Se describe, desde una perspectiva histórica, el proceso institucional y legal de los estudios generales en Perú en el último siglo, tomado en cuenta sus contextos políticos e intelectuales. También se reflexiona sobre la dimensión humanista de los estudios generales y la razón de ser de la educación universitaria.

Negli ultimi anni le ricerche sulla civiltà rupestre del Mezzogiorno medioevale, in seguito agli studi innovativi di Cosimo Damiano Fonseca, hanno condotto alla rivisitazione, attraverso approcci nuovi e con l'ausilio di strumenti sofisticati, di questo fenomeno nelle sue varie sfaccettature. Se, a partire soprattutto dalla fine dell'800, gli studiosi avevano rivolto i loro interessi in specie alle cappelle rupestri e alla loro decorazione pittorica, ovvero all'aspetto, in apparenza il più eclatante, dell'abitato rupestre, di recente l'attenzione si è focalizzata intorno allo (...) studio del paesaggio rupestre stesso e ai suoi valori, inteso come modello insediativo non certamente alternativo, né inferiore, a quello urbano, bensì come elemento specifico all'interno della complessa realtà dell'insediamento umano delle regioni meridionali e della Sicilia tra Tarda Antichità e Medioevo. (shrink)

Reseña de “La trama invisible de lo útil – Reflexiones sobre conocimiento, poder y educación“ de Ricardo L. Falla Carillo.

Este artículo explora algunas de las relaciones entre dialéctica y filosofía dentro del programa de una dialéctica modificada de Theodor W. Adorno ¿Cómo pensar la tensión entre las categorías dialécticas y la filosofía desde el prisma de una dialéctica negativa? ¿Qué significa desde el pensamiento de Adorno a liberar a la filosofía y a la dialéctica de su carácter afirmativo? Elaborar estas preguntas es el objetivo de este trabajo.

This article addresses the relationships between dialectic and learning within the constellations of the conceptual universes of Adorno and Vygotsky. In that order, we proceed to analyze the set of links between the main dialectical categories that structure the dialectical approach that characterizes both representatives of the Marxist thought tradition (process, totality, mediation, fields of force, antagonism, praxis) and the communicating vessels that go from epistemology to aesthetics and that demonstrate the relevance of the tasks of thought in the face (...) of social transformation. Finally, the article addresses the question of an (im)possible analytical horizon that arises, from both thinkers, to emphatically think about social emancipation and its challenges today. (shrink)

Asumimos el problema de la singularidad como categoría filosófica aplicado en las principales variables metafísicas de Platón; primero en su expresión trascendentista, que supone la lectura de las Formas eternas como entidades singulares: luego, en su redimensión en el llamado período crítico, donde se presenta nuestro concepto de manera negativa, como un propiciador de aporías: y, finalmente, en una suerte de lugar intermedio, constituido sobre todo a partir de la ambigua posición de las obras finales del pensador, que sustentan tanto (...) la identidad absoluta de lo metafísica cuanto su traslado a las entidades determinadas. Nuestra idea básica es que la singularidad constituye uno de los aspectos más completos y ricos en posibilidades de la teoría platónica de las Formas, al punto de justificar una evolución de la doctrina, sea desde el punto de vista de su expresión, o desde lo más hondo de su pensamiento. (shrink)

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

Este ensayo no es una interpretación metafísica del universo, sino de una interpretación científica, en donde la física contemporánea aparece como un sistema evolutivo y el universo como un sistema en expansión. Se pretende simplemente �averiguar si la imagen del universo físico que se forma la ciencia actual reclama o conduce a admitir la existencia de una realidad propia en y por sí misma, distinta realmente del universo y sin la cuál éste no podría existir ni ser lo que es�(A. (...) González). (shrink)

Dialogue between the Greeks and the contemporary way of thought.

In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, leading figures in the fields of virtue ethics and ethics come together to present the first ...

La noción de tiempo y la idea de historia que surgieron después de la revolución científica y de la ilustración, fueron claramente secularizadas. Consideramos, de forma conjetural y exploratoria, que estas concepciones de tiempo y de historia, en su desarrollo y evolución final, ha tenido efectos sobre la formulación de una posible condición transhumana de nuestra especie.

This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property that does the work in explaining the (...) possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections. (shrink)

Two problems are considered here. One relates to who has moral status, and the other relates to who has moral responsibility. The criteria for mattering morally have long been disputed, and many humans and nonhuman animals have been considered “marginal cases,” on the contested edges of moral considerability and concern. The marginalization of humans and other species is frequently the pretext for denying their rights, including the rights to health care, to reproductive freedom, and to bodily autonomy. There is broad (...) agreement across cultural and philosophical traditions about the capacities and responsibilities of moral agents. I propose an inclusive and expansive way of thinking about moral status, situating it not in the characteristics or capacities of individuals, but in the responsibilities and obligations of moral agents. Moral agents, under this view, are not privileged or entitled to special treatment but rather have responsibilities. I approach this by considering some African communitarian conceptions of moral status and moral agency. I propose that moral agency can also be more expansive and include not just individual moral agents but collective entities that have some of the traits of moral agents: power, freedom, and the capacity to recognize and act on the demands of morality and acknowledge and respect the rights of others. Expanding who and what is a moral agent correspondingly extends moral responsibility for respecting rights and fostering the conditions for the health and well-being of humans and animals onto the collective entities who uniquely have the capacity to attend to global-scale health threats such as pandemics and human-caused climate change. (shrink)

Our interpretive resources enable us to make sense of, navigate, and communicate about our shared world. These resources not only carve the world up into categories, but also guide how we, individually and collectively, are oriented towards it. In this thesis, I examine how these resources, and the dispositions they guide, may be harmful. A vital kind of interpretive resources are frames, which equip us with unified perspectives on the world. Perspectives are suites of open-ended interpretive (inquisitive, attentional, inferential, evaluative, (...) and affective) dispositions. Frames thereby guide how we interpret, respond to, and navigate the world. I show that these perspectives are epistemically powerful and indispensable. I argue that flawed perspectives, and the distorting frames that produce them, are deeply pernicious and I examine their relationship to oppression. (shrink)

This chapter presents an opinionated account of how to understand the contributions of experience, especially with respect to the role of cognitive science, in developing and assessing metaphysical theories of reality. I develop a methodological basis for the idea that, independently of work in experimental philosophy focused on explications of concepts, contemporary metaphysical theories with a role for experiential evidence can be fruitfully connected to empirical work in psychology, especially cognitive science. My argument is not that cognitive science should replace (...) the metaphysician’s use of a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality. Rather, we should enrich our perspective on a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality by drawing on any relevant work in cognitive science. (shrink)