Standard models of adolescent risk taking posit that the cognitive abilities of adolescents and adults are equivalent, and that increases in risk taking that occur during adolescence are the result of socio emotional differences in impulsivity, sensation seeking, and lack of self-control. Fuzzy-trace theory incorporates these socio emotional differences. However, it predicts that there are also cognitive differences between adolescents and adults, specifically that there are developmental increases in gist-based intuition that reflects understanding. Gist understanding, as opposed to verbatim-based analysis, (...) generally has been hypothesized to have a protective effect on risk taking in adolescence. Gist understanding is also an essential element of informed consent regarding risks in medical decision- making. Evidence thus supports the argument that adolescents’ status as mature minors should be treated as an exception rather than a presumption, because accuracy in verbatim analysis is not mature gist understanding. Use of the exception should be accompanied by medical experts’ input on the bottom-line gist of risks involved in treatment. (shrink)

The selections contained in these volumes from the papers and letters of Leibniz are intended to serve the student in two ways: first, by providing a more adequate and balanced conception of the full range and penetration of Leibniz's creative intellectual powers; second, by inviting a fresher approach to his intellectual growth and a clearer perception of the internal strains in his thinking, through a chronological arrangement. Much confusion has arisen in the past through a neglect of the develop ment (...) of Leibniz's ideas, and Couturat's impressive plea, in his edition of the Opuscu/es et fragments (p. xii), for such an arrangement is valid even for incomplete editions. The beginning student will do well, however, to read the maturer writings of Parts II, III, and IV first, leaving Part I, from a period too largely neglected by Leibniz criticism, for a later study of the still obscure sources and motives of his thought. The Introduction aims primarily to provide cultural orientation and an exposition of the structure and the underlying assumptions of the philosophical system rather than a critical evaluation. I hope that together with the notes and the Index, it will provide those aids to the understanding which the originality of Leibniz's scientific, ethical, and metaphysical efforts deserve. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to examine exceptionalisms in ethics in general and in the fields of animal and technology ethics in particular. Design/methodology/approach This paper reviews five sample works in animal/technology ethics it considers representative for particularly popular forms of “exceptionalism”. Findings The shared feature of the exceptionalisms exhibited by the chosen samples appears to be born out of the cultural and biological history, which provides powerful intuitions regarding the on “specialness”. Research limitations/implications As this paper is mostly a critique (...) of existing approaches, it contains only a limited amount of counter-proposed alternative approaches. Practical implications This is a discussion worth having because arguments based on exceptionalism have more chance of resulting in significantly altered theoretical conclusions and practical suggestions for normative guidance than non-exceptionalist perspectives. Social implications The approaches critiqued in this paper have a significant effect on the way the authors approach animals, machines/technologies and each other. Originality/value The paper identifies intuitive notions of exceptionalism and argues in favour of a reformist, ethical expansionist stance, which views humanity as residing on the same plane of ethical significance as any other entity regardless of its material composition. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled out (...) by natural causes. With causes of actions being activated prepositional attitudes their rationality is analysed in terms of the coherence of prepositional attitudes. Principles of rational choice are not the basic ingredients of free i.e. rational action but have to conform to the prepositional attitudes of the human agent. (shrink)

Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled out (...) by natural causes. With causes of actions being activated prepositional attitudes their rationality is analysed in terms of the coherence of prepositional attitudes. Principles of rational choice are not the basic ingredients of free i.e. rational action but have to conform to the prepositional attitudes of the human agent. (shrink)

Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled out (...) by natural causes. With causes of actions being activated prepositional attitudes their rationality is analysed in terms of the coherence of prepositional attitudes. Principles of rational choice are not the basic ingredients of free i.e. rational action but have to conform to the prepositional attitudes of the human agent. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Vorwort.--Die texte: A. Aus der Stuttgarter gymnasialzeit. B. Aus der Tübingen studienzeit. C. Aus der Berner hauslehrerzeit. E. Aus der Jenenser dozentenzeit. F. Gedichte von 1790-1801.--Anmerkungen.

La vie historique est un complément essentiel aux recherches de Dilthey sur la fondation des sciences humaines. Il y développe une philosophie qui prend en compte tant la vie que l'histoire, l'individu que les communautés et structures dans lesquelles il s'intègre. L'articulation entre la vie, l'expression et la compréhension en constitue un élément essentiel qui l'inscrit au coeur de l'herméneutique. L'ouvrage apporte ainsi un complément essentiel aux recherches qui, en France, ont opposé de manière très radicale la pensée de la (...) structure et la connaissance de l'individu et de son inscription singulière dans le monde. (shrink)

Excerpt from Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der Philosophischen Wissenschaften Nebst Ihrer Literatur und Geschichte Nfcfl'oc bet %ilofopln'e an bet univafitdt an 269n mb sum: bet Ginil= 88(tbientloxcns. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in (...) the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungOhne Zweifel stehen Sprachen und Konventionen in engen Beziehungen zueinander; grosse Teile der Oberflächenstrukturen unserer natürlichen Sprachen hängen von Konventionen ab, und um aussersprachliches Verhalten durch Konventionen zu regeln, benötigt man eine gemeinsame Sprache. Zu fragen ist dann, ob eine reale oder idealisierte Gemeinschaft von Personen sich eine gemeinsame Sprache durch irgendeine Art von Konvention erstmals schaffen kann, ohne dabei bereits ausdrücklich oder stillschweigend eine gemeinsame Sprache zu benützen, die nicht weniger ausdrücksreich als die zu kreierende ist. Es wird gezeigt, (...) dass dies in unserer faktischen Welt nicht der Fall ist, und diese empirischen Gründe werden durch philosophische Argumente erhärtet, die sich auf Ergebnisse der Metalogik und der Wissenschaftstheorie beziehen, wonach eine Erstschaffung einer gemeinsamen Sprache ohne Voraussetzung einer mindestens genauso aus‐drucksreichen Sprache der Teilnehmer – vom logischen Gesichtspunkt aus gesehen unmöglich ist, d. h. in keiner möglichen Welt vorkommt.SummaryThere can be no doubt that languages and conventions are interrelated one to another; large parts of the surface structure of some given natural language depends on conventions, and some common language is necessary to create conventions with regard to non‐lingual behaviour. Then the question arises, whether or not some real or idealized community may create a common language via some kind of convention without using explicitely or implicitely some common language being at least as rich as the language to be created. It is pointed out that this does not hold in our factual world, and those empirical reasons are supported by philosophical arguments referring to results of metalogic and philosophy of science indicating that radical creation of some common language without using some common language being at least as rich as the other is impossible from a logical point of view, i. e. will never occur in any possible world.RésuméSans aucun doute, langues et conventions sont en relation étroite les unes avec les autres; pour une grande part, les structures superficielles de nos langues naturelles dépendent de conventions et, pour régler par conventions notre comportement non linguistique, il faut un langage commun. On peut ensuite se demander si une communauté réelle ou idéalisée peut se constituer, par quelque genre de convention, un langage commun sans pour cela utiliser, explicitement ou implicitement, un langage commun qui n'est pas moins riche en potentialités expressives que celui qu'il s'agit ?on;établir. On montre que cela ne se produit pas dans un monde factuel, et ces arguments empiriques sont confirmés par des arguments philosophiques se référant à des résultats de la métalogique et de la théorie de la science, selon lesquels la création originelle ?on;une langue commune est, du point de vue logique, impossible sans supposer chez les participants un langage au moins aussi riche. (shrink)

El problema ecológico no es nuevo, ha acompañado toda la historia reciente de la humanidad. Sin embargo, lo que es nuevo es el alcance que ha tenido desde la modernización tecnológica e industrial de los siglos XIX y XX y que, si los indicios y la información no son engañosos, amenaza con convertirse en un desastre para toda la humanidad en el siglo XXI. El informe de la ONU de la Conferencia sobre el Cambio Climático, del año 2007, y recientemente (...) el desastre nuclear de Fukushima aportan evidencias en esta dirección. ¿Cómo se llegó a esa problemática, cómo evolucionó el saber al respecto y cómo se deja justificar convincentemente la actuación humana y social? ¿Qué puede hacer un individuo para proyectar una vida más sostenible? ¿Qué es el Antropoceno? ¿Es posible construir una sociedad ecológica y solidaria? Estas y otras preguntas se abordan desde la reflexión filosófica en el presente artículo. (shrink)

There is plenty of evidence, e.g. in mathematics, in the sciences, and in economics, that rationality is paramount to all other cognitive powers. There is further evidence that intentions are borne and originate in the mind. We therefore might be inclined to conclude that rational intentions are brought about in the mind internally by the best of all cognitive powers. In this case it would be enough to analyse mental representations which are antecedent to decision making in order to find (...) the basic ingredients causing rational or irrational intentions. But there is neither evidence for representations of this sort nor for mental causes of rational intentions. It is true that intending is a mental state or act, but it would, indeed, be false to believe that intentions are produced or brought about internally, i.e., without reference to the external world. Some intentions seem to be irrational although their mental origin is not different from the origin of rational ones. I shall argue that this indifference of origin of rational and irrational intentions is due to the fact that intentions like all volitional attitudes - have external meanings. This implies that the criteria of rationality themselves are external to the mental activities of reasoning and intending. `External' here means that the contents of volitional attitudes are individuated by the objects they are directed to and not by the mental acts or performances of intending themselves. I shall further argue that the indifference of origin of rational and irrational intentions sheds light on the hybrid nature of rationality. For the sake of argument I shall use examples from the theory of choice. The gist of my argument is that intentional states enable us to choose mental acts, speech acts or non-verbal actions without reflecting alternatives beforehand. (shrink)

A metafisica traditional de Descartes, Kant e Moore tern a pretensão de possuir um conhecimento certo sobre o Eu e sobre o Mundo. Em Sobre a Certeza, Wittgenstein critica esta metafisica de forma radical, pois, segundo ele, a metafisica traditional confunde as "proposições gramaticais" com proposições metafisicas. Por esta razão o presente artigo concentra-se sobre a estrutura das "proposições gramaticais" e as suas diferenças em relação a orações com conteúdo proposicional e a pretensão de verdade. Na prossecução desta andlise o (...) artigo procura responder a questões como as seguintes: "Em que consiste a semantica pragática de Wittgenstein?" "Qual a relação entre "proposicoes gramaticais" e proposições empiricas?" e "Em que medida proposições gramaticais podem determinar uma visdo do mundo?". /// Traditional metaphysics by Descartes, Kant and Moore claims to have a certain knowledge of the I and of the world In Über Gewißheit Wittgenstein criticizes this metaphysics radically: traditional metaphysics misunderstands "grammatical sentences" as metaphysical sentences. This is why the following examination focuses on the structure of "grammatical sentences "and their differences to sentences with propositional contents and a claim to truth In this examination we will also have to answer questions like: "What does Wittgenstein's pragmatic semantics consist of?", "What is the relationship between ' grammatical sentences' and empirical sentences?" and "In which respect do ' grammatical sentences' determine a world view? ". (shrink)

A idéia da vida concerne um objeto tão concreto e, se se quiser, tão real, que ela parece ter ultrapassado o âmbito da lógica, tal como é comumente concebida. Certamente, se a lógica não contivesse nada além de formas de pensamento, vazias e mortas, então não poderia ela tratar de nenhum conteúdo tal como a idéia ou a vida. Se, porém, a verdade absoluta é objeto da lógica e a verdade como tal consiste essencialmente em conhecer, então o conhecer teria (...) que, pelo menos, ser tratado por ela. (shrink)

By the end of April 1923, Paul Tillich’s Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1981: The System of the Sciences according to Objects and Methods) was published by the German publishing house Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen. Based on numerous source documents from the publishers’ archives and particularly on the correspondence between the publishers Wilhelm and Gustav Ruprecht, hitherto unknown but now edited and commented on here, the present article explains that Tillich wrote his System of the Sciences (...) primarily for the publisher. It was Emanuel Hirsch who established the connection between them as the publishing house was looking for a new editor for their popular series Wege zur Philosophie (Ways to Philosophy), published since 1911. After Hirsch having brought Tillich into play, Wilhelm Ruprecht could convince the Berlin “Privatdozenten” to become the new editor of the series. As to the series, Tillich unfolded the concept of a comprehensive system design which covered 65 topics, i. e. forthcoming volumes. When the publisher then demanded that Tillich prove his abilities to write comprehensively in common language by providing a sample of a first issue of the series, he began to work on his System der Wissenschaften. Although this text contained all sorts of ideas and concepts, it was certainly not very well suited as an introduction to a series of popular accounts of the central themes and matters of philosophy. In the end, the System was published, although not as a volume of the series as having been announced by the publishing house in 1922, but as a text in its own right. (shrink)

By the end of April 1923, Paul Tillich’s Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1981: The System of the Sciences according to Objects and Methods) was published by the German publishing house Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen. Based on numerous source documents from the publishers’ archives and particularly on the correspondence between the publishers Wilhelm and Gustav Ruprecht, hitherto unknown but now edited and commented on here, the present article explains that Tillich wrote his System of the Sciences (...) primarily for the publisher. It was Emanuel Hirsch who established the connection between them as the publishing house was looking for a new editor for their popular series Wege zur Philosophie (Ways to Philosophy), published since 1911. After Hirsch having brought Tillich into play, Wilhelm Ruprecht could convince the Berlin “Privatdozenten” to become the new editor of the series. As to the series, Tillich unfolded the concept of a comprehensive system design which covered 65 topics, i. e. forthcoming volumes. When the publisher then demanded that Tillich prove his abilities to write comprehensively in common language by providing a sample of a first issue of the series, he began to work on his System der Wissenschaften. Although this text contained all sorts of ideas and concepts, it was certainly not very well suited as an introduction to a series of popular accounts of the central themes and matters of philosophy. In the end, the System was published, although not as a volume of the series as having been announced by the publishing house in 1922, but as a text in its own right. (shrink)

Beyond the world, i.e. beyond the collection of finite things, there is some one being who rules, not only as the soul is the ruler in me (or, to put it better, as the self is the ruler in my body), but also in a much higher way. For the one being who rules the universe doesn’t just •govern the world but also •builds or makes it. He is above the world and outside it, so to speak, and therefore he (...) is the ultimate reason for things. ·That follows because •he is the only extramundane thing, i.e. the only thing that exists out of the world; and •nothing in the world could be the ultimate reason for things. I now explain that second premise·. We can’t find in any individual thing, or even in the entire collection and series of things, a sufficient reason why they exist. Suppose that a book on the elements of geometry has always existed, each copy made from an earlier one, ·with no first copy·. We can.. (shrink)

We aim to compile some means for a rational reconstruction of a named part of the start-over of Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza's metaphysics in 'de deo' (which is 'pars prima' of the 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' ) in terms of 1st order model theory. In so far, as our approach will be judged successful, it may, besides providing some help in understanding Spinoza, also contribute to the discussion of some or other philosophical evergreen, e.g. 'ontological commitment'. For this text we (...) assume the reader familiar with 'de deo' as well as with some basic concepts and results of 1st order model theory. Before we start reconstruction, we will first revisit shortly the concept of 'attributum' (definitio IV) in it's setting in 'de deo' , next scan for formalizable aspects of 'in suo genere finita' ('de deo', definitio II), subsequently list the model theoretic constructs we will make use of. Then we begin reconstruction by stating "coordinative definitions" for the notions of 'attribute (of a substance)', 'modus (as conceived via an attribute)' and 'substance (as conceived via an attribute)', reasoning shortly for each of them. The "coordinative definitions", we will arrive at, must not be understood as literal translations of Spinoza's concepts - of course, there can't be such a thing as a literal translation - they are meant as formal analoga of these concepts, mapping some logical structure. But even with this caveat they may seem strange to the reader at this stage of discussion. Additional justification for them then should be found in our endeavour, to map some argumentation of Spinoza's proofs of some of his propositions from this starting point. -/- [ Version 1 of this paper originated from 2020-03-14. This is version 2 from 2021-09-12 with some readability amendments. ]. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Publicada em sete volumes entre 1710 e 1746, Miscellanea Berolinensia foi o principal jornal da Academia de Berlim, cuja fundação se deve ao próprio Leibniz em 1690, a dissolução da Societas ocorreu em 1744. A nova instituição, a Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres de Prusse, conseguiu a Societas, e a Miscellanea Berolinensia foi sucedida pelo Berlim histoire et mémoires em 1745/46.

Hegel et l'Orient vise a combler une lacune : dans les cours de Berlin consacres a la Philosophie de l'Histoire et a la Philosophie de la Religion, l'Orient occupe une place considerable, mais cette enorme masse de textes n'a guere jusqu'ici retenu l'attention des historiens de la philosophie. L'auteur s'efforce tout d'abord de reperer les motifs qui ont conduit Hegel a elever a la dignite de categorie philosophique le tres ancien mythe de l'Orient et de replacer cette reconstruction historico-speculative dans (...) le cadre general de sa doctrine. Pour ce faire, l'auteur examine, a travers les textes classiques (Phenomenologie de l'Esprit, Logique et Encyclopedie), mais aussi a travers les Ecrits de jeunesse, comment Hegel est conduit a accorder a l'Orient une place importante dans les premiers cours d'Esthetique et dans les Principes de la philosophie du droit, ainsi que la maniere dont le theme est repris et developpe dans La raison dans l'histoire et dans la Philosophie de la Religion. Il examine parallelement le contexte immediat de l'histoire des idees (redecouverte de l'Orient par l'Aufklarung et le Romantisme allemand) et les raisons de l'attitude, generalement polemique, de Hegel vis-a-vis de ces courants. Il s'interroge enfin sur la valeur et les limites de l'interpretation hegelienne. En annexe est presentee la Recension que Hegel fait de la Dissertation de W. von Humboldt sur la Bhagavad-Gita - publiee en 1827 dans les Jahrbucher fur wissenschaftliche Kritik, et jusqu'alors inedite en francais - qui fournit une illustration vivante de ces themes. (shrink)

Lying is typically more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Yet, recent cognitive models of lying propose that lying can be just as easy as truth telling, depending on contextual factors. In line with this idea, research has shown that the cognitive cost of deception decreases when people frequently respond deceptively, while it increases when people rarely respond deceptively (i.e., the truth proportion effect). In the present study, we investigated two possible underlying mechanisms of the truth proportion effect. In Experiment 1 (...) ( N = 121), we controlled for the impact of switch costs by keeping the number of switches between deceptive and truthful responses constant. We found that people who often responded deceptively made fewer errors when responding deceptively than people who only occasionally responded deceptively, replicating the truth proportion effect. Thus, while the truth proportion effect in earlier studies may be partially driven by the cost of switching between truthful and deceptive responses, we still found evidence for the truth proportion effect while controlling for switch costs. In Experiment 2 ( N = 68), we assessed whether the truth proportion effect is influenced by goal neglect. According to this view, the truth proportion effect should be reduced if participants are cued to maintain the task goals, while it should be larger when participants are allowed to neglect the task goals. In line with this hypothesis, we found a smaller truth proportion effect when participants were cued with the task goals compared to when they were not cued. This study shows that the truth proportion effect is influenced by goal neglect, implying that frequent deceptive responding strengthens the goal of responding deceptively. Our findings imply that the accuracy of lie detection tests could be increased by using a majority of truth-items (i.e., induce the truth proportion effect), and that the truth proportion effect should be maximized by (1) increasing the number of truth-lie task switches and (2) inducing goal neglect. (shrink)

_The first unabridged English translation of the correspondence between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Georg Ernst Stahl detailing their opposing philosophies_ The correspondence between the eighteenth-century mathematician and philosopher G. W. Leibniz and G. E. Stahl, a chemist and physician at the court of King Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia, known as the Leibniz-Stahl Controversy, is one of the most important intellectual contributions on theoretical issues concerning pre-biological thinking. Editors François Duchesneau and Justin E. H. Smith offer readers the first fully (...) annotated English translation of this fascinating exchange of philosophical views on divine action, the order of nature, causality and teleology, and the soul-body relationship. (shrink)

Rombach, H. Die Gegenwart der Philosophie.--Möller, J. Philosophie als Antihumanismus?--Schaeffler, R. Zum Verhältnis von transzendentaler und historischer Reflexion.--Balmer, H. P. Produktivität und Rezeptivität.--Marx, W. Das Bedürfnis der Philosophie.--Mader, J. Philosophie als Kritik.--Hommes, U. Sein und Sinn.--Sobrevilla, D. Ortega und der deutsche Idealismus.--Kohlenberger, H. Robert Musils philosophischer Anspruch.--Schwartländer, J. Die Menschenrechte und die Notwendigkeit einer praktischen Weltorientierung.--Heintel, E. Vom Sinn der Freundschaft.--Oeser, E. Die wissenschaftstheoretische Wende der Philosophie.--Simon, J. Zu einem philosophischen Begriff der Kausalität.--Schäfer, L. Der wissenschaftstheoretische Status synthetischer Urteile a (...) priori.--Lütterfelds, W. Das kategoriale Apriori des Erfahrungsfortschritts. (shrink)

O cristianismo introduzido no Brasil no século XVI, afirmando-se em oposição a religiões anteriores, evidenciou marcas de exclusivismo, intolerância, estigmatização. Com estas marcas o cristianismo buscou reduzir a si indígenas, cristãos novos e negros, negando-lhes em sua alteridade. No século XIX, com a introdução do protestantismo, e no século XX, com o aparecimento do pentecostalismo e neopentecostalismo podem-se verificar marcas semelhantes de exclusivismo e negação mútua no âmbito intra-cristão Uma análise da história das religiões no Brasil evidencia que as identidades (...) religiosas formam construídas na tensão dinâmica da negação mútua. Disso se poderá concluir que as religiões não construíram suas identidades no isolamento, mas nas relações, por vezes marcadas pela dinâmica de contrastes, diferenciações e estigmatizações mútuas. Isso se evidencia pelo estabelecimento de fronteiras, caracterizadas não raramente por discursos bipolares e maniqueístas, no intuito de produzir exclusões ao nominar o outro de infiel, ateu, herético. O resultado pode ser verificado no caráter anti-ecumênico destas religiões. Palavras-chave : Religiões. Identidades. Exclusivismo. EstigmatizaçãoThe Christianity which was introduced in the 16th century in Brazil affirmed itself in opposition to prior religions, showing traits of exclusiveness and intolerance. With these traits Christianity sought to denigrate the indigenous peoples, the new Christians and the Blacks by do not accepting them in their otherness. In the 19th century, with the introduction of Protestantism, and, in the 20th century, with the appearance of Pentecostalism and Neo-Pentecostalism, similar traits of mutual exclusiveness and negation can be verified in the intra-Christian realm. An analysis of the history of religions in Brazil shows that the religious identities were constructed through the dynamic of mutual negation. From this one can conclude that the identities of religions were not build in isolation but through the relations, sometimes marked by the dynamic of contrasts, differentiations and mutual stigmatizations. This is seen by the establishment of boundaries, which commonly are characterized by bipolar discourses, with the intent of producing exclusions by naming the other by unfaithful, atheist and heretical. The result can be verified by the anti-ecumenical characteristic of these religions. Keywords : Religions. Identities. Exclusiveness. Stigmatization. (shrink)

t. 1. Nauka logiki.--t. 3. Filosofii︠a︡ dukha.