Pharmaceutical companies routinely engage physicians, particularly those with prestigious academic credentials, to deliver “educational” talks to groups of physicians in the community to help market the company's brand-name drugs.Although presented as educational, and even though they provide educational content, these events are intended to influence decisions about drug selection in ways that are not based on the suitability and effectiveness of the product, but on the prestige and persuasiveness of the speaker. A number of state legislatures and most academic medical (...) centers have attempted to restrict physician participation in pharmaceutical marketing activities, though most restrictions are not absolute and have proven difficult to enforce. This article reviews the literature on why Speakers' Bureaus have become a lightning rod for academic/industry conflicts of interest and examines the arguments of those who defend physician participation. It considers whether the restrictions on Speakers' Bureaus are consistent with principles of academic freedom and concludes with the legal and institutional efforts to manage industry speaking. (shrink)

Pharmaceutical companies routinely engage physicians, particularly those with prestigious academic credentials, to deliver educational talks to groups of physicians in the community to help market the company's brand-name drugs. These speakers receive substantial compensation to lecture at events sponsored by pharmaceutical companies, a practice that has garnered attention, controversy, and scrutiny in recent years from legislators, professional associations, researchers, and ethicists on the issue of whether it is appropriate for academic physicians to serve in a promotional role. These relationships have (...) become so contentious that three years ago the pharmaceutical industry trade association, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, adopted voluntary guidelines stating that drug companies should stop giving doctors free pens, calendars, sports bags, or tickets to entertainment events. Further, numerous medical associations, such as the Association of American Medical Colleges, the American Board of Internal Medicine and the Institute on Medicine as a Profession, and government bodies such as the Institute of Medicine have recommended that medical schools and teaching hospitals prohibit or strongly discourage faculty from participating in so-called industry Speakers Bureaus — promotional events designed solely to market pharmaceutical products. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has suggested that compassion can occur at the organizational level. The definition of “organizational compassion” is particularly problematic because organizations have multiple reasons for engaging in actions that then have effects on various stakeholders. A number of questions regarding organizational compassion thus merit theoretical attention: Are all organizations capable of demonstrating caring and compassion? What factors enable or constrain organizational compassion? In a move toward a more complete understanding of compassion at the organizational level, a continuum of organizational (...) compassion is developed, considering both positive and negative organizational deviance. As factors across multiple levels of analysis may influence where firms would fall on this compassion continuum, examples of enablers and constraints to organizational compassion are also considered. (shrink)

Building on the success and importance of three previous volumes, _Relational Psychoanalysis_ continues to expand and develop the relational turn. Under the keen editorship of Lewis Aron and Adrienne Harris, and comprised of the contributions of many of the leading voices in the relational world, _Volume 4_ carries on the legacy of this rich and diversified psychoanalytic approach by taking a fresh look at recent developments in relational theory. Included here are chapters on sexuality and gender, race and class, (...) identity and self, thirdness, the transitional subject, the body, and more. Thoughtful, capacious, and integrative, this new volume places the leading edge of relational thought close at hand, and pushes the boundaries of the relational turn that much closer to the horizon. Contributors: Neil Altman, Jessica Benjamin, Emanuel Berman, Jeanne Wolff Bernstein, Susan Coates, Ken Corbett, Muriel Dimen, Martin Stephen Frommer, Jill Gentile, Samuel Gerson, Virginia Goldner, Sue Grand, Hazel Ipp, Kimberlyn Leary, Jonathan Slavin, Malcolm Owen Slavin, Charles Spezzano, Ruth Stein, Melanie Suchet. (shrink)

In Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley speaks of the sensible qualities of an apple as being its parts. The paper argues that our words for sense-qualities play a role so unlike that of part-words that verbal atrocities would result from treating qualities as parts. Berkeley lends a surface plausibility to this move by focusing on a narrow selection of the normal linguistic accompaniment of the noun 'apple'. He puts out of mind the language of 'doing things with apples'— peeling, dicing, (...) and so on— which when recalled shows how strikingly far apart are the two categories he tries to mingle. (shrink)

Mr. Barker examines the efforts of Keynes, Reichenbach, Carnap, Williams, Popper, Kemeny and others in their search for the rationale of experimental inference. On what paradigm of reasoning does empirical knowledge depend? Some philosophers suppose it to be induction by enumeration, others induction by elimination, but Mr. Barker sees hope in a modified version of the hypothetico-deductive method. Our knowledge, he explains, forms a’ system ‘in which the fates of various bits are bound together. Philosophers are misled when they speak (...) as if we could confirm a hypothesis that stands alone. Instead, we ought to count one hypothesis better confirmed than its rival ‘if and only if there is some system including the former and the evidence which is somehow than any system including the latter and the evidence’. Here he brings in Kemeny’s ‘logical measure’ of simplicity, read in terms of the number of ways in which two systems of hypotheses can be true in an membered universe. Mr. Barker does not go into the application of this enormous Apparat, nor does he explain the sense of ‘system’ which is supposed to go with his examples of hypotheses, e.g., ‘There’s a cat behind the sofa’. (shrink)

Mr. Barker examines the efforts of Keynes, Reichenbach, Carnap, Williams, Popper, Kemeny and others in their search for the rationale of experimental inference. On what paradigm of reasoning does empirical knowledge depend? Some philosophers suppose it to be induction by enumeration, others induction by elimination, but Mr. Barker sees hope in a modified version of the hypothetico-deductive method. Our knowledge, he explains, forms a’ system ‘in which the fates of various bits are bound together. Philosophers are misled when they speak (...) as if we could confirm a hypothesis that stands alone. Instead, we ought to count one hypothesis better confirmed than its rival ‘if and only if there is some system including the former and the evidence which is somehow than any system including the latter and the evidence’. Here he brings in Kemeny’s ‘logical measure’ of simplicity, read in terms of the number of ways in which two systems of hypotheses can be true in an membered universe. Mr. Barker does not go into the application of this enormous Apparat, nor does he explain the sense of ‘system’ which is supposed to go with his examples of hypotheses, e.g., ‘There’s a cat behind the sofa’. (shrink)

Since its publication in 1922, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has changed the face of modern logic and, whether rightly or wrongly interpreted, lent its ideas to such typically 20th Century movements as Logical Atomism and Vienna Circle Positivism. Mr. Stenius turns back to the Tractatus with a deep though critical commitment to the view of language which it upholds. Its ‘picture’ theory of sentence-meaning, he feels, offers a key to many problems about how language functions. To get a notion of what (...) Mr. Stenius does in this book, it is helpful to keep in mind the problems Wittgenstein tried to meet. (shrink)

While recent studies have shed some light on the significance of the electrical activity of the nervous system, there has been no adequate explanation for the wave formation or synchronization of this electrical activity. Adrian sums up the problem. “The origin of the 10-a-second rhythm is still uncertain, though the evidence points to some widespread organization, probably involving the central masses as well as the cortex. There are abundant nervous connexions for coordinating the beat, and when the rhythm is well (...) developed it is possible to record impulse discharges in phase with it passing to and fro in the nerve fibers of the white matter below the cortex. But in some areas no impulse could be detected entering or leaving the cell layers, though the potential waves keep more or less in step with those elsewhere. There is no proof that the waves are kept in phase by some means which does not involve nervous signalling, for impulses in axons of small diameter might well be missed, but it is not altogether unlikely that the synchronization is due in part to a direct electrical influence of one group of nerve cells on another. Gerard and Libet have shown that synchronization can occur between the two halves of a frog's brain cut in two and then placed in contact, and more recently Arvanitaki has shown that individual nerve cells may influence one another if they are brought close together in a conducting medium. At all events there are many examples of synchronized rhythmic activity in large collections of nerve-or-muscle cells. In the optic ganglion of the water beetle, for instance, there may be both a slow rhythm when the eye is in darkness and a rapid one when the eye is exposed to a bright light. The change from a slow to a fast rhythm is curiously reminiscent of that in the cerebral cortex when a sensory stimulus abolishes the 10-a-second rhythm and substitutes one at 40–60 a second. Such resemblances in preparations of quite different structures may be quite fortuitous, but they make it difficult to resist the suggestion that the rhythms of the brain may be dependent on the general properties of cell masses rather than on any special anatomical arrangement of them. Whatever its origin, the 10-a-second rhythm of the cortex corresponds to the resting, drowsy, or inattentive state and there is no such uniform pulsation when the brain is alert.”. (shrink)

The task of understanding Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is more like that of understanding a difficult person than of grasping difficult ideas. It makes heavy demands upon the reader. He must first of all have the patience to stare at slight variations in language-uses until they look as marked as Wittgenstein wants them to look. Then he must be prepared for what looks like impassable break-offs in line of thought. Next, if he is a philosopher, he must listen to a great (...) many hard sayings about philosophy—some of them prepared for, others thrown in as crotchety asides. Through all this, he must also come to see that here is suggested a radically new way of looking at language. Without some grasp of this new way, he cannot hope to feel the main force of the work. Instead of trying to summarize the Investigations, therefore, I will try to draw together some of the principal ideas which seem to me to give sense and unity to its details. This will not amount to seeing the book as a whole. Also, I expect that the result will misrepresent some of those ideas, I hope not grievously. (shrink)

Much of the literature on the question “Is a human essentially distinct from every possible machine?” proceeds on the assumption that we know what a man essentially is, namely a living body with such attributes as consciousness, freedom, feeling and linguistic competence. Is a man essentially that? The paper contrasts that picture of man with Kierkegaard’s account of man as essentially self. Hard limits of machine subjectivity begin to appear in the failure of certain everyday concepts involving ‘self’ to engage (...) at all with the concept ‘machine’. (shrink)

Chrysippus claims that some propositions perish. including some true conditionals whose consequent is impossible and antecedent is possible, to which he appeals against Diodorus?s Master Argument. On the standard interpretation. perished propositions lack truth values. and these conditionals are true at the same time as their antecedents arc possible and consequents impossible. But perished propositions are false, and Chrysippus?s conditionals are true when their antecedent and consequent arc possible, and false when their antecedent is possible and consequent impossible. The claim (...) of the Master Argument that Chrysippus rejects, then, is stronger ihan usually supposed. (shrink)

Much of the literature on the question “Is a human essentially distinct from every possible machine?” proceeds on the assumption that we know what a man essentially is, namely a living body with such attributes as consciousness, freedom, feeling and linguistic competence. Is a man essentially that? The paper contrasts that picture of man with Kierkegaard’s account of man as essentially self. Hard limits of machine subjectivity begin to appear in the failure of certain everyday concepts involving ‘self’ to engage (...) at all with the concept ‘machine’. (shrink)

Since its publication in 1922, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has changed the face of modern logic and, whether rightly or wrongly interpreted, lent its ideas to such typically 20th Century movements as Logical Atomism and Vienna Circle Positivism. Mr. Stenius turns back to the Tractatus with a deep though critical commitment to the view of language which it upholds. Its ‘picture’ theory of sentence-meaning, he feels, offers a key to many problems about how language functions. To get a notion of what (...) Mr. Stenius does in this book, it is helpful to keep in mind the problems Wittgenstein tried to meet. (shrink)