This is a collection of the key articles written by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, G.P. Baker, on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published posthumously. Following Baker’s death in 2002, the volume has been edited by collaborator and partner, Katherine Morris. Contains articles previously only available in other languages, and one previously unpublished paper. Completely distinct from the widely-known work Baker did with P.M.S. Hacker in the Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.

“Dünyadaki kötülüklerin varlığı, geleneksel teizmdeki Tanrı inancı için bir problem oluşturur mu?” 2000 yıldan fazla zamandır çok çeşitli geleneklerden gelen düşünürleri meşgul eden bu çetrefilli soruya bu kitap, en güncel tartışmalardan hareketle cevap vermeye çalışıyor. Kötülük probleminin tarihsel gelişimini, mantıksal ve delilci kötülük argümanlarını özetledikten sonra kitap, geleneksel ve modern teist çözüm önerilerini ele alıyor: Özgür iradenin varlığı veya manevi gelişim potansiyeli, kötülüklerin varlığını meşru hâle getirir mi? Etrafımızda gördüğümüz kötülüklerin gerekçesi konusunda şüpheci tavır takınıp Tanrı'nın hikmetinin, insanın kısıtlı zihni (...) tarafından sorgulanamayacağı sonucuna mı varmalıyız? Özel olarak İslami gelenek içinde kötülük problemini çözmemizi sağlayacak kaynaklar bulabilir miyiz? Kitap, tüm bu önerilerin yetersiz kaldığını iddia ederken karşı cevap olarak modern "kötü tanrı" argümanını ele alıyor. Buna ek olarak ilahi adaleti tehdit eden ilahi gizlilik ve benzeri argümanlar, kötülük problemini daha da çözümsüz hâle getiriyor. Kötülük probleminin çözümsüzlüğü, evrenin bizim acılarımıza ve isyanımıza kayıtsız olduğu ihtimali ise bizi daha üst düzey bir probleme, anlam problemine taşıyor. Anlam problemi, herkesin problemi olduğuna göre kötülük karşısında kimsenin rahat olmaması, anlamlı hayat konusunda herkesin kafa yormaya devam etmesi gerekiyor. (shrink)

Despite traditionally being characterised as a melancholy thinker with a propensity to dwell on existential anxiety, sin and despair, scholarly interest in the place of love in Søren Kierkegaard’s ethical thought is currently gaining significant traction. In particular, Kierkegaard’s Works of Love has increasingly come under the academic spotlight as a text with potentially rich and previously underappreciated insights for Christian ethics. This article aims to contribute to this ongoing illumination, by highlighting the moral psychology and theological anthropology of Kierkegaard’s (...) Christian lover in discourses II–V of Works of Love’s second series. In doing this, I aim to put forward an overarching ethical framework which can be seen to structure these moral deliberations. (shrink)

In ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Professor N. Malcolm took us to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein's arguments on the relationship between the concept of following a rule and the concept of community agreement on what counts as following a given rule. Not that we denied that there are any grammatical connections between these concepts. On the contrary, we emphasized that a rule and an act in accord with it make contact in language. Moreover we argued that agreement in judgments and (...) in definitions is indeed necessary for a shared language. But we denied that the concept of a language is so tightly interwoven with the concept of a community of speakers as to preclude its applicabilty to someone whose use of signs is not shared by others. Malcolm holds that ‘This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for “shared” language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language simpliciter.’ Though less striking, we believe that it has the merit of being a true thought. We shall once more try to show both that it is correct, and that it is a correct account of Wittgenstein's arguments. (shrink)

G. P. Meredith; XIII—Words as Instruments, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 241–260, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

G. P. Meredith; XIII—Words as Instruments, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 241–260, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

The dictum ‘“ought” implies “can”’ has a status in moral philosophy in some respects like that of ‘a good player needs good co-ordination’ in talk about ball-games. Clearly, you say something important but not conclusive about proficiency in playing a ball-game when you say that it requires good co-ordination: similarly, you say something important but not conclusive about obligation when you say that it implies a certain possibility or power or ability. Each dictum is a reminder: the one about such (...) courses of physical instruction, the other about such exhortations to duty, as are worth persevering with. It would be hopeless to keep on teaching a boy the moves and tricks of rugby football if he could never co-ordinate well enough to get his eye in, so to speak. Correspondingly, it would be meaningless to recommend that someone ought to do something the specification of which involved a contradiction, and pointless to suggest that he ought to do something which, for quite general reasons, was not, and was certain to remain not, within his power. So each dictum expresses a bluff, no-nonsense wisdom which we should count on before involving ourselves in certain more detailed commitments. But probably this is as far as the comparison between the two sayings can well be taken. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Tractatus and rules of logical syntax From logical syntax to philosophical grammar Rules and rule‐formulations Philosophy and grammar The scope of grammar Some morals.

Discussions of forgiveness within Christian theology have tended to focus on the conditions in which forgiveness may be a moral or divine imperative for believers. With regard to Søren Kierkegaard’s theological ethics, this article explicates a radical perspective. For the Kierkegaardian Christian lover, no definitive relational break with the other (however objectionable) can occur. As Kierkegaard emphasizes in Works of Love, in a discourse which bears this sentiment as its title, “love abides.” Indeed, I illustrate how in three consecutive discourses (...) in Works of Love—“VI: Love Abideth,” “VII: Mercy, a Work of Love,” and “VIII: The Victory of the Reconciliation in Love”—Kierkegaard’s ethical vision is grounded in Christian love’s immutability. For Kierkegaard, if Christian love is present, then forgiveness is redundant, and unforgiveness is impossible. (shrink)

At the end of the prayer with which he begins Works of Love (1847), Søren Kierkegaard notes that while ‘works of love’ might normally be viewed as a subset of worthwhile human endeavours or ‘works’, from heaven's perspective no work can be pleasing unless it is a work of love. From this arises the question—which Kierkegaard himself moves swiftly to address—of what distinguishes a work of ‘love’ from other, non-loving works? In this article, and with particular reference to Jacob Boehme (...) (1575–1624), I highlight how Kierkegaard's answer to this question draws upon the theological tradition that Bernard McGinn has called ‘the mysticism of the ground’. (shrink)