My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the concept of knowledge so that they may (...) be seen to resonate positively with Williams's epistemological picture: the admixture of internalist and externalist features; the proto-contextualism; and, finally, the distinctively genealogical antisceptical impetus. In this way I aim to support and augment the socialized anti-sceptical case mounted by Williams, and so to show that expanding epistemology in the temporal dimension can be a productive move in central debates in epistemology. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (1) 2008: pp. 27-50. (shrink)

Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

La seule façon pour le Je de devenir singulier, c'est-à-dire de déployer la synthèse active des multiplicités qui le traversent, c'est la volonté de faire exister ce qui n'existe pas. Etre à la fois la terre et la mer et le navigateur, voilà le salut de l'âme qui s'étend, nous dit Deleuze. C'est cela la ligne de fêlure ascendante.

t. 1-2. Introdução à ciência do direito.

O texto apresenta alguns resultados de pesquisa de mestrado sobre educação quilombola e busca responder como a “escola” presentes na comunidade quilombola Tambaí-Açu, Mocajuba/PA, educam as crianças entre as reproduções ampliadas da vida e as reproduções ampliadas do capital. Trata-se de investigação qualitativa, como base no materialismo histórico-dialético, com dados obtidos a partir de entrevistas semiestruturadas, analisadas em articulação com revisão de literatura científica. Ao se fazer análise de conteúdo, compreendeu-se que, embora haja diversas formas de saberes nos chãos e (...) terreiros da comunidade, como a floresta, os rios, as/os “encantados”, as/os pretos/as velhos/as, os mutirões, o “Quilombauê”, os movimentos sociais como a Associação Remanescente de Quilombo Tambaí-Açu – ACREQTA e, ainda, leis e diretrizes que dão base à Educação Quilombola no Brasil, o que tem prevalecido é o sentido “urbanocêntrico” em termos de educação escolar que desconsidera o espaço rural, suas diversidades, suas formas de aprender a ser, embora contraditoriamente a escola venha buscando a isso se contrapor por meio da integração de suas experiências quilombolas nos processos formativos, a partir de seus modos de se formar-produzir pelo trabalho no mutirão. Palavras-chave: Experiências, Educação, Escolas, Infância Quilombola. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...) in combating epistemic injustice. My response to Goldberg principally concerns my perceptual account of the epistemology of testimony, which I defend as being both well-motivated and best categorized as a species of non-inferentialism. I also explain its relation to the reductionism/non-reductionism contrast, and defend my resistance to casting it as any kind of default view. In response to Hookway, I contrast discriminatory with distributive forms of epistemic injustice, and defend the basic taxonomy I present in the book, which casts testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as the two fundamental discriminatory forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...) lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. (shrink)

Vous éprouvez souvent l'embarras du choix? Que sera la liberté au XXIe siècle? Depuis l'invention des machines et des computeurs, notre quotidien semble avoir gagné du temps. Mais en contrepartie, il paraît de plus en plus codé, soumis aux automatismes. Depuis Leibniz jusqu'à la puce biométrique, l'auteur raconte une histoire alternative de l'ère informatique. Il démontre que le " numérisme ", le principe ordinateur, est une vertu humaine ancestrale et nécessaire. Mais insuffisante. Après le sauve-qui-peut du postmodernisme, un nouveau paradigme (...) est en train de naître, le " créalisme " : le monde est notre création commune incessante. L'horizon de notre liberté politique et existentielle, c'est la Terre comme oeuvre d'art. Construit comme une odyssée philosophique curieuse et empreinte d'humour, voici un traité de cocréativité pour une époque aux forces actives éclatées. Où l'on découvre que l'ordre et l'aventure ne sont pas incompatibles. (shrink)

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form (...) of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised. (shrink)

In this book, Frank Griffel presents the most comprehensive examination to date of the life and thought of this important figure.

Moral intensity theory is used to explain how characteristics of moral issues affect ethical decision-making. According to moral intensity theory, individuals and firms will make more ethical decisions when moral intensity is present, such as greater negative consequences, including harm to customers. However, evidence suggests this does not always happen in crisis situations. For example, Fisher Price waited until 30 babies died before recalling its Rock’n Play Sleeper in 2019. In this article, the concept of immoral entrenchment is introduced to (...) address how crises affect the expected firm responses to morally intense ethical issues. Immoral entrenchment suggests that firms experience threat-rigidity responses to crises that lead to collective moral disengagement. Immoral entrenchment results in firms’ denial of responsibility and unethical behavior, instead of ethical behavior, in the face of highly negative consequences. The study in this article tests immoral entrenchment in the context of the speed to recall 843 consumer products. Supplemental qualitative evidence illustrates the collective moral disengagement dimension of immoral entrenchment. Contributing to the literature on ethics and crisis, the findings demonstrate that crises can generate immoral entrenchment in firms, which reverses the expected ethical response of those firms to issues with high moral intensity. (shrink)

In this book, Frank Griffel presents the most comprehensive examination to date of the life and thought of this important figure.

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...) significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom. (shrink)

This note is a postscript to Ramsey's 'Truth and Probability'. It replaces that article's psychological reading of subjective probability with a reading of it as a consistency condition on the theory that we act to maximise expected utility.

How could ectogestative technology disrupt gender roles, parenting practices, and concepts such as ‘birth’, ‘body’, or ‘parent’? In this chapter, we situate this emerging technology in the context of the history of reproductive technologies and analyse the potential social and conceptual disruptions to which it could contribute. An ectogestative device, better known as ‘artificial womb’, enables the extra-uterine gestation of a human being, or mammal more generally. It is currently developed with the main goal of improving the survival chances of (...) extremely premature neonates. We argue that the intended use of the technology in neonatal intensive care units, as an alternative to current incubators (’partial-ectogestation’), challenges concepts such as ‘birth’, ‘fetus’, and ‘neonate’, and has several ethico-legal implications. We moreover address a more futuristic scenario where the entire embryological and fetal development could happen within an artificial womb (’full-ectogestation’). Such a scenario reveals the disruption of gender roles, parenting practices, and concepts such as ‘mother’, ‘father’, and ‘parent’. Both full- and partial-ectogestation would have implications for engineering and design, law-making, ethics, and philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

Famously Ryle imagined a visitor who has seen the colleges, departments, and libraries of a university but still wonders where the university is. The visitor fails to realize that the university consists of these organizational units. In this paper I ask what exactly the relation is between institutional entities such as universities and the entities they are composed of. I argue that the relation is constitution, and that it can be illuminated in terms of constitutive rules. The understanding of the (...) ontology of institutions that constitutive rules provide, however, is incomplete. In order to capture the practical significance of institutions, I introduce the notion of a status rule. Status rules concern the normative powers of institutions. The status account of institutions defended here is used to solve the problem of freestanding status terms: it turns out to be rather difficult to identify the entities of which statuses such as corporations and electronic money are composed. Unable to solve this problem, Searle concludes that they are created out of thin air. I criticize this claim and argue that these statuses are imposed on persons. (shrink)

The Edinburgh History of Distributed Cognition (Series Editor(s): Miranda Anderson, Douglas Cairns) -/- Questions the barriers between the humanities and the cognitive sciences. -/- Cognitive science is finding increasing evidence that cognition is distributed across brain, body and world. This series calls for a reappraisal of historical concepts of cognition in light of these findings. It engages with recent debates about the various strong or weak models of distributed cognition and brings them into discourse with research in the humanities. (...) Together, the books in this series give a wide-ranging examination of the parallels (and divergences) from these models in cultural, philosophical and scientific works, from antiquity to the mid-20th century. -/- Key Features: * Opens up our reading of Western European works in the fields of history of ideas, history of science, material culture and literary studies by bringing recent insights in cognitive science to bear on the distributed nature of cognition * Explores how sociocultural and environmental contexts lead to the manifestation of particular forms of cognitive paradigms or to their suppression * Traces the interconnections between and particular divergences across Western European history among the various concepts of distributed cognition -/- . (shrink)

There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This (...) paper explains how, by showing that the basic role each plays in moral-social life is the same; and that one is conceptually and therefore historically prior to the other. The result is pluralism, with each kind of forgiveness represented as distinctive in both its psychology and its normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration. (shrink)

How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take-home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are (...) not as far apart as is often thought. (shrink)

Historicism -- Time -- Interpretation -- Representation -- Reference -- Truth -- Meaning -- Presence -- Experience (I) -- Experience (II) -- Subjectivity -- Politics.

The letter and the neon -- Augustus Rex -- Sublimism -- The incalculable -- The halo -- The new grail -- The mint and the muses -- Neon in space.

v. 1. Introducção á sciencia do direito.--v. 2. Investigação scientifica e politica juridica.

Los estudios acerca de la Antigüedad, la Tardoantigüedad y el Medioevo que se ofrecen en este libro contemplan aspectos retóricos, filosóficos y culturales de tan dilatado período que se hallan atravesados por discursos y representaciones en torno a diversas instituciones y personalidades. Los trabajos reunidos en el volumen, lejos de pretender cerrar o encauzar una perspectiva de abordaje y un contenido específico, promueven la apertura de las reflexiones hacia distintas realizaciones o aportes, en el seno de las humanidades, que instalen (...) o, incluso, reinstalen los debates y las especulaciones investigativas.Dada la constelación de temas que surgen de título y subtítulo, la secuencia del libro es cronológica: inicialmente aparecen los capítulos que se ocupan de la Antigüedad grecorromana; a continuación, se ubican las colaboraciones dedicadas a manifestaciones tardoantiguas y medievales y, finalmente, cierra el recorrido un capítulo referido a una fuente filosófica del siglo XX que analiza las épocas que nos interesan. Sin embargo, el cúmulo de fuentes, temas, intereses y ópticas de interpretación puestos en juego permitirá al lector otras formas de agrupación de los capítulos, a la hora de asignar un sentido global al libro, que darán cuenta, sin duda, de una hermenéutica más compleja que la mera sucesión temporal de los textos y discursos a los que cada una de las secciones se aplica. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...) likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed. (shrink)