Kunsthandelaar Karl Stimm schenkt op een verfrissende manier aandacht aan beschouwingen over Archeologica & Oude kunst. Hij benoemt onder andere de bedreigingen van het cultureel erfgoed, het belang van metaaldetectoramateurs en de moeilijke tijden die zijn aangebroken voor verzamelaars. Met dit boek wil de auteur bruggen bouwen tussen wetenschappers, musea, verzamelaars en handelaren, erfgoedcommissies en de autoriteiten. Slaagt Stimm erin het onmogelijke te verwezenlijken? De vereenzelviging van object en mens."--Publisher information.

Jaspers sieht die moderne Gesellschaft in einem Widerstreit. Sie errichtet sich als Massenordnung zur technischen Daseinsfürsorge einer Vielzahl von Menschen und zerstört damit gleichzeitig jene Welt von Schicksal und Autorität, Vertrautheit, Nähe und Entscheidung, in der eigentliche menschliche Existenz allein möglich ist. Nivellierung und Funktionalisierung des Menschen sind der Preis der Moderne. Politisch sorgt sich Jaspers um das Ausbleiben echten Führertums, von dem allein Reformen des zum Erstarren neigenden Apparats der Daseinsfürsorge zu erwarten sind. Die politischen Bewegungen des Faschismus und (...) des Bolschewismus deutet Jaspers nur am Rande als gefährliche Auswege des Menschen aus der allgegenwärtigen Krise in die Leichtigkeit des Gehorchenkönnens. Zwar schenkt er aktuellen politischen Strömungen und Strukturen nur geringe Aufmerksamkeit, aber die geistige Haltung und persönliche Verantwortlichkeit des Einzelnen implizieren den Abscheu gegen den sich ankündigenden politischen Wahnsinn in Deutschland. Der Staat gilt ihm als Phänomen der Macht. Nachdenklich blickt Jaspers auch auf die Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Für ihre unbestreitbaren Erfolge zahlt der Mensch mit der Verdinglichung seiner selbst. Er wird sich zum Objekt. (shrink)

I. Altertum und Mittelalter--II. Die Philosophie der Neuzeit bis Kant--III. Die Philosophie des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts.

[A]ny theory of practical rationality must explain— or explain away—the following: Rational: In many cases, what it is rational (in some sense) for one to do or intend to do depends on what one desires. [...] I argue that in order to capture the rational significance of desire, we need to consider both its content and its force, on analogy to the rational significance of both the force and content of beliefs and perceptual experiences. This will open up a new (...) and more elegant way of explaining Rational, while also allowing us to understand how our desires provide us with a basic form of normative experience. Thus, in the end, this will provide the basis for a novel defense of the ancient thesis that desire, in some sense, presents its object under the “guise of the good.”. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik. Bd. 2. Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft.

Every theory of modernity must at least presuppose an implicit ontology of the social-historical. Castoriadis is one of the few who makes these presuppositions explicit. Castoriadis’s socio-cultural ontology reveals that the essentially indeterminate nature of the social-historical entails ontological plurality, in the face of which monological or unilinear theories of modernity collapse — leaving us with a fragmented field of tensions. Castoriadis’s exposition of the ontological plurality of the social-historical is one of his most important contributions to social theory — (...) but when he turns his attention to modernity, he immediately polarizes the field. The aim here is to offer some correctives to Castoriadis’s polarized depiction, primarily by teasing out tensions in his work. (shrink)

This book is an anthology of some of the most influential research on basic income in the period of roughly 1960-2010.

This article argues that, under likely empirical conditions, sufficientarianism leads not to an easily achievable duty to maintain a social minimum but to the onerous duty of maintaining a social maximum at the sufficiency level. This happens because sufficientarians ask us to give no weight at all to small benefits for people above the sufficiency level if the alternative is to relieve the suffering of people below it. If we apply this judgment in a world where there are rare diseases (...) and hard-to-prevent accidents that cause people to fall below the sufficiency threshold, all of our discretionary spending will have to be devoted to bringing harder and harder cases up to sufficiency. Nothing will be left for anyone to consume above the sufficiency level. (shrink)

An autobiographic instinct may be as old as Man Writing; but only since 1800 has Western Man placed a premium on autobiography. A bibliography of all autobiographic writing prior to that time would be a small fascicule; a bibliography since 1800 a thick tome. The ground behind this simpleminded assertion of a quantitative measure cannot be explained away by easy reference to the mass literacy of the modern world or the greater ease of publishing. It is as much a fact (...) of cultural conditions as is the significant relation of rhetoric to the intense public mindedness of classical men, the relative insignificance of tragedy in a thoroughly Christianized world view, the disappearance of epic from a nonaristocratic world, or the powerful assertion of the novel in an age of burghers. The usage of the term "autobiography" itself is suggestive, although this mode of historical explanation is always defective in the sense that such older terms as "hypomnemata," "commentarii," "vita," "confessions," or "memoirs" may well have covered the functions subsequently encapsulated in a newly fashionable term. In German the term makes its appearance shortly before 1800; the Oxford English Dictionary attributes first English usage to Southey in an article on Portuguese literature from the year 1809. Karl J. Weintraub, Thomas E. Donnelley Professor of History and dean of the Division of the Humanities at the University of Chicago, is the author of Visions of Culture and numerous articles. His introduction to a new edition of Goethe's Autobiography will prove of special interest to our readers. (shrink)

Der Band bietet einen Überblick über eine der fruchtbarsten Teildisziplinen der Film- und Medienwissenschaft. Nach einer Einführung in film- und kinoanthropologische Perspektiven der frühen Filmtheorie stellt der Band – etwa mit Morins Beschreibung des Kinos als ‚Muttermaschine’ oder Powdermakers Hollywood-Studie als Fabrik zur Herstellung ‚geistloser Zombies’ – einige Positionen der klassischen Kinoanthropologie vor. Die Einflüsse der philosophischen Anthropologie werden mit Bubers Wahrnehmungsmodell als ‚zuverlässige Kinematographie’ ebenso diskutiert wie mit Husserls Besuch eines Wachsfigurenkabinetts.

On top of the puzzles mentioned by Colman comes the puzzle of why rationality has bewitched classical game theory for so long. Not the smallest merit of evolutionary game theory is that it views rationality as a limiting case, at best. But some problems only become more pressing.

Nonmonotonic logics were created as an abstraction of some types of common sense reasoning, analogous to the way classical logic serves to formalize ideal reasoning about mathematical objects. These logics are nonmonotonic in the sense that enlarging the set of axioms does not necessarily imply an enlargement of the set of formulas deducible from these axioms. Such situations arise naturally, for example, in the use of information of different degrees of reliability. This book emphasizes basic concepts by outlining connections between (...) different formalisms of nonmonotonic logic, and gives a coherent presentation of recent research results and reasoning techniques. It provides a self-contained state-of-the-art survey of the area addressing researchers in AI lo. (shrink)

On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind (...) associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume's discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume's thought and contemporary philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Many libertarians make a moral argument that liberty requires the freedom to exercise strong property rights. From this, they argue that no more than a minimal state with sharply limited powers of taxation can be justified. A larger state would supposedly interfere with private property rights and thereby reduce liberty. In response, this article shows how natural rights to property do not entail any particular vision of the state. It demonstrates that the principles of natural property rights support monarchy just (...) as well as they support a capitalist aristocracy. Nothing in the theory of natural property rights rules out government ownership of property or government ownership of the right to tax. Therefore, the natural rights argument does not necessarily imply libertarian limits on the state, but rather the acceptance of whatever state powers and property rights have been in place for a sufficient amount of time. For example, historical property rights in Britain do not imply that private titleholders possess rights that have been subject to interference from the state, as libertarians claim. Instead, they imply that the Queen and her ministers in parliament have a strong claim to at least partial ownership of the whole island of Britain and the property within it. If this argument holds, it poses a serious dilemma for libertarians, forcing them to choose between their account of liberty as the exercise of property rights and their belief that only a minimal state is justifiable. Key Words: libertarianism • ownership • property rights • taxation • distribution • redistribution. (shrink)

This paper argues that a guaranteed income is not only consistent with the principle of reciprocity but is required for reciprocity. This conclusion follows from a three-part argument. First, if a guaranteed income is in place, all individuals have the same opportunity to live without working. Therefore, those who choose not to work do not take advantage of a privilege that is unavailable to everyone else. Second, in the absence of an unconditional income, society is, in effect, applying the principle, (...) “(S)he who does not work, will not eat.” If the application of this principle is to be consistent with reciprocity, it must be applied to everyone. Most modern industrial societies exempt many citizens from that choice. For example, the owners of external assets do not face the work-or-starve choice and do take advantage of a privilege that is not available to others. An unconditional guaranteed income is one way to eliminate that violation of reciprocity. Third, this paper addresses the criticism that the guaranteed income exploits middle-class workers by demonstrating that a basic income will have a positive effect on wages, which will at least partially counteract the effect of the taxes needed to pay for it. (shrink)

The explanation versus understanding debate was important to the philosophy of thesocial sciences from the time of Dilthey and Weber through the work of Popper and Hempel.