Recently, a review regarding the mechanics and evolution of mitochondrial fission appeared in Nature. Surprisingly, it stated authoritatively that the mitochondrial outer membrane, in contrast with the inner membrane of bacterial descent, was acquired from the host, presumably during uptake. However, it has been known for quite some time that this membrane was also derived from the Gram‐negative, alpha‐proteobacterium related precursor of present‐day mitochondria. The zombie idea of the host membrane still surrounding the endosymbiont is not only wrong, but more (...) importantly, might hamper the proper conception of possible scenarios of eukaryogenesis. Why? Because it steers the imagination not only with regard to possible uptake mechanisms, but also regarding what went on before. Here I critically discuss both the evidence for the continuity of the bacterial outer membrane, the reasons for the persistence of the erroneous host membrane hypothesis and the wider implications of these misconceptions for the ideas regarding events occurring during the first steps towards the evolution of the eukaryotes and later major eukaryotic differentiations. I will also highlight some of the latest insights regarding different instances of endosymbiont evolution. (shrink)

This introduction to a special issue of Topoi introduces and summarises the relationship between three main varieties of 'enactivist' theorising about the mind: 'autopoietic', 'sensorimotor', and 'radical' enactivism. It includes a brief discussion of the philosophical and cognitive scientific precursors to enactivist theories, and the relationship of enactivism to other trends in embodied cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

Clinical research with adults who are unable to provide informed consent has the potential to improve understanding and care of a number of devasting conditions. This research also has the potential to exploit some of society's most vulnerable members. Recently, a number of task forces and individual writers have proposed guidelines to ensure that such research is both possible and ethical. Yet, there is widespread disagreement over which safeguards should be adopted. In the present paper, I consider to what extent (...) these disagreements can be resolved by appeal to a general account of the interests of subjects who are unable to consent and the conditions that must be satisfied for research enrollment to constitute exploitation of their inability to make their own decisions. (shrink)

We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that (...) the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended. (shrink)

Eukaryotic origins are heavily debated. The author as well as others have proposed that they are inextricably linked with the arrival of a pre‐mitochondrion of alphaproteobacterial‐like ancestry, in a so‐called symbiogenic scenario. The ensuing mutual adaptation of archaeal host and endosymbiont seems to have been a defining influence during the processes leading to the last eukaryotic common ancestor. An unresolved question in this scenario deals with the means by which the bacterium ends up inside. Older hypotheses revolve around the application (...) of known antagonistic interactions, the bacterium being prey or parasite. Here, in reviewing the field, the author argues that such models share flaws, hence making them less likely, and that a “pre‐symbiotic stage” would have eased ongoing metabolic integration. Based on this the author will speculate about the nature of the (endo) symbiosis that started eukaryotic evolution–in the context of bacterial entry being a relatively “early” event–and stress the differences between this uptake and subsequent ones. He will also briefly discuss how the mutual adaptation following the merger progressed and how many eukaryotic hallmarks can be understood in light of coadaptation. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/ekqtNleVJpU. (shrink)

DIVBased on a series of lectures delivered in 1840, Thomas Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History considers the creation of heroes and the ways they exert heroic leadership. From the divine and prophetic to the poetic to the religious to the political, Carlyle investigates the mysterious qualities that elevate humans to cultural significance. By situating the text in the context of six essays by distinguished scholars that reevaluate both Carlyle’s work and his ideas, David (...) Sorensen and Brent Kinser argue that Carlyle's concept of heroism stresses the hero’s spiritual dimension. In Carlyle’s engagement with various heroic personalities, he dislodges religiosity from religion, myth from history, and truth from “quackery” as he describes the wondrous ways in which these “flowing light-fountains” unlock the heroic potential of ordinary human beings. /div. (shrink)

Aspects of peroxisome evolution, uncoupling, carnitine shuttles, supercomplex formation, and missing neuronal fatty acid oxidation (FAO) are linked to reactive oxygen species (ROS) formation in respiratory chains. Oxidation of substrates with high FADH2/NADH (F/N) ratios (e.g., FAs) initiate ROS formation in Complex I due to insufficient availability of its electron acceptor (Q) and reverse electron transport from QH2, e.g., during FAO or glycerol‐3‐phosphate shuttle use. Here it is proposed that the Q‐cycle of Complex III contributes to enhanced ROS formation going (...) from low F/N ratio substrates (glucose) to high F/N substrates. This contribution is twofold: 1) Complex III uses Q as substrate, thus also competing with Complex I; 2) Complex III itself will produce more ROS under these conditions. I link this scenario to the universally observed Complex III dimerization. The Q‐cycle of Complex III thus again illustrates the tension between efficient ATP generation and endogenous ROS formation. This model can explain recent findings concerning succinate and ROS‐induced uncoupling. (shrink)

Of two contending models for eukaryotic evolution the “archezoan“ has an amitochondriate eukaryote take up an endosymbiont, while “symbiogenesis“ states that an Archaeon became a eukaryote as the result of this uptake. If so, organelle formation resulting from new engulfments is simplified by the primordial symbiogenesis, and less informative regarding the bacterium‐to‐mitochondrion conversion. Gradualist archezoan visions still permeate evolutionary thinking, but are much less likely than symbiogenesis. Genuine amitochondriate eukaryotes have never been found and rapid, explosive adaptive periods characteristic of (...) symbiogenetic models explain this. Mitochondrial proteomes, encoded by genes of “eukaryotic origin“ not easily linked to host or endosymbiont, can be understood in light of rapid adjustments to new evolutionary pressures. Symbiogenesis allows “expensive” eukaryotic inventions via efficient ATP generation by nascent mitochondria. However, efficient ATP production equals enhanced toxic internal ROS formation. The synergistic combination of these two driving forces gave rise to the rapid evolution of eukaryotes.Also watch the Video Abstract. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging interview, Dave Elder-Vass discusses his main contributions to critical realist theory over two decades. In the first half, he explains his early work on emergence, agency, str...

The Executive's Guide to 21st Century Corporate Citizenship provides a major update on how to "do" corporate citizenship, showing senior managers how they can win the reputation battle and deliver value to society while creating the most successful business possible in today's competitive landscape.

Skepticism about the limits of online learning is as old as online learning itself. As with other technologically-driven innovations in pedagogy, there are deep-seated worries that important educational goods might be effaced or obscured by the ways of teaching and learning that online methods allow. One family of such worries is inspired by reflections on the bodily basis of an important kind of understanding, and skepticism over whether this bodily basis can be inculcated in the absence of actual, flesh-and-blood, classroom (...) interactions. This paper focuses on the ways in which such worries arise in the influential work of Hubert Dreyfus. The negative conclusion for which I argue is that endorsing Dreyfus's Merleau-Pontian picture of the relationship between bodily skill and understanding does not commit us to his general pessimism concerning online learning—bodily, emotional, and interactive dimensions might be essential to learning, but we lack reasons to think that online learning necessarily lacks these dimensions. The negative argument motivates a positive claim: rather than giving up on online learning we should focus on designing courses and pedagogies that scaffold the bodily, affective and interactive dynamics constitutive of understanding in a particular domain. (shrink)

How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, (...) but as a matrix of possibilities for pursuing and accomplishing one’s intentional actions, goals and projects. If this is correct, the links between planning, intention and perceptual experience are tight, while (contrary to some recent accounts invoking the notion of ‘sensorimotor expectations’) the links between embodied activity and perceptual experience, though real, are indirect. What matters is not bodily activity itself, but our practical knowledge (which need not be verbalized or in any way explicit) of our own possibilities for action. Such knowledge, selected, shaped and filtered by the grid of plans, goals, and intentions, plays, we argue, a constitutive role in explaining the content and character of visual perceptual experience. (shrink)

How should we understand the relationship between conscious perception and action? Does an appeal to action have any place in an account of colour experience? This essay aims to shed light on the first question by giving a positive response to the second. I consider two types of enactive approach to perceptual consciousness, and two types of account of colour perception. Each approach to colour perception faces serious objections. However, the two views can be combined in a way that resists (...) the criticisms to each. Furthermore, the hybrid view we arrive at lets us see which enactive account of perceptual consciousness we should prefer in the case of colour. (shrink)

I shall characterize normative functionalism and contrast it with its causal counterpart. After tracing both stripes of functionalism to the work of the classical American pragmatists, I then argue that they are not exclusive alternatives. Instead, both might be required for an appropriately illuminating account of human rational activity.

Synaesthetes persistently perceive certain stimuli as systematically accompanied by illusory colours, even though they know those colours to be illusory. This appears to contrast with cases where a subject’s colour vision adapts to systematic distortions caused by wearing coloured goggles. Given that each case involves longstanding systematic distortion of colour perception that the subjects recognize as such, how can a theory of colour perception explain the fact that perceptual adaptation occurs in one case but not the other? I argue that (...) these cases and the relationship between them can be made sense of in light of an existing view of colour perception. Understanding colours as ways in which objects and surfaces modify light, perceived through grasping patterns and variations in colour appearances, provides a framework from which the cases and their apparent disanalogy can be predicted and explained. This theory’s ability to accommodate these cases constitutes further empirical evidence in its favour. (shrink)

In this article, I foreground the role of relationality in Husserl’s later reflections on ethics and self-constitution, with a particular interest in Husserl’s account of sacrifice. I exposit how Husserl’s account of self-constitution and the conflict of absolute values between competing vocations offers a solution to Brentano’s rendering of the obligation to “choose the best among the ends attainable.” I explore the numerous instances in which Husserl uses the parent-child relation to illustrate the absolute value of our relation to an (...) individual and how this absolute value triumphs over other seemingly rational maxims. Although problematic in several ways, Husserl’s account of motherhood grounds his notion of self-constitution in particular relations with others, rather than in a general category of nation or humanity. I conclude by considering how his emphasis on phenomenological constitution and his approach to value and sacrifice may inform future projects in phenomenological relational ethics. (shrink)

What are the acceptable limits of scientific investigation and genetic engineering, the rights and wrongs of animal rights, euthanasia and civil disobedience? This book confronts these dilemmas, tracing arguments of moral thinkers, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and brings us up to date with postmodern critics.

The Walker model raises a number of questions, particularly about the nature of the sleep states involved in consolidation enhancement. While REM sleep, Stage 2 sleep, and Stage 3/4 sleep have been implicated in procedural learning, we still do not understand which types of learning are involved with specific sleep states. Several possible ideas for future research are suggested.

The transparency of perceptual experience has been invoked in support of many views about perception. I argue that it supports a form of enactivism—the view that capacities for perceptual experience and for intentional agency are essentially interdependent. I clarify the perceptual phenomenon at issue, and argue that enactivists should expect to find a parallel instance of transparency in our agentive experience, and that the two forms of transparency are constitutively interdependent. I then argue that i) we do indeed find such (...) parallels: the way in which an action is directed towards its goal through our bodily movements parallels the way in which an experience is directed towards its object through our perceptual sensation, and ii) reflecting on sensorimotor skills shows why the two instances of transparency are constitutively interdependent. Section 4 gives reasons for generalizing beyond the cases considered so far by applying the enactive view to Kohler's landmark studies of perceptual adaptation. The final section clarifies the form of enactivism to which the previous sections point. The view that emerges is one whereby our perceptual and practical skills are interrelated aspects of a single capacity to have one's mind intentionally directed upon the world. The transparency of experience, on this view, is achieved in virtue of our capacities as agents as much as it is given in virtue of our capacities as perceivers. (shrink)

I argue that the phenomenal properties of conscious visual experiences are properties of the mind-independent objects to which the subject is perceptually related, mediated by the subject's practical understanding of their sensorimotor relation to those properties. This position conjoins two existing strategies for explaining the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences: accounts appealing to perceivers’ limited, non-inferential access to the details of their sensory relation to the environment, and the relationalist conception of phenomenal properties. Bringing these two positions together by emphasizing (...) their sensorimotor common ground allows each one to respond to damaging objections using the resources of the other. The resulting ‘sensorimotor relationalism’ about conscious vision provides a promising schema for explaining phenomenal properties of perceptual states, replacing ‘Hard’ questions with tractable ones about the perceptual relation and its sensorimotor underpinnings. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractIntelligent-design websites misquote to subvert belief in Darwinian evolution. Nowadays, such sites pose as “objective” sources of information. Speaking more generally, spreading misinformation can be linked to climate science denial, vaccination avoidance, and a resurgence of pseudo-scientific racism. Internet regulations to counter these sources of pseudo-science are urgently needed.

What is it to be an agent? One influential line of thought, endorsed by G. E. M. Anscombe and David Velleman, among others, holds that agency depends on practical rationality—the ability to act for reasons, rather than being merely moved by causes. Over the past 25 years, Velleman has argued compellingly for a distinctive view of agency and the practical rationality with which he associates it. On Velleman’s conception, being an agent consists in having the capacity to be motivated by (...) a drive to act for reasons. Your bodily movements qualify as genuine actions insofar as they are motivated in part by your desire to behave in a way that makes sense to yourself. However, there are at least two distinct ways of spelling out what this drive towards self-intelligibility consists in, both present in Velleman’s work. It might consist in a drive towards intelligibility in causal-psychological terms: roughly, a drive to maximize the rational coherence of your psychological states. Alternatively, it might consist in a drive towards narrative intelligibility: a drive to make your ongoing activity conform to a recognizable narrative structure, where that structure is understood emotionally. Velleman originally saw these options as basically equivalent, but later came to prioritize the drive towards causal-psychological intelligibility over that towards narrative intelligibility. I argue that this gets things the wrong way round—we should instead understand our capacities to render ourselves intelligible in causal-psychological terms as built upon a bedrock of emotionally suffused narrative understanding. In doing so, we resolve several problems for Velleman’s view, and pave the way for an embodied, embedded and affective account of practical rationality and agency. According to the picture that emerges, practical rationality is essential to agency, narrative understanding is essential to practical rationality, and the rhythms and structures patterning the ebb and flow of our emotional lives are essential to narrative understanding. (shrink)

Clinical research with adults who are unable to provide informed consent has the potential to improve understanding and care of a number of devastating conditions. This research also has the potential to exploit some of society's most vulnerable members. Recently, a number of task forces and individual writers have proposed guidelines to ensure that such research is both possible and ethical. Yet, there is widespread disagreement over which safeguards should be adopted. In the present paper, I consider to what extent (...) these disagreements can be resolved by appeal to a general account of the interests of subjects who are unable to consent and the conditions that must be satisfied for research enrollment to constitute exploitation of their inability to make their own decisions. (shrink)

Eukaryotic origins are inextricably linked with the arrival of a pre‐mitochondrion of alphaproteobacterial‐like ancestry. However, the nature of the “host” cell and the mode of entry are subject to heavy debate. It is becoming clear that the mutual adaptation of a relatively simple, archaeal host and the endosymbiont has been the defining influence at the beginning of the eukaryotic lineage; however, many still resist such symbiogenic models. In part 1, it is posited that a symbiotic stage before uptake (“pre‐symbiosis”) seems (...) essential to allow further metabolic integration of the two partners ending in endosymbiosis. Thus, the author argued against phagocytic mechanisms (in which the bacterium is prey or parasite) as the mode of entry. Such positions are still broadly unpopular. Here it is explained why. Evolutionary thinking, especially in the case of eukaryogenesis, is still dominated by anachronistic reasoning, in which highly derived protozoan organisms are seen as in some way representative of intermediate steps during eukaryotic evolution, hence poisoning the debate. This reasoning reflects a mind‐set that ignores that Darwinian evolution is a fundamentally historic process. Numerous examples of this kind of erroneous reasoning are given, and some basic precautions against its use are formulated. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/ekqtNleVJpU. (shrink)

How should accounts that stress the embodied, embedded and engaged character of human minds accommodate the role of rationality in human subjectivity? Drawing on Matthew Boyle’s contrast between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ conceptions of rationality, I argue that contemporary work on embodied cognition tends towards a problematic ‘additivism’ about the relationship between mature human capacities to think and act for reasons, and sensorimotor capacities to skillfully engage with salient features of the environment. Additivists view rational capacities to reason and reflect as (...) a distinct ‘layer’ or ‘storey’ of human cognition, with a normative structure that differs from that of the sensorimotor coping skills which support it. I argue that emphasizing the embodied and engaged character of human minds is better combined with a ‘transformative’ conception of rationality – one which holds that acquiring abilities to give and ask for reasons transforms the normative structure of our unreflective embodied dealings with the environment. And I argue that a transformative embodied cognitive science of human rationality is not only possible, but underway. Integrating existing work on embodied cognition with work on the cultural and developmental contexts that shape human minds suggests how human immersion in culture transforms the structure of sensorimotor engagements by bringing about the communicability and negotiability of the meanings to which those engagements attune us. (shrink)

Recently, constructive neutral evolution has been touted as an important concept for the understanding of the emergence of cellular complexity. It has been invoked to help explain the development and retention of, amongst others, RNA splicing, RNA editing and ribosomal and mitochondrial respiratory chain complexity. The theory originated as a welcome explanation of isolated small scale cellular idiosyncrasies and as a reaction to ‘overselectionism’. Here I contend, that in its extended form, it has major conceptual problems, can not explain observed (...) patterns of complex processes, is too easily dismissive of alternative selectionist models, underestimates the creative force of complexity as such, and – if seen as a major evolutionary mechanism for all organisms – could stifle further thought regarding the evolution of highly complex biological processes. (shrink)

The function of REM, or any other stage of sleep, can currently only be conjectured. A rational evaluation of the role of REM in memory processing requires systematic testing of hypotheses that are optimally derived from a complete synthesis of existing knowledge. Our view is that the large number of studies supporting a relationship between REM-related brain activity and memory is not easily explained away. [Vertes & Eastman].

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When Should “Riskier” Subjects Be Excluded from Research Participation?*Dave Wendler** (bio)AbstractThe exclusion of potential subjects based on increased risks is a common practice in human subjects research. However, there are no guidelines to ensure that this practice is conducted in a systematic and fair way. This gap in the literature and regulations is addressed by a specific account of a “condition on inclusion risks” (CIR), a condition under (...) which potential subjects should be excluded from research on the basis of increased risks. This account provides a general framework for assessing standard exclusions as well as more controversial ones such as the exclusion of pregnant women and women of childbearing potential from certain types of research.The exclusion of potential subjects on the basis of increased risks is a common and, in most instances, noncontroversial practice in human subjects research. Investigators routinely exclude potential subjects with reduced kidney function, bleeding disorders, and allergies to the drugs under investigation. Surprisingly, this use of exclusion criteria takes place in the absence of any explicit guidelines. In the present paper, I attempt to fill this gap in the literature and regulations by offering a specific account of the conditions under which potential subjects should be excluded from research on the basis of increased risk. This account serves two purposes.First, subjects who are excluded on the basis of increased risk are prevented from making their own enrollment decisions. Therefore, it is important to ensure, in spite of the broad range of potential subjects and the varied reasons for excluding them, that potential subjects are excluded in [End Page 307] a systematic and fair way. Second, certain instances of subject exclusion, most notably the exclusion of pregnant women and women of childbearing potential, raise more difficult issues. By providing a general framework for assessing the exclusion of potential subjects based on increased risks, the present analysis covers these cases as well and, thus, offers a solution to one of the thornier ethical dilemmas facing investigators and IRBs today.Briefly, I argue that standard exclusion practices suggest that whenever two groups of potential research subjects offer the same opportunity for scientific and individual benefit, but different levels of risk, the group that would introduce greater risks should be excluded. With this framework in place, I consider potential subjects, such as men and women of child-parenting potential, whose research participation introduces increased risks to third parties. I argue that the present approach is justified, not because it reduces harms to specific individuals, but because it reduces aggregate harms. Therefore, it should be applied to all riskier potential subjects regardless of who faces the risks in question. After defending this approach, I consider several objections.First, I argue that the present approach is not paternalistic; the exclusions it calls for are not justified by what is thought to be in the best interests of the individuals excluded. Rather, the argument is that these exclusions minimize the aggregate harm of human subjects research. In addition, the present approach does not violate the obligation of researchers to respect subject autonomy because it does not reduce the number of potential subjects who are given the opportunity to enroll in a particular protocol. Finally, the exclusions are consistent with reasonable side constraints on attaining the goals of research.“Riskier” SubjectsWhen it comes to evaluating risks, most guidelines on human subjects research stipulate simply that the risks entailed must be reasonable given the potential for benefit. The Australian National Health and Medical Research Council’s guidelines, for instance, require only that “the investigator... must be satisfied that the possible advantage to be gained from the work justifies any discomfort or risk involved” (ANMRC 1992, Clause 3). To determine whether the risks of a protocol are justified, one sums the risks of the various procedures in the protocol, whatever those procedures may be, and compares the result to the procedures’ potential for benefit. This evaluation of risks assumes that the aggregate risks of a [End Page 308] given protocol are fixed and thus will not help to determine whether and when the risks of particular protocols should be reduced by excluding riskier subjects. The United States Department of Health... (shrink)

Social and linguistic perceptions are linked. On one hand, talker identity affects speech perception. On the other hand, speech itself provides information about a talker's identity. Here, we propose that the same probabilistic knowledge might underlie both socially conditioned linguistic inferences and linguistically conditioned social inferences. Our computational–level approach—the ideal adapter—starts from the idea that listeners use probabilistic knowledge of covariation between social, linguistic, and acoustic cues in order to infer the most likely explanation of the speech signals they hear. (...) As a first step toward understanding social inferences in this framework, we use a simple ideal observer model to show that it would be possible to infer aspects of a talker's identity using cue distributions based on actual speech production data. This suggests the possibility of a single formal framework for social and linguistic inferences and the interactions between them. (shrink)

In this article, I foreground the role of relationality in Husserl’s later reflections on ethics and self-constitution, with a particular interest in Husserl’s account of sacrifice. I exposit how Husserl’s account of self-constitution and the conflict of absolute values between competing vocations offers a solution to Brentano’s rendering of the obligation to “choose the best among the ends attainable.” I explore the numerous instances in which Husserl uses the parent-child relation to illustrate the absolute value of our relation to an (...) individual and how this absolute value triumphs over other seemingly rational maxims. Although problematic in several ways, Husserl’s account of motherhood grounds his notion of self-constitution in particular relations with others, rather than in a general category of nation or humanity. I conclude by considering how his emphasis on phenomenological constitution and his approach to value and sacrifice may inform future projects in phenomenological relational ethics. (shrink)

An eye-opening tour of the political tricks that subvert scientific progress. The Butter-Up and Undercut. The Certain Uncertainty. The Straight-Up Fabrication. Dave Levitan dismantles all of these deceptive arguments, and many more, in this probing and hilarious examination of the ways our elected officials attack scientific findings that conflict with their political agendas. The next time you hear a politician say, "Well, I’m not a scientist, but…," you’ll be ready.

_The Invisible Dragon_ made a lot of noise for a little book When it was originally published in 1993 it was championed by artists for its forceful call for a reconsideration of beauty—and savaged by more theoretically oriented critics who dismissed the very concept of beauty as naive, igniting a debate that has shown no sign of flagging. With this revised and expanded edition, Hickey is back to fan the flames. More manifesto than polite discussion, more call to action than (...) criticism, _The Invisible Dragon_ aims squarely at the hyper-institutionalism that, in Hickey’s view, denies the real pleasures that draw us to art in the first place. Deploying the artworks of Warhol, Raphael, Caravaggio, and Mapplethorpe and the writings of Ruskin, Shakespeare, Deleuze, and Foucault, Hickey takes on museum culture, arid academicism, sclerotic politics, and more—all in the service of making readers rethink the nature of art. A new introduction provides a context for earlier essays—what Hickey calls his "intellectual temper tantrums." A new essay, "American Beauty," concludes the volume with a historical argument that is a rousing paean to the inherently democratic nature of attention to beauty. Written with a verve that is all too rare in serious criticism, this expanded and refurbished edition of _The Invisible Dragon_ will be sure to captivate a new generation of readers, provoking the passionate reactions that are the hallmark of great criticism. (shrink)

In a promising working note to the Visible and Invisible, Merleau-Ponty proposes that we understand Being according to topological space – relations of proximity, distance, and envelopment – and move away from an image of Being based on homogeneous, inert Euclidean space. With reference to treatments of cross-sensory perception, color-blindness, and the concept of quale or qualia, I seek to rehearse this shift from Euclidean to topological Being by illustrating how modern science confines color itself to a Euclidean model of (...) color space. I discuss “being as Object” in Merleau-Ponty’s later work before showing how color, and indeed all perception, is reduced to being as Object in the form of “quale”. Next, I address discussions in Merleau-Ponty’s work and contemporary research to illustrate how synesthesia and so-called color-blindness are rendered abnormal by this objectified being of color. Merleau-Ponty’s reading of synesthesia follows directly from his rejection of quale, and his use of color perception serves as a rejection of solipsism. With appeal to his proposed topological model of Being, I conclude by recognizing the problematic nature of synesthesia and color-blindness as being ontological, not psychological.Dans une note de travail, à mon sens décisive, du Visible et l’Invisible, Merleau-Ponty propose que l’on comprenne l’Être à partir de l’espace topologique – relations de proximité, distance et enveloppement – allant à l’encontre d’une l’image de l’Être fondée sur un espace euclidien homogène et inerte. En faisant référence aux traitements de la perception synesthésique, au daltonisme et au concept de quale ou qualia, j’essayerai de décrire ce passage de l’Être euclidien à l’Être topologique en montrant que la science moderne finit par confiner la couleur dans un modèle euclidien d’espace-couleur. J’examinerai « l’Être-objet » dans les derniers écrits de Merleau-Ponty avant de montrer comment la couleur, et plus en général la perception, est réduite à être comme un Objet dans la forme d’un « quale ». Ensuite, en examinant les analyses merleau-pontiennes et les recherches contemporaines, je montrerai comment la synesthésie et le daltonisme sont donc considérés comme anormaux à partir de cette objectivation de la couleur. La lecture que Merleau-Ponty donne de la synesthésie est la conséquence directe de son refus du quale, et l’utilisation qu’il fait de la perception des couleurs sert comme un refus du solipsisme. En faisant appel au modèle topologique de l’Être qu’il propose, je conclurai en constatant que la nature problématique de la synesthésie et du daltonisme est ontologique et non pas psychologique.In una nota di lavoro al Visibile e l’invisibile, Merleau-Ponty propone di comprendere l’Essere a partire da uno spazio topologico – secondo le relazioni di prossimità, distanza e avvolgimento – e abbandona l’immagine di un Essere fondato su uno spazio omogeneo, inerte, euclideo. Facendo riferimento ai trattamenti per le percezioni sinestetiche, al daltonismo e al concetto di quale o qualia, si cercherà di provare questo passaggio da un Essere euclideo a uno topologico, illustrando quanto la scienza moderna tenda a ridurre il concetto stesso di colore a un modello euclideo di spazio-colore. Si esaminerà l’“Essere-oggetto” degli ultimi lavori di Merleau-Ponty, mostrando come il colore, e in realtà la percezione tout court, vengano ridotti a oggetto nella forma di “quale”. Infine, si esaminerà l’opera merleau-pontiana e la ricerca contemporanea al fine di illustrare quanto la sinestesia e il daltonismo siano resi anormali da questa oggettivazione dell’essere del colore. L’interpretazione merleau-pontiana della sinestesia deriva proprio dal suo rifiuto del quale, e il suo uso della percezione del colore funge da rifiuto del solipsismo. Ricorrendo al modello topologico di Essere elaborato da Merleau-Ponty, si conclude riconoscendo che il problema della sinestesia e del daltonismo è, a tutti gli effetti, ontologico e non psicologico. (shrink)

Mark Coeckelbergh argues that Romanticism and the Enlightenment philosophies are not that far apart when it comes to philosophy of technology.

Mark Edmundson explores and defends the value of ideals in contemporary culture, focusing on courage, contemplation and compassion. In his argument, he explicates the ideas of authors and thinkers such Homer, Plato, and the Christian and Eastern religious traditions. Shakespeare and Frued are seen as detractors of the Soul.

Recently, the group of McBride reported a stunning observation regarding peroxisome biogenesis: newly born peroxisomes are hybrids of mitochondrial and ER-derived pre-peroxisomes. What was stunning? Studies performed with the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae had convincingly shown that peroxisomes are ER-derived, without indications for mitochondrial involvement. However, the recent finding using fibroblasts dovetails nicely with a mechanism inferred to be driving the eukaryotic invention of peroxisomes: reduction of mitochondrial reactive oxygen species generation associated with fatty acid oxidation. This not only explains the (...) mitochondrial involvement, but also its apparent absence in yeast. The latest results allow a reconstruction of the evolution of the yeast's highly derived metabolism and its limitations as a model organism in this instance. As I review here, peroxisomes are eukaryotic inventions reflecting mutual host endosymbiont adaptations: this is predicted by symbiogenetic theory, which states that the defining eukaryotic characteristics evolved as a result of mutual adaptations of two merging prokaryotes. See also the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/HtyKhQ3DSxg Eukaryotic peroxisomes illustrate effects of symbiogenesis, following the non-phagocytotic merger of an archaeon and a bacterium. Internal ROS formation upon fatty acid oxidation was reduced by the invention of peroxisomes for extra-mitochondrial FA oxidation. Both peroxisomal membranes and their oldest enzymes seem ultimately derived from the pre-mitochondrion. (shrink)

As free‐living organisms, alpha‐proteobacteria produce reactive oxygen species (ROS) that diffuse into the surroundings; once constrained inside the archaeal ancestor of eukaryotes, however, ROS production presented evolutionary pressures – especially because the alpha‐proteobacterial symbiont made more ROS, from a variety of substrates. I previously proposed that ratios of electrons coming from FADH2 and NADH (F/N ratios) correlate with ROS production levels during respiration, glucose breakdown having a much lower F/N ratio than longer fatty acid (FA) breakdown. Evidently, higher endogenous ROS (...) formation did not hinder eukaryotic evolution, so how were its disadvantages mitigated? I propose that the resulting selection pressures favoured the evolution of a variety of eukaryotic ‘innovations’: peroxisomes for FA breakdown, carnitine shuttles, the linkage of beta‐oxidation to antioxidant properties, uncoupling proteins (UCPs) and using mitochondrial uncoupling during beta‐oxidation to reduce ROS. Recently observed relationships between peroxisomes and mitochondria further support the model. (shrink)