi is used fifteen times by Plautus. On all but one occasion these words introduce a new speaker. The single ‘exception’ is, I suggest, rather an error of transmission. I quote the line in context, Bac. 1171–4 NIC. Ni abeas, quamquam tu bella es, malum tibi magnum dabo iam. BACCH. Patiar, non metuo, ne quid mihi doleat quod ferias. NIC. Ut blandiloquast! ei mihi, metuo. SOR. Hie magis tranquillust. 1173 non – blandiloquast uno versu B 1174 SOROR (...) B: B D. (shrink)

Let me begin with some of the background worries that motivate the paper. First, for years I have been working on the relation of the Timaeus to the Republic guided by this triple analogy: as the demiurge is to the cosmos, so the philosopher-ruler is to the polis, so reason is to the soul or individual. The key claim is Tim. 29e: the demiurge is good and so wants to make everything it makes like it itself is, i.e., good, as (...) good as possible. I take the demiurge to be reason idealized, so I infer reason wants to make everything it makes as good as possible. This sets the stage: how is reason related to the good? (shrink)

The phrase ei mihi is used fifteen times by Plautus. On all but one occasion these words introduce a new speaker. The single ‘exception’ is, I suggest, rather an error of transmission. I quote the line in context, Bac. 1171–4 NIC. Ni abeas, quamquam tu bella es, malum tibi magnum dabo iam. BACCH. Patiar, non metuo, ne quid mihi doleat quod ferias. NIC. Ut blandiloquast! ei mihi, metuo. SOR. Hie magis tranquillust. 1173 non – blandiloquast uno versu B 1174 SOROR (...) B: B D. (shrink)

. The question of whether science may usefully be viewed as a market process has recently been addressed by Mäki, who concludes that “either free-market economics is self-defeating, or else there must be two different concepts of free market, one for the ordinary economy, the other for science.” Here I argue that such pessimism is unwarranted.Mäki proposes that the conduct of economic research itself be taken, self-reflexively, as a test case for any suggested economics of science. While agreeing that we (...) may expect economics to apply to the conduct of economic research itself, I demonstrate that there is a lack of cogency, both in Mäki's argument for his proposal and in his attempt to implement a reflexivity test.Mäki asks what would be exchanged in the scientific “market for ideas”. The answer is that recognition is exchanged for the opportunity to use another's research results. The identification of an organized and pervasive system of exchange establishes a firm basis for analyzing science as a market process. (shrink)

Abstract:Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.

The badness of having conflicting emotions is a familiar theme in academic ethics, clinical psychology, and commercial self-help, where emotional harmony is often put forward as an ideal. Many philosophers give emotional harmony pride of place in their theories of practical reason.1 Here we offer a defense of a particular species of emotional conflict, namely, ambivalence. We articulate an conception of ambivalence, on which ambivalence is unresolved inconsistent desire (§1) and present a case of appropriate ambivalence (§2), before considering two (...) alternative defenses of emotional conflict (§3). We then argue that inconsistent desires can be fitting (§4) and that it can be reasonable not to resolve inconsistent desires (§5), before considering an objection (§6) and concluding the discussion (§7). (shrink)

We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self-knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (section 2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (section 3), existential self-knowledge (section 4), and spontaneity (section 5). Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of self-knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of (that species of) (...) authenticity conflicts with the value of self-knowledge. (shrink)

: Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.

D I Lloyd; I Experientially Remember, Therefore I Exist? A reply to R. D. Smith, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 97–1.

D I Lloyd; I Experientially Remember, Therefore I Exist? A reply to R. D. Smith, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 97–1.

We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self-knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (section 2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (section 3), existential self-knowledge (section 4), and spontaneity (section 5). Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of self-knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of (that species of) (...) authenticity conflicts with the value of self-knowledge. (shrink)

D I Lloyd; Theory and Practice1, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 98–113, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1976.tb0.

D I Lloyd; Theory and Practice1, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 98–113, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1976.tb0.

Purpose: Often radical constructivists are confronted with arguments why radical constructivism is wrong. The present work presents a radical constructivist alternative to such arguments: a comparison of the results of two instructional practices, the standard, realist-based instruction and a radical constructivist-based instruction, both in physics courses. Design: Evidence from many studies of student conceptions in standard instruction (Duit 2004) is taken into account. In addition, diagnostic data, pre and post instruction, were collected from over 1,000 students in multiple institutions across (...) the U. S. over a period of about 15 years via an established diagnostic of conceptual understanding of motion and force. Findings: Evidence from many studies of student conceptions in standard instruction (Duit, 2004) is that little or no change in student conceptions happens in standard instruction. About half the students in the particular study reported, all science and engineering majors, experienced standard, realist-based instruction and show an average effect size of 0.6 standard deviations and an average normalized gain of 15%. The other half of the students, none of whom were science and engineering majors, experienced radical constructivist-based instruction and show an average effect size over 2.5 standard deviations and an average normalized gain over 60%. Diagnostic pre scores were nearly the same for both groups. Practical implications: The outcome, that students, neither science nor engineering majors, made changes in understanding foundational topics in physics far greater than science and engineering students, poses (1) an ethical challenge to the continued adherence to standard, realist-based instructional practices and (2) an intellectual challenge to the usefulness and appropriateness of the elitist-realist paradigm on which such standard instruction is based. Conclusion: This radical constructivist argument uses the effect of paradigms to judge their pragmatic value, not their truth-value. Based on pragmatic value, radical constructivism results in superior outcomes when applied to physics instruction. The approach to instruction can be applied generally in education. (shrink)

Context: In spite of its advantages and its ability to make valid responses to objections, radical constructivism is not mainstream. Problem: Extolling the virtues of radical constructivism and responding logically to the objections does not work. We know this from the evidence of many attempts. Our theoretical stance, radical constructivism, also suggests this approach is not likely to have much influence on realists. We cannot transmit understanding in the signals with which we attempt to communicate. How can we in radical (...) constructivism enable those outside of RC to understand our explanation of human knowing? Method: Examine our understanding of radical constructivism itself, because it is an explanation of how, why and under what circumstances people change their understandings of their experiential worlds. Results: We must find ways to direct the attention of others to situations that they cannot explain with their existing understanding of the world. Then we must create conditions conducive to their revising and testing new understandings for fit with the evidence of their experience. Implications: Since radical constructivism is a theory of human knowing, it tells us how humans develop knowledge, hence it is an answer to the questions central to this special issue. This answer is not one to be used to win in debates with realists. Radical constructivism gives us an answer to the problem of engaging realists in understanding our position, but strategies consistent with radical constructivism are not easily carried out. Developing and executing such strategies is the work at hand. (shrink)