The third century of the hegira represents an extremely important period in terms of the formation process of Islamic sciences and the acquirement of the identity of a systematic school of fiqh madhhabs. In terms of the Zaydiyya madhhab, this century has an identity that affects the next period in terms of both political and scientific studies. Because in this period, the scholars of the madhhab like Kāsim al-Rassî (d. 246/860), Ahmad b. Isā (d. 247/861) and Yahyā b. al-Husayn (d. (...) 298/911), who were in a leading position both in politics and in sciences such as kalām, hadith and fiqh, emerged. Kāsim al-Rassî, who was accepted as the star of the Ahl al-Bayt by Zaydî sources in the first period, was presented as the Plato of Muslims by orientalists in modern studies. The main reason why today's studies on him are mostly about the history of sects and theology, most of Rassî's works are about kalām. However, Kāsim al-Rassî is an important name in the science of fiqh and İslamic legal theory as well as in the science of kalām. According to Abī Tālib Nātik bi’l-Hakk (d. 424/1033), one of the important jurists of the Zaydiyya madhhab, Rassî was a scholar who came to the fore with his ability in fiqh issues; in order to see his ijtihād method, his skill in furû al-fiqh, his mastery in using hadiths and knowing the disagreements of scholars, ‘‘Masā’il al-Dja’far b. Muhammad and Abd Allah b. Hasan” should be consulted. Rassi's epistles named Kitab al-Nāsikh wa’l-Mansūkh, Kitab al-tahāra, Kitab al-salāt al-yevm ve al-Laylā and Kitab al-menāsik are important studies on fiqh that have survived to the present day. In addition, Mueyyed-Billah (d. 411/1021) compiled Kāsim al-Rassî’s and Yahya b. al-Husayn's views on fiqh in his work named al-Tecrîd. Kāsim al-Rassî's views on fiqh are also determinative in later fiqh books such as Tahrîr, al-Cāmi' al-Kāfi, al-Intisār and al-Azhar. In time, the emergence of a jurisprudence sect named Kāsimiyya in Zaydiyya, referring to his name, is also important in terms of revealing his position. Although Rassî's views on fiqh have been referred to a number of studies in our country, no independent study has been found that deals with his views on fiqh. However, considering both of his works on fiqh that have survived to the present day and the early works in which his views are compiled, it is obvious that Kāsim al-Rassî's views on fiqh deserve an independent works. The aim of this study is to reveal Ressî's position within the madhhabs and his perspective on fiqh in general. In this context, in the study, the period in which Ressî lived, his life and works were briefly mentioned, and then the basic views of the fiqh, especially in the field of worship, were discussed in outline. (shrink)

Filosofiske betragtninger over æstetik, kunst og litteratur.

Within the field of virtue and vice epistemology open-mindedness is usually considered an archetypal virtue. Nevertheless, there is ongoing disagreement over how exactly it should be defined. In this paper I propose a novel definition of open-mindedness as a process of impartial belief revision and use it to argue that we should shift our normative assessments away from the trait itself to the context in which it is exercised. My definition works by three sequential stages: not screening new claims, impartially (...) weighing the evidential strength of claims, and updating beliefs accordingly. Using this definition I argue for a focus on agents’ particular circumstances to determine what degrees of credulity, open-, or closed-mindedness are appropriate in any given situation. As well as providing conceptual clarity regarding the concept of open-mindedness this paper indicates the benefits of this contextual approach for our everyday epistemic attitudes. In particular it enables us to recognise, without stigma, when ourselves or others deviate from open-mindedness for appropriate reasons. (shrink)

Spoofing—placing orders on financial exchanges intending to withdraw them prior to execution—is widely legally prohibited. I argue instead on two main grounds that spoofing should be permitted and legalised. The first is that spoofing as a form of bluffing remains within the market practice of making legally binding offers—as opposed to lying or betraying trust—and primarily concerns the spoofer’s personal information. As a form of bluffing spoofing helps prevent financial speculators, in particular high-frequency algorithmic traders, from easily profiting by other (...) market actors reliably revealing their underlying preferences through their market activity. The second is that at the systemic level permitting spoofing would benefit non-speculative actors who place orders to hedge economic risk and whose activities provide the raison d’être for financial exchanges, differentiating them from simple forums for gambling. I also address potential concerns that legalised spoofing would drive speculators out of financial markets entirely and, therefore, undermine market liquidity. This work contributes to the wider debate in business ethics regarding bluffing by illustrating the acceptability of bluffs which do not betray counterparty trust or reliance on testimony by remaining within the framework of market practices. (shrink)

This article takes as its starting point the moral requirement to include persons with serious cognitive impairments in democratic decision‐making. That said, including such persons poses particular practical challenges to effective democratic participation. Nussbaum has set out the most extensive proposals for inclusion based on a model of guardianship, but we find they fall short due to not suitably respecting and facilitating the subjective decision‐making of impaired persons. Instead, we argue for a model of co‐constitution, whereby aides work within a (...) supported decision‐making paradigm to arrive at political choices in collaboration with impaired persons. To flesh out this model, we propose collaboration be based on three ideal types of interaction – expert, Socratic, and deliberative – designed to accommodate differing degrees and types of cognitive impairments. We further argue that the aide should have a relationship of detached professionalism with the impaired person and therefore should not be the person’s carer. Finally, we conclude that this separation be combined with transparent and regular invigilation of the aide’s decision‐making process to best safeguard the process from abuse or error. (shrink)

1. Odvažnost izricanja ; Figure otvorenih značenja -- 2. Činiti i biti ; Apokrifnost poetskog govora -- 3. Prizma i ogledalo -- 4. Filozofsko i umjetničko iskustvo -- 5. Filozofska i umjetnička kritika -- 6. Marksistička kultura mišljenja.

H. L. A Hart complained about the ambiguity of legal positivism, and proposed a definition that refers to particular explications of the concept of law, to certain theories of legal interpretation, to particular views on the moral problem of a duty to obey the law, and to a sceptical position with regard to the meta-ethical issue of the possibility of moral knowledge. It is said to be restricted to the Thesis of Separation — the contention that there is no necessary (...) connection between law and morals. In this chapter, the Separation Thesis is discussed even further, and has three shortcomings identified: first, that it has been vacillating between object-level contentions about moral qualities of the law; that the precise logical relation between both levels has never been properly accounted for; and that the question of necessary relations between morality and law hinges crucially on the presupposition that the very concept of law itself does not unravel into different sets of convenient stipulations from different epistemological angles, each of which renders the question of such necessary relations trivial. The Separation Thesis is also identified as having two versions: the Fallibility Law and the Neutrality Law. (shrink)

This paper presents an adaptive logic enhancement of conditional logics of normality that allows for defeasible applications of Modus Ponens to conditionals. In addition to the possibilities these logics already offer in terms of reasoning about conditionals, this way they are enriched by the ability to perform default inferencing. The idea is to apply Modus Ponens defeasibly to a conditional and a fact on the condition that it is ‘safe' to do so concerning the factual and conditional knowledge at hand. (...) It is for instance not safe if the given information describes exceptional circumstances: although birds usually fly, penguins are exceptional to this rule. The two adaptive standard strategies are shown to correspond to different intuitions, a skeptical and a credulous reasoning type, which manifest themselves in the handling of so-called floating conclusions. (shrink)

According to the received view the later Wittgenstein subscribed to the thesis that speaking a language requires being guided by rules (thesis RG). In this paper we question the received view. On its most intuitive reading, we argue, (RG) is very much at odds with central tenets of the later Wittgenstein. Giving up on this reading, however, threatens to deprive the notion of rule-following of any real substance. Consequently, the rule-following considerations cannot charitably be read as a deep and subtle (...) defense of (RG) against the threat of paradox, as proponents of the received view are wont to do. Instead, we argue, the rule-following considerations provide Wittgenstein's deep and subtle reasons for rejecting the very idea that speaking a language involves rule-guidance. Although Wittgenstein subscribed to (RG) during his middle period writings, his later remarks on rules, far from being a clarification and elaboration of his earlier views, are directed against the claim of the middle period that speaking a language is an essentially rule-guided activity. (shrink)

ḳunṭres 1. ʼOr ha-emunah --ḳunṭres 2. Śimḥah ṿe-hitḥazḳut, ha-derekh le-hatsalah li-nevukhim.

Donald Davidson denied convention any interesting role in the philosophical theory of meaning: Conventions are neither necessary nor sufficient to account for communication by language. This anticonventionalism is part of Davidson's more general individualism about meaning. According to Davidson, notions such as that of a shared language, shared practices of use, and the attendant notions of standard meaning and linguistic mistake, are as uninteresting to the philosophical theory of meaning as that of convention. The chapter starts with a sketch of (...) the meaning theoretical background for Davidson's anticonventionalism, arguing that Davidson ultimately motivates both anti‐conventionalism and individualism by the social or public nature of language. After quickly taking up Davidson's arguments against attempts to conventionally link semantics to nonsemantic purposes, the chapter then focuses on his attack on the idea that literal meaning is conventional meaning and the surrounding discussion. (shrink)

Donald Davidson famously held that only beliefs provide reasons for belief. Perceptual experiences, he held, are not even propositional attitudes, and thus doubly disqualified from being reason providers. John McDowell and others have tried to restore the intuitive reason-providing role of experience by suggesting that experiences do have contents. However, on McDowell’s account, experiences provide ‘reasons’ in a sense very different from the Davidsonian. In this paper, I argue that there is a better way of rescuing the reason-providing role of (...) experience: Construed as a (special) kind of belief, experience provides reasons for belief in precisely the Davidsonian sense. Moreover, the doxastic account of experience I suggest integrates naturally both with the Davidsonian picture of content determination and, consequently, with Davidsonian anti-skepticism. (shrink)

Lou Goble proposed powerful conditional deontic logics (CDPM) that are able to deal with deontic conflicts by means of restricting the inheritance principle. One of the central problems for dyadic deontic logics is to properly treat the restricted applicability of the principle “strengthening the antecedent”. In most cases it is desirable to derive from an obligation A under condition B, that A is also obliged under condition B and C. However, there are important counterexamples. Goble proposed a weakened rational monotonicity (...) principle to tackle this problem. This solution is suboptimal as it is for some examples counter-intuitive or even leads to explosion. The paper identifies also other problems of Goble’s systems. For instance, to make optimal use of the restricted inheritance principle, in many cases the user has to manually add certain statements to the premises. An adaptive logic framework based on CDPM is proposed which is able to tackle these problems. It allows for certain rules to be applied as much as possible. In this way counter-intuitive consequences as well as explosion can be prohibited and no user interference is required. Furthermore, for non-conflicting premise sets the adaptive logics are equivalent to Goble’s dyadic version of standard deontic logic. (shrink)

Den Bildbegriff verwendet die unterschätzte US-amerikanische Philosophin Susanne Langer argumentativ in allen drei Phasen ihres Denkens, ohne den Begriff bildtheoretisch zu fundieren. Versucht man nun diesen Bildbegriff vergleichend mit semiotischen oder phänomenologischen Bildtheorien zu diskutieren, so erlangt ihre Philosophie des Bildes nur dann die erforderliche Stringenz, wenn man die gegenwärtigen Bildtheorien einer grundlegenden Kritik unterzieht. Mit Langer erscheint u.a. Husserls Bildkonstitutionstheorie in einem neuen, aber ursprünglicheren Licht, wodurch sich eine komplementäre Bildtheorie abzeichnet, in der semiotische und phänomenologische Aspekte konstitutiv sind.

In this article, we present an argumentative approach to normative reasoning. Special attention is paid to deontic conflicts, contrary-to-duty and specificity cases, which are modelled by means of argumentative attacks. For this, we adopt a recently proposed framework for logical argumentation in which arguments are generated by a sequent calculus of a given base logic of Argument & Computation ), and use standard deontic logic as our base logic. Argumentative attacks are realized by elimination rules that allow to discharge specific (...) sequents. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by means of various well-known benchmark examples, and show that this approach is rich enough to capture a variety of paradigms for handling conflicting norms such as reasoning with maximally consistent sets, prioritized norms and deontic formalisms based on I/O logic. (shrink)

We translate unconstrained and constrained input/output logics as introduced by Makinson and van der Torre to modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has some additional benefits. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our framework naturally gives rise to useful variants and allows to express important notions that go beyond the expressive means of input/output logics, such as violations and sanctions.