Konstantin Pollok offers the first book-length analysis of Kant's theory of normativity that covers foundational issues in theoretical and practical philosophy as well as aesthetics. Interpreting Kant's 'critical turn' as a normative turn, he argues that Kant's theory of normativity is both original and radical: it departs from the perfectionist ideal of early modern rationalism, and arrives at an unprecedented framework of synthetic a priori principles that determine the validity of our judgments. Pollok examines the hylomorphism in Kant's (...) theory of normativity and relates Kant's idea of our reason's self-legislation to the 'natural right' tradition, revealing Kant's debt to his predecessors as well as his relevance to contemporary debates on normativity. This book will appeal to academic researchers and advanced students of Kant, early modern philosophy and intellectual history. (shrink)

In den Kant-Forschungen werden sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierte Arbeiten zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants veröffentlicht. Die Bände stellen Funde unbekannter oder verschollen geglaubter Kantischer Autographen und Vorlesungsskripte vor und erörtern Editionsprobleme der Kantischen Vorlesungen und Werke. Sie enthalten darüber hinaus Studien zu Kants Umfeld und zur Kant-Rezeption im 18. Jahrhundert sowie systematisch angelegte Arbeiten zu Architektonik und System der Philosophie Kants.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 3 Seiten: 492-498.

Konstantin Pollok - Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 559-575 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion Konstantin Pollok There are two significant places in Kant's Critical corpus where he discusses the concept of motion. The first is in the Critique of Pure Reason, where in the "Deduction of the Categories" Kant writes: Motion, as an act of the subject , (...) and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, first produces the concept of succession—if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act through which we determine the inner sense according to its form. In this passage Kant simply refers to the concept of motion, and the immediate context in which this reference occurs reveals little about what he means by it. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, motion plays a more significant role, and, concomitantly, it is in his writings on natural science that Kant most fully expresses his thoughts on the subject. For present purposes, the most relevant passage is paragraph 15 of the Preface of the Metaphysical Foundations, where Kant says that the concept of matter had … to be carried through all four of the indicated functions of the concepts of the understanding , where in each a new determination of this concept was added. The.. (shrink)

By taking into account some texts published between the first and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that have been neglected by most of those who have dealt with the deduction of the categories, I argue that the core of the deduction is to be identified as the ‘almost single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general’, which Kant adumbrates in the Metaphysical Foundations in order to ‘make up for the deficiency’ of the (...) A-deduction. Whereas the first step of the B-deduction is an attempt to show that the manifold of an intuition belongs to the ‘necessary unity of self-consciousness’ by means of the synthesis of the understanding, the second step has the task of showing that the very same synthesis is responsible for the spatio-temporal unity of the manifold. Thus, Kant's ‘answer to Hume’ is that no spatio-temporal objects of experience at all are merely ‘given’, independently of the conceptual activities of the understanding. Against the established view I substantiate the claim that with this ‘almost single inference’ of the second proof step the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience consequently vanished from Kant's thinking. (shrink)

IMMANUEL KANT GRADUATED IN 1755 from the University of Königsberg on the basis of the dissertation On Fire and with the essay A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysics written specifically for the occasion; he took up a position as lecturer in the same year. In 1756 he wrote a third Latin essay, the Physical Monadology, and applied for a professorship at the Albertina in Königsberg. The application was unsuccessful and, more significantly, the work failed to attract the (...) attention Kant had hoped. He had to wait until 1770—some fourteen years later—for an appointment as full professor in Königsberg, and it was not until the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 that he finally established his reputation as a philosopher. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 105 Heft: 4 Seiten: 509-530.

Explores imagination and human rationality in a crucial period of philosophy, from hermeneutics and transcendental logic to ethics and aesthetics.

Explores imagination and human rationality in a crucial period of philosophy, from hermeneutics and transcendental logic to ethics and aesthetics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 (2006) 559-575 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Kant's Critical Concepts of MotionKonstantin PollokThere are two significant places in Kant's Critical corpus where he discusses the concept of motion. The first is in the Critique of Pure Reason, where in the "Deduction of the Categories" Kant writes:Motion, as an act of the subject (not as a determination of an object†), and therefore the synthesis (...) of the manifold in space, first produces the concept of succession—if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act through which we determine the inner sense according to its form.In this passage Kant simply refers to the concept of motion, and the immediate context in which this reference occurs reveals little about what he means by it. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, motion plays a more significant role, and, concomitantly, it is in his writings on natural science that Kant most fully expresses his thoughts on the subject. For present purposes, the most relevant passage is paragraph 15 of the Preface of the Metaphysical Foundations, where Kant says that theconcept of matter had … to be carried through all four of the indicated functions of the concepts of the understanding (in four chapters), where in each a new determination of this concept was added. The basic determination of something that is [End Page 559] to be an object of the outer senses had to be motion, because only thereby can these senses be affected. The understanding traces back all other predicates of matter belonging to its nature to this, and natural science, therefore, is either a pure or applied doctrine of motion. The metaphysical foundations of natural science are therefore to be brought under four chapters. The first considers motion as a pure quantum in accordance with its composition, without any quality of the movable, and may be called phoronomy. The second takes into consideration motion as belonging to the quality of matter, under the name of an original moving force, and is therefore called dynamics. The third considers matter with this quality as in relation to another through its own inherent motion, and therefore appears under the name of mechanics. The fourth chapter, however, determines matter's motion or rest merely in relation to the mode of representation or modality, and thus as appearance of the outer senses, and is called phenomenology. 2The first passage from the first Critique (quoted above) reveals both that the concept of motion plays a central role in Kant's epistemology and that he distinguishes clearly between motion of the object, on the one hand, and action of the subject, on the other. The two concepts of motion are quite different—the former belonging to transcendental philosophy and geometry (to "pure science" in the Kantian sense), the latter to the metaphysical and empirical investigation of nature. By contrast, the second passage from the Metaphysical Foundations shows that the conceptual apparatus Kant developed in his transcendental philosophy is also relevant for understanding the empirical concept of motion. Since all empirical concepts are based on transcendental conditions for their possibility, this connection between elements of the Critical philosophy should come as no surprise. What remains unclear, however, is the sort of connection involved, and whether in the particular case of motion there might not be a more intimate relationship between the transcendental conditions and the empirical concept than one might at first suspect.Indeed, this is a possibility that has been entertained by a number of commentators. In his investigation of Kant's metaphysics of nature, Lothar Schäfer, for example, contends that "the original perspective on the unity of the sensibility in which nature reveals itself, and which belongs to the conception of nature, results in the original perspective on motion. Therefore, the laws of nature are laws of motion …." 3 Similarly, in her book on Kant's theory of natural science, Karen Gloy argues thatin the predicable 'motion' the connection of elements of the understanding with... (shrink)

Ziel dieser Studie ist es, ein umfassendes Bild des Denkens Moses Mendelssohns zu zeichnen.

: Complex aesthetic perception, according to Mendelssohn’s writings between 1755 and 1771, is most alluring if it showcases a breach in the order of perfection. With this, Mendelssohn introduces a shift in our understanding of the artistic act of imitation: Artistic semblance is always lacking, and a painting that does not point to this fact is, in fact, displeasing. This is also the main reason why we enjoy non-beautiful art: in the artistic rendering of an unpleasant ‘object’ we focus on (...) the artistic act itself, on its formal features, and its effects on us as the perceiver. Thus, a representation that evokes the mixed feelings of pleasure, appreciation, and rejection is superior to ‘pure’ beauty, in that it better refers us to higher forms of perfection: the perfection of the perceiving and creative subject. It is the nagging, near-painful impression of mixed sentiments that, according to Mendelssohn, guides our self-perfection, the highest aim of all human endeavors. (shrink)

Who would hold that history is a dialogue? It sounds somewhat striking to concentrate on the second-person perspective in Cassirer’s account of history, since it is obviously true that the past may somewhat “speak to us”, but that it cannot “speak with us” in a truly dialogical sense. What is here and now contrasts with what is stored away in the past, as two different levels of fluidity. Symbols, as the expressions of past consciousness, are no longer in flux as (...) the present ones are, but need to be actively reconstructed, or revivified by the historian. With Cassirer’s dynamic view on symbolic forms, however, this reconstruction can be understood as a movement from both sides, from the past and from the present. (shrink)

Against the standard interpretation of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and (...) thus he shifts the focus from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments. Section 1 of this paper clarifies the pre-Kantian role of the concept of perfection and examines Kant's critical response to that concept. Section 2 identifies Kant's point of departure from the Cartesian ‘way of ideas.’ Section 3 explains the key problem of his novel account of epistemic normativity. I conclude that Kant's anti-perfectionism must be seen as the driving force behind his ‘Copernican revolution’ in order to fully appreciate his mature account of epistemic normativity. (shrink)

I draw attention to a 12-page Vorarbeit to Kant’s Prolegomena from the so-called Scheffner-Nachlaß and argue that the parallel Kant draws there between the possibility of theoretical and practical synthetic a priori propositions provides important insight into the development of his account of practical autonomy in the Groundwork. Based on a brief sketch of the role synthetic a priori propositions play in the development of Kant’s critical philosophy, I conclude that for Kant the objective validity of any science depends on (...) the objective validity of a number of synthetic a priori propositions. (shrink)

Bettina Brentano-von Arnim (1785–1859) is one of the most fascinating writers of German Romanticism. After a late, but spectacular start to her career as an author with the biographically inspired Goethe's Correspondence with a Child (1835) that boldly claims the legacy of Germany's most admired poet, Bettina continues to explore the realm of biography, but also widens her perspective to the pressing social questions of her time. Her message is entertaining, yet clear: we need a new way of thinking that (...) engages the whole human being who understands and accepts her rational as well as sensible side, who is situated in a society and engages in dialogue with others. Accordingly, her work is an apt example of the practice of symphilosophy in late German Romanticism. This paper will concentrate on the notion of self-formation through dialogue in her letter books, and the political-aesthetic idea of a ‘king for the people’ that guided Brentano-von Arnim's political engagement in the 1840s. (shrink)

Main description: Handlungsgründe besitzen unterschiedliche Formen und Reichweiten der Verbindlichkeit. Die vorliegende Untersuchung entwickelt formale Kriterien sowohl der Rationalität als auch der Vernünftigkeit, also der intra- und der interpersonellen Kohärenz praktischer Überlegungen. Der Autor bezieht sich auf anglophon-analytische wie auf kontinental-historische Debatten zum Handlungsbegriff und gelangt damit zu einer nicht-naturalistischen Antwort auf die Frage nach den Standards des Gelingens von Begründungen und Rechtfertigungen unserer Handlungen.

In his essay On the necessary limits in the use of beautiful forms Schiller delineates to what degree beautiful packaging of philosophical thoughts is beneficial, as opposed to cases where it merely masks an inconsistent position—defending his philosophical style in contrast to Fichte’s, therewith taking another step in the Horenstreit. This paper shows how Schiller justifies the seeming paradox why his Aesthetic Education is not as nicely written as one might expect from a poet, and why his insistence on a (...) full development of our sensible and imaginative capacities is not tantamount to a call for replacing textbooks with novels. Our capacity to coordinate reason and sensibility finds its limits in women, who are deemed unable to reason sufficiently and are forced to resort to beautiful form alone. Schiller relegates learned women to the sidelines of literary discussion, setting the tone for German academia. (shrink)

Welchen Standards müssen Personen genügen, damit ihre Äußerungen als wahrhaftig angesehen werden? Nicht Wahrhaftigkeit als soziale Tugend und auch nicht Wahrhaftigkeit als notwendige Argumentationsvoraussetzung , sondern die normativen Voraussetzungen wahrhaftiger Äußerungen von Überzeugungen, Werten, Wünschen und Gefühlen einer Person, d. h. eine Analyse der normativen Erfordernisse der Wahrhaftigkeit als Teilaspekt einer Sprachpragmatik, sind das Thema dieses Aufsatzes. Ausgehend von Überlegungen Wittgensteins, John Broomes und Robert Brandoms untersuche ich die normative Feinstruktur der Differenz zwischen dem 'Äußern' und dem 'Besitzen' eines propositionalen (...) Gehalts sowie der Vorsätzlichkeit dieser Differenz im 'Äußern'. Mein Ergebnis ist schließlich: Person B glaubt, daß die Äußerung des propositionalen Gehalts p durch Person A wahrhaftig ist, wenn die Person B der Person A die Festlegung auf p zuweist, die Person B der Person A eine Berechtigung zu p zuweist und die Person B der Person A die Festlegung auf eine Berechtigung zu p zuweist. (shrink)

This paper considers Mendelssohn’s attempt at a definition of Enlightenment in terms of Bildung, comprising the theoretical element of the enlightenment of reason with the practical requirements of culture. To avoid a possible dialectics of enlightenment, where the very methods one uses to enlighten harbour the seeds of new blindness, Mendelssohn advocates considering the lively connections between people, the role of traditions and personal relations in the formation of an individual self, and the connections we should have to our past, (...) present, and future. Thus, his essay from 1784 can be read as an apt defence of a dialogical notion of freedom within the Enlightenment era. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant und das Problem des metaphysischen Idealismusby Dietmar H. HeidemannKonstantin PollokDietmar H. Heidemann. Kant und das Problem des metaphysischen Idealismus. Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 131, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998. Pp. 268. Cloth, DM 158.00.Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy was controversial from the very beginning. His refutations of idealism played an important part in these debates. Dietmar H. Heidemann’s book on the problem of idealism is an attempt to (...) evaluate Kant’s arguments against metaphysical idealism. Yet Heidemann never takes a position on whether Kant eventually succeeded or failed in refuting idealism. On the one hand, he thinks it is possible “to consider the proof of the existence of the external world as ultimately unsatisfactory” (238). On the other hand he ambiguously talks of Kant’s “solution of the problem of metaphysical idealism, which is, though not satisfactory in all parts, still quite convincing and even plausible” (238). This indecisiveness constitutes a fundamental shortcoming in an otherwise interesting discussion of a central Kantian problem. The book is distinguished by its close reading of the relevant Kantian texts between 1781 and 1800 and its scrupulous rendering of the respective steps of Kant’s argumentation.Heidemann’s well written investigation consists of an introduction, dealing with the pre-Kantian discussion of that problem, followed by three chapters that present Kant’s criticism of “metaphysical idealism” (3). The author lumps together the theories of Descartes’s ‘skeptical’ or ‘problematic’ idealism and Berkeley’s ‘dogmatic’ idealism with this non-Kantian term. The three chapters correspond to different chronological stages in Kant’s attempts at refuting idealism. First, Heidemann analyzes the structure of the Fourth Paralogism of the Critique of Pure Reason, which was directed against Descartes. This argument was intended to prove that our knowledge of the external world is [End Page 175]immediate. Kant appeals to a radical difference between transcendental and empirical idealism on the one hand and transcendental and empirical realism on the other, and he claims that doubts about the external world that are based on discursive argumentscan be dismissed as illegitimate in principle. Heidemann criticizes Kant’s argumentation. In particular, he thinks that the immediacy of our perceptions alone cannot prove the necessity of outer objects, which could instead be imaginations of immediate objects.In the second chapter, which is unquestionably the center of Heidemann’s study, he analyzes the Refutation of Idealismin the second edition of the Critique. Beginning from its external occasion—the ‘Göttingen review’ by Garve, edited by Feder— Heidemann tries to show that Kant’s refutation of idealism is compelling. He sees Kant’s arguments as implicitly or explicitly informed by the postulate of actuality and the consciousness of one’s existence in time. It is this consciousness that makes necessary the presupposition of something permanent in intuition and thus of substance as matter. In supporting Kant’s sometimes elliptical argumentation with other passages from the Critique, Heidemann tries to improve on Kant’s text. Yet, he is doubtful as to whether the argument succeeds. He thinks that the refutation of idealism would remain insufficient, unless the “theory of self-affection ( Selbstaffektion)” (127), added in 1787, is taken into consideration. In other words, the refutation depends on Kant’s revision of the relationship between the inner and the outer sense in the B-Deduction.The third chapter examines Kant’s occupation with the refutation of idealism after 1787. Heidemann finds that Kant continues to be preoccupied with this subject because of Eberhard’s articles in his Philosophisches Magazin, G. E. Schulze’s Aenesidemus, and D. Tiedemann’s Theaetet. Using Kant’s Reflexionsbetween 1788 and 1800, Heidemann argues that Kant’s new approach is characterised mainly by a decreasing importance of the permanent in the determination of time and a new emphasis of the coexistence argument. But this is questionable for Kant relies on the synthetic connection between the categories of coexistence and substance in the Critique. Heidemann pays a great deal of attention to Kant’s Reflexion “On inner sense” because of its explicit consideration of the relationship between the inner and the outer sense. Heidemann views this passage as “Kant’s... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Synthetische Reflexion. Zur Stellung einer nach Kategorien reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kants theoretischer PhilosophieKonstantin PollokManfred Kugelstadt. Synthetische Reflexion. Zur Stellung einer nach Kategorien reflektierenden Urteilskraft in Kants theoretischer Philosophie. Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 132. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gravier, 1998. Pp. 341. Cloth, DM 190.00.Zunächst etwas scheinbar Äußerliches: Die "Dunkelheit" einer philosophischen Darstellung ist dann zu entschuldigen, wenn zumindest "das Princip richtig angegeben worden" ist. So sieht es Kant (nicht (...) nur) in der Kritik der Urteilskraft. In Manfred Kugelstadts Buch Synthetische Reflexion liest man Ähnliches: "Werden dann schließlich auch, in den beiden Anhängen, ganz erhebliche Dunkelheiten im einzelnen bleiben, so sollte dies doch kein Einwand sein, wenn nur hinreichend deutlich gemacht werden kann, daß wir auch da den Grundgedanken richtig angegeben haben." (14) Eine Probe solcher Dunkelheit liefert Kugelstadt jedoch schon zu Beginn: "So werden auch gleich im folgenden die in diesem Abschnitt B. wohlgemerkt auch bereits thematische, an sich immer nur zusätzliche analytische Reflexion und Subsumtion, bzw. uneigentliche 'Determination', der reflektierenden Urteilskraft nach analytischer Bewußtseinseinheit und jene gerade erwähnte synthetische Reflexion und wirkliche Determination qua Subsumtion der bestimmenden Urteilskraft nach objektiv synthetischer Einheit noch nicht immer hinreichend deutlich unterschieden und auseinandergehalten. - Man muß diese Bemerkungen und nachträglichen Korrekturen noch eine Zeitlang in Gedanken behalten. Denn diese Unstimmigkeiten, die sich uns erst spät geklärt haben und an denen Kant selbst durchaus ein gut Teil Schuld trägt, finden sich an einigen wenigen verstreuten Stellen wiederholt noch ein ganzes Stück in den Hauptteil dieser Arbeit hinein.)" (4f.) Die Unstimmigkeiten - Kugelstadt spricht in bezug auf seinen eigenen Text auch vom "erneut Unlogischen der Gedankenführung" (7) - Kant anzulasten ist eine fragwürdige Sache. Noch fragwürdiger ist jedoch, daß ein Text, dessen Unstimmigkeit nicht erst die Rezensenten bemerken, sondern bereits der Autor selbst mehrfach hervorhebt, überhaupt in dieser Form publiziert wird.Doch worum geht es dem Text? Schon die Antwort darauf ist nicht einfach, denn der Text enthält keine Exposition des Themas und keine Erläuterung der These bzw. [End Page 128] deren Konsequenzen. Dabei ist das Thema der bestimmenden bzw. reflektierenden Urteilskraft für das Verständnis von Kants Kritischem System von zentraler Bedeutung und aufgrund der weitreichenden Konsequenzen für seine Erkenntnistheorie, seine Ästhetik und seine Naturphilosophie auch einer Erklärung wert. Stattdessen beginnt Kugelstadt unmittelbar mit einem Kant-Referat. Er ist dabei bestrebt, die Kantische Differenzierung von bestimmender und reflektierender Urteilskraft (KdU: AA V 179) zu erläutern. Kugelstadt vertritt die These, daß die reflektierende Urteilskraft nach Kant ausschließlich reflektierend (und nicht bestimmend) ist, daß aber die bestimmende Urteilskraft nach Kant auch reflektierend ist. Diese These hat natürlich prima facie wenig textliche Evidenz für sich, denn Kant schreibt in unmittelbarem Anschluß an die genannte Differenzierung: "Die bestimmende Urtheilskraft unter allgemeinen transscendentalen Gesetzen, die der Verstand giebt, ist nur subsumirend", wodurch ein Gegensatz zur reflektierenden Urteilskraft bezeichnet ist. Es muß also um einen anderen Sinn von 'reflektierend' gehen. Die Reflexion der bestimmenden Urteilskraft sieht Kugelstadt in einer synthetischen Vergleichung der empirischen Anschauungen bzw. bloß empirischer Begriffe untereinander und mit den Kategorien. Dahingegen gehe es der bloß reflektierenden Urteilskraft um eine Klassifizierung der bereits erkannten Gegenstände gemäß einem zu suchenden Gesetz. Diese bloß reflektierende Urteilskraft, die "nicht das allergeringste (!)" (4) zu tun hat mit der auch reflektierenden Urteilskraft, interessiert in der Abhandlung nicht weiter. Stattdessen wird die Reflexion der bestimmenden Urteilskraft zu einer Rehabilitierung des Sinnlichen verwendet: nicht nur die Kategorie bestimmt das sinnliche Material, wodurch ein Erfahrungsbegriff entstehen kann, sondern auch umgekehrt wird die Kategorie durch das Materiale bestimmt. Diese letztere Bestimmung ist nach Kugelstadt eine Reflexion der bestimmenden Urteilskraft. Abgesehen von textlichen Problemen - das Opus postumum wird zur Interpretation der KrV herangezogen (vgl. z. B. 54ff.) - verlieren bei diesen Bestimmungen die Begriffe der Bestimmung und der Reflexion selbst ihre Bestimmtheit. Denn daß die Kategorien erst durch Anschauungen ihre objektive Realität erhalten, kann man bei Kant wohl lesen (z. B. KrV B 288). Dies jedoch Reflexion zu nennen trägt nichts zum Verständnis jenes Bezugs bei. Denn Reflexion - selbst die "transzendentale Reflexion" (KrV A 261) - ist in der Kantischen Konzeption etwas diesem Prozeß Nachträgliches. Und damit... (shrink)

For philosophers of German idealism and early German Romanticism, the imagination is central to issues ranging from hermeneutics to transcendental logic and from ethics to aesthetics. This volume of new essays brings together, for the first time, comprehensive and critical reflections on the significances of the imagination during this period, with essays on Kant and the imagination, the imagination in post-Kantian German idealism, and the imagination in early German romanticism. The essays explore the many and varied uses of the imagination (...) and discuss whether they form a coherent or shared notion or whether they embody points of philosophical divergence within these traditions. They shed new light on one of the most important and enigmatic aspects of human nature, as understood in the context of a profoundly influential era of western thought. (shrink)

I. Kant hat mit seiner universalistischen, formalistischen und kognitivistischen Konzeption moralisch-praktischer Gründe in Gegenüberstellung zu seiner instrumentalistischen Konzeption nicht-moralisch-praktischer Gründe eine Begrifflichkeit geschaffen, die es erlaubt, handlungsleitende Überzeugungen hinsichtlich ihres Geltungsanspruchs und ihrer Verbindlichkeit zu differenzieren. Von einem ‚Sollen‘ spricht Kant in beiden Fällen. Nicht nur der kategorische Imperativ, der unbedingt gebietet, „ich soll niemals anders verfahren als so, daß ich auch wollen könne, meine Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden“ (GMS, AA 04: 402), sondern auch hypothetische Imperative, die bedingt (...) gebieten, „ich soll etwas thun, darum weil ich etwas anderes will“, nehmen bei Kant die normative Form eines ‚Sollens‘ an. In beiden Fällen ergehen also Forderungen an die Vernunft, doch es ist alles andere als klar, in welcher Beziehung diese Sollensformen zueinander stehen. Bestünde gar keine solche Beziehung, so träte praktische Vernunft im Plural auf – wohlgemerkt in einer einzigen Person, welcher sich der Sinn beider Imperativformen erschlossen hat. Da eine solche Form von Schizophrenie der Willensbestimmung nicht der Kantischen Vorstellung von praktischer Vernunft entspricht, stellt sich die Frage nach der Einheit von bedingtem und unbedingtem Sollen. (shrink)

I. Kant hat mit seiner universalistischen, formalistischen und kognitivistischen Konzeption moralisch-praktischer Gründe in Gegenüberstellung zu seiner instrumentalistischen Konzeption nicht-moralisch-praktischer Gründe eine Begrifflichkeit geschaffen, die es erlaubt, handlungsleitende Überzeugungen hinsichtlich ihres Geltungsanspruchs und ihrer Verbindlichkeit zu differenzieren. Von einem ‚Sollen‘ spricht Kant in beiden Fällen. Nicht nur der kategorische Imperativ, der unbedingt gebietet, „ich soll niemals anders verfahren als so, daß ich auch wollen könne, meine Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden“ , sondern auch hypothetische Imperative, die bedingt gebieten, „ich soll (...) etwas thun, darum weil ich etwas anderes will“, nehmen bei Kant die normative Form eines ‚Sollens‘ an. In beiden Fällen ergehen also Forderungen an die Vernunft, doch es ist alles andere als klar, in welcher Beziehung diese Sollensformen zueinander stehen. Bestünde gar keine solche Beziehung, so träte praktische Vernunft im Plural auf – wohlgemerkt in einer einzigen Person, welcher sich der Sinn beider Imperativformen erschlossen hat. Da eine solche Form von Schizophrenie der Willensbestimmung nicht der Kantischen Vorstellung von praktischer Vernunft entspricht, stellt sich die Frage nach der Einheit von bedingtem und unbedingtem Sollen. (shrink)