90 nian dai, Du Weiming xian sheng de geng duo jing li zai yu kai zhan "wen hua Zhongguo" de lun yu."Wen hua Zhongguo" zhuo mo zui duo de shi ru jia de ren wen jing shen, yi jiu zheng jiang ru jia ru shi de jia zhi qu xiang he fan su ren wen zhu yi hun wei yi tan de yin xiang, tu xian ru jia yi mai xiang cheng de pi pan jing shen.

Chu tu wen xian yu ru dao guan xi " nei rong jian jie: ru dao guan xi shi yi xiang gui mo hong da de yan jiu ke ti, ta she ji daozheng ge Zhongguo si xiang shi de nei zai jie gou he fa zhan guo cheng, she ji dao Zhongguo wen hua jin hou de zou xiang, yi yi zhong da. Er shi shi ji yi hou, yi huo de le shu liang ke guan de yan jiu (...) cheng guo. Zui jin chu tu wen xian de da liang yong xian you wei zhe ge wen ti de tao lun ti gong le xu duo xin cai liao, xin shi ye, xin guian dian."Chu tu wen xian yu ru dao guan xi " shou ji le 30 duo pian you dai biao xing de lun wen, tong guo "Kong Lao Meng Zhuang zhi bian", "Ru dao hu bu yu ying xiang", "Chu tu wen xian xin shi ye" san ge ban kuai jia yi cheng xian, xi wang du zhe jie ci dui yi wang ru dao guan xi yan jiu de fa zhan mai luo yu kuang jia you zong ti de ba wo, bing you ci kai chu xin de yan jiu tian di. (shrink)

The problem of free will as it is know in Western philosophical traditions is hardly known in China. Considering how central the problem is in the West, this is a remarkable fact. We try to explain this, and we offer insights into discussions within Chinese traditions that we think are related, not historically but regarding the issues discussed. Thus we introduce four central Chinese concepts, namely: (1) xīn 心 (heart, heart-mind), (2) xìng 性 (human nature, characteristic tendencies, inborn capacity), (3) (...) mìng 命 (lifespan, fate, command, allotment, endowment), and (4) zìrán 自然 (self-so, so of itself, nature, spontaneity), and we indicate how these concepts and their discussions can be related to discussions on free will. (shrink)

Most of the essays collected here are essaysinmetaethics seeking in exacting and interesting ways to resolve problems raised by the familiar options in metaethics we outlined in our Introduction. Richard Brandt, for example, forcefully argues, going much against the at least modestly holistic grain of our time, for a foundationalism (noncognitivist though it be) which would be foundational in both metaethics and normative ethics. R.M. Hare makes a brief but systematic defense, which is both spirited and clear, of his prescriptivism (...) (a species of what we, following tradition, have called ‘noncognitivism,’ but which he argues should instead be called ‘nondescriptivism’). His arguments here for his position - call it nondescriptivism or noncognitivism- are directed forcefully against ethical naturalism (descriptivism) and specifically against the naturalism of Philippa Foot. Nicholas Sturgeon and David Copp contribute elaborate and rigorously argued defenses of ethical naturalism, or, as they might prefer to call it, ‘moral realism.’. (shrink)

It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured that the more encompassing Δ11-comprehension (...) schema would already be inconsistent. In the present paper, we show that this is not the case. (shrink)

Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. (...) First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions. (shrink)

1. Xin yi shu chuang zuo lun, Xin yi shu lun ji -- 2. Mian xiang sheng huo, Lun yi shu de ji qiao -- 3. Yi yi dang shi -- 4. Xi wen le jian -- 5. Ge er bu ge -- 6. Lun Feng jie -- 7. Kai xin yue shi -- 8. Bu dao ding dian, Shen mei de min gan -- 9. Zai zai tan suo -- 10. Liao ran yu xin -- 11. Shen mei tan (...) -- 12. Si zeng xiang shi, Yi shen er ren -- 13. Shen mei xin tai -- 14. Hui jian zi ji -- 15. Diao su diao su -- 16. "Fu huo" de fu huo -- 17. Dong fang ji bai -- 18. Shen yu wu you -- 19. Tu na ying hua -- 20. Qu yu wu xie -- 21. Shu xin, ti ci xuan -- 22. Duan jian can pian. (shrink)

Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. (...) First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for a historical-critical perspective on rationality. In our global age, we in the West need to come to terms with the fact that non-Western traditions have developed complex forms of practical rationality. I will first give an overview of what I call the “Confucian standards of reasoning.” Secondly, I will explain how the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi 朱熹 has rearticulated the earlier understanding of practical reasoning. Thirdly, I will demonstrate why a comparative perspective may enrich (...) our reasoned engagement with individuals in the Chinese-speaking world. In developing forms of global reasoning, we should make sure that these are neither parochial nor difference-blind. (shrink)

Until recently, most humanities scholars in North America and Europe lived in a world where China was notable for its absence. In the great debates of the 1990s and early 2000s on postmodernism, the end of history, the legacy of Marxism, and the future of liberalism, no Chinese contributions were heard, nor were they in the more recent debates on the relationship between Islam and the West, the post-secular age, genetic engineering, the digital age, or Speculative Realism. Only most recently, (...) with the changed geopolitical situation, are Chinese thinkers starting to receive more attention. In this context, Eric S. Nelson’s book Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 3 Seiten: 535-553.

EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND We are experiencing an unprecedented period where wide ranging and disruptive major global change is taking place around us. In this context, the theme of Mindful Leadership and Sustainable Development provides a point of reference and pathway for understanding the contemporary chaotic situations. These disruptive changes challenge our understanding and meaning of humanity and truly question whether or not, we are able to live in a society where justice, equality, peace, and prosperity abound. In the Buddhist light, (...) a focus is placed on understanding the Buddhist teachings to develop solutions for dealing with these wide-ranging problems. Both the scope of change and the response from a Buddhist approach are core to the content of this volume. It is of paramount importance that any investigation and development of solutions for the changes taking place, require guidance from the Buddhist philosophy. As a starting point for discussion, an initial focus is placed on providing a thorough and critical understanding of the character and context of change. In doing so, we also seek to clarify and outline the nature of a Buddhist approach. In completing this review, it is productive to see that given the complex issues being dealt with, the papers do generate different frameworks and viewpoints within the broad term of “approach.” The frameworks based on the Buddha´s teachings are not fully fixed and agreed upon by all. Therefore, our term “approach” refers to a set of arrangements and viewpoints that act to inspire further discussion and development. Given the above context, this volume is a collection of conference papers presented and published for the panel on the first sub-theme of UNDV 2019 on Mindful Leadership for Sustainable Peace on 13 May 2019 at the Tam Chuc International Convention Center, Ha Nam, Vietnam. The panel commemorates the occasion of the 16th United Nations Day of Vesak Celebrations 2019. Through the contributions of participants and their papers at this workshop, this volume provides a diverse and rich range of thinking and wisdom rather than more traditional mainstream thinking or conventional wisdom. Treating the Buddha’s teachings as a basic theoretical reconstruction, we examine the relationships between societies and Buddhism. We combine the analyses of the conflicts, trends and dynamics affecting future global development with focused studies on a range of policy areas for improving societies. In the Buddhist light, our two most crucial aims in this period of disruption are to greatly increase the influence and impact of Buddhism as our foremost duty; and that the Buddhist responsibility contributes to creating a new foundation for Mindful Leadership and Sustainable Development. (shrink)

This book deals with the thorny issue of human rights in different cultures and religions, especially in the light of bioethical issues. In this book, experts from Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Daoism, Hinduism and Confucianism discuss the tension between their religious traditions and the claim of universality of human rights. The East-West contrast is particularly evident with regards to human rights. Some writers find the human rights language too individualistic and it is foreign to major religions where the self does (...) not exist in isolation, but is normally immersed in a web of relations and duties towards family, friends, religion community, and society. Is the human rights discourse a predominantly Western liberal ideal, which in bioethics is translated to mean autonomy and free choice? In today's democratic societies, laws have been drafted to protect individuals and communities against slavery, discrimination, torture or genocide. Yet, it appears unclear at what moment universal rights supersede respect for cultural diversity and pluralism. This collection of articles demonstrates a rich spectrum of positions among different religions, as they confront the ever more pressing issues of bioethics and human rights in the modern world. This book is intended for those interested in the contemporary debates on religious ethics, human rights, bioethics, cultural diversity and multiculturalism. (shrink)

When people interact with social robots, they treat them as real social agents. How people depict robots is fun to consider, but when people are confronted with embodied entities that move and talk – whether humans or robots – they interact with them as authentic social agents with minds, and not as mere representations.

I examine Alasdair MacIntyre’s grounds for setting aside Marxism. I find them wanting. I argue that his criticisms are either unsound or fail to consider plausible alternative readings of Marxism which would elude what, on the reading MacIntyre gives, are sound criticisms. I consider MacIntyre’s remarks about Marx’s predictions, his remarks about the moral failures of Marxism and its alleged theoretical impoverishment in considering questions of value.

Conceptual relativism is characterized and elucitated in such a way that its force can be appreciated. It is argued that the usual attempts to dismiss it as a conceptual confusion fail. Then two attempts to articulate a conception of rationality adequate to show how conceptual relativism rests on a mistake are examined and shown to be at the best only partially successful. The upshot is, that, counter-intuitive as it is, the problem of conceptual relativism is still very much with us.

Conservative criticisms of egalitarianism are examined. Entitlement and desert based accounts of justice are assessed. Nisbet's, Nozick's and Flew's accounts, as paradigms of conservative views, are criticized and liberal egalitarian and radical egalitarian accounts of justice, in their responses to conservatism, are contrasted and a defense is provided for radical egalitarianism. A secure place for entitlements is found within an egalitarian frame work. Liberty and equality are shown to be so reciprocally related that one cannot flourish without the other and (...) socialism and egalitarianism are shown not to be enemies of liberty. Personal property remains intact under socialism but private productive property does not. But the non-existence of the latter is perfectly compatible with the existence of the full range of basic liberties. Following a coherentist methodology respect for entitlements, for liberty and a commitment to equality are shown to be in reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

The objectivity of morality is achieved by the coherentist method of appealing to considered convictions in wide reflective equilibrium. This method yields a conception of morality that is at once universalistic and particularistic. It follows that morality must be cosmopolitan, but also accept a liberal nationalism, at least under certain circumstances. This paper concludes by applying these ideas to the issues of Quebec nationalism and the status of African-Americans in the United States.

I explicate and argue for a way of looking at life, and responding to it, that is uncompromisingly secularist. It is an atheism and a social naturalism: a distinctive form of naturalism that I argue answers better than religious orientations or “scientific” forms of naturalism to both our cognitive interests and to our moral and political and other affective interests. It is a thoroughly anti-metaphysical naturalism rejecting metaphysical realism and physicalism without taking an antirealistor dualist turn. How it is a (...) social naturalism is explained and defended as well as the senses in which it is non-scientistic, historicist, and contextualist. It will alsoseek to make clear what really grips some religiously sensitive people, even people fully attuned to modernity, about religion and then to show how we can live full well and even flourishingly without religion. However, I do not only argue that we can so live, but that we should so live. We should be secularists all the way down. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analizuojama fenomenologinë intersubjektyuvumo samprata Husserlio Karteziðkosiose meditacijose. Jose autorius tyrinëja ne konkreèias socialumo formas ar personalinio santykio að – tu subtilybes, bet atvirumo kitam prielaidas. Dëmesys sutelkiamas á konstitutyvinæ kito prasmës genezæ. Husserlis ásigilina á savasties patirtá parodydamas jos parodoksalø susvetimëjimà su savimi. Tiek savo kûno,tiek savo laiko patirtis atskleidþiama kaip reikalaujanti kitybës. Tiksliau sakant, tokia kûno ir laikopatirtis negalima kaip tapatybë su savimi. Tik patirdamas savo kûnà kaip tarpkûniðkumà, galiu atsikratyti vidujybës ir iðorybës, imanencijos ir transcendencijos prietaro. Kitybës (...) dalyvavimà esamybëjeHusserlis apraðo aprezentacijos arba implikacijos terminais, o „poravimasis“ yra svarbiausias tarpkû-niðkos jungties su kitu apibûdinimas. Kito prasmës kilmæ paaiðkina ne metafiziðkai postuluota transcendencija, bet susiporavimo su kitu patirties apraðymas.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: fenomenologija, intersubjektyvumas, kitas, gyvenamas kûnas, tarpkûniðkumas, implikacija, poravimasis. (shrink)

I thought the paper by Kai-yee Wong and Chris Fraser was fascinating and insightful. Two things I especially appreciated are the clarity with which they summarize my views. I think they are quite fair and accurate. Second, I appreciate their suggestion that the way to deal with the practical problem of weakness of will has much to do with the role of the Background in shaping our actions. I think they are especially on the right track when they say that (...) the improvement of Background skills may actually narrow the range of real options for action, (p. 21) nonetheless, they do not decrease freedom. As they say, “It is a process of strengthening the self, and the agent is likely to experience the concomitant restriction of ‘live’ options not as a limitation but as strength of character.” (p. 21). That seems to me very much on the right track. What they are suggesting, and it is a powerful addition to my own writings, is that we should not just think of the Background as facilitating languages, games and social practices generally, but for morality as well (p. 23). (shrink)